The AirSea battle concept has recently emerged as an answer to the growing threat of anti-access, area-denial capabilities now being acquired by potential adversaries such as China and Iran. These capabilities are designed to deny the U.S. military the ability to project power into a contested region. While the original ASB concept written by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment focused on the use of Air and Naval power it neglected to mention ground forces. A careful analysis of the U.S. Army’s current and emerging capabilities show that it has the ability to significantly contribute to the ASB concept by implementing regional alignment of its BCTs and select Division / Crops HQ, providing service specific “niche” fires capabilities in air defense and long range strike, and by rapidly deploying forces from the sea utilizing the Joint Seabasing concept.

15. SUBJECT TERMS
Air-Sea Battle concept, Sea Basing, Regional Alignment of Forces, Fires, Anti-Access / Area Denial

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:
- a. REPORT Unclassified
- b. ABSTRACT Unclassified
- c. THIS PAGE Unclassified

17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU

18. NUMBER OF PAGES

19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
Marine Corps University / School of Advanced Warfighting

19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code)
(703) 432-5318 (Admin Office)
FUTURE WAR PAPER

The U.S. Army's Role in Air-Sea Battle

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF OPERATIONAL STUDIES

MAJOR DAVID SMITH
U.S. ARMY

AY 2012-13

Mentor: Dr. Gordon Rudd
Approved: 
Date: 16 May 2013
Executive Summary

Title: The Army's Role in AirSea Battle

Author: Major, David K. Smith, United States Army

Thesis: The US Army can significantly contribute to the AirSea battle concept by implementing regional alignment of its BCTs and select Division / Corps HQ, providing service specific "niche" fires capabilities in air defense and long range strike, and by rapidly deploying forces from the sea utilizing the Joint Seabasing concept.

Discussion: The AirSea battle concept has recently emerged as an answer to the growing threat of anti-access, area-denial capabilities now being acquired by potential adversaries such as China and Iran. These capabilities are designed to deny the US military the ability to project power into a contested region. While the original ASB concept written by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment focused on the use of Air and Naval power, hence AirSea Battle, it neglected to mention ground forces. A careful analysis of the US Army's current and emerging capabilities show that it has the ability to significantly contribute to the ASB concept in three major areas.

As of 2012, the Army has begun the process of regionally aligning brigades with geographic combatant commands. This will soon be expanded to Corps and Division HQ and will entail the designated units focusing their training efforts on these regions. The aligned units would begin a partnership program with regional allies in Africa, South East Asia, and the Middle East. The military-to-military relationship would build the host nations capacity as a deterrent to aggression while laying the foundation for potential forward basing of American forces.

A second contribution is that the Army has "niche" fires capabilities that will be in demand in an A2AD fight, specifically defensive anti-ballistic missile systems like Patriot and THAAD and long range fires such as the ATACMS missile. Future development of THAAD, directed energy anti-missile systems, and hypersonic weapon systems will enable the Army to significantly contribute to the ASB scenario at greater ranges.

The final capability resides in contributions to Joint Seabasing. The Army currently can add to the Joint Seabase with its logistics from the sea, watercraft, APS stocks, and forced entry capabilities resident in its airborne an air assault forces. In the future, the Army should increase investment in configuring APS stocks for transfer at sea, high speed ship-to-shore capabilities, and a more robust logistics support capability based at sea.

Conclusion: The Army currently has the capability to contribute to the ASB concept and will have even more ability to do so in the future if key investments are made in emerging systems and technology. The Army's attempt at regional alignment could be a powerful tool used to maintain stability in a given region give that nations are willing and able to partner with the Army. That being said, any future discussion of ASB needs to take into consideration how the Army can bring elements of land power into the fight to achieve decisive results.
DISCLAIMER

THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED WARFIGHTING OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT
## Table of Contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................................... ii
DISCLAIMER .............................................................................................................................. iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS .............................................................................................................. iv
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1
THE AIR-SEA BATTLE CONCEPT ........................................................................................... 3
REGIONAL ALIGNMENT ......................................................................................................... 5
FIRES A "NICHE" CAPABILITY .............................................................................................. 9
THE ARMY’S ROLE IN JOINT SEABASING ........................................................................ 13
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................... 17
END NOTES ............................................................................................................................... 19
BIBLIOGRAPHY ....................................................................................................................... 21
In 2010, a Washington based think tank, the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, or CSBA, published the operational concept known as Air Sea Battle. The concept describes an operational partnership between the US Navy and US Air Force. The purpose of this partnership was to counter an emergence in enemy doctrine designed to neutralize the United States operational reach, through Anti-Access/Area Denial or A2AD weapons. A2AD capabilities, specifically guided ballistic missiles, have been increasingly developed and fielded by China. A proliferation of the technology has spread to countries like Iran who could deny US access to the Persian Gulf. In 2012 the Department of Defense officially adopted the concept of ASB in the new Joint Operational Access Concept or JOAC.

Two factors lead to the adoption of the JOAC, the first of which was that the United States economy was increasingly tied to trade with the Pacific. Any interruption in that trade could be disastrous to the US economy. A second factor was the continuing rise of China as a regional superpower with goals not necessarily aligned with those of the US. China's rise has come with a heavy investment in its armed forces, which continues to narrow the capability gap with the United States.

The original CSBA AirSea Battle proposal made no mention of land forces role in a potential conflict. When later questioned the authors claimed that given the range and nature of the A2AD threat that America would be unable to project any land power forward. They envisioned the battle as an exchange of long range precision fires involving air and naval assets. The authors did discuss the role of ground forces, Army or Marine, in the proposal. In the two years since its first publication a number of senior military leaders both active and retired have scrutinized the ASB scenario. By analyzing potential ASB scenarios advocates for ground forces began to see that established missions such as forced entry operations from the sea and air,
ballistic missile defense, and sea basing could complement ASB and enable a true joint fighting force.

As the U.S. Army reviewed the dynamics of ASB, it was clear that no viable role for ground forces had be incorporated into the concept. The mission of the United States Army has always been to fight and win the Nation's wars. However the recent "pivot to the Pacific" and accompanying strategic guidance has essentially taken Large-scale nation-building off the table. Retired Maj. Gen. Robert Scales, a former commandant of the Army War College told Politico: "As soon as you finish up a long-term engagement, you always hear the same thing: We're not going to do that again. You heard it in 1954, 1972, 1989 and 1993. We're saying it again now. It must be part of our cultural DNA." Despite the pending downsizing in Army force structure and a deep desire to avoid any future counterinsurgency operations, the U.S. Army remains the Nation's most powerful and flexible ground force. According to the Army's 2012 Capstone Concept "the Army exists to fight and win the Nation's wars, serve the American people, and protect enduring national interests consistent with applicable U.S., international, and in some cases host nation laws and regulations." It goes on to note that "the Army provides combatant commanders the forces and capabilities necessary to execute the National Security, National Defense, and National Military Strategies." Finally, the Capstone Concept notes that the U.S. Army is a global force which remains vital to "ensuring equilibrium and balancing risk to our Nation's interests."

The Capstone Concept states that the methodology the Army will use to guide its employment is to prevent/shape/win. The Army prevents conflict, shapes the operational environment, and wins the Nation's wars. In order to accomplish these tasks, the Capstone Concept outlines an army that has a robust expeditionary capability that is able to deploy quickly
to seize and maintain the initiative. This force will complement the Joint Force and will be less reliant on intermediate staging bases, ports, and airfields. Looking to the future, the Army can be an essential part of fighting a conflict in a A2AD environment in both the PACOM and CENTCOM AORs and can best contribute to operations in three distinct ways. First, the regional alignment of an Army Corps Headquarters in the major Combatant Command AORs in order to build partnership capacity, provide forward basing, and deter conflict. Second, the Army has "niche" capabilities that are unique to its force structure such as Patriot air defense and ATACMS long range artillery which could prove invaluable in the future A2AD environment. Third, the U.S. Army has a distinct role to play in Joint Sea Basing, using Army seaborne assets to rapidly project power into any Joint Operational Area. In order to better understand how the Army contributes to the JOAC, it is important to first take a closer look at AirSea Battle.

