1. Report Date (DD-MM-YYYY) 09-02-2012
2. Report Type Master of Operational Studies Research Paper
3. Dates Covered (From - To) August 2011 - June 2012

4. Title and Subtitle
   Orienting the Marine Corps to Operate Across the Joint Force Continuum

5a. Contract Number N/A
5b. Grant Number N/A
5c. Program Element Number N/A
5d. Project Number N/A
5e. Task Number N/A
5f. Work Unit Number N/A

6. Author(S)
   Choat, Darrel L. Major, United States Marine Corps

7. Performing Organization Name(S) and Address(Es)
   USMC School of Advanced Warfighting
   Marine Corps University
   3070 Moreell Avenue
   Quantico, VA 22134-5068

8. Performing Organization Report Number N/A

9. Sponsoring/Monitoring Agency Name(S) and Address(Es) N/A

10. Sponsor/Monitor's Acronym(s) N/A

11. Sponsoring/Monitoring Agency Report Number N/A

12. Distribution Availability Statement Unlimited

13. Supplementary Notes N/A

14. Abstract
   Fiscal austerity and the end of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are forcing the services to downsize, examine their structure, and discern a posture that will address asymmetric and conventional threats. This austere atmosphere presents opportunities to capitalize on lessons learned over the past decade and establish a structure that will endure and serve future Marines. While the Marine Corps has the wherewithal to train, conduct, capture lessons learned, and prepare for future conventional fights (phase 2 and 3 of the Joint Force Continuum), it lacks the ability and commitment to apply these skills toward engagement, security and stability operations, and governance requirements that inevitably follow combat operations. Two case studies illustrate the conduct of operations across the joint force continuum, while a headquarters-level organization to capture, organize, preserve, and apply these lessons, as well as establish direct support teams at the MEF level to support the warfighter across the Joint Force Continuum is proposed.

15. Subject Terms
   Joint Force Continuum, MCDP 1-0, fiscal austerity, downsizing.

16. Security Classification of:
   a. Report Unclassified
   b. Abstract Unclassified
   c. This Page Unclassified

17. Limitation of Abstract UU

18. Number of Pages 19

19a. Name of Responsible Person
   Marine Corps University / School of Advanced Warfighting

19b. Telephone Number (Include area code)
   (703) 432-5318 (Admin Office)
FUTURE WAR PAPER

TITLE:
Orienting the Marine Corps to Operate Across the Joint Force Continuum

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF OPERATIONAL STUDIES

AUTHOR:
Major Darrel L. Choat

AY 2011-12

Mentor: Gordon W. Rude
Approved: C.W. Rude
Date: 29 May 2012
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Fiscal austerity and the end of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are not only forcing the services to downsize but also to examine their structure and how to posture themselves to address asymmetric as well as conventional threats following a decade of conflict. As challenging as downsizing and force reductions will be, this austere atmosphere presents opportunities to capitalize on lessons learned over the past decade and establish a structure that will endure and serve future Marines. The 2010 update of MCDP 1-0 recognizes that Marine Corps responsibilities extend across the joint force continuum and directs the Marine Corps to be able to conduct military engagement and to counter irregular threats, but also to be able to conduct security and stability operations including the initial establishment of military government. While the Marine Corps has the wherewithal to train, conduct, capture lessons learned, and prepare for future conventional fights (phase 2 and 3), it lacks the ability and commitment to apply these same skills toward engagement, security and stability operations, and governance requirements that inevitably follow combat operations. Through two case studies that illustrate the conduct of operations across the joint force continuum, the need for appropriate institutions to capture, preserve, and apply the lessons-learned of non-lethal operations to future challenges is suggested. Finally, a headquarters-level organization to capture, organize, preserve, and apply these lessons, as well as establish direct support teams at the MEF level to support the warfighter is proposed.
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Introduction

While Marine Corps ethos and training readily embrace phase 2-(Seize the Initiative) and phase 3 (Dominate) operations of the joint warfare continuum (see appendix A), 21st Century strategic requirements require military forces to possess capabilities beyond lethal—or so-called "kinetic operations"—aspects of warfare. For example, ongoing forward presence commitments and operations in Afghanistan require Marines to capably and effectively conduct operations across the joint force continuum, from phase 0 (Shape) to phase 5 (Enable Civil Authority). Engagement, a “key” to the National Security Strategy, at minimum requires expertise in phase 0, phase 1, and phase 5 operations. While a wealth of experience has been gained by Marines across the joint continuum over the past decade, these have been hard lessons learned in the midst of combat and often in the absence of support or training from higher headquarters. Furthermore, as Marines retire and leave active service in a era of down-sizing, resident experts will be lost at the rapid rate.

