**Title:** Developing Interagency Experts in the United States Marine Corps  

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**Abstract:**  
Efforts to increase the capabilities and capacities of other government agencies have fallen short requiring the Marine Corps to deploy ad hoc entities to address the demand of SSTR operations. If the Marine Corps is to succeed in this complex operating environment, it should build this capability from within.  

Interim solutions will provide the foundation for achieving a sustainable capability. In order to better train the force the Marine Corps could require deploying headquarters to send select officers to the Office of Stabilization and Reconstruction training program. This program will establish a foundation of knowledge and introduce these personnel to U.S. government agency composition, capability, and policy.  

Long-term solutions begin with a focused recruiting program that identifies and pursues candidates with specific degrees that translate well into SSTR operations. Educational opportunities can be developed similar to the defunct fellowship program assigning ten officers per academic year to different U.S. government agencies. Upon completion of this assignment these officers will owe a payback tour at MEFs where their skills can be best used. By spending a year with different agencies the Marine Corps could be postured to reach back to these agencies when forward deployed, interface with these agencies in country, and influence the development Office of Stabilization and Reconstruction training programs. The final phase in the development of this capability is to identify numerous 8006 and 8007 (any officer/any ground officer) billets in the MEF that could serve as the compensated structure spaces necessary to ensure a staffing goal is allocated to this capability.
FUTURE WAR PAPER

DEVELOPING INTERAGENCY EXPERTS IN THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF OPERATIONAL STUDIES

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DISCLAIMER

THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title: Developing Interagency Experts in the United States Marine Corps

Author: Major Terry Paustenbaugh

Thesis: The Marine Corps faces a challenging mission of providing a stability and reconstruction capability and must be prepared to address these civilian resource shortfalls by recruiting, organizing, training, and educating their own personnel to address the Stability Security Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) tasks routinely assigned to other United States agencies.

Discussion: The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) explored the implications of this directive on military organizations and it concluded that a “lack of deployable specialists has left the Department of Defense as the default responder.” Efforts to increase the capabilities and capacities of other government agencies have fallen short requiring the Marine Corps to deploy ad hoc entities to address the demand of SSTR operations. If the Marine Corps is to succeed in this complex operating environment, it should build this capability from within.

Interim solutions will provide the foundation for achieving a sustainable capability. Manpower and Reserve Affairs (M&RA) has been tasked by the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3210.06 to develop a plan to identify and assign officers towards interagency billets. This directive serves as a forcing function and will support organizing for this capability. In order to better train the force the Marine Corps could require deploying headquarters to send select officers to the Office of Stabilization and Reconstruction training program. This program will establish a foundation of knowledge and introduce these personnel to U.S. government agency composition, capability, and policy. Additionally, these classes could serve as a networking opportunity and provide a reach back mechanism for Marines who are planning, executing, and assessing these actions in SSTR operations.

Long-term solutions begin with a focused recruiting program that identifies and pursues candidates with specific degrees that translate well into SSTR operations. Educational opportunities can be developed similar to the defunct fellowship program assigning ten officers per academic year to different U.S. government agencies. Upon completion of this assignment these officers will owe a payback tour at MEFs where their skills can be best used. By spending a year with different agencies the Marine Corps could be postured to reach back to these agencies when forward deployed, interface with these agencies in country, and influence the development Office of Stabilization and Reconstruction training programs. The final phase in the development of this capability is to identify numerous 8006 and 8007 (any officer/ any ground officer) billets in the MEF that could serve as the compensated structure spaces necessary to ensure a staffing goal is allocated to this capability.

