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FUTURE WAR PAPER

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Australia’s Regional Security Formula: Insurance for the 21st Century

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF OPERATIONAL STUDIES

AUTHOR:
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References to this study should include the foregoing statement.

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Executive Summary


Author: Major Ashley R. Collingburn.

Thesis: The future operating environment remains uncertain, but through focused and synchronized whole-of-government Regional Security Cooperation (RSC), Australian Government agencies will be able to more effectively work with regional partners. In doing so, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) will significantly reduce security threats posed by weak or fragile states, thus preventing the likely requirement for a large-scale military intervention in the future.

Discussion: Australia is a nation with European origins but is geographically located in Southeast Asia. This situation presents unique challenges and has seen Australia evolve from a largely neutral and passive nation into a regional power. Today, Australia seeks to assist failing states with the aim of preventing regional conflict. The ADF has been active in the first part of the 21st Century, both globally with its involvement in the major wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, but also within the region. These recent endeavors illustrate that it is more cost effective to prevent conflict through regional engagement than it is to militarily intervene once conflict has started.

Australia’s current approach to regional engagement is valuable but inadequate. The objectives are generally not well defined and the efforts are rarely synergized across government departments. Furthermore, as a result of instability with the region, Australia has had to deploy military and police intervention forces to both East Timor and the Solomon Islands within the past decade. Today, East Timor, Papua New Guinea, Fiji, and the Solomon Islands—all within Australia’s Primary Operating Environment (POE)—remain weak states at risk of failing unless collaborative action is taken in the near term. Interagency country teams must be established within each embassy in order to systemically assess and respond to the unique needs of each country within the POE.

The future operating environment presents many challenges for the Australian Defence Force (ADF). Balancing its size against the capabilities of the force to meet these challenges remains the dilemma. Further, Australia must maximize its scarce resources without placing unacceptable levels of stress upon the ADF.

Conclusion: Focused whole-of-government Regional Security Cooperation (RSC) will provide an increased level of insurance to secure Australia’s future. Interagency country teams outfitted with special language, cultural, and RSC-specific training will be more capable of responding to crises in the region. The development of an international training center, combined with other initiatives will enable the transformation of the ADF into a composite of independent learning organizations that will provide for a more flexible, adaptable force to deal with an increasingly complex and uncertain operating environment.
Preface

In recent years, the Australian Government has taken the initiative and accepted the responsibility incumbent upon it as a regional power to improve security and stability within Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific. However, simultaneous military intervention in East Timor and the Solomon Islands and support of the Global War on Terror has proved costly, both in terms of human resources and national treasure. A more effective and efficient formula to achieve regional security must exist.

Attendance of the United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College in 2010 and the School of Advanced Warfighting in 2011 has provided insight into the way the U.S. Government – through its geographical combatant commands – strives to achieve regional security within their respective areas of responsibility. Value lies in applying these U.S. lessons to the Australian Defence Force as it grapples with its role and capability requirements for the future operating environment.

Investing more resources up front through a whole-of-government coordinated effort will increase host nation capacity. This increase will help to prevent conflict and reduce the need for military intervention. This solution provides the Australian Government with a new regional security formula that serves as its insurance for the 21st Century.

I wish to acknowledge the support of my Marine Corps University mentor, Dr. Gordon Rudd, for his outstanding support and frank feedback throughout the research and writing of this paper. I dedicate this paper to all Australian service personnel who have contributed to regional security by deploying, exercising, or engaging with partner nations in the region.

This paper specifically relates to the Australian Defence Force; therefore, Australian spelling is applied to relevant terms throughout.
"In the Pacific we have primary responsibilities and primary risks...I look forward to the day when we will have a concert of Pacific powers, pacific in both senses of the word."
Robert Gordon Menzies, 27 April 1939

Introduction

Australia has been actively involved in regional engagement, seeking a pacified Pacific, for more than half a century. Engagement, however, does not equate to security or necessarily prevent conflict, as proven by the need for recent military intervention in East Timor and the Solomon Islands. The paradox pertaining to security in the 21st Century, therefore, requires militaries to strike a balance between preparing combat forces for the next conflict and conducting security cooperation to prevent future conflict. The consequences of failure in today’s security environment – faced with ever increasing hybrid threats, and intrastate and transnational extremist threats – are enormous. As such, statesman, strategists, military leaders, and planners must continuously and collaboratively assess the security needs of the future. The future operating environment remains uncertain, but through focused and synchronized whole-of-government Regional Security Cooperation (RSC), Australian government agencies will be able to more effectively work with regional partners. In doing so, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) will significantly reduce security threats posed by weak or fragile states, thus preventing the likely requirement for a large-scale military intervention in the future.

