**Abstract**

Currently, there is an understandable lack of experience in conducting operations or even training for a high intensity environment. As the focus for units and training shifts towards this spectrum, there are some fundamental capacities currently lacking in the Army's inventory. These capacities include, but are not inclusive of; the ability to be expeditionary, subsequently support reconnaissance needs at the division or corps level, and finally a force capable of exploiting success on the battlefield.

The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have established a paradigm of what the Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) is and what it is not. As the Army moves ahead through the coming budget quandary, it needs to focus on how we win our nation's wars and apply resources against that problem set. The SBCT is the ideal unit to fill existing gaps present in the US Army's mission set to win our nation's wars.

**Subject Terms**

- Stryker Brigade Combat Team
- SBCT
- expeditionary
- reconnaissance
- exploitation
- corps and division task organization
- SBCT mission

**Unclassified**

- UU
- 20
- N/A
- N/A
- N/A
- N/A
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Instructions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. REPORT DATE</td>
<td>Full publication date, including day, month, if available. Must cite at least the year and be Year 2000 compliant, e.g., 30-06-1998; xx-08-1998; xx-xx-1998.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. REPORT TYPE</td>
<td>State the type of report, such as final, technical, interim, memorandum, master's thesis, progress, quarterly, research, special, group study, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. DATES COVERED</td>
<td>Indicate the time during which the work was performed and the report was written, e.g., Jun 1997 - Jun 1998; 1-10 Jun 1996; May - Nov 1998; Nov 1998.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. TITLE</td>
<td>Enter title and subtitle with volume number and part number, if applicable. On classified documents, enter the title classification in parentheses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5a. CONTRACT NUMBER</td>
<td>Enter all contract numbers as they appear in the report, e.g. F33615-86-C-5169.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5b. GRANT NUMBER</td>
<td>Enter all grant numbers as they appear in the report, e.g. 1F665702D1257.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER</td>
<td>Enter all program element numbers as they appear in the report, e.g. AFOSR-82-1234.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5d. PROJECT NUMBER</td>
<td>Enter all project numbers as they appear in the report, e.g. 1F665702D1257; ILIR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5e. TASK NUMBER</td>
<td>Enter all task numbers as they appear in the report, e.g. 05; RF0330201; T4112.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER</td>
<td>Enter all work unit numbers as they appear in the report, e.g. 001; AFAPL30480105.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. AUTHOR(S)</td>
<td>Enter name(s) of person(s) responsible for writing the report, performing the research, or credited with the content of the report. The form of entry is the last name, first name, middle initial, and additional qualifiers separated by commas, e.g. Smith, Richard, Jr.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</td>
<td>Self-explanatory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER</td>
<td>Enter all unique alphanumeric report numbers assigned by the performing organization, e.g. BRL-1234; AFWL-TR-85-4017-Vol-21-PT-2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. SPONSORING/MONITORS AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</td>
<td>Enter the name and address of the organization(s) financially responsible for and monitoring the work.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)</td>
<td>Enter, if available, e.g. BRL, ARDEC, NADC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)</td>
<td>Enter report number as assigned by the sponsoring/monitoring agency, if available, e.g. BRL-TR-829; -215.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT</td>
<td>Use agency-mandated availability statements to indicate the public availability or distribution limitations of the report. If additional limitations/restrictions or special markings are indicated, follow agency authorization procedures, e.g. RD/FRD, PROPIN, ITAR, etc. Include copyright information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES</td>
<td>Enter information not included elsewhere such as: prepared in cooperation with; translation of; report supersedes; old edition number, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. ABSTRACT</td>
<td>A brief (approximately 200 words) factual summary of the most significant information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. SUBJECT TERMS</td>
<td>Key words or phrases identifying major concepts in the report.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION</td>
<td>Enter security classification in accordance with security classification regulations, e.g. U, C, S, etc. If this form contains classified information, stamp classification level on the top and bottom of this page.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT</td>
<td>This block must be completed to assign a distribution limitation to the abstract. Enter UU (Unclassified Unlimited) or SAR (Same as Report). An entry in this block is necessary if the abstract is to be limited.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FUTURE WAR PAPER

FILLING THE GAPS IN FULL SPECTRUM OPERATIONS:
THE STRYKER BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF OPERATIONAL STUDIES

MAJOR MARC J. AUSTIN
UNITED STATES ARMY

AY 2011-2012

Mentor: Dr Gordon Rudd, Ph.D., Professor of Military History
Approved: 24 May 2012
Date:
DISCLAIMER
THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF THE MARINE CORPS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED WARFIGHTING, THE UNITED STATES ARMY, OR ANY OTHER UNITED STATES GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY.

REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT.

QUOTATION FROM, ABSTRACTION FROM, OR REPRODUCTION OF ALL OR ANY PART OF THIS DOCUMENT IS PERMITTED PROVIDED PROPER ACKNOWLEDGEMENT IS MADE.
Executive Summary

Title: Filling the Gaps in Full Spectrum Operations: The Stryker Brigade Combat Team

Author: Major Marc J. Austin, United States Army

Thesis: The Stryker Brigade Combat Team answers existing gaps present in the US Army’s mission when conducting major combat operations, due to its capabilities, force structure, and adaptability.

