Based on guidance provided in the National Security Strategy signed by President Obama in May of 2010, the United States will continue to participate in Security, Stability, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations in support of strategic interests around the world. A major component of SSTR Operations is the support to maintaining rule of law through the execution of training foreign police forces. The United States Government (USG) currently lacks a formation exclusively dedicated to this mission. Without a dedicated formation, the current efforts to train foreign police forces are uncoordinated and does not maximize the full potential of the USG. The United States has the capability to establish within the Department of Defense (DoD) a deployable, sustainable, Expeditionary Police Training Brigade (EPTB) designed exclusively for training host nation police forces.
FUTURE WAR PAPER

TITLE:
Training Host Nation Police Forces:
Establishment of an Expeditionary Police Training Brigade

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Executive Summary

Based on guidance provided in the National Security Strategy signed by President Obama in May of 2010, the United States will continue to participate in Security, Stability, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations in support of strategic interests around the world. A major component of SSTR Operations is the support to maintaining rule of law through the execution of training foreign police forces. The United States Government (USG) currently lacks a formation exclusively dedicated to this mission. Without a dedicated formation, the current efforts to train foreign police forces is uncoordinated and does not maximize the full potential of the USG. The United States has the capability to establish within the Department of Defense (DoD) a deployable, sustainable, Expeditionary Police Training Brigade (EPTB) designed exclusively for training host nation police forces. This paper will recommend a logical, economical, and efficient solution to the problem of training foreign police forces which will support United States strategic interests for the future.
Introduction

The National Security Strategy signed by President Obama in May of 2010 outlines, among many others, the requirement to uphold the rule of law, deny safe havens and strengthen at-risk states, pursue comprehensive engagement, and promote a just and sustainable international order. Counter-insurgency, engagement, security and stability, humanitarian and disaster relief operations, and pre and post-conflict operations are traditionally nested within the framework of this broad guidance. In all of these operations or endeavors, which will be termed security, stability, transition, and re-construction (SSTR), the ability of the host nation police forces to maintain the rule of law is a critical requirement for accomplishing the established political and strategic goals. If the host nation’s police forces are non-existent or incapable of maintaining the rule of law then they must be formed and trained to meet this standard. There currently is no existing agency or entity within the United States Government (USG) with exclusive responsibility for this task. The United States has the capability to establish within the Department of Defense (DoD) a deployable, sustainable, Expeditionary Police Training Brigade (EPTB) designed exclusively for training host nation police forces.

Establishing a police force that is properly trained and equipped, professionally led, and proficient at executing their contribution to maintaining the rule of law would go a long way towards achieving USG political and strategic goals during SSTR Operations. The EPTB would not be an end to this goal by itself however. The maintenance of rule of law requires the legal, judicial, and executive aspects of a government adhere to some basic principles. The World Justice Project (WJP), funded by the American Barr Association, private foundations, and foreign governments, is a multinational, multidisciplinary initiative to strengthen the rule of law.
worldwide. After comprehensive study, the WJP has published a Rule of Law Index based on four overriding principles.

(1) The government and its officials and agents are accountable under the law.

(2) The laws are clear, publicized, stable, fair, and protect fundamental rights, including the security of persons and property.

(3) The process by which the laws are enacted, administered, and enforced is accessible, fair, and efficient.

(4) Access to justice is provided by competent, independent, and ethical adjudicators, attorneys or representatives, and judicial officers who are of sufficient number, have adequate resources, and reflect the makeup of the communities they serve. ²

As stated in bullet number three, the fair and efficient enforcement of law is the aspect of rule of law where a properly trained police force would have the greatest contribution.

The current responsibility for training and assisting host nation police forces is divided between the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, and Homeland Security. This division of labor is not a result of careful deliberation, planning, or coordination. It is divided in this manner because there is no cohesive organization or plan to harness the collective resources of the USG. Without an established force that is specifically trained and equipped to rapidly deploy in support of host nation police force training during SSTR, the United States is missing an opportunity to maximize the contributions to its political and strategic goals.

