EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

TITLE: LEE, STUART, AND THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN: VALUABLE LESSONS FOR LIGHT ARMORED INFANTRY DOCTRINE

THESIS: An examination of the employment of Confederate cavalry during the Gettysburg Campaign provides valuable lessons learned for the development of Light Armored Infantry doctrine.

ISSUE: During the early 1980's, the Marine Corps procured the Light Armored Vehicle, a highly mobile, versatile ground vehicle with eight different variants. The vehicle was the first of its kind to be fielded by the Corps. Many Marines initially questioned the need or utility for a vehicle that appeared best suited for the U.S. Army cavalry units and their Air-Land Battle doctrine. Indeed, over the past seven years, those responsible for writing Marine Corps doctrine have wrestled with the questions regarding the proper employment of the Light Armored Infantry battalions. A breakthrough of sorts occurred with the 1989 publication of FMFM 1, Warfighting. This manual set forth the Commandant of the Marine Corps' philosophy on warfighting—maneuver warfare. The Light Armored Vehicle's physical characteristics and its complement of mission role variants appear particularly well suited for operating under just such a philosophy. Unfortunately, many Marines are still having a difficulty in understanding the concepts of maneuver warfare as defined in the manual and, consequently, encountering difficulty in the correlation of Light Armored Infantry (LAI) employment and this philosophy of warfare by maneuver. A solution to this problem lies in the study of military history, specifically, an examination of the employment of Confederate cavalry during the Gettysburg Campaign of the Civil War.

CONCLUSION: An examination of the employment of Confederate cavalry provides some excellent historical lessons regarding the application of cavalry tactics with maneuver warfare concepts. Unfortunately, some of the more valuable lessons learned come at the expense of Generals R. E. Lee and J.E.B. Stuart. However, the tough lessons learned from the employment of Confederate cavalry during the Gettysburg Campaign does not diminish the value of studying military history. Rather, the study of history will likely stimulate some thoughtful discussions and insights regarding the proper employment of the Light Armored Infantry—the Marine Corps' modern day cavalry.
THESIS STATEMENT: An examination of the employment of Confederate cavalry during the Gettysburg Campaign provides valuable lessons learned for the development of Light Armored Infantry doctrine.

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In 1983, the U. S. Marine Corps formed its first of four Light Armored Vehicle (LAV) battalions (later renamed Light Armored Infantry (LAI) battalions) for the purpose of providing the Corps with a highly mobile, multi-mission-capable force similar to the U. S. Army's armored cavalry units. The LAI battalion was the first of its kind to be fielded by the Marine Corps. Many Marines were initially skeptical of the vehicle's utility to the Corps' primary mission of amphibious warfare. Employment questions were raised about a vehicle which appeared best suited for the U. S. Army's Air-Land Battle doctrine.

These questions went largely unanswered until the publication of FMFM 1 Warfighting in 1989. FMFM 1 contains the
Commandant of the Marine Corps' philosophy of warfighting. The manual formally introduced the concept of maneuver warfare as the warfighting doctrine for the Marine Corps.

Maneuver warfare is a philosophy that seeks to shatter the enemy's cohesion through a series of rapid, violent, and unexpected actions which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which he cannot cope.

The warfighting manual states that to attack an enemy from a position of advantage rather than to meet it head on is the essence of warfare by maneuver. Speed and surprise are, therefore, two of the essential elements of maneuver warfare. To gain and maintain the elements of speed and surprise, a commander must be capable of seeing and shaping the battlefield to his advantage. The LAI battalion provides the Corps with an excellent tool to help Marine commanders see and shape future battlefields.