No coherent Marine Corps structure exists to capture, retain, organize non-lethal lessons learned so they can be readily applied by phase of the joint force continuum in the future. If captured, these lessons could be used to train and assist Marines who currently confront, and those who will confront, similar challenges or adversaries across the joint warfare continuum. A “mish-mash” of “stove piped” offices, activities, centers, and groups currently exist at the headquarters, Marine Corps, level that address discrete aspects of the joint force continuum. As a true force in readiness, however, the Marine Corps should institutionalize its organic expertise and lessons learned across the force and create MEF-level elements to provide critical assistance to combat units engaged across the joint warfare continuum.
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The current political and strategic environment facing the Marine Corps, the updated strategic-level guidance that directs the Marine Corps to conduct engagement, security and stability operations (to include initial military government), and the provision of an Iraq case study demonstrate how Marine units conduct phase 0 to phase 5 operations in fulfillment of a combat mission. A way forward to update the Marine Corps support establishment, recognize strategic guidance, and support the Marine Corps warfighter across the full continuum of the 21st-century battlefield is needed.

Political Environment

In 2007, under the leadership of Commandant General James Conway, the Marine Corps expanded from an end strength of 186,492 to a fiscal year 2009 end strength of 202,786, which it has maintained to the current year. In Congressional testimony on February 15, 2007, General Conway argued that the increase was necessary to "reduce the strain of forces and position them for the long war against terrorism by increasing time at home for units between deployments. The additional time at home will also allow the services to prepare their forces for missions in areas besides Iraq and Afghanistan."

Budget realities, a political environment that is examining the level of federal spending devoted to national defense, the end of operations in Iraq, and the winding down of operations in Afghanistan have prompted the Department of Defense and the Marine Corps to fundamentally examine missions and budget priorities. In light of this change in circumstances, the Marine Corps began a force structure review in the fall of 2010 that ultimately recommended a return to the end strength of 2007, approximately 186,400. In some cases, the review recommended a return to 2007 conditions such as the deactivation of 9th Marine Regiment, reducing the number of Marine infantry battalions by three to 24. Perhaps more important are proposals to create five
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JTF capable MEB headquarters aligned with combatant commands and increases in civil affairs groups, MARFORCYBER command, and MARSOC. While downsizing will likely be an imperative in future years, this transition also presents an opportunity to reorganize or restructure to better address future challenges. A well managed transition will not only consider Marine Corps end-strength, but also and more importantly, where and how Marines should be employed to the greatest strategic effect.

Strategic Environment

The late 20th and early 21st centuries have been shaped (or disrupted) by social and technological forces that have brought tribal, religious, or ethnic differences to the fore. These forces have contributed to the breakup of empires such as the Soviet Union and facilitated the "colored" revolutions in Eastern Europe and the "Arab Spring." The proliferation, decreasing cost, and greater accessibility of communications technologies ensures that this trend will continue into the 21st century. As the disaffected segments of a population are increasingly able to communicate and organize outside of the purview of unresponsive governments, stability will decline. The ability of trans-national criminals, terrorists, and insurgents to communicate and organize is also likely to increase, again with corresponding harm or threat to stability.²

The need for forward deployment or engagement to shape the battlefield and develop relationships that will facilitate access for United States forces in response to a crisis in unstable environments is therefore more important than ever before. While the United States must continue to prepare for conventional threats, recent experience indicates that it is unlikely that potential adversaries will confront the United States in a conventional manner. A major lesson for adversaries in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars is that asymmetrical approaches to counter the overwhelming conventional power of the United States can be effective. Thus, using Iraq as a
model to shape the size and composition of future United States forces could be a mistake. One analyst goes so far as to state that, since no adversary will challenge the United States directly and conventionally, the overwhelming technical and conventional arsenal of the United States has become obsolete. Ironically then, the United States’ overwhelming superiority in fighting conventional war nearly ensures it will not fight another conventional war. With this in mind, while the United States must be prepared to fight a conventional war, engagement will be a critical tool to shape the non-conventional battlefield.