Discussion: As the US Army concludes operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, there will be a renewed focus on conducting operations across the full spectrum of war. Currently there is an understandable lack of experience in conducting operations or even training for a high intensity environment. As the focus for units and training shift towards this spectrum, there are some fundamental capacities currently lacking in the Army’s inventory. These capacities include, but are not inclusive of; the ability to be expeditionary, the requirement to subsequently support reconnaissance needs at the division or corps level, and finally a force capable of exploiting success on the battlefield.

There is no guarantee of what the next conflict or war will entail, the forces needed, or even the technology necessary, but there are certain baseline operations that an Army must be capable of conducting. As the US Army modifies existing force structures, operates with a depleted budget, and rewrites its current doctrine it would be wise to reexamine what its current organizations could accomplish with little or no change.

There are a myriad of questions and concerns to address as the Army looks to the future. As we look at what our current allies are capable of or willing to undertake, it would be less than ideal to presume that we will have their full support. In addition, it is easy to look at the recent past during Operation Iraqi Freedom and identify shortfalls and failings in our doctrine. In most areas of consternation the solution to problems are already available in the Army force.

Conclusion: The current deployments in support of OIF and OEF have constrained the SBCT from fulfilling its original mission and further restrict its potential by what it has done as opposed to what it could do. The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have established a paradigm of what the SBCT is and what it is not. As the Army moves ahead through the coming budget quandary, it needs to focus on how we win our nation’s wars and apply resources against that problem set. The SBCT is the ideal unit to fill existing gaps present in the US Army’s mission set to win our nations wars.
# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PREFACE</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FORCE ANALYSIS AND DOCTRINE</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMPLICATIONS &amp; ALLIES</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CASE STUDIES FOR UTILIZATION</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RECOMMENDATION</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCLUSION</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENDNOTES</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX A:</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX B</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Preface

The Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) is a relatively new concept that has yet to be fully realized or even planned for by the US Army. Since its inception in 2003, the SBCT has deployed multiple times in support of OIF and OEF, but has never deployed in support of any other type of operation. A SBCT paradigm has been established, if semantically, bounded by the constraints and limitations of being a Stability and Support Operations (SASO) organization.

Compounded by the narrow scope of SASO and the last eight years of conflict the SBCT has confirmed its effectiveness in smaller scale conflicts. The problem with this confirmation of capabilities is the mantra, "that we do not train for the last war." Implied in that statement, is the supposition that the next conflict will not inherently be a small war, nor will employment of forces be comparable to OIF or OEF.

As the drawdown in Afghanistan begins in the face of a fiscally constrained environment, the US Army needs forces that are capable of operating across the Full Spectrum of Operations. This paper will focus on three critical capabilities that the Army must be capable of executing in order to conduct Major Combat Operations: a force that is expeditionary, can collect reconnaissance in support of a division or higher level headquarters, and a force that can conduct an exploitation. These capabilities were chosen because they are dormant or cannot currently be conducted by Army forces. Additionally, these tasks logically build off one another in concept of phased operations, they address the overwhelming nature of SBCTs as independent organizations by tying them to headquarters, and finally they highlight the capabilities that a SBCT can bring to operations other than SASO.

I would like to thank my mentor Dr. Gordon Rudd for his time, effort, and patience to make this paper engaging and readable. I would also like to thank my peers, friends, and mentors at the School of Advanced Warfighting who have challenged my ideas and expanded my views. Most importantly, I would like to thank my very understanding wife, Katie, who continues to let me live my dream.
Introduction

The current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have left the Army ill prepared to fight the nation’s wars and win them. The purpose of the US Army is to, “provide the capability-by threat, force, or occupation-to promptly gain, sustain, and exploit comprehensive control over land, resources, and people.” No other service has this mandate, and it is imperative that the Army does not look beyond its genesis. Since the 2003 invasion of Iraq the Army has focused its efforts and resources predominantly on counterinsurgency operations. Due to the lack of focus in training and the current force requirements the Army is decidedly unprepared to truly conduct operations along the spectrum of conflict continuum.

Looking to the future, the United States must anticipate threats and prepare its capacity and capability to conduct full spectrum operations across the range of military operations. As the Army rebalances its force capabilities to meet this spectrum, there are gaps in force tasks and requirements. Specifically, when conducting Major Combat Operations (MCO) the Army lacks sufficient capability to conduct reconnaissance at division or higher level, the ability to exploit success at the operational level, and an expeditionary capability to establish lodgment and successive passage of lines at the division level. The capacity to accomplish these missions is present in the Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT). Based on its capabilities, force structure, and adaptability the SBCT realizes existing gaps present in the US Army’s mission when conducting major combat operations.
**Force Analysis and Doctrine**

There are currently forty-five active duty maneuver brigades in the Army, eight of which are SBCTs. SBCTs are comprised of three maneuver battalions, reconnaissance surveillance and target acquisition (RSTA) squadron, field artillery battalion, support battalion, and organic companies of engineers, military intelligence, anti-tank, and signal. In contrast, both Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs) and Heavy Brigade Combat Teams (HBCTs) contain only two maneuver battalions. The delta is obvious when comparing squad structure and size. The HBCT fields thirty-six nine man squads; whereas the IBCT is able to field fifty-four nine man squads. The SBCT contains eighty-one, nine man squads, showing a raw number of 729 squad members; whereas the HBCT and IBCT total 324 and 486 squad members respectively.