Recommendation: A comprehensive phased approach to recruiting, educating, training, and organizing the force to address this requirement could see this capability fully fielded in the future. Intermediate objectives could serve as the foundation for a long-term comprehensive approach that looks to provide officers with opportunities to serve in other agencies coupled with a more comprehensive education and training program that leads to an institutional capability.
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In recent years there has been a renewed focus regarding how to best capitalize on the capabilities of both civilian government agencies and military might during the conduct of Stability Security Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR). The leadership in the United States government continues to explore how to best bring all elements of national power to bear since SSTR operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have taken on a greater importance in the nation’s national security strategy. Even with this emphasis, a true capability has not formed due to lack of civilian personnel willing to volunteer for assignments in this challenging operating environment. As a result of these resource deficiencies progress in the areas of economic, governance, and rule of law, proves that increased governmental agency involvement on the ground is necessary.

The Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2008 provided $75 million in initial funding for the development of a civilian response corps.\(^1\) In 2009 an additional $248 million was allocated to hire 250 full time members for the civilian response corps and another 2000 persons in support of the stand by element of the response corps.\(^2\) Current recruiting efforts to fill these billets remain behind schedule, and recent reports from the Department of State Civilian Stabilization Initiative show that recruiting goals still fall short of their total requirements.\(^3\) As a result the recruiting, training, and deploying civilians to austere environments on short notice will continue to be a challenge. Couple this reality with the tightening of the government’s purse strings and the future of increased civilian agency involvement with forward deployed Marine forces in these challenging operations is not very bright. As a result the Marine Corps will continue to face the challenging mission of providing a stability and reconstruction capability throughout the world and must be prepared to address these civilian resource shortfalls by recruiting,
organizing, training, and educating their own personnel to address the SSTR tasks routinely assigned to other United States agencies.

Concepts and Background

National Security Presidential Directive-44 (NSPD-44) of 2005 states the requirement for United States departments and agencies to increase coordination, planning, and implementation in reconstruction and stabilization efforts. Adhering to NSPD-44, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) explored the implications of this directive for military organizations and concluded that a "lack of deployable specialists has left the Department of Defense as the default responder." The manpower shortfalls throughout U.S. government agencies is quite revealing, as these civilian institutions are challenged to fill critical billets within their own organization before they can consider assigning personnel to support the military’s needs during training events or while forward deployed.

In spite of these realities, the Department of Defense continues to pursue efforts to better synchronize SSTR with their undermanned civilian counterparts. The 2010 Joint Operating Concept (JOC) states that "forces will marshal all available resources and tap into sources throughout the United States Government. These insights will be incorporated into campaign plans." The harsh reality regarding this assertion by the JOC is that these resources are not routinely accessible to the Marine Corps. The JOC further proclaims “the combined civil-military team will form plans and programs into a single process and be synchronized to achieve maximum synergy.” Although admirable desires on the part of the military, the other elements of national power have not been able to field a deployable element capable of meeting current and potential operational requirements.
The Marine Corps has begun to address the requirement to work more closely with its civilian counterparts. The 2009-2015 United States Marine Corps Service Campaign Plan requires the force conduct persistent forward naval engagement, employ integrated combined arms, provide forces and specialized detachments for service aboard ships, on stations, and for operations ashore. The Marine Corps must be proficient in joint forcible entry operations, capable of conducting complex expeditionary operations in urban littorals, and finally lead joint and multinational operations that enable interagency activities. This sixth core competency, enabling interagency activities, tasks the Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration (CD&I) via the implementation guidance with identifying key interagency skills by capability and capacity required of Marines in complex operating environments. CD&I’s initial response to this service campaign plan task was the publication, *The Concept for Unified Action Through Civil-Military Integration*. This concept paper attempts to answer the challenges of working with other government agencies to address the problems associated with SSTR as it recognizes organizational culture, structure, and fiscal issues have made multi-agency cooperation difficult. Despite this recognized problem of cooperation, the concept states that resources available to commanders are plentiful, and the operating concept goes on to explain that commanders are required to plan, execute, and assess operations which can be supported by adding a liaison office from a Country Team to the military staff.