AirSea Battle And The A2AD Threat

The ASB concept was quickly embraced by both the USAF and USN as it played to their service strengths as well as being in line with the 2010 National Security Strategy which emphasized a U.S. strategic shift to the Pacific region. This strategic pivot to the Pacific focuses on a rising China that is rapidly building a near-peer military capability. In the envisioned ASB scenario with China, the PLA would exploit US vulnerabilities by investing in long range anti-access / area denial (A2AD) capabilities. The CSBA study concludes that A2AD will include coordinated operations by an enemy’s air forces and air defenses to maintain a degree of air parity or superiority over its AO. Land-based A2/AD systems will include short-to medium-range artillery and rockets with long range missiles strikes against US forward-based forces. These enemy forces can also operate against maritime forces to include anti-ship cruise,
or even ballistic, missiles and submarines armed with torpedoes or anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs). In the littoral close fight, sophisticated mines, coastal submarines, and small attack craft would be used against US forces.\textsuperscript{7}

The CSBA study went on to state that the consequences for U.S. forces would include "a loss of forward sanctuaries in physical domains (including space and cyberspace), denial of access to areas of operations and, loss of strategic and operational initiative.\textsuperscript{8} The end result of these attacks would hold U.S. forces back beyond offensive range leaving the enemy with air and naval superiority to achieve its military and political goals.\textsuperscript{9} While A2AD is emerging as a valid threat the US ability to project power abroad, the ASB concept has drawn criticism for its focus on air and sea power with no mention of ground forces.\textsuperscript{10} The authors of ASB felt that the campaign would be fought at extreme range, precluding the deployment of land forces due to the lack of secure ports and airfields.\textsuperscript{11}

In 2012, the JOAC was adopted as the Joint communities version of ASB. The JOAC reflects an air and naval centric approach to emerging A2AD threats. In response to what appeared to be questions of the US Army's relevancy, the Chief of Staff of the Army; General Raymond Odierno, stated that "Those who want to assume away the need for ground force capability, I don't agree with that, and I think that's a dangerous road for us to go down."\textsuperscript{12} In November, 2012, the Army established the Strategic Landpower Office at the Pentagon in an effort to partner the US Army, USMC, and SOCOM to argue the strategic relevance of ground forces.\textsuperscript{13} One of the immediate outputs from this new office has been the Army's new focus on regional alignment.
The election of John Kennedy as President in 1960 brought with it a change in national strategy from Massive Retaliation to Flexible Response. Kennedy based this shift on General Maxwell Taylor's book *The Uncertain Trumpet*. Flexible Response was envisioned as meeting Communist aggression at the level of violence it was initiated. President Kennedy wanted the Army to look beyond Europe and placed greater emphasis on the new Special Forces units. To address the Presidents emphasis on small wars, Lt. General Hamilton H. Howze convened a board at Ft.Bragg on 7 December 1961. The Howze Board findings recommended that the U.S. Army could not depend on Special Forces alone to meet global requirements and that the conventional Army needed to be considered the primary effort. The board recommended that at least three divisions and two battle groups be partnered with regionally aligned SF units. These units would be area-oriented and new personnel rotations would ensure units involved could build up their depth of expertise. The scheme of employment would have SF units deployed during phase I & II of an insurgency with their partnered division arriving if the insurgency reached phase III conventional warfare. Ultimately, the Army rejected the Howze Board recommendations, and with the death of President Kennedy in 1963, there was little top-down pressure on the Army to regionally align.

The strategic problem facing the Army as outlined in the December 2012 Capstone Concept states: "What must the Army do as part of the joint force to retain its ability to win, protect U.S. national interests, and successfully execute the primary missions outlined in defense strategic guidance in an emerging, complex operational environment in an era of fiscal austerity?" As part of the Army's answer to this question, in October, 2012 the Army announced that the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division would be the first BCT to
become "regionally aligned" under a new program to provide forces to the regional Combatant Commanders. Essentially the essence of the recommendations from the Howze Board were embraced by the Army after 52 years.19