While it took the Corps almost six years to correlate the procurement of the LAI vehicle with a new concept of warfighting, the Fleet Marine Corps still awaits the publication of a FMFM regarding LAI employment. The deployment of over two-thirds of the Corps' LAI assets to the Persian Gulf will undoubtedly assist those responsible for writing doctrine with current operational experiences upon which to formulate concepts of employment. On the other hand, the concepts of maneuver warfare and employment of cavalry assets is not entirely new. History provides useful illustrations of various concepts of cavalry employment. In fact, a study of Confederate cavalry forces during the Gettysburg Campaign provides valuable lessons learned regarding the development of LAI doctrine and its correlation with maneuver
warfare. Interestingly, the most valuable lessons learned from studying this campaign are those obtained at the expense of Confederate General Robert E. Lee and his cavalry chief, General J.E.B. Stuart. An analysis of the actions of these two commanders during the Gettysburg Campaign provides an historical example for understanding the correlation between maneuver warfare and the employment of the Light Armored Infantry battalions.

CAVALRY EMPLOYMENT PRIOR TO JUNE 1863

Before examining the Confederate cavalry employment during the Gettysburg Campaign, this paper briefly examines the cavalry employment prior to 1863. When the Civil War began, the Confederate cavalry performed many of the same types of missions (reconnaissance, screening, delaying actions) that their American Revolutionary forebearers and European counterparts of the Napoleonic era developed before them. However, the Confederate cavalry soon developed their own operations and tactics designed to capitalize on the Confederate cavalry's strengths (leadership, esprit de corps, operations on friendly soil) and exploit the Union army's weaknesses (long lines of communication, extended supply lines, ineffective leadership prior to 1863). The Confederate cavalry was employed on missions designed to gain the advantage of strategic, operational, and tactical surprise in order to keep the Union armies off-balance and incapable of massing its overwhelming combat power.

Confederate cavalry was usually employed in the strategic and operational missions of screening, reconnaissance, and raiding. The cavalry typically had an operational rather than
tactical relation to the rest of the army. By screening in advance of the army, the cavalry prevented the enemy from learning of the Confederate army's movements. At the same time, it was important for the cavalry to be positioned to observe and report the movement of the Union armies. The screening missions (known then as outpost duty) were assigned to cavalry units because of the mobility, daring, and leadership required of these independent actions.

Prior to the Civil War, the use of cavalry for long range raids was considered a risky operation and seldom practiced in the United States or Europe. Raids were indeed risky, but very skillfully utilized by the Confederates to keep the Union armies off-balance. Raids were conducted to interdict Union lines of communication, destroy enemy supply depots, and threaten the capture or destruction of major Union cities including Washington, D.C. Not only would a successful raid disrupt the enemy's railroads and telegraph system, but would provide valuable intelligence to the commander. General Lee took full advantage of this development.

Between June 1862 and March 1863, Lee ordered his cavalry to conduct several daring, highly successful raids behind enemy lines. The Chickahominy, Catlett Station, Chambersburg, and Burkes Station raids along with the equally valuable screening operations during the Second Manassas Campaign and the battle of Antietam were instrumental to the Confederate army's success prior to the Gettysburg Campaign. With each successful venture, Lee became convinced that J.E.B. Stuart's military judgment was
equal to his bravery, audacity, and skill. Lee's confidence in Stuart was evidenced not only by the missions he assigned to Stuart, but also in the increasing discretionary nature of his orders to his cavalry chief. Lee believed he could rely on Stuart, and certainly Stuart's performance prior to June 1863 justified that belief. The Gettysburg Campaign would later raise doubts about the judgment of both men, doubts which have sparked scores of debates and books on the subject over the past one hundred and twenty-eight years.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES - R. E. LEE AND J. E. B. STUART

Any analysis of the Confederate cavalry employment during the Gettysburg Campaign should include a biographical sketch of the key leaders involved since the success or failure of the armies hinged in large measure on the skill, bravery, and judgment of those leaders. Accordingly, this paper examines the personality and character of R. E. Lee and J. E. B. Stuart to gain a better insight on the reasons for their actions during the Campaign.

In 1861, Robert E. Lee was a colonel in the U.S. Army, a career soldier who had served with distinction in the Mexican War. When the Civil War began, Lee was offered command of the Union army, which he reluctantly turned down in order to serve with the Confederate forces in his home state of Virginia.