Other United States government agencies have also attempted to address NSPD-44 in order to better meet the requirements necessary to succeed in a complex operating environment. These agencies often lack the personnel depth necessary to be able to send their personnel to advanced education programs such as the Marine Corps’ Command and Staff College much less provide liaison officers for training exercises with military organizations, or assign them to the
staff of a deploying Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), or division. As a means to pool their collective resources and better compete for funding, Congress formally recognized the Civil Response Corps in 2008 as an organization that should meet the demand signal for future stabilization and reconstruction requirements. This relatively new entity was designed to fill a recognized capability gap, but in reality it is not a large enough organization to provide teams down to the tactical level (MEFs, MEBs, and divisions) where they can assist in the planning, executing, and assessment of SSTR operations.

The Civilian Response Corps is comprised of Foreign Service Officers and Civil Service personnel from eight United States government agencies: the Department of State, USAID, Department of Agriculture, Department of Commerce, Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice, and the Department of Treasury. The response corps was chartered to fill 264 full-time positions for members of the Active component with another group of 2,000 “standby” federal employees volunteers to undertake additional training and to be available to serve in stabilization missions in case of need. This standby component is to be prepared to deploy within 30 days for up to 180 days. Finally, a reserve component consisting of 2,000 volunteers from the private sector and state and local governments could be called upon to augment the response corps in roles such as local police officers, city administrators, and port operators. These lofty personnel goals have been slow to materialize as the civilian response corps remained 750 employees short of their fiscal year 10 recruiting requirements according to the 2010 Civilian Stabilization Initiative. The goal for the Civilian Response Corps is to achieve full operational capability in both the active component and standby force; and based on the above statistics these lofty goals remain a daunting challenge. Ongoing operations in Afghanistan, coupled with deployments to countries
such as Haiti, Somalia, and Morocco, it is evident that the civilian response corps will not meet all the requirements levied upon them and certainly can’t be counted upon to plan, execute, and assess SSTR operations with Marine units in future operating environments. If the Marine Corps is to succeed in this complex operating environment, it should build this capability from within. This would provide the Marine Corps the flexibility to either prosecute the mission without the services of civilian response corps or to better leverage these high demand, low density experts in a given area of operation.

**Interim Solutions**

The Marine Corps should develop a comprehensive phased approach to recruiting, educating, training, and organizing its forces to address the Marine Corps' ability to implement interagency activities. There are measures that can be taken in the next few years to develop an interim capability that will ensure deploying units are better postured to address the dynamic SSTR environment while the Marine Corps methodically “institutionalizes” this much needed capability. As with fielding any new capability, some tough decisions regarding training, education, and organizational structure will need to be made in these identified areas. If the Marine Corps is serious about addressing this SSTR capability gap, the solution can be found by energizing some ongoing activities at Headquarters Marine Corps, in addition to the development of some innovative programs.

It is customary for units who are preparing to deploy to haphazardly fill Billet Identification Codes (BICs) with any officer that meets grade requirements. In many instances a Marine Air Ground Task Force background satisfies the need to fill billets that don’t support traditional warfighting staff functions. Currently, the II MEF FWD headquarters manning
document calls for twelve officers to be assigned to the G-9 section in support of SSTR planning, execution, and assessment. Of these identified billets, only two are filled organically by the MEF. The 2d Marine Division’s headquarters manning document is comparable to MEF headquarters manning requirements as the Division G-9 calls for ten officers in its section. The artillery regiment normally fills seven of these billets, requiring the remainder of these sections to be sourced from throughout MEF or via global source management. This type of sourcing solution continues to hinder the operating forces and does not always place the right people in these unique and challenging billets.

In order to lessen this disjointed assignment process in the operating forces, Manpower and Reserve Affairs (M&RA) has been tasked by the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3210.06 to develop a plan to identify and assign officers to these unique billet assignments. This instruction requires the Marine Corps to track personnel inventories of those Marines who have proficiency in interagency/irregular warfare relevant requirements. These skills and experiences can be acquired through military occupational specialty, college degree programs, professional licensing, and technical schools. One can argue that these Marines are not true professionals in these areas based on their experiences, but it is a logical step in aligning a Marine’s formal education and interest with a specific capability required in a MEF or division.