As forces draw down out of Afghanistan through 2014, the Army is eager to find a way to keep units "engaged" and relevant. The regional alignment concept is a first step which assigns BCTs for a year to each GCC for tasking and deployment. At first glance this looks like the Army will be deploying entire BCTs abroad but in reality, only small formations at the company level will actually deploy for training and advisory missions. The intent is to provide trained and equipped brigades that have some level of familiarity with a region prior to deploying in response to a crisis. The Army has also announced that corps headquarters will be regionally focused with I Corps assigned to the Pacific, III Corps to Central Command, and XVIII Airborne Corps remaining a global force entry headquarters. Division headquarters that are Joint Task Force capable will be aligned with all remaining commands such as EUROCOM, SOUTHCOM, and NORTHCOM. 20 The alignment of all three remaining Army Corps can support a future Joint Operational Access scenario either in the Pacific or the Middle East if given the proper force structure model.

Regional alignment of forces outlined under the Army Capstone Concept serves the purpose of prevent conflict and shaping the operational environment.21 Looking specifically at shaping the operational environment in the Pacific, the Army contributes to JOAC in three distinct ways. The first step to is to build partnership capacity with Pacific nations by aligning I Corps and its subordinate divisions (2nd & 25th divisions) with Vietnam, Australia, Thailand, South Korea, and the Philippians through multinational exercises and exchanges. Partnership with South Korea has endured since the Korean war and the Cobra Gold exercise with Thailand
serves as a good example of multinational training. This partnership builds trust and enables the U.S. Army access to friendly APODs and SPODs in the threat AOR. These ports and airfields could be used as intermediate staging bases for action against an enemy in the region.

The second contribution is in the deterrence phase of an operation, U.S. forces could potentially be forward deployed to the region to stage in a host nation as a show of American commitment. The second contribution is linked to the first and takes the form of support security cooperative activities. These activities are military-to-military relations where the Army builds the capability of host nation Army through training. A more capable host nation force in and of itself is a deterrent to aggression and helps ensure regional stability. Finally, regional alignment gives CONUS based Army units a mission to train for and threats to train against. This allows for highly refined training against threat tactics as well as cultural and language familiarization. All three of these aspects of alignment complement each other and make this a viable course of action for the Army, however, the Brigade Combat Team is not the optimal unit to assign against this model. The division headquarters with a major general commanding and a robust staff is the minimum mission command element that should interface with the host nation at the operational level. A corps headquarters would be the preferred level of command for regional alignment with subordinate divisions focusing on individual countries.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recently issued the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020. In this document the JCS stipulated a need for the future force to develop deep regional expertise. It claimed that "maintaining regional expertise within the armed forces will therefore remain an important requirement especially when it comes to cooperative security, counterinsurgency, and unconventional warfare." In the Pacific AOR, the PACOM commander is engaged with many nations simultaneously. A BCT assigned under that GCC can
partner and train with a single country in the AOR. It is unrealistic to expect that in a time of crisis that a BCT sized unit is the ideal force for large scale engagement. It is focused at the tactical level and has a small HQ. This is where the regional alignment is currently wanting in its construct and the corps and division level headquarters are required.

A corps headquarters, tailored to be expeditionary, can rapidly insert to form the operational link for a region. Designated division HQ are then inserted under the corps along to partner with individual nations. Both corps and division headquarters are better suited to interact with the joint community and integrate special operations forces. The corps HQ, commanded by a Lieutenant General, is optimal to form the base for a Joint Task Force HQ and to manage the RSOI of forces flowing into the theater. A similar construct under the 8th US Army has filled this role in Korea for 60 years. Since US Army Special Forces are by design regionally aligned, they would be ideally suited to operate in conjunction with a division or corps HQ. Subordinate Brigade Combat Teams, operating under the division HQ, would conduct engagements at the tactical level.

Corps and division headquarters needs to be tailored to deploy anywhere in the region on short notice and fill the operational gap below the GCC. In order to fulfill this mission the corps HQ should be robust enough to provide mission command for multiple divisions while remaining small enough to deploy by air in 72 hours or less. In addition, the corps should form the same cultural and mil-to-mil relationships found at the tactical level. To accomplish this, the Army in the near future needs to arrange for Corps HQ deployment to their respective AORs to begin engagements and exercises with host nation military commands. Regional alignment has a significant role to play for the Army and the Joint force in regard to the JOAC. If properly executed, it could deter or degrade a threat nations ability to deny the U.S. access to the global
commons of the Pacific. With only three corps headquarters remaining in the Army after 2014, the force structure should be examined in regards to regional alignment. The Army could re-activate up to four corps HQ as either active or National Guard organizations in order to provide support for EUROCOM, AFRICOM, SOUTHCOM, and NORTHCOM. While the Army's regional alignment of forces has great potential for supporting the JOAC, the Army also can contribute key enablers, such as fires.