The NOETIC Corporation published in 2009 a study titled “Considerations for the Employment of Transitional Law Enforcement (TLE) Capabilities” which was contracted by the Emerging Capabilities Division within the Rapid Reaction Technology Office of the United States Office of the Secretary of Defense. TLE is the act of conducting law enforcement functions in a foreign country rather than training host nation police but the challenges described below are entirely applicable.
Agencies and bureaus within Departments of State, Defense, Justice, and Homeland Security have involvement in TLE. The perspectives and end states sought by these stakeholders can vary markedly. Motivations for being involved with TLE vary between agencies with responsibilities for reconstruction and stabilization operations; law enforcement agencies; and military services which need to maintain readiness to deploy to situations that may involve law enforcement aspects. Given the divergence of viewpoints, an uncoordinated approach to TLE has the potential to undermine effectiveness of TLE efforts by other agencies. It is important for the USG to develop a comprehensive approach that maximizes mutual benefits from TLE capabilities.

This study highlights the institutional difficulties associated with the current method of executing foreign police training missions.

There currently is no single organization responsible for training, equipping, deploying, executing, or assessing the training of host nation police forces. The recent police training operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have been executed by a combination of federal and civilian law enforcement agencies, military police, general purpose military personnel, and government contracted organizations such as DYNCORP. There are inherent problems associated with this lack of unified structure or methodology. Complications with this model range from the simple inconsistencies of basic training techniques, unclear chain of command, and confusing and redundant reporting requirements. Often military forces, civilian law enforcement personnel and government contractors have worked side by side with minimal prior assimilation or opportunity to develop standard operating procedures or establish a chain of command. Additionally, this ad hoc structure does not easily fit into any existing military or government formation that would be operating in the theatre.

In addition to the training, command and control, and reporting concerns; the legal hurdles to the establishment of a force that exclusively conduct foreign police training bear examination. With the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973, Congress prohibited the use of foreign assistance funds for police training and related programs in foreign countries. Section 2420, Title
22 of the United States Code outlines this police training prohibition. Qualifying exceptions have been granted to this code however. Exception six states “with respect to assistance provided to reconstitute civilian police authority and capability in the post-conflict restoration of host nation infrastructure for the purposes of supporting a nation emerging from instability, and the provision of professional public safety training, to include training in internationally recognized standards of human rights, the rule of law, anti-corruption, and the promotion of civilian police roles that support democracy.” The current major police training initiatives in Iraq and Afghanistan have been loosely qualified under this exception. In order to ensure longevity of the concept and avoid future negative legal implications, the USG should pursue amending the code in order to maximize the political and strategic benefits of establishing an EPTB.

How does the USG get to the point where it can deploy a force with this capability? Initially, institutional and governmental paradigms need to be broken. According to a report issued by the United States General Accounting Office, The US Codes that prohibit the military from training foreign police were written in the early 1970s because Congress became concerned over the apparent absence of clear policy guidelines and the use of program funds to support repressive regimes that committed human rights abuses. Just because something did not necessarily work in the past does not mean it could not work in the future. Times have changed and the mistakes of the past could be mitigated with the appropriate oversight, accountability, and clear policy guidance from the USG.

A point of clarification, training foreign police and executing policing functions in a foreign country are entirely different operations. The act of executing policing functions is beyond the scope of the proposed EPTB. Not only are there complex legal considerations; the execution of these tasks begins to bear a striking resemblance to Peace Enforcement Operations.
The EPTU would be designed to train the host nation police training cadre rather than upholding and enforcing the law. Active policing operations are better left to forces designed for that task. For example, the European Gendarmerie Force (EGF), which is comprised of five participating European nations, has deployed in support of the European Union and/or the United Nations, and has executed policing and law enforcement functions.⁶ The EGF and other similar forces originate from the National Police Force model which is not common to the United States. While a deployable National Police Force like the EGF being developed in the United States is highly unlikely, establishing the proposed EPTB is entirely feasible with the potential to plug into multi-national, coalition, or NATO active policing formations. A subordinate task for the EGF is the training of the host nation police force. An EPTB would provide the USG with the ability to assist with that and support the EGF during multi-national operations.