Australia’s Strategic and Military Culture

Analyzing the past helps to explain the present, which in turn, enables shaping of the future. Understanding Australia’s traditional approach to regional security provides a foundation for recommending a way ahead. Napoleon Bonaparte’s assertion that a nation’s geography dictates its policies has certainly proven true for Australia. Though Australia is an ethnically diverse nation originating from a European civilization, it is geographically situated in Southeast Asia. “A society transplanted into an alien environment,” Australia’s contemporary security dilemma centers on its geographical proximity to Asia despite its cultural distance. The most
effective way to reduce this cultural divide and mollify future challenges is to conduct well-coordinated whole-of-government security cooperation with partner nations.

Australia’s distinct culture has proven itself resilient during times of global challenges and prosperously industrious during periods of opportunity. Furthermore, Australia’s tendency to maintain a regionally “neutral” policy for many years has resulted in a foreign policy focused on self-defense and friendship rather than proactive mediation or intervention. From its federation until WWII, Australia relied on the United Kingdom to provide strategic security over-watch. Although Australia has continued to maintain close ties with Britain, it has enjoyed a growing alliance with the United States since WWII, as the U.S. military helped to protect Australia from Japanese aggression during the war in the Pacific. This created an Australian-United States alliance that was formalized by the ANZUS Treaty in 1951. This important alliance has continued to evolve with the Australian and U.S. militaries serving alongside each other in every major conflict since it was endorsed.

The end of the Cold War brought about an adjustment in Australia’s strategic thinking. The 1993 Strategic Review directed the Australian military to focus on building strategic partnerships in Southeast Asia while simultaneously remaining committed to the Southwest Pacific. This strategy has been further refined in the new millennium with what has become known as the Howard Doctrine. According to his doctrine, former Prime Minister John Howard envisaged Australia playing a more prominent role in the region, in a deputized role to the United States. This proved evident during the early years of the 21st Century, when the ADF intervened in both East Timor and the Solomon Islands. Moreover, it is apparent that Australia wants to be known by the U.S. “as a global ally, not just a regional partner,” proven by Australia’s involvement in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. There is little doubt that these global security-related tasks are linked to regional security; however, the Australian people expect that the ADF’s primary focus in the future will more directly contribute to national and
regional security. In order to determine how the ADF should focus its efforts to ensure regional
security in the future, it is necessary to look at both the probable future operating environment
and the government's strategic guidance.

Framing the Problem: Australia's Future Operating Environment

Australia's Primary Operating Environment (POE) is defined as the air-sea gap to the
north and encompasses neighboring states in the Southwest Pacific and Southeast Asia. This
POE includes Indonesia, not only the most populous Muslim country but also the third largest
democracy in the world. The "arc of instability," to which the POE has been referred, has been
Australia's primary security concern for many years.9 Lieutenant General Frank Hinkling
referred to Australia's obsession with the defense of the air-sea gap as a strategy akin to a "blue-
water Maginot Line."10 Regardless of strategy, Australia's greatest security challenges stem
from within the POE, to include transnational terrorism, weapons proliferation, illegal
immigration, illicit smuggling, and the inherent threats posed by weak and failing states.

The U.S. Pacific Command's Area of Responsibility (AOR) encompasses Australia's
POE. Dr. Michael Auslin, a leading scholar from the American Enterprise Institute, provided
justification as to why Australia must increase its investment in regional security:

There is a recognition that America is at a crossroads in deciding how it will play
its role as the guarantor of regional stability. The future budget environment looks
"lean," in common parlance, making it harder to maintain U.S. presence in the
Asia-Pacific region, and making it more likely that America will have to struggle
to catch up to changing military balances, political alignments, and multilateral
initiatives.11

In essence, the U.S. military is stretched and cannot maintain an active presence in every
corner of the globe, particularly when capable regional powers and allies such as Australia exist.
It is therefore essential that Australia and the United States work collaboratively to achieve
common goals within the region to meet the ever-increasing myriad of contemporary threats.