Initially, he served as the chief military advisor to Confederate President Jefferson Davis and only reluctantly took command of the Army of Northern Virginia in 1862 when the Union army arrived on the outskirts of the Confederate capital in Richmond, Virginia. For the next year, Lee skillfully maneuvered his
outnumbered forces to numerous victories over his Union counterparts. Lee abandoned the strategic and tactical defensive strategy employed by the Confederate Army and, instead, launched several operational and tactical offensive actions in order to seize the initiative and carry the war to the Union. Lee hoped that his tactical successes would earn a strategic payoff of European diplomatic recognition for the Confederacy and, indeed, possibly military and economic support for the South.

To seize and maintain the initiative against the enemy, Lee sought to achieve operational and tactical surprise at every turn. Lee and the Confederacy needed leaders who were bold, aggressive and who thrived on independent command and the flexibility inherent in mission orders. Lee found those attributes in several of his commanders, none as famous or more successful as Generals Stonewall Jackson and J.E.B. Stuart. Lee's strategic and operational genius was forged through the operational and tactical expertise of Jackson and Stuart. Lee was so confident in their abilities that he frequently issued orders to both giving them the maximum latitude and flexibility in accomplishing the desired outcome.

When Jackson was killed during the Chancellorsville battle, Lee was heartbroken and commented that he had just lost his right arm. Meanwhile, Stuart took command of Jackson's infantry corps when he was wounded in battle--another indication of Lee's faith and confidence in him. Later, Lee would issue Stuart discretionary orders during the Gettysburg Campaign which would directly result in Lee's inability to see and shape the battle in Pennsylvania.
Major General James Ewell Brown (or J.E.B.) Stuart personified the Confederate cavalry leader, a descendant of the 17th century English cavalier projected into another century. Although rather young, (30 in 1863), he enjoyed a meteoric rise to success (captain to brigadier general in fifteen months.)

Stuart cut a youthful and physically imposing figure and inspired great loyalty and spirit from his men. He loved a good time and displayed a fondness for pretty women. He constantly sought praise and recognition, a trait which would cause him problems throughout his career. There were few people with a neutral opinion of Stuart: fellow officers either liked him intensely or hated him with equal fervor.

Stuart's early military training came at West Point, where he scored above average academically, but finished near the bottom of his class in conduct with 128 demerits. After graduation, he served with the U.S. cavalry on the frontier where he fought the Indians. A loyal Virginian, Stuart immediately joined the Confederate Army upon the outbreak of the Civil War.

A fierce fighter, Stuart possessed great courage, endurance, and physical strength. As the years progressed, Stuart became known for his skills in gathering information about the enemy. These intelligence capabilities made him indispensable to Lee, for the cavalry served as the eyes and ears of Lee's army.

A bold planner, Stuart became very good at improvising when his original plan could not be implemented. He became known as an aggressive, resourceful and enterprising officer. Stuart's motto was: "If we oppose force with force, we cannot win for
their numbers are greater than ours. We must substitute esprit for numbers. Therefore, I strive to inculcate in my men the spirit of the chase."7

EMPLOYMENT OF CONFEDERATE CAVALRY DURING GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN

To simplify this examination of cavalry employment during the Gettysburg Campaign, this paper will divide the campaign into three phases. Phase I (5-24 June 1863) will examine the cavalry battle at Brandy Station and the screening operations conducted south of the Potomac River. Phase II (25 June-2 July 1863) includes a detailed examination of Stuart's raid in Maryland and a brief discussion of Lee's employment of his remaining cavalry assets. Phase III (3-13 July 1863) discusses the only major cavalry battle at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania on 3 July and the screening operations conducted during the Confederate army's retrograde to Virginia. The map at Tab A is provided for the reader's orientation.