The lack of a standing foreign police training formation has been recognized across the spectrum of the USG. Numerous studies and recommendations have been conducted to examine the issue. The largest hurdle has been establishing a lead agency. Numerous Federal agencies have been considered and each has been identified to possess their own unique strengths and weaknesses. The Department of Defense has been considered but often ruled out because of a perception that military personnel, primarily military police, do not have the requisite real world police experience needed for the task. This is due to what is considered a lack of real policing opportunities aboard military installations compared to law enforcement personnel working in the civilian sector. Most of these studies however, have focused exclusively on the United States capacity to develop a deployable unit capable of executing policing tasks rather than a unit focused exclusively on training.

If the focus is shifted towards establishing a force dedicated to training host nation police forces, then the DoD has the capacity to field and maintain such a force. Adding structure or
increasing funding for the DoD is not likely to gain support regardless of the potential benefits. However, even with the current emphasis on reducing redundancies, cutting costs, and re-shaping the force to meet future requirements, an internal solution is possible. Within the DoD, the requisite personnel, funding, training facilities, and most importantly, expeditionary culture and responsiveness already exists. The most legitimate shortfall, but the easiest and most economical to overcome, is developing a structure and training methodology that prepares the EPTB for the specific task of training host nation police forces. The DoD is the most capable organization in the USG at adapting to emerging requirements and projecting influence around the world. On the other hand, civilian and federal law enforcement agencies would require massive increases in funding, a radical culture change, and develop a capacity to deploy operational units that is unprecedented and unlikely to occur. The DoD stands out as the most logical institution to assume the lead for foreign police training.

The following scenario provides a simple yet clear example of the strategic benefits of an EPTB within the DoD. Imagine that a country whose internal stability is in the political and strategic interests of the United States has just experienced a natural disaster. The resulting turmoil threatens to undermine the fragile yet developing government before it has a chance to establish itself. The United States and European allies rush military forces to provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations. Prior to the disaster, the fledgling government’s attempts to modernize and train its police forces have experienced setbacks due to lack of expertise and competing priorities. If the United States decides to assist in this endeavor, the options, much like they have been in Iraq and Afghanistan, are most likely going to be a reactive, unorganized, and a hastily thrown together attempt to solve the problem.

However, what if a self-sustaining and appropriately task organized force deployed to the affected country on little notice with everything required to accomplish the task? Such a force
could either be subordinate to the larger relief effort or operate as a standalone formation. In order to meet this standard the force would require certain critical capabilities. First, the force would need the ability to provide for its own security once on the ground. The second requirement would be the ability to provide for its own transportation. Sustaining itself with sustenance, communications, administration, and a contracting capability if required would be the third necessity. Finally, and most importantly, would be having the police training expertise commensurate with the assessed requirements of the police force being trained. The first three requirements are things the DoD does better than any organization in the USG. Meeting the final requirement is simply a matter of training and organization.

To build the proposed EPTU there should be an analysis of the required and anticipated missions that would be assigned. “Training host nation police forces” is a broad and simplistic statement. A competent military police corporal could very likely instruct the vast majority of basic or core skills required of any police officer. Proper handcuff techniques, fingerprinting, investigating petty crime, and enforcing basic laws do not require a career civilian law enforcement officer with 20 years experience “walking the beat”. However, homicide investigations, police force administration, counter-narcotics, undercover work, and Special Weapons and Tactics type operations may require an advanced level of experience and expertise from the trainers. This type of experience is abundant in the civilian police agencies but rather limited within the military police formations within the DoD, although it does exist. Tapping into the expertise and training opportunities available from civilian law enforcement agencies would be a method to build the capability of the trainers. An example of the successful merging of civilian and military capabilities into a proficient, permanent, deployable military force is the United States Marine Corps establishment of the Chemical Biological Incident Response Force in 1996. The Marine Corps took what was essentially a sub-par capability (Nuclear, Biological,
and Chemical Defense), and through robust training and integration of civilian capabilities developed a strategic level worldwide crisis response force for the USG.