The 21st Century has brought with it a new paradigm wherein the international system has
transitioned from a traditional state structure to one that includes non-state actors and is
challenged by a multitude of emerging threats. Moreover, the Australian Government’s 2009
White Paper suggests that the future operating environment will likely be dominated by hybrid
threats and challenges, including intrastate and transnational extremist threats. Consequently,
this complex international system will increase the likelihood of states fragmenting and
exposing themselves to potential failure. According to Dr. Seyom Brown, a former policy
analyst for the Research and Development (RAND) Corporation, “Failed or failing states...
could catalyze dangerous regional instabilities. Moreover, the entire system can be destabilized,
and wars initiated and conducted by non-government actors: violent political movements,
terrorist networks, and criminal syndicates.” Additional pressures such as climate change,
population growth, the global economic downturn, and an increasing dependency on energy and
resources will further amplify these security challenges.

Some of these destabilizing effects have already been experienced within the POE. For
example, the 2002 Bali bombings and 2004 terrorist attack on the Australian Embassy in Jakarta
resulted from a global increase in radicalized Islam. Illustrating the benefits of security
cooporation, the Australian and U.S. governments closely collaborated with the Indonesian
authorities to investigate and consequently apprehend the perpetrators of the Bali bombings.
Additionally, the December 2004 Asian tsunami significantly affected the region, particularly
Indonesia. In response, Australia’s humanitarian assistance and disaster relief response effort
proved timely and effective. These examples prove that Australia’s past and present regional
engagement activities serve a purpose; however, there is significant room for reform.

Today, weak governance and instability within a number of the larger Melanesian states
and smaller Polynesian nations require a proactive approach to prevent further degradation in
regional security. The 2010 Failed States Index, published by the U.S. Fund for Peace, identified
East Timor, the Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea (PNG), and Fiji as weak states that are at
risk of failing. This assessment was based on political, economic, military, and social considerations. Many of the major issues in Australia’s focus-region are centered on political instability, corruption, weak governance, underdeveloped services, and a lack of infrastructure, combined with an inherent lack of security and weak rule of law. This is relevant because experience suggests that fragile states, such as Sudan and Somalia, have historically provided safe havens for non-state actors and terrorist organizations. Australia must therefore deny these terrorist breeding grounds by increasing its commitment to security cooperation within the region.

To address these challenges, the Australian Government’s 2009 White Paper directed four essential tasks for the ADF: (1) to deter and defeat attacks on Australia, (2) to contribute to security and stability in the South Pacific and East Timor, (3) to contribute to military contingencies in the Asia-Pacific Region, and (4) to contribute to military contingencies in support of global security. Protecting Australian citizens and property on the Australian continent is the ADF’s primary responsibility, but it is the least likely task to be executed. Undoubtedly, the task requiring the most focused attention will be regional security.

The Solution: Regional Security Cooperation

Based on its current strategic and military culture, Australia must apply a more synergistic whole-of-government approach to regional security in order to mitigate the security issues stemming from weak governance, underdevelopment, and rising terrorism. To achieve this, Australia must leverage all of the elements of its national power – diplomatic, informational, military, and economic – to ensure unity of purpose and effort in order to affect regional security. RSC aims to help prevent direct attacks on Australia, deter threats against Australian national security, and promote security and stability within the POE. Furthermore, it promotes the development of infrastructure and social services, such as education, healthcare, economic growth, and effective governance, within partner states. Moreover, a recent study from the
Kokoda Foundation reveals that it is more cost effective to prevent states from failing through engagement and partnering than it is to have to intervene after the damage has been done.\(^\text{19}\) A paramount example is the ADF’s intervention into East Timor; which has cost the Australian Government approximately $4B AUD since operations commenced in 1999.\(^\text{20}\) The assertion that RSC will actually reduce costs in the long-term is particularly pertinent for Australia given its traditional approach of seeking “defence on the cheap.”\(^\text{21}\)

In essence, RSC must involve a long-term strategic commitment, prove mutually beneficial for the nations involved, and be executed through a whole-of-government coordinated effort. It should promote ideals such as democratic ruling governments, conform to human rights and international law, and improve security and stability.\(^\text{22}\) Specific security-related aims include the following:

- Strengthen alliances and coalitions for the future,
- Maintain an overseas footprint and a forward security posture,
- Eliminate weapons of mass destruction,
- Combat terrorism,
- Resolve regional disputes through cooperation with affected parties, and
- Influence the strategic outlook of regional actors.\(^\text{23}\)

In executing their security cooperation plans the U.S. geographical combatant commands conduct what they refer to as Phase Zero operations, or what the ADF currently terms regional engagement. Regardless of the terminology, these shaping actions aim to “promote stability and peace by building capacity in partner nations that enables them to be cooperative, trained, and prepared to help prevent or limit conflicts.”\(^\text{24}\) The ADF has conducted regional engagement via the Defence Cooperation Program (DCP) since the 1960s.\(^\text{25}\) Among other things, the DCP supports bilateral exercises, the training of the PNG and East Timor Defence Forces and provides a maritime surveillance capability to various Pacific Island nations via the Pacific
Patrol Boat Program. The ADF committed $92.7M AUD to defense cooperation during the 2008-09 fiscal year (See Appendix 1). Importantly, RSC activities cannot be conducted by the military in isolation; they must involve all (Australian) government departments working in close cooperation with foreign governments, non-governmental organizations (NGO’s), security forces, and organizations from the private sector. Such whole-of-government RSC activities include the following:

- Multinational training, education, and exercises (including command post exercises),
- Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief,
- Military-to-military engagement (senior officer visits and port visits),
- Security assistance (DCP),
- Defense experimentation (Defence Science & Technology Organisation),
- Monitoring of illegal immigrants, and
- Intelligence sharing (whole-of-government intelligence community effort).

One of Australia’s premier strategic thinkers, Dr. Michael Evans reinforced the importance of synergizing all of these activities across government departments when he stated, "In an interdependent 21st-century strategic environment, only a ‘whole of government’ system is capable of integrating Australia’s increasingly diverse, yet interconnected, security requirements."28

**Australia’s Regional Security Formula: An Insurance Policy for the Future**

A whole-of-government system must be integrated into Australia’s regional security framework in order to effectively contribute to regional security and ultimately provide insurance for the nation’s future. Accordingly, Australia’s regional security formula will assist states within the POE to increase their capacity, build their capabilities, and ultimately empower them to take responsibility for the welfare of their people and their national security. The ADF has an important role to play in this as part of a wider Australian Government effort.
Dr. Michael Evans asserts that the "primary aim of Australian strategy must be, wherever possible, to seek to counter all threats to the nation's interests at a geographical distance rather than on home soil." The United States learned this lesson the hard way following the September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001. Thus, the question arises, how can Australia best achieve standoff security?

The solution is whole-of-government RSC; the challenge is determining the best way to achieve it. The Australian Government must establish an RSC apparatus, led and coordinated in Canberra with interagency country teams within each embassy. These teams must integrate all available intelligence and apply a systems approach to assess and respond in a timely and effective manner. Furthermore, these teams should receive special language, cultural, and RSC specific training. The ADF must harness all possible bilateral and multinational training opportunities and develop an international training center to facilitate world-class training and to enhance interoperability. Assessing all RSC actions is critical; country teams and the ADF must be learning organizations, by adapting internally and by adopting best practices from external models.

U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), the newest U.S. combatant command, provides a model for Australia's RSC framework as it is based around the interagency and advocates whole-of-government thinking and execution at every level. AFRICOM's headquarters is organized into functional working groups rather than along the lines of a traditional joint staff. Furthermore, the Deputy Commander of AFRICOM is a senior official from the Department of State. Unlike the other U.S. combatant commands, U.S. AFRICOM's primary focus is not warfighting; it is war prevention. AFRICOM applies a three-dimensional security engagement approach to Africa, which encompasses "diplomacy, development, and defense." This provides a solid foundation from which to build Australia's future RSC model as the ADF prepares to fight the next war, while at the same time aiming to avoid that very conflict.
Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) conducted by the U.S. geographical combatant commands is based on plans that are nested within a whole-of-government security framework and aim to serve U.S. national interests. Thus, the military planner’s primary role is to reconcile strategic ends with operational means and tactical ways. Evidently, the Australian Government can learn from the U.S. model as it currently struggles to align agency and military actions with national interests and policy objectives. Though experiences in East Timor and the Solomon Islands have shown that the ADF’s engagement efforts are worthwhile, the conflicts remain ongoing and therefore significant room for improvement exists.