PHASE I (5-24 JUNE 1863)

On 5 June 1863, J.E.B. Stuart conducted a grand review of his five cavalry brigades at Brandy Station, Virginia. Local citizens throughout the area were invited to observe the parade. The pass-in-review culminated in a mock cavalry charge causing men to cheer and ladies to faint due to the excitement of it all. 8

General Lee did not attend because he was involved in some important logistical matters in connection with the forthcoming invasion of the North. He instructed Stuart to prepare another review on the 8th of June so he might ascertain the condition of his cavalry. The second review did not contain all of the
fanfare of the previous parade. Upon its conclusion, Stuart's men retired to their bivouac areas to prepare for the invasion. However, Union cavalry under General Pleasonton spoiled their plans for a day of rest. While the Confederate cavalry was busy preparing for parades, Pleasonton's force crossed the Rappahannock River undetected and surprised the Confederates at Brandy Station. The resulting battle, the largest pure cavalry battle ever fought by Americans (nearly twenty thousand men), was a fierce struggle lasting throughout the day. The battle's outcome could best be described as a draw. However, the significance of Brandy Station is not reflected in the casualty figures of the battle.

Immediately after the engagement, many Southern newspapers criticized Stuart for his lack of vigilance and self-aggrandizement. Stuart was outraged by these allegations and felt challenged to take revenge against the Union army.

The following day, 10 June, the Confederate Army began its movement northwest through the Shenandoah Valley to invade the North. From 10-24 June, the Confederate cavalry conducted standard missions of screening, reconnaissance, and counter-reconnaissance in support of the army's movements to the north. Stuart positioned his forces in the Aldie and Thoroughfare Gaps, two key passes through the Bull Run Mountains. Repeated attempts by Union cavalry to break through the cavalry screen and locate the Confederate Army were skillfully thwarted by Stuart's cavalry units.

On the 21st of June, Stuart met with General Lee and proposed a daring plan to ride around the rear of the Union Army,
thereby threatening the Union capital and the Union Army's lines of communication. In his report after the campaign, Stuart wrote:

I submitted to the commanding general a plan of leaving a brigade or so in my present front, and passing through Hopewell or some other gap in Bull Run Mountains, attain the enemy's rear, passing between his main body and Washington, and cross into Maryland, joining our army north of the Potomac. 10

Lee sent two letters to Stuart in response to Stuart's proposal. The first one, dated 22 June, was forwarded to Stuart from General Longstreet, who attached a letter of his own. (This was appropriate since Stuart was working for Longstreet at that time.)

General: I have just received your note of 7:45 this morning to General Longstreet. I judge the efforts of the enemy yesterday were to arrest our progress and ascertain our whereabouts. Perhaps he is satisfied. Do you know where he is and what he is doing? I fear he will steal a march on us, and get across the Potomac before we are aware. If you find that he is moving northward, and that two brigades can guard the Blue Ridge and take care of your rear, you can move with the other three into Maryland, and take position on General Ewell's right, place yourself in communication with him, guard his flank, keep him informed of the enemy's position and collect all the supplies you can for the use of the army. One column of General Ewell's army will probably move toward the Susquehanna by the Emmitsburg route; another by Chambersburg. Accounts from him last night state that there was no enemy west of Frederick. A cavalry force (about 100) guarded the Monocacy Bridge which was barricaded. You will, of course, take care of (A.G.) Jenkins' brigade, and give him necessary instructions. All supplies taken in Maryland must be authorized by staff officers for their respective departments--by no one else. They will paid for, or receipts for the same given to the owners. I will send you a general order on this subject, which I wish you to see is strictly Complied with. 1
This letter directed Stuart to join General R. S. Ewell of the First Corps if Hooker moved north, but it specified no routes. When he forwarded this letter to Stuart, Longstreet added some intriguing instructions of his own.

General: General Lee has inclosed to me this letter for you, to be forwarded to you, provided you can be spared from my front, and provided I think you can move across the Potomac without disclosing our plans. He speaks of your leaving, via Hopewell Gap, and passing by the rear of the enemy. If you can get through by that route, I think that you will be less likely to indicate what our plans are, than if you should cross by passing to our rear. I forward this letter of instructions with these suggestions.

Please advise me of the condition of affairs before you leave, and order General Hampton--whom I suppose you will leave here in command--to report to me at Millwood, either by letter or in person, as may be most agreeable to him.