Fires: Niche Capabilities Needed For ASB

In examine ASB and how it is envisioned being fought over the vast distances of the Pacific ocean, two issues emerge that are of interest to the Army. First, the ASB scenario forecasts that forward U.S. bases, such as Guam, will be subjected to long-range ballistic missile bombardment as part of the enemies A2AD strategy. Second, with U.S. naval and air forces facing a restricted operating environment due to anti-access weapons, ground based fires, if forward positioned, could be leveraged to attack enemy A2AD systems.26 Currently, the Army is the only service component with land-based high altitude anti-missile systems, the Patriot PAC-3 and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and the long-range surface to surface Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS).27 These current systems are combat proven and could be forward deployed to protect forward bases and provide long-range strike. They are, with the exception of THAAD, systems of the Cold War and not optimized for the large operating area of the Pacific.

The PAC-3 and THAAD, although highly capable systems, are expensive. The Patriot PAC-3 missile costs $3.3 million per copy, the THAAD costs $9 million per copy. Assuming two missiles are fired per intercept, a defensive strategy depending on these systems alone could
become a financial burden. Larger quantities of these missiles would have to be stockpiled and forward positioned. One added benefit of both of these systems is the powerful ground radars that they include. These systems can be integrated into the joint force to provide early warning and target data for other IADS platforms. The Army should address the JOAC with an eye towards the future as these current systems are inadequate. Major investments in upgrading these systems along with emerging technology could make Army fires much more relevant in the A2AD environment.

In looking to the future of Army air defense, the service should "prioritize the development and fielding of offensive and defensive capabilities that could change the unfavorable missile salvo cost-exchange ratio in the United States favor." The THAAD system could play a key role in any future A2AD battle with its accuracy and range. Investment in electronic warfare systems and directed energy weapons which can be integrated into a layered defense are critical. With THAAD as the primary system, EW assets could potentially blind incoming ballistic missiles if they have advanced guidance systems. Directed energy weapons have seen a renewed interest following the successful C-RAM project which incorporated a USN Phalanx weapon system with existing ground radars to intercept rockets and mortars. A laser version of this platform is in testing and the technology is maturing to allow for larger scale lasers to engage fast moving ballistic missiles from ground stations. Such systems could greatly reduce the cost per shot of destroying long range ballistic missiles. While THAAD and directed energy weapons are defensive in nature, the Army requires the capability to strike at enemy Terminally Erected Launchers or TELs which keep A2AD threats mobile.

In the event the Army tries to respond after an initial strike on a forward base or attempt a preemptive strike to destroy enemy systems, it requires long-range, offensive fires which are
ground based and all weather. For artillery systems the Army has the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) which can range out to 300 km and is GPS guided. Future concept development for the ATACMS missile requires a range of at least 500 km with the ability to hit moving targets. The ATACMS, a tactical weapon, is handicapped by its range unless forward firing positions were seized to enable its employment. In the ASB scenario, the artillery rocket/missile exchange and counter-fire fight will take place at extreme ranges covering hundreds of miles.

During World War II, the United States seized key islands in the Pacific in or to extend the range of air power over enemy territory. In the ASB scenario, Air Power, both land and carrier based could be held back beyond effective range. Substituting rocket artillery for air power, Joint forces could secure key islands in order to emplace ATACMS battery within effective range of enemy TELs.