Political and strategic objectives must be more clearly defined and communicated, and operational objectives for the ADF and other government agencies must be better synchronized. Furthermore, actions must be assessed in order to determine their level of effectiveness and whether or not specific programs should be sustained or discontinued. Moreover, the engagement needs to be tied into a whole-of-government RSC framework. Many of the current programs in isolation could be perceived as little more than a good will gesture by a wealthy regional power. Promoting whole-of-government communications, cooperation, and actions to transform Australia’s current disparate engagement efforts into a unified RSC formula can rectify this situation. This will ultimately build stronger partnerships and develop more robust security capability within partner states.

Australia’s RSC objectives must be determined based on national interests. Therefore, the National Security Adviser should manage the RSC effort through a national security apparatus from within the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet. The RSC organization should be based on a whole-of-government structure (in accordance with Appendix 2). The functional groups will likely comprise political (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and Australian Electoral Commission), military (ADF), economic (Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) and Department of Finance), and rule of law (Australian
Federal Police (AFP) and Australian Customs & Border Protection) teams. These functional areas nest well within the aim of RSC, which is to promote security, an effective justice system, stable and effective governance, and social well-being for the population, all within an overarching sustainable economic system. These functional groups should form interactive standalone teams that are physically located in each country within the region.

Australia’s POE is so diverse that one model cannot be applied to all situations. As such, the Australian Government should establish country teams in each embassy directly supervised by the resident ambassador. The military representative will be the senior ADF officer in location and the military cell’s composition will depend on requirements and commitments based on the country’s capability, deficiencies, and needs. The East Timor and PNG teams, for example, should comprise of members of the training teams that are currently in situ and are committed to developing the capacity of the security forces of those countries. Other country teams, such as the Tongan Team, would also have a Pacific Patrol Boat Program adviser/liaison officer.

The one essential member that must exist within each country team’s military cell (in addition to the leader) is the civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) officer. The CIMIC officer should act as the interface between the military and all other civil agencies, including Australian government, NGOs, and international government agencies. This officer is an essential member of the interagency team that ensures comprehensive assessment and whole-of-government synchronized action. Essentially, the CIMIC officer’s role is similar to that of a conductor in an orchestra, ultimately striving to obtain the best input and participation from all team members. He must also leverage the talents and capabilities of resident non-government organizations and, where necessary, engage civilian contractors to fulfill mission essential roles.

Each country team will complete a strategic assessment to review opportunities and vulnerabilities of the state in relation to its neighbors, particularly focusing on the political,
economic, geographic, and cultural nuances.\textsuperscript{34} The Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF) provides an excellent method of fulfilling this requirement as it enables a shared understanding of the problem and supports a systems thinking approach to solving it (see Appendix 3). The ICAF is a tool that was generated and used by the U.S. Government’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. Interagency country teams within the relevant U.S. Embassies use the model as a means of determining priorities for Phase Zero engagement.\textsuperscript{35}

The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade should lead the RSC effort. Each ambassador must be responsible for recommending RSC priorities and supervising and evaluating the resulting engagement. RSC activities must be continuously assessed to validate their effectiveness (see Appendix 4). Assessment data should be qualitatively analyzed, reported, and discussed during the Defence Quarterly Strategic Review. This forum can verify the effective progress of military-related RSC activities and recommend necessary changes. All agencies should conduct their own internal review, but individual country teams must have an assessment cell that is ultimately responsible for ensuring that whole-of-government performance and effectiveness accords with the defined strategic objectives.

The Australian Government’s Law Enforcement Cooperation Program highlights positive progress with respect to law enforcement and regional security enhancement. In 2004, the program introduced the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation.\textsuperscript{36} The ADF contributes to law enforcement capability development by facilitating hostage recovery and counter-hijack exercises with the Indonesian National Armed Forces. Australian Customs, in conjunction with regional partners, such as Indonesia, have also taken measures to facilitate information sharing and more effective border management aimed at reducing illegal immigration.\textsuperscript{37} The Regional Assistance Mission in the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) provides a good example of the effect of interagency partnering at the national and international level. The
multinational RAMSI force is police led and military supported. The coalition included contingents from Australia, Fiji, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, and Tonga. The operation illustrates an excellent example of partnering among Pacific nations to help a member state in need. There remains room for improvement, however, particularly with the identification of potential threats before they develop.