**Stryker Brigade Combat Team**

The HBCT force, structured around the M1 Abrams and M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV), is ideal for fighting a conventional military threat. Due to its limited
expeditionary capability the HBCT requires time to establish itself in a theater and build combat power. The IBCT in contrast is a reactionary force capable of deploying quickly, with an ability to conduct Full Spectrum Operations (FSO). The deficiency of an IBCT is its survivability and lack of inherent ground mobility upon arrival in theater. These limitations are exasperated when faced with hostile conventional forces in an operating environment or a mission that requires mobility.

The SBCT is an amazing hybrid of the aforementioned units, and it requires less lift assets and time than an HBCT while providing more boots on the ground than an IBCT. Airlift can move an SBCT force, and upon arrival in theater it can quickly transition to conducting operations. Additionally it contains more Javelins, 155mm Howitzers, and mortars variants than any other BCT in the Army. To conduct operations across the spectrum of conflict, the SBCT fields an anti-armor company and twenty-seven Mobile Gun System (MGS) Stryker’s which consists of a 105mm tank cannon. The SBCT force structure truly allows for a highly mobile, independent unit capable of Full Spectrum Operations (FSO) that other BCTs are inherently incapable of conducting.

The current Army manual for the SBCT, FM 3-21.31, was published in 2003, and has not been updated since. To put this in perspective, in 2003 there was only one SBCT in the Army, and it was being stood up; whereas today there are nine active duty SBCTs that have deployed regularly for the last eight years with no updates to the FM. The manual states that:

The Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT) is designed to be a full spectrum, early entry combat force. It has utility in all operational environments against all projected future threats. It possesses significant utility for divisions and corps engaged in a major-theater war; however, the SBCT is optimized to meet the challenges of smaller-scale contingencies.
This mission statement does not match the reality of how an SBCT has been employed or even conceptualized to operate in support of OEF and OIF. There are currently eight SBCTs in the Army, and the question after eight years of conflict and facing an imminent force restructuring; why not expand the scope of the SBCT and utilize their inherent capabilities?

US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) should relook the SBCT mission and determine how best to integrate its inherent capabilities into achieving the COCOMs and Army needs. The research conducted will direct the attention to what the SBCT is, what it is not, and more importantly what it could be in our force and doctrine. This will include understanding our allies' policy, and capabilities that will necessitate an analysis of how we conduct future operations. An examination of current Army doctrine on the SBCT, and the command and control (C2) relationship of an SBCT will highlight potential pitfalls of operating independently, while uncovering flaws in our current operating model. Subsequently exploring and analyzing gaps in recent military history where the SBCT could have conducted the operation and produced the desired outcome more efficiently. Identifying these gaps in Army missions lead to a recommendation with proposed changes to the SBCT that accounts for deficiencies in the organization, doctrine, and training. The SBCT ultimately fills these gaps with its capabilities, force structure and adaptability answering the Army's future requirements.

**IMPLICATIONS & ALLIES**

Two primary factors will shape the United States' operational concepts in the next ten to fifteen years. First, the US military will have to consider what role and missions can and will our current allies conduct, and secondly, the US military will have to
confront fiscal restrictions in the coming years affecting, among others, the mission, force structure, R&D, and mission capability. These two broad factors will directly affect how the US Army should shape its capabilities and for our purposes how the SBCT can fill gaps that will no longer be viable through fiscal constraints and our allies’ lack of capabilities.

The members of NATO, who have supported the mission in Afghanistan, have undergone a radical shift in their structure and capability. The German government has recently announced the downsizing of their military to approximately 56k soldiers. One of our staunchest allies, the United Kingdom is under fiscal duress, is in the midst of a force restructuring, and has canceled multiple programs for their military. In addition, by 2020 Britain will have removed all of its troops from Germany, and with the majority of their forces based in Britain the potential remains for a change in mission for its armed forces. In the Pacific theater, the US has recently strengthened alliances with Australia through a new military pact, and the US has continued their annual exercises with other allies in the Pacific region. The counter to this is a decrease in relations with Pakistan, an expansion of Chinese influence, and the overall lack of US presence in this hemisphere of the world. Current operational concepts advocate coalition warfare, but based upon drawdowns and political sentiments is that a viable assumption? The closure of Joint Force Command makes this a question with a vacuum as the answer. If it is not, then the capability and mission sets that the US Army needs to foster is different from the ones it is currently operating under.

If our allies are incapable or unwilling to conduct operations with the US then the nation’s military must be shaped realize this necessity. This possibility would realize a
deficiency in capability and capacity that will require US forces that can react to threats quickly and independently. To further elaborate, the fiscal problems that our allies are currently weathering could force them to relook at their force projection capabilities outside of operations necessary to defend their immediate national interests.