The focus of training for the EPTB would be on the police leadership and the cadre of instructors who could then assume the role of ensuring the required skills and capabilities are maintained. There are two primary benefits to this approach. First, training the leadership and future instructors facilitates a more long term solution. The methodology of pushing police recruits through "police academies" does nothing to establish or support the legitimacy of the host nation police force as an institution. This concept may actually promote dependence on outsiders which is the opposite strategy the USG should be taking when participating in SSTR Operations. Secondly, with a focus on developing the cadre, the size requirement in personnel of the proposed EPTB is reduced. A smaller EPTB would require fewer resources and better facilitates the potential to staff the unit with the highest quality personnel.

From a task organization and line diagram perspective, the EPTB could look like a small Brigade. Despite being substantially smaller in overall personnel than a standard infantry brigade, the rank to billet assignments should be higher. Similar to an Army Special Forces Group, the independent nature of the missions assigned to the EPTB would require a higher level of maturity and experience. Companies should be commanded by majors and platoons commanded by captains. The proposed unit consists of a Brigade Headquarters Element, a Headquarters and Service Company (H&S), a Training Support Battalion (TSB), and two Cadre Training Battalions (CTB). The CTB's are divided into three Cadre Training Companies (CTC) each. Each CTP is further broken down into 3 training sections. The key to this structure would be the ability to task organize the deploying force to fit the requirement.
Figure 1. Expeditionary Police Training Brigade Task Organization

The H&S Company would provide the logistics, administration, communication, and sustainment of the brigade. Much like in a conventional infantry brigade, components of the H&S capabilities would be assigned to the battalions and companies. Training formations might deploy in a variety of sizes and configurations based on the mission. The H&S functions should be task organized to fit the requirement of the deploying force to ensure all required sustainment is provided.

The TSB would provide for and facilitates the training of the actual police trainers assigned to the battalions. The TSB would provide instructor training courses as well as advanced and specific skill set training. Additionally, resident within the TSB would be liaison officers from the local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies. Their purpose would be to serve as a conduit to these agencies in order to enhance the service members training. Additionally, the liaison officers could facilitate an instructor exchange program.

The total manpower for the EPTB would be approximately 1400 personnel. The bulk of the personnel would be assigned to the two battalions with approximately 450 personnel each. The remainder would make up the support and training elements of the Brigade. The size and shape of the deploying element would be determined by the threat, the environment, the existing
military or civilian support structure, and most importantly the training requirements of the force being trained. As the scope of the mission increases, the larger the force deployed. For a mission on the scale of Iraq and Afghanistan, the entire Brigade could deploy. For a short term theater security cooperation mission a platoon under the command of a captain could deploy. A similar model is the Marine Corps Reconnaissance battalion. The traditional deployable element is the platoon but examples exist where the entire reconnaissance battalion has deployed in its entirety for long duration missions.

The EPTB should be a joint force for two reasons. The first is to harness the collective strengths of each branch of the service. Secondly, a standing force that is Joint will reduce the staffing burden on each service. Optimally, the Secretary of Defense would appoint the Secretary of the Army as the Executive Agent. DoD Directive 5101.1 defines Executive Agent as “The head of a DoD Component to whom the Secretary of Defense or the Deputy Secretary of Defense has assigned specific responsibilities, functions, and authorities to provide defined levels of support for operational missions, or administrative or other designated activities that involve two or more of the DoD Components.” The Army would make both logistical and institutional sense to serve as the Executive Agent due to its sheer size of military police formations and its existing military police training infrastructure.

Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri and Lackland Air force Base are the two largest military police training installations in the country and either one would make a logical home base for the proposed EPTB. Further analysis would be required to determine which location best suits the needs of the unit and the institution at large. With an approximate size of 1400 personnel, existing structures with the traditional amenities would suffice. The support requirements from an infrastructure standpoint would be much less than a standard brigade sized element and would not require much in the way of up front development costs. From a home station training
perspective, much like the infrastructure, existing training areas, ranges, and the training infrastructure associated with the existing military police school would be adequate. Nothing about the mission or training requirements to prepare the EPTB for deployment are unique or revolutionary. The only unique aspect of the unit would be the manner in which it is organized and deployed.