I think that your passage of the Potomac by our rear at the present moment will, in a measure disclose our plans. You had better not leave us, therefore, unless you can take the proposed route in rear of the enemy.\textsuperscript{12}

An analysis of Longstreet's letter reveals several important points. Longstreet felt it necessary to remind Stuart of their command relationship. Longstreet expressed concern that crossing "to our rear" would disclose the army's intentions to the enemy. (This refers to crossing west to Harper's Ferry through the Shenandoah Valley.) Finally, Longstreet concludes with a strong suggestion that Stuart move around the "rear of the enemy." In other words, pass through Hopewell Gap and cross the Potomac east of the enemy.

On 23 June, Lee sent Stuart a second letter to prevent any misunderstanding on the intent of his orders to Stuart.
If General Hooker's army remains inactive, you can leave two brigades to watch him, and withdraw with the three others, but should he not appear to be moving northward, I think you had better withdraw this side of the mountain to morrow night, cross at Shepardstown next day, and move over to Fredericktown.

You will, however, be able to judge whether you can pass around their army without hinderance, doing them all the damage you can, and cross the river east of the mountains. In either case, after crossing the river, you must move on and feel the right of Ewell's troops, collecting information, Provisions, etc.

Give instructions to the commander of the brigades left behind, to watch the flank and rear of the army, and (in the event of the enemy leaving their front) retire from the mountains west of the Shenandoah, leaving sufficient pickets to guard the passes, and bringing everything clear along the valley, closing upon the rear of the army.

As regards the movements of the two brigades of the enemy moving toward Warrenton, the commander of the brigades to be left in the mountains must do what he can to counteract them, but I think the sooner you cross into Maryland, after to-morrow, the better.13

A close comparison of Lee's letters of the 22d and 23d of June reveals a subtle change in his orders to Stuart. In the first letter, Lee tells Stuart to join Ewell if the enemy is moving northward. In the second, Lee tells Stuart to move to join the Army if Hooker remained inactive. If Hooker's Army moved north (as it had been doing by then), Stuart's orders were unclear and left much to his discretion. Coupled with Long street's letter of the previous day, the letter of 23 June implied that Stuart could ride around the Union army. However, it also directed that after crossing the river, Stuart should move to protect Ewell. A condition, though, was placed on any ride around the Union Army--it must be "without hinderance."
Lee's orders were more like suggestions than explicit military orders. In Stuart's after-action report, he stated that "the Commanding General wrote me authorizing this move if I deemed it practicable." There is little doubt that Stuart felt he had Lee's permission and that he was fully aware of his mission to gain contact with Ewell's flank.

But what of Lee's intentions? Lee apparently had great faith in Stuart's abilities and wanted to provide him maximum flexibility. In his report submitted in January, 1864, Lee explained that Stuart did, indeed, have the authority to conduct the raid.

... Upon the suggestion of the former officer (Stuart) that he could damage the enemy and delay his passage of the river by getting in his rear, he was authorized to do so, and it was left to his discretion whether to enter Maryland east or west of the Blue Ridge; but he was instructed to lose no time in placing his command on the right of our column as soon as he should perceive the enemy moving northward.

Lee obviously intended for Stuart to place himself on the right flank of the Army once he crossed the Potomac. To accomplish this task, Stuart could cross at Shepardstown (west of Harper's Ferry) or cross east of the Union Army and then link-up with General Ewell's corps in Pennsylvania. Stuart favored the latter course and Lee's orders did not preclude it. Also, Longstreet's orders even suggested the eastern route. The eastern route afforded Stuart the opportunity to harass the Union Army's rear and cut his lines of communication. Moreover, Stuart now had an opportunity to seek revenge for the Brandy Station humiliation and restore his reputation.
PHASE II (24 JUNE-2 JULY 1863)

On 24 June, Stuart began his march towards Haymarket, Virginia and around the Union Army. He immediately discovered that the Union II Corps had recently passed Haymarket heading north. At this point, Stuart made the decision to make an even wider circle east to avoid the enemy. However, in doing so, Stuart further removed himself from Lee and lengthened his route by at least twenty-four hours.16

Stuart drove himself, his men, and his horses at a breakneck pace to get around the Union Army undetected. He crossed the Potomac River on the twenty-eighth of June under cover of darkness in a risky and exhausting operation. After stopping in Rockville, Maryland to destroy telegraph lines, Stuart made a mistake that would delay his advance for many hours. A large Union supply train of 125 wagons was sighted and Stuart decided to capture it.17 By not destroying it, the train of slow-moving wagons further eroded his mobility and delayed his movement north.