Updated Strategic Guidance

The U.S. Congress established the enduring composition and functions of the Marine Corps in Title 10, United States Code. On this basis, the President and Secretary of Defense assign specific activities to the Marine Corps. These activities, found in Department of Defense Directive 5100.1 (DODIR 5100.1), were established in 1987 and updated in 2002 and 2010. Reflecting changes in defense guidance and in contrast to the 2001 version of MCDP 1-0 which focused the Marine Corps on phases 2 and 3 of the joint force continuum, the 2010 edition emphasizes key roles that Marine Corps units are required to play across the range of military operations and across all phases of the joint force continuum. The 2010 version of MCDP 1-0, for example, updates Marine Corps functions by adding two functions and directing that the Marine Corps shall:

- Conduct amphibious operations, including engagement, crisis response, and power projection operations, to assure access. The Marine Corps has primary responsibility for the development of amphibious doctrine, tactics, techniques, and equipment.

- Conduct security and stability operations and assist with the initial establishment of a military government, pending transfer of this responsibility to other authority.
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In response to the 2010 update, a formal Marine Corps review of the security environment, strategic direction, public law, and departmental policy and guidance was conducted. This review considered the changed geostrategic context and recognized that "21st-century security challenges cannot be solved by any single nation or by military action alone." As a result of this review, MCPD 1-0 lists the following as the first and last items among five interrelated tasks that Marine Corps forces must be able to perform:

Conduct military engagement. The ability of the Marine Corps to conduct military engagement is essential to building partner capability and capacity, forging relationships across cultural barriers, and promoting diplomatic access. Sea-based military engagement also facilitates interaction while treading lightly on the sovereignty of the partner-nations. Forward posture is critical to providing effective engagement and ensuring rapid response to crises.

Counter irregular threats. These operations involve military force, usually in combination with the other elements of power, in the affairs of another state whose government is unstable, inadequate, or unsatisfactory. Military measures may not, by themselves, restore peace and order because the fundamental causes of unrest may be economic, political, or social. Often these operations occur in response to crises under austere conditions. They are the modern manifestation of our "small wars" legacy.

Note that under Counter irregular threats, MCDP 1-0 recognizes that military force should be used with other elements of power and that military measures may not be adequate to restore peace and order. In that regard, these operations "are [a] modern manifestation of [the Marine Corps'] 'small wars' legacy." By bookending the interrelated tasks of the Marine Corps with these functions, MCDP 1-0 recognizes that Marine Corps responsibilities extend across the joint phasing model continuum of operations. While Marine Corps training and support organizations are well prepared to support operations in phases 2 and 3, little attention has been given to preparing Marine units to succeed in phases 0, 1, 4 and 5.

The case studies reviewed below provide examples of engagement at opposite ends of the joint force continuum. The first examines the actions of Lima Company, 3d Battalion, 7th
Marines in Ramadi, Iraq, in 2007, as violence rapidly declined and the “al Anbar awakening” took hold. In the second example, Marine Observer/Controllers assisted the 31st Georgian Light Infantry Battalion in a benign training environment in a friendly third country (Germany) in a Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRE) designed to prepare the Georgian battalion to deploy to Afghanistan and attach to Regimental Combat Team-8. Afterward, a discussion of strengths and weaknesses of Marine Corps efforts to pursue engagement will be offered as well as suggested structural changes to more effectively conduct engagement and meet the goals of the National Security Strategy.

FLEXIBILITY AND ADAPTABILITY OF THE MARINE INFANTRY COMPANY

In April 2007, 3d Battalion, 7th Marines (3/7), conducted a Relief in Place (RIP)/Transfer of Authority (TOA) with 1st Battalion, 6th Marines (1/6). “Lima” Company, 3/7, assumed authority in an area that included the Ramadi, Iraq, government center and an area that lay between the Euphrates River and a canal that feeds Lake Habbaniyah during periods of flooding. This was a period of transition when violent attacks in Iraq had declined from a high of nearly 1,400 a month in October 2006 to under 600 in April 2007. By August 2007, attacks would decline further, to nearly 200 per month.