Once an appropriate home station is identified, the process of building the unit can begin. Since there would be no new requirements for gear, weapons, or technology; the development, training, and assignment of the most qualified personnel would be the number one priority. The initial staffing of billets should focus on the supporting elements. The logisticians, administrators, maintainers, and communicators should be fully staffed and operational prior to any movement to begin training. Once the support infrastructure of the unit is established, the Commanding Officer with the headquarters element and Training Support Battalion take position. Once the headquarters and supporting formations are established, the primary focus shifts towards selecting personnel and training and equipping the battalions.

The selection process of personnel to man the force, especially the trainers assigned to the CTBs, should focus on maturity and intellect. The current intelligence requirement for a military police member is one of the highest of any branch or military occupational specialty within all the services. The responsibility levied upon the military police member and the independent nature of their job requires the ability to think and make timely decisions often under duress. The difference between a military police corporal and an infantry squad leader is the proximity to more senior leadership. The squad leader has his platoon commander and company commander nearby for support, the military police corporal is very often by himself with nothing more than is wits to work through complex situations until back up arrives. The
attributes expected of today’s military police is a good baseline requirement for selection to the EPTB.

The process for assigning personnel should be a dual track of selecting applicants currently serving in military police units in addition to developing a program within in the entry level training pipeline. The Marine Corps reconnaissance community utilizes this dual track. Marines can apply and be screened after a few years of service as well as enter the reconnaissance community directly out of basic training. It only makes sense for the initial assignment of personnel, especially the commanders and trainers, to come from the military police field. However, as the training program takes shape then qualifying personnel from other specialties could make the lateral move into the unit.

Compared to other current military specialties, the training pipeline for EPTB personnel assigned to the CTBs would follow a non-traditional path. The training curriculum would be tailored for the level of instructor responsibility assigned to each member. Prior to assignment to the EPTB, service members from all branches would attend their respective military police training schools. Upon graduation of their entry level school, service members assigned to the EPTB would attend an instructor training course provided by the Training Support Company. This course would be designed along the same lines as the Marine Corps Formal Schools Instructor course which teaches formal instructional techniques and curriculum management. This course would set the instructional baseline, establishes standard operating procedures, and delineate the responsibilities and mission requirements of the unit.

Once EPTB members completed their instructor training course, the training pipeline becomes non standard from the traditional military perspective. The next level of schooling would occur at a civilian local, state, or federal law enforcement academy. The current military
police training schools focus on military specific law enforcement functions and do not provide the most relevant instruction with regards to civilian police issues and consideration. This issue is one of the biggest arguments for not placing the DoD in the lead on foreign police training. Attending civilian law enforcement training would serve as a horizon broadening experience for the military trainers.

The assignment process for this concept should be based on rank and expected level of instructor responsibility. For example, a Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) would most likely be responsible for instructing core and basic policing techniques. He would attend a civilian basic or local law enforcement academy. Upon completion of the academy the NCO would serve as part of an exchange program on the civilian police force for a period of six month to one year. The Platoon, Company, and Battalion Commanders would most likely be responsible for higher level and more complex instruction; therefore, they would attend one of the Federal Law Enforcement Schools like the FBI / DEA Academy or one of the Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers. Upon completion the Officer would spend six months to a year working alongside the Federal Officers. These exchange programs would provide a level of depth and experience that will greatly enhance the ability of the EPTB to overcome the perceived lack of real policing experience resident with the DoD military police forces. The requirement to execute the exchange program may diminish or go away completely after the EPTB has been fully operational for a period of time that allows for institutional expertise and experience.

The USG would need to work out a compromise in order to mitigate violation of the Posse Comitatus Act with the exchange program. There are numerous options for overcoming this potential limitation of the exchange program. Numerous reserve service members serve as full time civilian law enforcement officers. This is one avenue to pursue. A more lasting if potentially more controversial option would be amending the law itself to facilitate the exchange
program. The experience and expertise gained by the service members through this type of exchange program greatly offset the hurdles that must be overcome in order for it to succeed.

From the initial authorization to stand up the force, approximately three to four years would be required before there should be any attempt to deploy the force. During this initial developmental period all the infrastructure and logistics requirements would need to be met. Additionally, the training program would have to be established, personnel screened and selected, and liaison with civilian and federal law enforcement agencies conducted. During the developmental period, the focus would be on establishing the institutional framework of the Brigade followed by the first fully manned, trained, and equipped battalion. Once the first battalion is deemed ready to deploy, the USG would then have a viable formation prepared to rapidly deploy and support foreign police training in support of SSTR operations around the globe.