On the twenty-ninth, Stuart again consumed precious time tearing up track and burning bridges along the B&O Railroad. On the thirtieth, he attempted to move towards Hanover, Pennsylvania and the right flank of the Confederate Army, but encountered Union cavalry along the way. Again, Stuart decided to detour east and then north to Carlisle, Pennsylvania. At this time, Stuart sent off couriers to locate Generals Lee and Ewell.

At Carlisle, Pennsylvania, Stuart again decided to delay his advance by attacking the army barracks there. At about this time, he received two messages from Lee ordering him to move to
Gettysburg. Stuart immediately complied, arriving the night of the second of July with his exhausted horses and men.

During the period that Stuart was conducting his raid, Lee still had four cavalry brigades to screen the army's movement north. Unfortunately, the cavalry commanders that remained with Lee did not perform their screening missions with the diligence Lee had grown to expect under Stuart. Some of the leaders lacked the self-discipline, initiative, and keen judgment necessary to carry out mission-style orders. Therefore, Lee was unaware that major elements of the Union Army were crossing the Potomac on the twenty-fifth of June in pursuit of the Confederates. Lee was accustomed to providing mission orders to Stuart and failed to recognize that, in Stuart's absence, he would need to exercise tighter control and coordination of his remaining cavalry assets.

PHASE III (3-13 JULY 1863)

The final phase in this examination of the Confederate cavalry employment took place on the third of July at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. Stuart's cavalry was ordered to support the Confederate Army's main attack by enveloping the rear of the Union defenses and attacking the Union supply trains. Also, if the Confederate main attack was successful, Stuart's cavalry would be positioned to exploit the success. Unfortunately, Stuart's quest for a great victory to help restore his tarnished reputation was dashed by two critically important failures.

First, and most importantly, the Confederate Army failed to breakthrough and defeat the Union defenses at Gettysburg. In fact, the final attack was a disaster for the Confederates. Many refer to Pickett's charge on that final day of battle at
Gettysburg as the high tide of the Confederacy. The Confederacy would retreat from Pennsylvania the next day and never regain the ability to mount a significant offensive again.

Second, Stuart and his cavalry were so exhausted by the pace of the operations during the ride around the Union Army that they, too, were unsuccessful in threatening the Union rear area. Stuart's cavalry movements were detected by the Union forces and effectively countered by the much improved Union cavalry under Generals Gregg and Custer. A battle raged between both cavalry units until dark when the Union cavalry forced Stuart to withdraw back to Gettysburg.

The Confederate Army was defeated at Gettysburg, but Lee did a magnificent job in conducting the difficult task of withdrawing a defeated army intact back to Virginia. Critical to the accomplishment of this difficult task was the employment of Stuart's cavalry as a flank and rear guard. Stuart's cavalry performed admirably, screening the army's flank and rear from Union interdiction efforts.

CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF LIGHT ARMORED INFANTRY DOCTRINE

While this paper examines the employment of Confederate cavalry throughout the campaign, the primary focus of my analysis centers on the effects of Stuart's ride around the Union Army. The merits of Stuart's raid were many, dutifully noted by Stuart and others who rushed to his defense after the war ended. The raid caused damage to the Union lines of communication with Washington D.C. and the capture of the Union supply train disrupted the Federal supply system momentarily. However, the
negative results of the raid were more significant, particularly at what many call the operational level of war. Lee gained little or no intelligence from the raid and was without knowledge of the Union main body until June twenty-eighth. Lee was hamstrung by the absence of his chief of intelligence and, hence, unable to see and shape the battlefield at Gettysburg. Also, the pace and distance of the raid exhausted Stuart's men and horses and contributed to their degraded combat efficiency during the final day's battle at Gettysburg. Finally, Stuart's reputation was forever tarnished by this episode and many of Lee's key subordinates lost confidence in his abilities.