Having previously deployed to Ramadi from September 2005 through March 2006, 3/7 experienced lethal combat in Ramadi as anti-Iraqi forces (AIF) bitterly fought to deny control of the government center to Coalition forces and preclude establishment of government control in this traditional government center. Thus, the second deployment required leaders to undergo a significant change in outlook, develop new methods to accomplish their mission, and impart this change to subordinates prepared to conduct lethal operations—after they reached Ramadi.
The killing of Colonel Salam al Dulaimi, a police station officer in charge, in a suicide car bomb attack on a Ramadi police station on 14 February 2007 was a turning point in the Ramadi security situation. This attack steeled the police to confront and defeat AIF in Ramadi, with assistance from Coalition forces only in the form of helicopter gunships. Ramadi's police forces thus became battle hardened and possessed the basic skills, esprit, and ability to enforce security in their area of operation. The battlespace occupied by Lima Company contained six police stations manned with 100 to 140 policemen and one station manned with 330 policemen. Two police stations were augmented by Iraqi soldiers. With advice and support from elements of 1/6, the security situation in the AOR assumed by Lima 3/7 was largely permissive.

Years of warfare had so damaged Ramadi's physical infrastructure that the city's ability to provide basic services such as electricity, fuel, water, and heating was destroyed. Corruption, incompetence, and scarcity were hindering reconstruction efforts. Relations between Ramadi government officials, the people, and Coalition forces were, however, positive.

In light of the new security situation, Lima 3/7's mission was to "Stabilize the City of Ramadi as a pro-coalition government." The broader purpose was "to disrupt IAF operations, thus preventing their negative influence from disrupting coalition operations in MND-B AOR." Key elements of the Lima Company Commander's intent were to "Build our communities and populations centers through economic assistance, quality of life and rule of law" and to "separate the insurgent from his base of support through a positive forward presence ... conduct patrols that allow leadership to interact with the local populace in order to facilitate the critical link that will allow Coalition forces (CF) to positively support the essential needs, economic development and basic needs."
Due to the abrupt change in security environment, the traditional infantry company structure (figure 1) with which Lima Company had trained and deployed was not suited to the problem set on the ground in Ramadi in August 2007. While the environment was not yet fully permissive, combat operations in Ramadi were no longer required as the AIF had been significantly degraded but not eliminated. The new mission became ensuring stability and empowering the local police forces to provide security in their assigned neighborhoods.

**Rifle Company T/O**

![Rifle Company T/O Diagram](image)

In light of the permissive security environment and reconstruction mission, Captain Marcus Mainz, the Lima Company Commander, quickly reorganized and adapted his company of four platoons to suit the situation in his company AOR. He rearranged his Marine personnel to create seven augmentation teams and five operations squads, in addition to headquarters elements unique for a Marine infantry company (figure 2). This organization contained many improvised staff elements not normally found below the battalion level.
Augmentation teams were manned with an officer and 12 Marines who lived and trained at one of the seven police stations in the company AOR (figure 3). Their mission was to "support, train, organize, equip, and employ the Iraqi Police in order to generate professional, competent police units capable of holding urban centers/battle space that are perceived [by Ramadi citizens] as legitimate." In addition to raising the proficiency and professionalism of the Iraqi police, patrolling by these units rapidly evolved into a combination of civil affairs/public affairs (CA/PA) missions where augmentation team leaders developed relationships with local people, assessed local needs, and observed and evaluated reconstruction efforts. Team leaders then reported progress, problems, corruption, and local opinion back to company headquarters to acquire or redirect resources and remove incompetent or corrupt officials. These teams had minimal organic security. The Marine teams found it necessary to cooperate with and train the Iraqi Police to ensure force protection at their stations.
Five operations squads that were manned by seven Marines and led by a non-commissioned officer (NCO) were created and staged at the company headquarters. These squads had dual roles. When at the company command post (CP), they provided post security and acted as a quick reaction force. When not on duty at the company CP, these squads provided security for augmentation teams that were conducting patrols to fulfill their CA/PA missions and interacted with Ramadi officials and citizens in their AOR. Under this construct, augmentation team members were able to focus on interacting and building relations with local people as an additional team of Marines focused on security and force protection. The mission of these squads, in concert with the augmentation teams, was to “secure MSRs (mobile supply routes) through continuous surveillance and assured mobility in order to allow unencumbered coalition movement, portraying a position of strength to AIF and the Iraqi people.”