The EPTB could serve independently; fall in support of a USG led operation, or fall in support of a multi-national led operation. The key to the EPTB is the flexibility it would bring to the USG foreign policy spectrum of options. For a small scale theater security cooperation requirement, an independent platoon could easily deploy and accomplish the mission. For a large scale multi-national operation, the EPTB could fit into the existing construct. For example; recent operations in Bosnia saw a large scale deployment of European Union (EU) Police formations in support of peace enforcing and civil crisis management operations. The EPTB would be an ideal formation to fill the police training niche while the EU formations maintained authority of the actual policing functions. This type of employment could facilitate the USG’s relevancy in major non USG led multi-national operations. Most importantly, since the EPTB would be a standing unit prepared for such contingencies, there would be no need for ad-hoc formations which has been the USG method in the past.
Conclusion

The United States has within the existing structure of the Department of Defense, the capability to develop a deployable and sustainable Expeditionary Police Training Brigade. The previous and current methodology for conducting foreign police training has been inadequate. As the requirement to train foreign police is not going away, it makes economic, logistical, and organizational sense to develop a formation within the DoD dedicated to the mission. The USG currently has the ability to rapidly deploy contingency forces around the world to conduct non-combatant evacuation operations, humanitarian assistance operations, raids, etc. Why then does the USG throw together what amounts to a pick up team to accomplish the mission of training foreign police? Historical examples abound of countries attempting to better themselves economically and socially yet struggle to maintain the basic element of rule of law. Without the rule of law, all other endeavors are futile. The United States ability to positively influence a countries establishment and maintenance of rule of law would be greatly increased with the establishment of the Expeditionary Brigade within the DoD.
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Training Host Nation Police Forces
Establishment of an Expeditionary Police Training Brigade

The United States has the capacity to establish within the Department of Defense a deployable, sustainable, Expeditionary Police Training Brigade designed exclusively for training host nation police forces.

Agenda
- Introduction: Title/Thesis (slide 2)
- The Problem (slides 3-6)
- The Solution (slides 7-10)
- Conclusion/Questions (slide 11)

The Problem
- A State Department official said that because of the proliferation of programs and the overlap in objectives, U.S. agencies may be duplicating efforts. As a result, determining which agency will provide training may depend largely on whether an agency has the resources or takes the initiative.

"Unity? I can't even get even get 2 different organizations to agree on how to put on handcuffs."
The requirement to conduct foreign police training is not going away...just the opposite
Numerous studies conducted to attempt to find solution to the problem (lead agency)
Results vary but a common theme runs throughout
- DOD has the resources, personnel, facilities but not the requisite level of real policing experience
- DOD / military police perform limited policing functions b/c duties conducted aboard closed environments
  - Military bases, stations, camps etc.

The Solution

**The DOD has the most resources, is the most responsive, and possesses an expeditionary mind set that is unrivaled by any other federal organization**

Expeditionary Police Training Brigade
- Department of the Army Executive Agent
- Joint
  - Interagency
  - Deployable
  - Scalable / task organized
  - Self sustaining (to a point)
  - Expeditionary / responsive
    - Trained and experienced

The Expeditionary Police Training Brigade
What would it look like?

- 1400 Personnel
- 450 Per Battalion
- Remainder in Training Support and H&S
- Traditional billet rank one higher
The National Security Strategy signed by President Obama in May of 2010 outlines, among many others, the requirement to uphold the rule of law, deny safe havens and strengthen at-risk states, pursue comprehensive engagement, and promote a just and sustainable international order.

- Is the requirement to conduct foreign police training going away?
- Previous experiences with foreign police training? Thoughts?
- Does the establishment of the EPTB help address these requirements more than the current model?
- Does the USG have the capacity, desire, or the will to institute a drastic change like this? Would the civilian agencies support or fight it?
- Thoughts on the civilian exchange program WRT the Posse Comitatus Act