Uniquely tied to this dilemma is the arena of public opinion in these countries. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are unpopular overseas;\textsuperscript{45} with the idea of sustained future ground wars even less appealing. The Army must have the capability to conduct missions under these auspices; deploying a force quickly with the requisite security capability to accomplish or initiate the required mission while implementing a command and control network that establishes the initial interface for the operational environment.

\textbf{US Army and the Way Ahead:}

As the Army prepares for future contingencies, it has begun the process of rewriting doctrine and introducing new concepts in TRADOC Pam 525-3-6, The US Army Functional Concept for Movement and Maneuver, which prescribes the concept of Combined Arms Maneuver and Wide Area Security. These concepts will be the foundation for all future Army operations and clarifies capabilities needed in Army units.

Combined Arms Maneuver is the combination of the elements of combat power with the integration and sequencing of all actions, activities, and programs necessary to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative in the context of full-spectrum operations.\textsuperscript{6}

Wide area security is the application of the elements of combat power in coordination with other military and civilian capabilities to deny the enemy positions of advantage; protect forces, populations, infrastructure, and activities; and consolidate tactical and operational gains to set conditions for achieving strategic and policy goals.\textsuperscript{7}

The division and corps are the only organizations robust enough and capable of fighting the campaign, planning ahead (intermediate objectives), and coordinating with
outside resources. Taking this idea forward, the Army must apportion forces to corps and
division mission sets that allow the formation to train and deploy these forces to
successfully execute these missions (See Appendix A).

These concepts reinforce corps and division operations. Some key words from
both definitions, "combination, integration, sequencing, all, programs, application,
coordination, civilian, and strategic and policy goals," infer the need for a command
headquarters capable of synthesizing the forces, information, plans, and outside resources
into a single campaign.

The Army corps and division structure are designed to command and control the
battlefield. As such, a BCT was neither resourced nor designed to plan while conducting
operations, but intended to move with the fight and exploit successes on the battlefield.
In addition, the current force structure is not conducive to conducting wide area security
nor combined arms maneuver. The challenge faced by the Army is a result of the
transition to modular BCTs, a cold war construct, which was designed to operate in a
conventional war environment. The BCT force restructuring decreased the number of
Infantry forces that deploy within a BCTs framework and decentralized operations to the
brigade level. OEF and OIF operations have struggled to balance this transition, as the
parent headquarters for brigades are usually not the same headquarters that provides the
command and control during the deployment. In addition, with the removal of a third
maneuver battalion from each brigade, BCTs can no longer place the same amount of
forces into operations without changing task organization and retraining organic forces
(RSTA, FA, Scouts, Mortars, and Company Teams in CABs). Focusing an SBCT along
lines of capabilities more logically orients these limitations: expeditionary capability, reconnaissance, and an exploitation force.

Additionally, the Army’s only remaining corps level unit designed to conduct reconnaissance, the Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR), has transformed to a Stryker Cavalry Regiment. The ACR was a unique organization designed around M1s and M2s, with organic aviation, artillery, and service support capable of conducting operations without adding outside resources. In comparison, the Battlefield Surveillance Brigade (BFSB) is the only reconnaissance-designed unit available to a commander today. It has one light squadron, approximately 450 soldiers, available to conduct reconnaissance operation. While it is very capable as an intelligence reach-back organization, it lacks a decisive capability to place boots on the ground to conduct reconnaissance missions (See Appendix B).

Designed for deployment anywhere in the world the XVIII Airborne Corps of the US Army is referred to as "America’s Contingency Corps". The reality however, is that this mission statement is more of a limitation due to its capabilities based upon its force structure. Light divisions while “rapid“ are limited in capacity by capabilities, and a heavy division is only “rapid" after its platforms are mission ready on the ground with a robust logistics package. While the XVIII Airborne Corps will continue in its role, there needs to be a unit capable of an expeditionary response that has more applicability with both capacity and capability that bridges the gap across the range of military operations.

For the purpose of this paper, expeditionary is defined as the ability to project (by air, sea, or land) a fully operational force into any theater of operations regardless of maturity or infrastructure, to conduct independent operations without the
need for outside resources, to possess organic mobility for independent maneuver across the theater, and to possess the ability to debark said force in support of COCOM requirements in under thirty days. The Army currently fails to train and equip its forces with the capacity to be expeditionary; and in its defense, the Army has not conducted operations in an environment or mission set that required expeditionary capability. To believe that the US military will always possess the freedom to mass forces in a mature theater of operations with advanced infrastructure is an assumption that will lead to failure. "Maturity" and "infrastructure" are separate in that; maturity means "an advanced level of military buildup of forces and resources to effectively conduct RSOI," and infrastructure means "an advanced transportation system capable of supporting rapid movement of large, heavy vehicles across great distances." An SBCT requires neither.

In most military scenarios requiring a forcible entry operation, it is understood, the Marine Corps will establish the initial point of entry. The problem lies in that there is currently no Army BCT capable to respond with the inherent level of capability needed for a forcible entry operation. A unit capable of deploying in trace of the USMC and establishing the initial architecture needed to conduct operations is currently lacking. Further, the Army needs to be capable of conducting link up with USMC forces at the transition point of a forced entry operation and conducting that forward passage of lines. The only organization that could deploy rapidly, is mobile and survivable, and is robust enough to operate in an immature theater with the Marines is a Stryker BCT.