Potential threats can be better identified by integrating the intelligence community and law enforcement agencies within the RSC framework in order to ensure effective information sharing, timely indications and warnings of emerging threats, and pre-emptive intervention where appropriate. Agency representatives should be embedded within embassy country teams and relevant military headquarters. This should result in an increase in embassy staff, however, the payoff will almost certainly outweigh the additional cost. The government agencies, including the military forces, will undoubtedly resist the requirement to post additional personnel overseas. Accordingly, the long-term benefit and overall aim must be communicated and promoted to ensure that reform takes place and that qualified people are appointed to these essential positions.

Australia must concentrate on developing whole-of-government deployable capabilities to meet the needs of the country teams and to deal with emerging threats and unforeseen crises such as natural disasters. The challenge for the Australian Army is to maintain a balance between providing a capability that can conduct warfighting at one end of the spectrum and RSC at the other end. The procurement of two new amphibious ships will posture the ADF to achieve both of these competing priorities while also maintaining a forward presence for unexpected contingency operations. The new amphibious capability offers tremendous potential. It could serve as a RSC platform, fulfilling requests by country teams approved by the military representative within the National Security Adviser's RSC forum. It could be a combined training exercise with a partner nation or responding to a humanitarian or disaster relief crisis.
Regardless of the nature of the mission, the Amphibious Ready Group should have interagency representatives embarked to ensure that military actions align with other agency intentions to achieve whole-of-government objectives.

Experience proves that security cooperation conducted prior to recent conflicts has helped enable the formulation of coalitions. U.S. Central Command, for example, is currently fighting two wars simultaneously. Previous military-to-military engagement helped the U.S. to build the necessary coalitions for these endeavors. Likewise, when the ADF established a coalition in East Timor, the Thai contingent was largely committed as a result of a strong relationship that had previously been developed between Australian and Thai military forces during the annual bilateral exercise, Chapel Gold. Thus, bilateral and multinational training must continue and develop further at every opportunity. Australia has a vast country that is ideally suited to large-scale military training exercises. The ADF must harness these world-class training areas and exploit combined training opportunities in order to promote coalition partnering for potential contingency operations. Military intervention is not desirable but may be necessary; therefore, engagement must occur now as insurance for the future.

An important lesson from the East Timor intervention was that regional forces must improve interoperability so that they are more effective when operating in a coalition environment. Differences in equipment and technology can be abated with increased training and education and through information sharing relating to science and technology, research and development, and military hardware procurement. Another way to overcome this problem is by developing an international training centre in Northern Australia, suitable for live fire maneuver exercises, command simulation exercises, and combined planning. The facility could also serve as an intermediate staging base for regional coalition intervention operations should large-scale military intervention, such as the East Timor operation, occur in the future.

All personnel involved in RSC should be fully aware of the interagency process; therefore,
combined education and training are essential throughout all departments. This will enable and
build relationships internally within Australian government departments and will ultimately lead
to more effective RSC with partner nations. Interagency training is essential in order to ensure
that capabilities, limitations, and synergies are identified and understood across the various
agencies. Interagency personnel currently attend the ADF’s Command & Staff College, for
example. Likewise, the ADF sends representatives to attend other agency courses. Where
attendance at a residential course or school is not feasible, the use of web-based software will
help to increase the level of throughput and enhance the overall understanding of interagency
processes. It is critical to the success of the RSC framework that representatives from each of
the agencies share a common understanding of other agency capabilities, regional issues, and
government RSC objectives. Moreover, these personnel must possess the desire to positively
contribute to regional security through a whole-of-government coordinated and unified effort. It
may be necessary to introduce a specialized RSC course, or at the very least implement it as part
of the existing career development courses. Only after the Australian Government agencies are
synchronized will they be able to effectively work with regional partners.

Effective communication is vital in establishing regional relationships. This includes a
requirement to invest in language training for military and civilian personnel. Military officers
should be affiliated with a specific country within the region and be responsible for language
and culture training as part of their professional military education and personal development.
Officers would then have greater utility and be more capable of serving as a military attaché,
foreign area officer, or security cooperation officer within the relevant country team. ADF
schools should continue to train and educate international military students and recognize and
promote it as a mutually beneficial program. Similarly, the ADF must continue to send
Australian officers and enlisted personnel to international schools. Professional military
education is an essential part of officer development as it builds character and intellect and
directly contributes to force enhancement and therefore indirectly to RSC.