To begin to address the above requirement, the Center for Irregular Warfare and M&RA identified Marines who hold degrees in specific interagency fields and the results were quite revealing. There were seven major identified SSTR capability categories which include civil security operations, restoration of essential services, justice, governance, economic development, agriculture, and commerce. Of these seven categories only agriculture did not have sufficient Marine personnel. Although these categories do not directly translate into specific agencies
they do adequately align with many of the capabilities required in this operating environment and serves as an initial step in identifying specific skill sets the Marine Corps can invest in developing further. Using the II MEF FWD headquarters and the 2d Marine Division headquarters' manning documents as a baseline, the Marine Corps operating forces would require approximately 60 officers to be identified with these skill sets in order to augment deploying forces requirements. Manpower could develop a draw-case code that would allow the MEF's consolidated administration centers and G-1 to determine who has particular educational backgrounds aligned with SSTR requirements. By using this code the MEFs could be smartly postured to identify critical skill sets when filling out manning requirements prior to deploying into theatre. With this first step complete the MEF can then focus on training these identified personnel.

During the pre-deployment training period these Marines could attend classes provided by the Office of Stabilization and Reconstruction that are designed to establish a foundation of knowledge and introduce these personnel to U.S. government agency composition, capability, and policy. These classes include an Introduction to Department of State Agency Culture, Foundations of Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations, and Foundations of Interagency Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations. These two week courses will not make one an expert in this complex field, but will serve as a starting point for those tackling complex SSTR tasks. As proven time and again it is not always what one knows but who one knows that makes a difference. A second order effect of attending these courses is the networking opportunities provided. These opportunities help to offset the lack of civilian response corps support within the MEF and division and provide a reach back mechanism for Marines who are planning, executing, and assessing these actions in SSTR operations void of civilians on these staffs.
This educational foundation will set the conditions for a greater amount of involvement as concepts, capabilities, and policies of those United States government agencies operating in a MEF, MEB, or division’s area of operation will be understood prior to these Marines’ participation in the pre-deployment exercises with the Marine Staff Training Program (MSTP). By having some background in SSTR, the G-3 or G-9 would prove a force multiplier as these newly formed staffs could focus on the fundamentals of planning, execution, and assessments during their time with MSTP rather than working through many of the basic periods of instruction during this stage in the pre-deployment training cycle. MSTP is chartered to work with deploying MEFs, MEBs, and divisions as part of a Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRX) agreement that assists these organizations in completing their pre-deployment training requirements. The first evolution in the MSTP/MEF MRX program is the Governance and Economics Conference, which includes lecturers from USAID, USDA, DOJ, and DOS. This serves as a unique opportunity to better understand policies and programs specific to the MEF, MEB, and division’s assigned area of operation and allows senior leaders to discuss issues with their counterpart. This first phase in the training program would serve as another step in the overall education as well as a networking opportunity for personnel assigned to serve as interagency subject matter experts on the staff.

The culminating event in the MRX is the command post exercise where MSTP runs the MEF, MEB, or division through their final paces prior to deployment. Ideally, interagency participation would reach its apex during this training evolution but MSTP continues to contract for interagency role players via IDS International Government Services using Joint National Training Capability funds. Although this shortfall in interagency participation cannot be completely overcome, the Marine Corps’ participation in multiple interagency training venues
could assist in energizing these other United States government agencies to augment some of the billets that are filled by IDS International Government Services. This increased partnership between the Marine Corps and other governmental agencies could provide the growth in interagency participation lending to a more realistic training and a better prepared staff. Cumulatively these efforts would decrease the discovery learning during the first weeks in theatre and allow these units to rapidly support and influence SSTR operations.