The SBCTs' unique force structure and platform allows it to fill the requirements desirable of an expeditionary unit. The Stryker, which is airlift and sealift capable, is able to conduct operations upon arrival in a theater. Further the Stryker is a 3rd
generation vehicle whose Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capability, and communication system allows it to establish a common operating picture of the battlefield and facilitate the reception of initial Army forces into theater. The SBCTs robust military intelligence capabilities working in conjunction with its Unmanned Arial System (UAS) section and RSTA battalion can form the nucleus for most reconnaissance efforts to establish the initial understanding on the ground. The SBCT maneuver battalions expand the capacity to allow for traditional reconnaissance missions of screen, guard, and cover.

**Combat Vehicle Lift Comparisons**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cargo Weight</th>
<th>&quot;H&quot; Range (NM)</th>
<th>&quot;J&quot; Range (NM)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>885 NM</td>
<td>1400 NM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>900 NM</td>
<td>1000 NM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42,000</td>
<td>60 NM</td>
<td>80 NM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note the capability shift in asset availability between an M1 vs M2 vs Stryker ability to deploy via air.

Reconnaissance is ultimately, the ability to provide timely and confirmed information to make and execute decisions more rapidly and effectively than the adversary. Reconnaissance above the level of a BCT is a lost art within the Army. There is no organization capable of establishing a common operational understanding of the battlefield from the ground to COCOMs, Corps Commanders and even Division.
Commanders. The ability to conduct reconnaissance is an imperative when conducting major combat operations. While the SBCT is not an ACR, nor could it act in that capacity, it does have the soldiers, sensors, mobility, and technological capabilities to conduct reconnaissance and inform the required commander.

The SBCT is an ideally suited organization to exploit an operational success on the battlefield, which is a final inherent need to conduct major combat operations. No Army unit has the ability to “take full advantage of success in military operations,” in that there is no exploitation force capable of operating in all environments. HBCTs do not have the capability to exploit success when confronted with population’s centers or light forces, and IBCTs lack the mobility and survivability required during major combat operations. For many of the same reasons that it would be ideal as an Expeditionary and a Reconnaissance unit, it could easily and successfully transition to an Exploitation force.

The SBCT as a unit is the answer to the above requirements and answers the forthcoming resource and fiscal dilemma the Army will face. The SBCTs have the ability to deploy quickly and operate in most environments. Technologically advanced enough, the SBCT can transfer and receive data, and has the capability to maintain pace with HBCTs to exploit any success or engage peripheral targets as needed. As read in the SBCT mission statement, the units could easily transition and expand their role within the Army and military structure of operations.

**Case Studies for Utilization**

On 3 October 1993, the 2d Battalion, 14th Infantry, 10th Mountain Division was conducting operations in Somalia. As a light infantry force they were suppressed and unable to maneuver, limited by mobility, and incapable of supporting the Rangers as they
encountered a crisis in Mogadishu. Again, in the invasion of Iraq V Corps did not have a force capable of moving with the 3rd Infantry Division and exploiting their success as they moved north. In these examples the US Army lacked a unit or force capable of meeting the requirement and was forced to adapt with extensive losses or was unable to fill the mission need. If the SBCT is a force multiplier that is properly aligned then it has the potential to provide capabilities that are lacking to accomplish tasks and missions within the US Army doctrine and mission sets that are left unfilled.

In 2004, 2-7 Cavalry, 3 Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division was attached to the Marine Regimental Combat Team-1 (RCT-1) for the Battle for Fallujah. During that time 2-7 CAV penetrated into the city destroying enemy positions and vehicles and engaged targets of opportunity. RCT-1 then employed its Marine units to conduct dismounted clearance operations, as they had an abundance of Infantry, but lacked the survivability of a mechanized unit.

This operation highlights the exploitation capability currently lacking in the Army mission set. 2-7 CAV during OIF II was attached to 11th MEU for both the Battles of Najaf and Fallujah because it had the firepower to conduct major combat operations, but it lacked the soldiers necessary to clear, seize or hold the terrain. The MEU was the perfect complement, due to the number of Marine infantry available that could fight. This force acted as the exploitation force to the penetration that 2-7 CAV conducted. This recent example of joint operations highlights a deficiency that Army doctrine and unit mission capability is lacking. Mechanized and armor forces possess an incredible amount of firepower, but the force structure lacks sufficient infantrymen to operate in highly populated areas. This limitation is present in the HBCT and will continue even in
the event that the Army adds an additional CAB to each HBCT. The IBCT in
comparison lacks the mobility and survivability to keep pace with an HBCT and as
already mentioned has a smaller amount of forces to employ.