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Lima Company headquarters was a composite organization resembling a battalion where Lima company Marines were tasked to establish operations, fires, logistics, information operations, civil-military operations, and intelligence cells. No Lima personnel had been trained or equipped to function as a battalion staff. A fixed site security manager (the company’s senior sergeant) inspected and ensured site security at the company CP and at all Iraqi Police stations where augmentation teams resided. The company possessed four gun trucks (up- armored HMMWVs armed with mounted 240G machine guns), organized into two truck units that conducted resupply and facilitated communications between the company CP and IP posts. Each gun truck was manned by a team of six Marines.

This reorganization strained the personnel resources and expertise of the Marines injected into a complex and evolving environment. While the Marines quickly established their own security and dedicated themselves to training the Iraqi Police, the ruins of the city surrounding them and provision of basic services required attention to ensure the hard fought victory over the AIF was not in vain. A typical infantry company has only five officers; the reorganized Lima Company warranted nine. Lima was augmented by a squad that deployed from the continental U.S. with a Gunnery Sergeant as its platoon commander and one Lima Company Sergeant was field promoted to the temporary grade of 1st Lieutenant. The company was also augmented with two engineers (MOS: 1300), one communications/data Marine (MOS: 0651), and one Human Exploitation Team (HET) Intelligence Marine (MOS: 0211). Neither Lima Company’s parent battalion nor the regimental headquarters possessed the personnel or the expertise to re-establish city government and city services.

Summary. Lima Company was successful because dynamic and critically thinking company-level leaders recognized that a fundamentally altered operational environment required
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significant changes be made to traditional infantry company organization and tactics. In essence, an infantry company trained and organized to operate in a phase 2 or 3 environment was deployed into an evolving phase 4 or 5 environment. Despite no pre-deployment training to prepare Lima Company for this challenge, the insight and personal study and initiative of Lima Company's leadership was critical to its success.

GEORGIA DEPLOYMENT PROGRAM

In August, 2011, 122 U.S. Marine and Navy personnel supported a Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRE) at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center and Joint Multinational Training Command at Hohenfels and Grafenwohr, Germany, to prepare 745 Georgian soldiers of the 31st Georgian Light Infantry Battalion (31st GEO Bn) to conduct operations in Afghanistan with Regional Command (South West). This exercise was known as International Security Assistance Force Rotation 11-07. Marine Forces Europe was the lead component in planning, coordinating, and executing the exercise while the Marine Corps Training and Advisory Group (MCTAG) was the lead command with direct responsibility for training. It was anticipated that the 31st GEO Bn would deploy to Regimental Combat Team – 8's (RCT-8) area of operations in Afghanistan.

The observer/controllers’ mission was to conduct an MRE in order to support the training, evaluation, and preparation of the 31st GEO Bn for deployment to Afghanistan. To do so, between 15 and 23 Marines from 3d Assault Amphibian Vehicle Battalion (Camp Pendleton, California), 1st Battalion, 23rd Marines (Houston, Texas), and 5th Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (Okinawa, Japan) were tasked to travel to Germany to act as observer/controllers and train the Georgians. Elements of each of these units had recently completed a deployment. Thirteen personnel from MCTAG also attended, acting in S2, S3, S4, and S6 roles to facilitate
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training. While 25 key billets were filled with Georgian officers, only 16 Marine and Army officers were available to partner with them during the exercise.

The exercise had two major components: an eight day planning exercise and an eight day field exercise. While some live fire training was conducted prior to the MRE, the MRE had no live fire component.

Summary. Even though the Georgian MRE is a routine training exercise, Marine observer/controllers undergo no training or preparation to conduct their mission, apprise them of the proficiency and needs of the subject unit, nor to culturally or linguistically adapt them to their prospective students. Further, despite the “priority” nature of engagement, adequate numbers of U.S. officers were not tasked to match their Georgian students.

Evaluation and Recommendations

These two exercises are at the opposite ends of the spectrum of forward deployed engagement activities. In the Ramadi example, a battalion was forward deployed into a combat zone to conduct security, training, military government, and civil affairs operations under threat of enemy action. Reorganization of basic company structure was necessary to address the problems confronted and to ensure security in a seemingly benign (but potentially volatile) combat environment. In the Georgia Deployment Training program, Marine observer/controllers linked up with a Georgian Infantry battalion in a benign training environment in a friendly country (Germany).