**Conclusion: Securing Australia’s Future**

A focused and well-coordinated RSC formula within the ADF’s POE will mitigate security-related threats presented by failing states. Moreover, effective RSC will reduce the potential need for the ADF to militarily intervene on a large scale, as has been the case during recent history in East Timor and the Solomon Islands. It is clear from these experiences that intervention is not the most effective or efficient means of establishing a safe and secure region. Military intervention, however, can potentially be avoided by implementing a robust security cooperation formula that strengthens the regional security apparatus, empowering it to deal with security threats before they spiral out of control.

Australia’s current approach to regional engagement is valuable but inadequate. The objectives are generally not well defined and the efforts are rarely synergized across the government departments. This can be rectified by establishing interagency country teams within each embassy to assess and respond to the unique needs of each country. The ICAF provides an effective means of conducting this assessment, as it applies a systems thinking approach to identify cause and effect and develop relevant solutions. During these times of economic and political uncertainty, it is vital that Australia maximizes its scarce resources without placing unacceptable levels of stress on the ADF. The challenge is to strike a balance between cost and benefit, between warfighting and conflict prevention. Whole-of-government RSC will enable the ADF to better accomplish this and ultimately provide an increased level of insurance to secure Australia’s future.
Notes


4 Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Advancing the National Interest: Australia’s Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper” (Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2003), viii.


35 The author used the ICAF to assess Phase Zero planning requirements during an exercise conducted at the United States Marine Corps Command & Staff College in May 2010. The ICAF effectively enables planners to identify the root drivers of conflict as well as mitigators and opportunities for remediation.


39 In *Adaptive Army: Embracing the Concept of Operational Manoeuvre from the Sea*, the author has addressed the value of combining this new amphibious capability with an expeditionary battle group to fulfill a wide range of tasks in accordance with the Australian Government’s strategic guidance.

41 Alan Ryan, From Desert Storm to East Timor: Australia, the Asia-Pacific and the 'New Age' Coalition Operations, Study Paper No. 302 (Canberra: Land Warfare Studies Centre, January 2000), 10.
Appendix 1

**Australian Defence Cooperation Program (DCP) Funding**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2008-09 ($ million AUD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
<td>12.293</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**South Pacific**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2008-09 ($ million AUD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East Timor</td>
<td>14.085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanuatu</td>
<td>1.660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solomon Islands</td>
<td>1.924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tonga</td>
<td>2.949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Samoa</td>
<td>0.853</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cook Islands</td>
<td>0.307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>0.292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marshall Islands</td>
<td>1.033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federated States of Micronesia</td>
<td>0.941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuvalu</td>
<td>1.110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiribati</td>
<td>0.740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palau</td>
<td>0.566</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateral General Assistance</td>
<td>20.817</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-total South Pacific</td>
<td>47.277</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**South-East Asia**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2008-09 ($ million AUD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>0.044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>7.887</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>3.595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>5.376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>4.780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>2.265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia and Laos</td>
<td>1.189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brunei</td>
<td>0.088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-total South-East Asia</td>
<td>25.224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other regional activities</td>
<td>7.872</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total DCP funding</strong></td>
<td><strong>92.666</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report 2008-09, Volume 1*
Appendix 2

Australian Government Regional Security Cooperation Organization

Prime Minister & Cabinet

DFAT

National Security Advisor

MINDEF

Ambassador

ADF HQ

Country Team (Interagency)

Political Cell (DFAT) Economic Cell (AusAID) Rule of Law Cell (AFP) Military Cell (ADF)

ASSESSMENT (Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework)
Task One: Conflict Diagnosis

**Step One:** Evaluate the Context of the Conflict

**Step Two:** Understand Core Grievances and Social/Institutional Resilience

**Step Three:** Identify Drivers of Conflict and Mitigating Factors

**Step Four:** Describe Opportunities for Increasing or Decreasing Conflict

Task Two: Segue into Planning

### Appendix 4

#### Regional Security Cooperation Assessment Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Ways</th>
<th>The Ends</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strengthen Alliances &amp; Coalitions</strong></td>
<td>Maintain an Overseas Footprint &amp; Forward Security Posture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction</strong></td>
<td><strong>Combat Terrorism</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Resolve Regional Disputes</strong></td>
<td><strong>Influence Strategic Outlook of Regional Actors</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Multinational training, education, and exercises
- Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
- Military-to-military engagement
- Security assistance (Defence Cooperation Program)
- Defense experimentation
- Monitoring of illegal immigrants
- Intelligence sharing