Currently, the Army does not have the capability in its inventory to strike from extreme long range over the Pacific without securing forward firing positions. In order to optimize ATACMS for the A2AD threat, even greater ranges need to be considered or even a new delivery vehicle and launch system. One system that is showing promise is the new hypersonic missile. Both the Army and the U.S. Air Force are developing hypersonic technology. Both services see the weapon as having global strike capability and as being critical to countering A2AD threats. The Army conducted a successful test with a hypersonic demonstrator in August 2011. The missile was fired from Hawaii and reached 6,100 miles per hour (Mach 8) while traveling 2,400 miles. While this was only a preliminary test, both the Army and the USAF are currently testing hypersonic weapons. In concept it would allow the United States to engage targets with cruise missile like capability, globally in under 30 minutes. This concept of "Global
Strike" should be invaluable to the Joint force in a future ASB, giving the Army the ability to quickly destroy enemy launch platforms at long range. The hypersonic weapons are traveling at such incredible speeds that an enemy barely has time to detect them, let alone react in a meaningful way. This technology and capability would make the U.S. Army a necessary part of any Joint operation countering an A2AD threat. The main challenge to the Army's future deployment of these weapons is described by Andrew Krepinevich as "China's anti-ship ballistic missile program, as well as its surface-to-surface ballistic missile force, represents an important and growing source of asymmetric advantage over the United States and its allies." He goes on to point out that the 1987 Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty "prohibits its signatories, the United States and Russia (formerly the Soviet Union) from producing or deploying ballistic missiles with ranges between 500–5,500 kilometers (approximately 300–3,500 miles)." China is not part of the INF treaty and is not regulated by its prohibitions.

By examining the Army's current long-range fires capability it is clear that the service has something to offer to the Joint Force but much more is needed over the next 20 years to truly counter the emerging A2AD threat. The Capstone Concept for Joint Operations sets fires capabilities as a requirement for the future force stating that "the ability to gain operational access and maintain freedom of action is being threatened by advanced anti-access and area denial capabilities. Developing mature fires able to deter and defeat these threats is a priority." A deliberate investment into both current systems such as THAAD and emerging technology like directed energy and hypersonic weapons will prove invaluable if faced with a war in the Pacific region.

The U.S. Army currently does not have a system that can effect an enemy from the "second island chain" range, specifically, Guam. The hypersonic missile should be considered
the primary acquisition effort for long range fires regarding the JOAC. While THAAD can provide limited close-in defense of forward US bases such as Guam, only the hypersonic missile can enable all weather strike capability. This system becomes all the more important if the enemy is successful at keeping the USN and USAF outside of the region due to A2AD threats. Fires are only one of the ways with which the Army can contribute to the Joint Forces. The projection of US land power is a key capability which allows the Army to "retain, and exploit the initiative, and to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage."  

The Army's Role In Joint SeaBasing

Despite the Army's best efforts at regional alignment and securing forward bases, some of which share a border with hostile nations, the nature of ASB may require the Joint Force to employ the concept of sea basing. The Seabasing Joint Integration Concept defines Seabasing as "the rapid deployment, assembly, command, projection, reconstitution, and re-employment of joint combat power from the sea, while providing continuous support, sustainment, and force protection to select expeditionary joint forces without reliance on land bases within the joint operations area."  

Seabasing can be a form of forced entry operations which also includes USMC amphibious and US Army Airborne and Air Assault operations. It can also serve as a follow-on operation to build combat power or as a standalone operation responding to a natural disaster or humanitarian aid mission. Seabasing is not a new concept and has been successfully used by the US military since World War II. To the casual observer, the term Seabasing invokes an image of the US Navy and USMC conducting amphibious operations on remote islands. The U.S. Army continues to maintain a competency for expeditionary warfare and has historically come from the sea through strategic ships or amphibious operations. Because of this tradition,
the Army has maintained the ability to rapidly deploy by both sea and air in order to reach distance theaters of operation. Given the changing nature of global operating environment, the U.S. Army published a concept capability plan for Joint Land Operations from a Joint Sea Base in 2009.\textsuperscript{37}