These intermediate organization, training, and education solutions would serve the Marine Corps well as units are called to deploy to theatres that require a greater level of expertise in SSTR operations. With these intermediate objectives achieved, a foundation for addressing the Marine Corps’ sixth core competency, enabling interagency activities, can be realized. The long term approach to building on these interim solutions begins with the recruitment of interagency minded candidates followed by education and training changes that will enable the Marine Corps to make modifications to their MEF and division headquarters’ tables of organizations, thus ensuring identified units are prepared for SSTR operations.

Long Term Solution

Long term solutions designed to address the Marine Corps’ requirement to enable interagency activities center around a focused recruitment process, comprehensive education program, increased coordination with the Office of Stabilization and Reconstruction regarding training opportunities, and structural compensation changes via the Marine Corps’ Total Force Structure Division (TFSD). If any of these initiatives are addressed in isolation, the desired capability for the Marine Corps will not be achieved. These initiatives will take time, cost
money, and require force structure adjustments in order to achieve the desired objective of developing an institutional solution to SSTR operations.

Recruiting officers with degrees in certain areas that translate to interagency skill sets could serve as an approach to building a foundation for addressing this interagency capability. Marine Corps recruiting command has historically met established recruiting goals ensuring qualified officers are available to fill necessary military occupational specialties. Current officer recruiting uses a number of avenues ranging the Naval Academy, Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC), Marine Corps Enlisted Commissioning Education Program (MECEP), and the Officer Candidate Course (OCC) in order to attract the most qualified candidate to join the Marine Corps. In many cases applicants must possess a myriad of basic skills in order to be considered for these programs. If recruiters take the selection process a step further and allocate quotas for candidates that have degrees in specific programs such as city planning, city management, justice, economics, agriculture, and commerce the Marine Corps could exploit these backgrounds allowing the institution to build a foundation of officers with a background in applicable SSTR missions.

This identification of officers with degrees in specific backgrounds is not intended to create a new MOS but serve as a means to develop a secondary MOS career track that will enable interagency activities on MEF, MEB, and division staffs. An officer’s initial assignment would still see them assigned as a platoon commander in order to obtain MOS credibility in a specific field. However, following this initial tour their specialized degree could serve to guide young officers and their monitors to a more specialized careers track with regards to B-billet
assignments, individual augmentation, and educational opportunities that would expose them to SSTR planning, execution, and assessments.

Through common practice in the Fleet Marine Force company grade officers are routinely assigned to individual augmentation or deploying headquarters 8007 (unrestricted ground officer) billets on these staffs. By identifying officers with specific degrees these headquarters could align educational backgrounds with specific billet requirements in the G-9 or via the joint manning document; therefore, matching one’s educational background with specific billet needs for these deploying headquarters and individual augmentation assignments that would begin to develop skills that can be further refined through a formal education process as they progress in rank. Following assignment to a B-billet an officer’s career track sees them return to the Fleet Marine Force in order to command at the company level or fill an appropriate level staff position. Following this step in one’s career progression an officer, having completed the professional military education requirements will have a struck an effective balance between specific MOS credibility and a basic educational and operational background in SSTR that makes them ideally suited for further education.

As officers pass from the rank of Captain to Major an education program that yields outstanding results can be re-established in order to further develop these burgeoning SSTR professionals. The Commandant of the Marine Corps Fellows Program, was originally designed to expose select field grade officers to assignments myriad of assignments outside of the military; however, in 2006 it was suspended due to operational commitments leaving a void in educational opportunities outside the military establishment. This program, following requirements detailed in Marine Corps Order 152.28B, was designed to provide officers with one
year assignments to prominent national public and foreign policy research institutions. Ten officers were competitively selected for these positions and it was determined that completion of this program was equivalent to attending either intermediate or top-level school. Upon completion of the program there were no designated follow-on assignments that could take advantage of this education. However, using this program as a model, the Marine Corps could take these ten officer education structure spaces not currently assigned and modify the program to have selected officers with SSTR educational backgrounds work for one year at the Departments of State, Agriculture, Commerce, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, Justice, Treasury, and USAID. This program could require selected officers to spend a portion of the year at the headquarters in Washington, D.C. as well as forward deployed in order to gain on-the-job training experiences that would educate them on the culture, policy, and user level aspects of these agencies operating in support of SSTR operations. Such a one-year program could provide these select officers invaluable insights that should benefit deploying staffs as they plan, execute, and assess SSTR operations. An officer who has participated in such a program could leverage these relationships to enable him to have ready contacts that could be of use while preparing for deployment or while forward deployed that might otherwise not be available to these staffs.