A final example of a deficient capability occurred after the fall of Baghdad in
2003. Intelligence indicated that about two thousand paramilitaries and elements of the
Adnan Division of the Republic Guard were holding Tikrit, and the military needed to
respond to this threat. The mission was to continue the attack north, seize Tikrit, and
deny the enemy the ability to escape. There was no Army unit capable of moving
approximately 150 kilometers north, with a small logistical footprint, and capable of
rapidly achieving mission success. The Marines were assigned the mission even though
they did not have a cohesive organization designed for such a mission. They improvised
by grouping their three LAR battalions into Task Force Tripoli, which was mobile and
survivable, yet light enough to successfully complete the assigned mission.13

After highlighting recent historical situations, it is easy to see the need to expand
the SBCT's scope of operations from one of stability operations that they are currently
viewed as, to an integral part of the Army's mission set and plan. The SBCT by nature is
not designed to fight force on force via its vehicles, but instead enables the movement of
soldiers on the battlefield to the assault position where they will then execute their
assigned mission dismounted. The SBCT is a perfect complement to an HBCT when it
reaches an urban area, and could even conduct operations independent of the HBCT to
secure urban areas on the flanks and to the rear vis-à-vis 101st Airborne (Air Assault) in
support of 3rd Infantry Divisions movement to Baghdad. In the case of TF Tripoli, the
SBCT is an organized force structure that is larger, has more organic firepower,
technologically more advanced, and has a command and control structure in place that precludes the need to improvise.

**Recommendations:**

First and foremost the “interim” status of the SBCT should be removed and the concept should be recognized as a viable organization that should be better incorporated into future operational plans. In recognizing the permanent nature of the organization and its broad capabilities, TRADOC should strike the limiting missions within the Field Manual limiting the SBCT, “to meet the challenges of smaller-scale contingencies.” Rewritten the passage should highlight the SBCT’s capability across the full spectrum of operations, and major combat operations.

The SBCT manual, FM 3-21.31, warrants a revision to incorporate lessons from the field since its publication in 2003. This FM should address the training, employment, and revised tactics required to conduct reconnaissance and exploitation. These mission capabilities cannot come at the expense of maintaining the SBCT’s expeditionary capability. Additionally the SBCT manual should rethink the definition of the SBCT from an ethereal statement, to one tied to tasks and missions with a clear purpose. The definition should read as a mission statement defining it as an expeditionary force bridging the gap for Army Forces, keeping higher headquarters informed via reconnaissance, and capable of filling the role of an exploitation force. Linked to these tasks and missions is a purpose of supporting the COCOMs or Corps mission and need. The change in format, highlights its capacity and capability while directly informing the unit and higher of its mission focus while confirming its C2 relationship.
To implement changes in the SBCT and initiate a foundation from which SBCT mission requirements change, TRADOC should ensure a residual command and control relationship is established. Five of the eight current SBCTs, are independent BCTS, and they do not have a C2 structure tied directly to a corps or division. Under these auspices there are two answers to aligning these brigades for future operations. One option is to align SBCTs under corps headquarters, allowing the corps to attach them to divisions or use them as independent maneuver formations. The other option entails regionally aligning the SBCTs to COCOMs. Either option would enable focused training and the formation of habitual C2 relationships.

By aligning independent SBCTs with a higher headquarters it further reinforces the mission sets and type of operations that SBCTs would train for and deploy in support of. It would further establish and delineate the framework for these operations and how the C2 architecture would work. This realignment would also enable the C2 organization to incorporate the SBCT capabilities into their initial plans. Finally, when tasking an organization to establish a foothold (expeditionary) and answer Priority Information Requirements (PIR) (reconnaissance) it is inherently smoother when operating with known entities.

In order for the SBCT to maintain its independence while operating in an expeditionary and reconnaissance role it needs to increase its logistical capacity. The solution is the addition of at least six Forward Support Company’s (FSC) to the Support Battalion. This addition, which is already present in all other BCT structures, is essential in that the FSC is the principle logistical facilitator in all other Army BCT organizations.
This would fill the maintenance and recovery gap and provide a logistical throughput at the Battalion level that it currently cannot accomplish.

The SBCTs need to adopt a program similar to the USMC Unit Deployment Program (UDP) in order to enhance the SBCT expeditionary capability, refine its mission set, and exercise command control networks with a Corps or the designated C2 Headquarters. The Marines designed the UDP to continue their forward deployed presence while reducing the number of unaccompanied tours and improve unit continuity.\textsuperscript{14} Renamed the Contingency Validation Exercise (CVE), the SBCT would be available to deploy worldwide in support or real world COCOM requests. The CVE should be tied to an ARFORGEN cycle with a validation exercise in the form of a Mission Readiness Exercise (MRE) that is then confirmed by conducting a CVE in support of COCOM requirements. The SBCTs focus would be to exercise and provide rigor to the expeditionary capability of the unit, confirm mission readiness when deployed, and reaffirm and enhance the C2 architecture while deployed. The CVE would additionally incorporate or enhance existing relationships with our allies through these exercises.

Linked to the CVE is the ability to employ forces across distances from different mediums. While the Stryker is airlift capable, that is currently the only trained for option by most of the SBCT force. By incorporating the Navy’s High Speed Vessel (HSV), formerly known as the Joint HSV, allows for the movement of the SBCT by sea. Each HSV can move fourteen Stryker’s and soldiers 400 miles in 10 hours.\textsuperscript{15} Utilizing another delivery method increases the SBCTs’ responsiveness and expeditionary capability.
Incorporating the HSV into CVEs' decreases the single point of failure of airlift, and exercises all available options that a COCOM has.