The world's littoral regions continue to be home to over three-quarters of the world's population and their respective nations capitals. While historically this has been the global trend, the littorals will continue to have an impact on planning at all levels of war. As a result of this significant geographic and human terrain, there continues to be a high probability that littoral regions will play a role in future operations. Humanitarian disasters in areas without established ports and potential A2AD threats could result in the Joint Force Commander employing Seabasing to enable the joint force to operate in a littoral environment that has little or no access to land bases\textsuperscript{38}. In the JOAC scenario, Seabasing will not be a viable option until joint fires neutralize the enemies A2AD capability. Once this has been accomplished, ships can move into the littoral regions to being forced entry operations for land forces. If no friendly neighboring country is present in which to build up combat power, a Seabase could be employed as a substitute. The Seabase removes the burden of seizing an enemy port (SPOD) right away. Joint Forces can operate and resupply via the SeaBase until such time as a suitable port can be secured. Forward airbases (APOD) will still need to be secured in order to project air power and ease the resupply burden on the Seabase. Seabasing is not an exclusively Marine Corps or Navy operation, nor is it limited to Brigade or small echelons that depend on prepositioned equipment sets. Seabasing reaches its optimal potential when synchronized with other means, enhancing the strategic and operational responsiveness during the campaign.\textsuperscript{39} If used, the Seabase would, by necessity, take the form of a Joint Operation. The Army does not have the
capabilities to execute this type of operation alone. While the USN-USMC team could establish a Seabase together, they would be limited in the amount of ground power they could project once ashore. The Army views its participation in any Joint Seabase as a "scalable capability to include logistics over-the-shore, theater opening, Army watercraft, and prepositioned vessels with equipment and sustainment stocks that expand operational maneuver options by rapidly projecting power from over-the-horizon to seize the initiative.\textsuperscript{40}

Currently the Army has the capability to support a Seabasing with its fleet of watercraft and prepositioned stocks. This is inadequate for projecting a division or larger force ashore using only a Seabase. The Army watercraft fleet consists of Logistics Support Vessel (LSV), Landing Craft Utility (LCU) 2000, and Landing Craft Mechanized (LCM) 8 MOD I and MOD II. The LSV is a roll-on/roll-off, heavy lift vessel with a 2000-ton payload capacity (24 M1 Abrams tanks or 50 20-ft ISO containers). LCU has a payload capacity of 350 tons (five M1 Abrams tanks or 24 20-ft ISO containers).\textsuperscript{41} These platforms serve as littoral supply route and sea-basing enablers, providing inter/intra-theater lift of personnel and material in support of Joint and Army ground forces, delivering cargo from advanced bases and deep draft strategic sealift ships to harbors, inland waterways, remote underdeveloped coastlines and unimproved beaches and degraded/denied ports.\textsuperscript{42} The Army has in its inventory 8 Logistics Support Vessels, 35 Landing Craft Utility 2000s, and 50 Landing Craft Mechanized.

With future conflicts projected to take place in the littoral regions and the looming challenges associated with the JOAC and a conflict in the Pacific, the Army should invest in capabilities that enhance its contribution to the Joint Seabase and enable it to bring decisive ground power into action. The Joint Force Commander will increasingly use the sea as additional maneuver space to position forces.\textsuperscript{43} Future capabilities for the Army should include
high speed inter and intra-theater sea lift that sustains heavy and medium forces in the JOA using austere ports. Enhanced afloat forward staging bases (AFSB) and maintenance facilities, and high speed connectors that support joint logistics over-the-shore (JLOTS). A recent congressional study on the issue concluded that a future force had to deliver combat-ready ground units directly into an AOR, support ground forces for extended periods of time independent of local permission or infrastructure, and withdrawal ground forces from an AO quickly.

Beyond the initial entry, the Army should invest in the capability that puts several Armored and Stryker BCTs afloat in APS ships with the ability to transfer vehicles and personnel at the Seabase to smaller high-speed vessels for ship-to-shore movement. This would negate the Army's need for a deep water port and allow significant combat power to flow into the beachhead after the initial entry was successful. The current challenge is that there are simply not enough vessels in the Army inventory to support even a moderate Seabasing effort. In addition the Army needs to address supply support activity (SSA) afloat which was a development off of Seabasing to provide logistics ashore for ground forces. Under the concept ships will provide support for any type of Army BCT. The SSA afloat would have all the capability resident in a land based equivalent.

The Army views Seabasing as one means by which to exploit multiple entry points to project forces to positions of advantage, enabling the operational maneuver from strategic distance. In the final assessment, the Army's current Seabasing capabilities are light, limited, and ultimately unsatisfactory for operating in the JOAC environment. The Army requires significant investment in systems to enable the basing at sea of a significant ground combat force. Seabasing is inherently interdependent, requiring capabilities from across the services
which should aggressively drive the Army to develop its capabilities in order to support the Joint Force.