Marine forces deployed to Ramadi in April 2007 achieved significant success even though they were not trained to conduct effective engagement nor to address the broader issues of governance and provision of basic services that confronted them in the Ramadi battlespace. At this pivotal time, no Marine Corps institution evaluated the changing Ramadi security
situation in order to guide or support Lima company’s initiative to reorganize itself to most effectively support Iraqi Police efforts to bring security and stability to Ramadi.

While the recently reformed Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group’s mission is in part to build Partner Nation Security Force capacity, it does not have the capability to rapidly assess a situation like that confronted by Lima company nor provide expertise or training to prepare Marines for success.

In current crisis response situations, “Marine Corps forces … can conduct immediate crisis response using a menu of standard force packages.” Those packages do not include training or preparation to successfully execute a mission such as the one conducted by Lima Company 3/7 in 2007.

The Marine Corps operating concepts directs the Marine Corps to “increase its capability and capacity to conduct steady-state security, engagement, and relief and reconstruction activities, without forfeiting the ability to conduct major operations.” To support requirements of OIF and OEF, the operating concepts document lists seven supporting establishment organizations created to support engagement:

- Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA)
- Security Cooperation Education and Training Center (SCETC)
- Center for Advanced Operation and Culture Learning (CAOCL)
- Center for Irregular warfare (CIW)
- Marine Corps Information Operations Center (MCIOC)
- Marine Corps Systems Command – International Programs (MCSC-IP)
- Advisor Training Groups (ATG)

In addition, the Marine Corps Training and Advisor Group (MCTAG) is tasked to coordinate USMC Security Force Assistance activities and a number of activities that fit under the broad rubric of engagement as defined by Joint Publication 3-0. MCTAG does not have cognizance or control of any of the listed supporting establishment organizations. Only MCTAG

* MCTAG was reorganized into the Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group in late 2011.
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supported the Georgia Deployment Program and none of the above organizations supported Lima Company 3/7 as it conducted a wide spectrum of security cooperation, engagement, civil affairs, and military government activities in a combat zone.

Proposal

The 3d edition of the Marine Corps operating concepts (MOC) states that engagement is a “key to the National Security Strategy and a key to the MOC,” and discusses a number of proposals to “increase forward engagement.” Absent from this document, however, is a proposal to create a command or guiding element that would assemble subject matter experts, develop and maintain lessons learned, develop capabilities and capacities, facilitate integration of engagement in operating units or campaign plans, partner with the interagency, and conduct planning and guide execution of a Marine Corps effort to seriously and effectively conduct engagement. This should be accomplished.

Also absent is a supporting organization that could have provided the support and expertise that Lima 3/7 needed to re-establish city services and provide a military government while the civilian government was re-built and re-established. This should also be accomplished.

In order to conduct a meaningful and effective effort in engagement, a Marine Corps Engagement and Civil-Military Affairs Command (MCECMA) should be established at the headquarter’s level at Quantico Base, Virginia. Relevant sections of the seven activities noted above, as well as MCTAG, should be moved under this command while company-sized direct support (DS) teams should be established at the MEF or Division level at Camp Lejeune, Camp Pendleton, and Hawaii or Okinawa.

The mission of headquarters and DS units would be to support and augment Marine Corps units conducting non-lethal operations across the joint force continuum with necessary
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personnel, expertise, and training necessary for success in forward deployed engagement and combat missions. The primary sections of the headquarters organization (in addition to internal administration and support functions) would correspond to the five phases of the joint force continuum. Personnel of each section would be tasked to: 1) gather and maintain relevant historical experience by phase; 2) gather and maintain relevant lessons learned by phase; 3) maintain situational awareness of Marine Corps units conducting or preparing to conduct non-lethal missions by phase; 4) maintain organic and civilian subject matter experts in their phase and; 5) maintain liaison with I, II, III MEF in order to prepare training packages and possible augments to support missions by phase.

The DS teams at the MEF level would also be organized by phase and be in direct liaison with the HQ to collect and disseminate latest lessons learned, training and access to support staff as well as maintain contact with and provide training teams and possible augments to deployed and deploying MEF units. The DS teams will maintain liaison with deployed units to stay abreast of relevant aspects of METT-T faced by the deployed unit to provide expertise and assistance as needed by the deployed unit. As units such as Lima Company face an environment evolving from lethal operations to the challenges of restoring city services and government in a combat zone, the DS should assemble and deploy SMEs to assist the affected unit.