The final recommendation is to increase the effective interoperability of a SBCT when conducting the prescribed mission sets. A SBCT should be adaptable to work with Marine Corp formations to effectively establish a footprint and smoothly transition to the reconnaissance mission. Further, an SBCT should conduct exercises with HBCTs and IBCTs to establish the capacity to serve as an exploitation force. Such operations are not currently trained nor properly planned for, and are inherently difficult to conduct.

**Conclusion:**

In order for the SBCT to effectively integrate into future operational plans the Army should implement changes to utilize the SBCT to its full capabilities, task its force structure for designed mission sets and highlight the adaptable nature of this organization. The SBCT has the capability and size to fill gaps in future operations of the Army in fighting and winning the wars of our nation. The identification of future threats and capabilities needed to combat adversaries requires a shift in doctrine, force structure, and inter-service cooperation not currently achieved nor realized.

The SBCT organization has not trained, nor fought in fulfillment of its original design and currently constrains itself by recent operations as opposed to what its capabilities would allow it to perform. The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have established a paradigm of what the SBCT is and what it is not. As the Army moves ahead through the coming budget quandary, it should focus on how the Army wins our nation’s wars and apply resources against that problem set. The SBCT is the ideal unit to fill existing gaps present in the US Army’s mission set to win United States wars.
1 Headquarters Department of the Army, The Army; FM 1. (Headquarters Department of
the Army, Washington DC, June 2005), CH 1

2 Maneuver Center of Excellence, SBCT Organization, Slide Number 2, April 2012

(Headquarters Department of the Army, Washington DC, September 2010), CH 1

4 “Poll reveals 70 per cent of Germans doubt success in Afghanistan.” Monsters and
Critics.com, 5 OCT 2011. Web 26 NOV 2011

5 “Public support for Afghan war slides: poll.” AFP News, 6 OCT 2011. Web 26 NOV
2011

6 Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate, Army Strategic Planning Guidance, (400
Army Pentagon, ,Washington, DC, 2011), 13

7 Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate, Army Strategic Planning Guidance, (400
Army Pentagon, ,Washington, DC, 2011), 14


9 Maneuver Center of Excellence, SBCT Organization, Slide Numbers 21-22, April
2012

10 Headquarters Department of the Army, Operational Terms and Graphics, FM 1-02.
(Headquarters Department of the Army, Washington DC, September 2004), 1-75.


APPENDIX A: Army Organization with Corps and Division Structure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field Army (3-5 Corps)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corps (2-5 Divisions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division (1 Brigade) 10,000 - 18,000 Soldiers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigade (3 or more Battalions) 3,000 - 5,000 Soldiers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battalion (1 - 5 Companies) 500 - 600 Soldiers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company (1 - 4 Platoons) 100 - 200 Soldiers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Platoon (1 - 4 Squads) 10 - 40 Soldiers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Squad A - 10 Soldiers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Corps: 20,000 to 40,000 soldiers. The Corps is the deployable level of command required to synchronize and sustain combat operations. It also provides the framework for multinational operations. The Corps provides command, control and logistical support of two to five divisions. The Corps is commanded by a Lieutenant General (L-8) who is assisted by a Command Sergeant Major (E-9) and an extensive Corps staff. There are currently four Corps in the Active Army - three with Headquarters in the Continental United States (I, III, and XVII Corps) and one in Germany (V Corps).

Division: 10,000 to 16,000 soldiers. The Division performs major tactical operations and can conduct sustained battles and engagements. Divisions are numbered (e.g., 1st Armored Division, 82nd Airborne Division) and are categorized by one of five types: Light Infantry, Mechanized Infantry, Armor, Airborne, or Air Assault. The Division is commanded by a Major General (O-8) who is assisted by two Principal Brigadier Generals (O-7) who perform duties as Assistant Division Commanders - one for Maneuver and one for Support. The Command Sergeant Major (E-9) is the principal non-commissioned officer assistant. Divisions are comprised of three tactical maneuver (Infantry and/or Armor) Brigades and a Division base of combat support and combat service support elements. There are currently ten divisions in the Active Army and eight Divisions in the Reserves/National Guard. In October 1999, The Army established two Integrated Divisions (the 7th Infantry Division and 24th Infantry Division) consisting of an Active Component headquarters commanded by an Active Component Major General (O-8), and three Army National Guard Enhanced Separate Brigades. 