Conclusion: Air, Sea and the Missing Component - Land Power

Future conflicts could potentially take the form of AirSea battle as enemies uses A2AD capabilities to "hold back" U.S. forces and deny them access to the global commons and strategic transit points. While this potential conflict will heavily involve the U.S. Navy and Air Force, given the vast size of the Pacific ocean and the distances involved, the U.S. Army can contribute significantly in several ways.

First, the Army's new Capstone Concept outlines regional alignment as a path to the future. Aligning forces against geographic regions, like the Pacific, could build partner capacity, trust, regional deterrence, and lay the foundation for forward basing of ground forces. In order to maximize this effort, it is recommended that the Army align corps HQ with regions and subordinate divisions / BCTs with individual nations for partnership. In order to cover all the Geographic Combatant Commands, the Army should consider re-activating at least four more corps HQ. Some of these could be National Guard units for GCCs such as NORTHCOM.

Second, the Army possesses unique capabilities in fires that can complement air and sea based assets in both the defensive air defense role and offensive precision strike role. The Army could deploy the THAAD / Patriot systems to defend forward U.S. bases while ATACMS missiles, with range modifications, could be used for surface to surface attack. Emerging technologies such as directed energy weapons and Electronic Defense could supplement current ADA systems while the new hypersonic missiles could enable the JTF commander to strike at enemy launch sites and IADS facilities from extreme ranges.
Finally, the Army can contribute to the Joint Sea Base, enabling the rapid deployment of Army forces from the sea. The Joint Force Commander will increasingly use the sea as additional maneuver space to position forces.\textsuperscript{48} Future capabilities for the Army could include high speed inter and intra-theater sea lift that sustains heavy and medium forces in the JOA using austere ports. The Army should invest in the capability to download APS stocks at sea and rapidly move them over-the-horizon to shore.

In looking to the future, the United States Army acknowledges that the Middle East will remain the most likely place where significant ground forces would be used to defend national interests.\textsuperscript{49} Beyond this, the Army needs to stand ready to rapidly project land power to decisively defeat any threat to our national interests. Given its capabilities, the Army can contribute significantly to any future AirSea Battle scenario.
1 Tol, Jan Van et al., *AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept*, (Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2010), p2.


5 Ibid., 16.


8 Tol, AirSea Battle., 14.

9 Ibid., 20-22.


11 Tol, AirSea Battle, p15.

12 Ibid.


15 Ibid., 108.

16 Stockfisch, J.A., "The 1962 Howze Board and Army Combat Developments" (Prepared for the US Army by the RAND Arroyo Center, Santa Monica, 1994).


18 TRADOC Pam 525-3-0 The Army Capstone Concept, (Headquarters, Department of the Army, December 2012) p7.


21 TRADOC Pam 525-3-0, p18.

22 Ibid., 17.


26 Gunzinger, Mark, "Outside-In: Operating from Range to Defeat Iran's Anti-Access and Area-Denial Threats" (CSBA, 2011), 67.


28 Gunzinger, "Outside-In" pg 67.

29 Ibid., 86.


31 Krempinevich, *Why AirSea Battle, 18*

32 Ibid., 18.

33 JCS, *Capstone Concept*, p17.

34 Tol, AirSea Battle., 31.

35 ADP 3-0, pg1.
36 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Seabasing Joint Integrating Concept, version 1.0 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, August 01, 2005), 5.
37 US Army Concept Capability Plan (Washington, DC: US Army Training And Doctrine Command), pg IV.
38 Ibid., III.
39 Ibid., IV.
40 Ibid., 12.
42 Ibid., 14.
43 Ibid., 19.
44 Ibid., 15.
46 TRADOC Pam 525-7-10, p26.
47 Ibid., 28.
48 TRADOC Pam 527-7-10, 19.
49 TRADOC Pam 525-3-0, 11.
Bibliography


Krepinevich, Andrew F. "Why AirSea Battle." Center For Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2010: 52.