**Measures of Effectiveness**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADF</td>
<td>Australian Defence Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFP</td>
<td>Australian Federal Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFRICOM</td>
<td>Africa Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>Area of Responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUD</td>
<td>Australian Dollar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AusAID</td>
<td>Australian Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>Civil-Military Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCP</td>
<td>Defence Cooperation Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFAT</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICAF</td>
<td>Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNG</td>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POR</td>
<td>Primary Operating Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAMSI</td>
<td>Regional Assistance Mission in the Solomon Islands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAND</td>
<td>Research and Development Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSC</td>
<td>Regional Security Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSC</td>
<td>Theater Security Cooperation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Bibliography


Australia’s Regional Security Formula: Insurance for the 21st Century

Maj Ash Collingburn
Australian Army

The future operating environment remains uncertain, but through focused and synchronized whole-of-government Regional Security Cooperation (RSC), Australian Government agencies will be able to more effectively work with regional partners. In doing so, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) will significantly reduce security threats posed by weak or fragile states, thus preventing the likely requirement for a large-scale military intervention in the future.

AGENDA
- Thesis
- Context:
  - Overview of the ADF (Army, Navy, Air Force)
  - ADF’s Strategic Guidance
  - Current Security Engagement
  - Future operating Environment
- Solution: Regional Security Cooperation
- Recommendations
- Conclusion

Australian Defence Force

Australian Army Task Organization

Major Army Bases
Royal Australian Navy Bases

Future RAN Capabilities:
2 x LHDs
Largs Bay (LSD)

3 x Air Warfare Destroyers

Royal Australian Air Force Inventory

Future RAAF Capabilities:
100 x JSF to replace F/A-18 and Super Hornet

5 x K30A Multirole Tanker

Royal Australia Air Force Bases

Strategic Guidance:
Defence White Paper 2009

- Four specified Tasks for the ADF:
  - Deter and defeat attacks on Australia
  - Contribute to security and stability in the South Pacific and East Timor
  - Contribute to military contingencies in the Asia-Pacific Region
  - Contribute to military contingencies in support of global security

Primary task is not the most likely task
Primary Operating Environment

Future Operating Environment

• Australia’s greatest security challenges (within the POE):
  - Transnational terrorism
  - Weapons proliferation
  - Illegal immigration
  - Illicit smuggling
  - Threats posed by weak and failing states
• East Timor, Papua New Guinea, Fiji, and the Solomon Islands are classified as states at risk of failing.


Solution: Regional Security Cooperation

• Whole-of-government approach to regional security.
  - Leverage all elements of national power - DIME.

Current Security Engagement

• Defence Cooperation Program (since the 1960s).
  - E.g. Pacific Patrol Boat Program (22 boats to 12 countries).
  - $92.7 million spent in FY 08/09
• Recent wars have been costly.
  - East Timor and the Solomon Islands.
  - Afghanistan and Iraq.
• Kokoda Foundation study: regional engagement is more cost effective than military intervention.

Current engagement is inadequate: objectives not well defined and inter-agency efforts are not synergized.

Australia’s Regional Security Formula: An Insurance Policy for the Future

Solution: Regional Security Cooperation

• RSC Activities:
  - Multinational training, education, and exercises
  - Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
  - Military-to-military engagement
  - Security assistance
  - Defense experimentation (Defence Science & Technology Organisation)
  - Monitoring of illegal immigrants
  - Intelligence sharing

Australia’s Regional Security Formula: An Insurance Policy for the Future
Australia's Regional Security Formula: An Insurance Policy for the Future

• Recommendations:
  – Apply a systems approach to country assessments.
  – Assessment – MOPs/MOEs.
  – Special training: language, cultural, and RSC-specific.
  – Bilateral and multinational training.
  – Develop an international training center to facilitate world-class training and to enhance interoperability.

Questions?

• ADF Structure and Capabilities
• Regional Security Cooperation

Conclusion

• The challenge is to strike a balance between cost and benefit, between warfighting and conflict prevention.
• Whole-of-government RSC will increase Australia's security and provide insurance for the future.