19
APPENDIX B: HBCT, IBCT, & BFSB Force Structure

Infantry Brigade Combat Team

Diagram of Infantry Brigade Combat Team
### Heavy Brigade Combat Team

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>185</th>
<th>BSTB</th>
<th>504</th>
<th>627</th>
<th>627</th>
<th>425</th>
<th>318</th>
<th>1025</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### BATTLEFIELD SURVEILLANCE BRIGADE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>181</th>
<th>TUAS</th>
<th>27</th>
<th>MI</th>
<th>282</th>
<th>325</th>
<th>35</th>
<th>SPT</th>
<th>175</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

- FORMING SUPPORT PLATFORM
- PROVIDES SUPPORT FOR 4TH M W

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HHC</th>
<th>HHC</th>
<th>HHC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PAGE A-1</td>
<td>PAGE A-6</td>
<td>PAGE A-18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- TECH COLLECT
- COLLECT & EXPLOIT
- HUMINT
ANNEX C: SBCT- Assets, Capabilities, and Sustainment Capabilities

Stryker Brigade Combat Team

**SBCT SUSTAINMENT**

**ASSET**
- **Brigade Support BN**
  - HHC
    - 1 x RSTA Field Feeding TM (2 x HEMTT)
    - 3 x MNVR Field Feeding TM (3 x HEMTT)
    - 1 x FA Field Feeding TM (1 x HEMTT)
    - 1 x Field Feeding TM (1 x HEMTT)
  - HQ and Distribution CO
    - Trans FLT
      - (20 x HEMTT)
    - Supply SPT PLT
      - (3 x HEMTT, 3 x MHE)
      - CL IX SEC
        - (3 x HEMTT, 2 x MHE)
      - ATP SEC
        - (3 x HEMTT, 2 x MHE)
    - Fuel and WTR SPT PLT
      - (14 x HEMTT Fuelers)
      - (42 x fuel drums (500k), 14 x FARE)
      - (3 x WTR Drums (500k), 2 x RCPWUs)
      - (3 x WTR QA Sets, 6 x HEMTT LMS)
      - (6 x FAWPSS)

**CAPABILITIES**
- Lift Capability for movement of all classes of supply (minus WTR and CL III (B))
- Receives and issues CL I, II, III (P), IV, VII, and IX. Operates ATP.
- Distribute 138 STONS/Daily
- Distro CL III (B) to CO level 27,000 gal.
- Purifies and Distro bulk WTR, Distro 13,000 gal store 24,000 gal.
### SBCT SUSTAINMENT

#### Forward Maintenance CO
1 x Maint Ctrl SEC  
(1 x HEMTT)  
1 x Service Recovery SEC  
(4 x HEMTT Wrkr)  
4 x Combat Repair Team (CRT)  
(2 x HEMTT Wrkr, 2 x FRS)  
1 x FA CRT  
(2 x HEMTT Wrkr, 1 x FRS)  
1 x Wheeled Vehicle Repair PLT  
(3 x HEMTT Wrkr, 3 x FRS, 1 x MHE)  
1 x Maintenance SPT PLT  
1 x GND SPT EQUIP Repair SEC  
1 x MSL/ELEC Repair SEC

- Maint to FMC standards. Replacement/BCR. Self and like vehicle recovery.  
- BSC maintain BSB/sep CO's and provides BAF and contact team maint to CRTs.

#### Medical CO
1 x Preventative Med SEC  
1 x Mental Health SEC  
1 x Med Treatment PLT  
1 x Medical SEC  
(3 x Ambulance)  
1 x Area SPT SQD  
1 x MED Treatment SQD  
(2 x Ambulance)  
1 x PAT Holding SQD  
1 x EVAC PLT  
3 x EVAC SQD  
(4 x Ambulance)  
2 x EVAC SQD  
(5 x Ambulance)  
1 x CORPS Slice  
1 x FWD Surgical TM  
1 x Medical DET  
Telemedicine TM

- Level I Area SPT.  
- Level II CHS.  
- Clinic Lab and Blood SPT  
- Med LOG SPT (CL VIII)  
- Digital Imaging Rad SPT  
- Dental Services  
- Med Force Protection  
- Combat Stress Control  
- 20 ctt Patient Holding Cap  
- Integrated EVAC  
- Reconstitute FWD  
- Forward Surgery. 30 Cases over 72 hrs.  
- Telemedicine Reach back CAP

#### Maneuver BN
3 x Maneuver BN  
2 x MEDEVAC SQD  
(2 x Stryker Ambulance)  
1 x Medical Treatment SQD  
(2 x Ambulance)  
1 x RSTA BN  
2 x MEDEVAC SQD  
(2 x Stryker Ambulance)  
1 x Medical Treatment SQD  
(2 x Ambulance)  
1 x FA BN  
1 x MEDEVAC SQD  
(3 x Ambulance)  
1 x Medical Treatment TM  
(1 x Ambulance)
Headquarters Department of the Army, Operations, FM 3-0. Headquarters Department of the Army, Washington DC, February 2008

Headquarters Department of the Army, Brigade Combat Team, FM 3-90.6. Headquarters Department of the Army, Washington DC, September 2010

Headquarters Department of the Army, The Stryker Brigade Combat Team, FM 3-21.31. Headquarters Department of the Army, Washington DC, September 2010

Headquarters Department of the Army, Commander and Staff Officer Guide, ATTP 5-0.1. Headquarters Department of the Army, Washington DC, September 2011

Headquarters Joint Chief of Staff, Joint Operations, JP 3-0. Joint Staff, Washington DC, September 2011


http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iZLSJySmvZq1xO6SW6J8rZA4zcsA?docId=CNG.8d34462f34375c1e4d31bb4792e6d873.571