Several conclusions can be drawn regarding the employment of cavalry in general and Stuart's actions in particular:

1. Lee's orders to Stuart were vague and contradictory. Stuart did not disobey Lee's orders, however, he did take full advantage of the ambiguity and latitude they offered. Stuart's apparent failure to comprehend the commander's intent can be traced back to Lee's inability to transmit his intent explicitly.

2. Stuart started out on a spirited adventure to restore his reputation but finished exhausted and embarrassed due to a combination of his own poor judgment and other factors beyond his control.

3. Stuart could have reached Lee at least 24 hours earlier had he decided to destroy the wagon train instead of capturing it.

4. Lee's lack of effective cavalry support from the twenty-fifth of June until the second of July can also be traced back, in part, to Lee himself. He approved Stuart's raid, but then was unable to get the kind of aggressive cavalry initiative and support out of his remaining cavalry commanders.

5. Lee was dependent upon Stuart himself for information concerning the enemy's dispositions and intentions. Without Stuart, Lee had no one upon whom he could rely for intelligence despite having other cavalry brigades under his command.
6. Stuart's raid was not the single major cause of Lee's defeat at Gettysburg. Appropriately, Lee assumed complete responsibility for the Confederate defeat at Gettysburg. On the other hand, Stuart is equally responsible to Lee for his failure "to move on and feel the right of Ewell's troops."

Considering that Lee had to fight outnumbered; was a master of strategic and operational maneuver; utilized mission-style orders in a decentralized system of execution; and aggressively employed his cavalry in missions designed to help him see and shape future battlefields, a number of important lessons regarding the development of LAI doctrine can be derived from an examination of this campaign:

1. Centralized control of reconnaissance assets
   The issue of control of cavalry (reconnaissance) assets is one faced by today's commanders. Should control remain at the senior headquarters or should they be attached to subordinate elements? The lessons of Gettysburg point to the advantage of centralized control in a war of maneuver. Additionally, today's high tech battlefield presents commanders with tremendous challenges in seeing and shaping the battle. Today's leaders are required to visualize the battlefield in time and spatial dimensions heretofore uncomparable in any other time in history. The LAI vehicle's physical characteristics (lightly armored, fast moving, air transportable) make it the most suitable ground vehicle in the Marine Corps inventory to project out the senior commander's eyes and ears and help him shape/influence the battle.

2. Mission-type orders demand the knowledge and intent of the issuing commander

Lee's orders were essentially mission type orders. Stuart did not locate Lee's right flank near the end of his raid because he didn't fully understand Lee's intentions and guessed at the Confederate Army's location. To enable a subordinate to act in the absence of specific orders during the course of a campaign, a commander's order must include the task to be accomplished and the reason, or intent. The task describes the action to be taken while the intent describes the desired result of the action. A subordinate must clearly understand how, and under what conditions, the commander envisions the battle taking place. While understanding the intent is important to
all subordinates, it is crucial for those units responsible for seeing and shaping the battlefield for the commander. The LAI battalion is one of several units that will routinely operate independently at great distances from the commander. During those times when distance, terrain, or enemy electronic warfare capabilities preclude positive communication between the commander and his LAI battalion, a clearly stated intent will guide the LAI leader's actions.

3. The reconnaissance force must be employed in sufficient depth to provide adequate time for the supported unit to deploy.

Lee had no reconnaissance or screening assets employed to the east (except Stuart) in his invasion. Therefore, the Union forces could stay close without detection. This contributed to the battle being fought at Gettysburg instead of another place more favorable to Lee. The obvious lesson for today's commander is to position your reconnaissance assets out as far as control and the situation permit, and in sufficient numbers to provide depth and redundancy to your reconnaissance and security efforts. This suggests that the LAI battalion may be best employed as a complete entity instead of attached out in smaller elements. The LAI battalion is comprised of several different, but mutually supporting, LAV variants designed to ensure the unit's self-sufficiency and survivability on the modern battlefield.