During conduct of phase 4 and 5 operations, and as deployed units rotate through the AOR, elements of forward deployed DS teams could remain in place to promote continuity of programs, initiatives, and interaction and relations to local officials. Forward deployed DS team members would interact with all Marine units conducting non-lethal operations to facilitate consistency and disseminate lessons learned and innovative approaches in real time. After action
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reports to DS teams and the headquarters would ensure pre-deployment training included the most up-to-date information and methods.

Establishment of a military government or conducting a transition to civil control will always follow successful combat operations. Including MCECMA planners in operational planning for combat operations will not only facilitate establishment of military government or re-establishment of civil control in the wake of combat, but also ensure combat units understand that civilian government, services, and security will also be required once combat has ceased. MCECMA knowledge and expertise will help ensure a successful end of combat operations across an AOR but also across time as lessons learned and expertise regarding phase 4 and 5 operations are carried forward from one operation to the next.

Civilian specialists in the areas of government and governance, engineering and city services, police forces and security, and development would be part of the T/O. Reserve augments with this type of experience could train with and support these units with the intent that they would deploy with forward engaged units as required. MCECMA would also be liaison point for the Marine Corp’s interaction with representatives from the interagency tasked to develop or provide a whole of government approach.

Conclusion

Rather than allow success in the case studies described above on chance assignment of a prescient and innovative company and battalion commanders, institutionalized knowledge and experience should guide or prepare Marines for success. With MCECMA, expertise and support would be organized across the joint force continuum for the sake of simplicity and to enable the end-user (deployed or deploying units as requested by combatant commanders) to prepare for and conduct assigned missions outside of phase 2 and 3 of the joint force continuum. Presence of
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astute Marine Corps leadership, institutions, knowledge, and training could ensure success was not a matter of chance, but a product of professional learning and training. Further, full development of MCECMA would place the emphasis on security cooperation and engagement embodied in MCDP 1-0.

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2 Robert Killebrew, “Cutbacks and Crises, How the military must adapt to a era of shrinking budgets and growing threats, Armed Forces Journal. (December 2011), 16-18, 40 – 41.


6 Marcus J. Mainz, former commander of Lima Company, 3d Battalion, 7th Marines. Interview with the author, 20-21 December, 28 December, 2011, and 10 April 2012. All information throughout the discussion of the Ramdi case study was provided by Mainz.

7 Marcus J. Mainz, unpublished command documents.

8 Marcus J. Mainz, unpublished command documents.

9 Marcus J. Mainz, unpublished command documents.

10 Marcus J. Mainz, unpublished command documents.


13 Department of Defense, Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-0, 11 August 2011. Page V-10

Joint Phasing Model for Operations*

The geographic combatant commanders commonly employ security cooperation in their theater campaign plans, contingency plans, and operation plans as the means to translate strategic objectives into tactical actions. To assist in formulating such plans, joint doctrine (see JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning) provides the following “phasing model,” which describes a continuum of operations:

Phase 0: Shape. This phase involves those ongoing and routine joint, interagency, and multinational activities conducted to assure or solidify friendly relationships and alliances and/or deter potential adversaries.

Phase 1: Deter. This phase focuses on deterring specific opponents by demonstrating the capability and resolve to apply force in pursuit of US interests. These actions will likely build upon phase 0 activities and may include a show of force or initiatives that would facilitate deployment, employment, and sustainment of additional forces within the region.

Phase 2: Seize initiative. Hostilities commence during this phase. The joint force applies combat power to delay, impede, halt, or dislodge the adversary as well as to gain access to theater infrastructure and enhance friendly freedom of action. Concurrently, the joint force provides assistance to relieve conditions that precipitated the crisis in order to promote stability.

Phase 3: Dominate. The focus during this phase is on the exploitation, pursuit, and destruction of the enemy in order to break the opponent’s will for organized resistance. Stability operations occur as needed to facilitate transition to the next phase.

Phase 4: Stabilize. The priority during this phase is on stabilizing operations, reconstitution of infrastructure, and restoration of services. The joint force may have to perform limited local governance and to coordinate activities of multinational and interagency organizations and nongovernmental organizations. This phase concludes with the transfer of regional authority to a legitimate civil entity.

Phase 5: Enable civil authority. The joint force will enable the legitimate civil authority and its provision of essential services to the populace. This action includes coordinating joint force activities with those of multinational, nongovernmental, and interagency organizations and promoting a favorable attitude among the population toward US and host nation objectives.