4. Counter-reconnaissance and screening missions are essential to the overall security of the army.

Lee utilized his cavalry primarily to thwart the reconnaissance efforts of the Union, thus denying them valuable intelligence. As evidenced during the recent Persian Gulf conflict, counter-reconnaissance and screening missions continue to be utilized by commanders bent on shaping the battlefield to their advantage while denying the same to their counterparts. These missions were assigned to Marine LAI battalions, Army cavalry units, and other coalition light mechanized units. All of these units utilized their superior mobility and maneuverability, along with their inherent combined arms firepower, to provide security to the coalition forces' western flank. Additionally, other elements of this modern day cavalry force were sent ahead of the main ground assault to shape the battle by identifying enemy units and locations.

5. Ability to attack or defend lines of communication and supply depots

Lee and Stuart recognized the advantages of raiding Union rear areas to disrupt lines of communication and
supply depots critical to the prosecution of any campaign into Virginia.

Numerous examples of successful raids led by Stuart are mentioned in this paper. Today, with the development of aviation (particularly helicopters) and other highly mobile ground vehicles, the ability to attack an enemy's rear area while simultaneously defending the friendly rear area is an even greater challenge to today's commanders than it was during the Civil War. A challenge that the multi-variant LAI battalion is ideally suited to meet in both the attack and defense roles.

6. Mobility of reconnaissance assets

Civil War commanders recognized the need for tactical and operational mobility. Large size cavalry units provided both sides with the ability to influence not only the immediate battle but the course of an entire campaign. Today's LAI battalion not only provides the same advantages on the tactical and operational levels but also provides the Marine Corps with the ability to impact on the strategic level through its rapid deployment capabilities. The LAVs are air transportable, helicopter transportable, and currently part of the maritime pre-positioned assets afloat. But what makes the LAV particularly suited to rapid deployment units is its relative freedom from the complex logistics required to repair and maintain tracked combat vehicles. Additionally, the LAV's reliability, stated in mean miles between mission failures, is unparalleled.

Further, the LAI's mobility provides opportunities for employment as a separate covering force for a larger unit or a separate landing force during preassault operations, supporting operations, raids, etc. Additionally, the LAI provides mobile reconnaissance assets ideally suited to integrate with aviation assets in the prosecution of the deep battle against enemy reserves, lines of communication, anti-air defense systems, logistics facilities, and command and control nodes.

The observations outlined above reveal that the Civil War cavalry missions of reconnaissance, screening, and raiding remain viable for modern-day cavalry units. These missions permit today's commander to see and shape the battlefield much the same as Lee did over a century ago. Moreover, the LAI battalion
provides today's commander with a capability to fight a maneuver style of warfare similar to the capability that Stuart's cavalry provided to Lee: a style of warfare that seeks to pit friendly strengths against selected enemy weaknesses; a style which relies on speed and surprise in order to shatter an enemy's cohesion, organization, command, and psychological balance; a style which envisions a numerically inferior force capable of defeating a numerically superior foe. The lessons of Gettysburg provide an excellent historical example upon which to gain a better understanding of the employment of cavalry in a maneuver style of warfare. The challenge for today's LAI commander is to match the time-tested tactical lessons of the past with the technological advances of tomorrow.
GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN
UNION AND CONFEDERATE LINES OF MARCH
3 JUNE TO 1 JULY 1863

PA
MD.

ROUTE OF CONFEDERATE ARMY
ROUTE OF CONFEDERATE CAVALRY
ROUTE OF UNION ARMY
END NOTES


2. Bierly, Jerome F., Mazor, USMC. Promises To keep: Lee Stuart and the Cavalry During the Gettysburg Campaign. (Virginia: Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 1982), P. 24.

3. Ibid, p. 25.


5. Bierly, p. 34.


7. Ibid. p. 51.

8. Freeman, Volume III, p. 3.


17. Bierly, p. 53.


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