Such a one year program could provide officers a secondary occupational specialty in interagency operations with specific sub-specialties would then be required to serve a two year pay back tour on either a MEF or division staff in such a role. By providing this secondary MOS designator the Marine Corps would remain compliant with CJCS Instruction 3210.06, and when selected officers had completed their pay back tour MEFs and divisions could still call on them to augment any exercise, pre-deployment training, or planning requirements. As with any
secondary MOS these officers will not be tied to this career track and can still enjoy the opportunities of command and staff assignments in the primary MOS ensuring that they remain competitive with their peers.

Initially this program should provide trained officers filling either G-3 or G-9 billet identification codes at all three MEF and division headquarters. As this program matures, and the understanding of this new capability is realized in the operating forces, the annual allocation of ten seats could grow by redistributing five seats each from the Marine Corps Command and Staff and Marine Corps War College. This small reallocation of seats would ensure an adequate number of interagency trained officers are available to either the G-3 or G-9 sections throughout all three MEF and division headquarters.

As officers support this interagency fellowship program the ability to influence instruction at interagency courses as well as those sponsored by the Marine Corps would continue to grow. The three interagency courses that have recently been developed certainly provide a foundation for understanding other U.S. government agencies, but the Marine Corps had no influence in the development of that instruction. In order to see the Marine Corps' interagency capability grow, an investment in time and funding in order to better shape the curriculum and increase attendance must be made and this fellows program could serve as the conduit to seeing this partnership between the Marine Corps and United Stated government agencies grow. Finally, second and third order effects might include increased interagency participation in programs at MCU, MSTP, and other pre-deployment training exercises.

Once career progression regarding identification, interim, and formal education opportunities has matured the next logical step is to find structure in the operating forces to
exploit this new capability. Structure spaces are closely guarded and the manpower process only allows for a certain number of billets in a unit's table of organization to be staffed. In order to routinely staff these qualified interagency officers in fleet the TFSD must identify free billets that M&RA could then fill through the established manning process. When reviewing the Fiscal Year 11 Tables of Organization for the MEF and division headquarters there are numerous 8006 and 8007 (any officer/ any ground officer) billets that could serve as the compensated structure spaces necessary to ensure a staffing goal is allocated.\textsuperscript{27} Through a thorough education and training package it is certainly in the realm of the possible to assign interagency specialists to key staff positions throughout the MEF at no cost to these organizations with regards to identified MOS structure spaces.

\textbf{Conclusion}

The Marine Corps has recognized the need to address the critical requirement of enabling interagency activities but has failed to grasp the reality that their civilian counterparts are undermanned and lack the resources necessary to meet these requirements at the tactical level. The time is ripe for the Marine Corps to develop a capability by committing resources to the development of its own solution for ensuring SSTR operations are supported by personnel who are educated and trained for this challenging operational requirement.

A comprehensive phased approach to recruiting, educating, training, and organizing its forces to address this sixth core competency could see this capability fully fielded in the future. Intermediate objectives include the tracking of officers with undergraduate, technical expertise, and real world experiences coupled with a comprehensive training plan. Increased and focused interagency pre-deployment training evolutions will see that a burgeoning capability can take
shape. Using this as the foundation, a more long-term comprehensive approach that looks to provide officers with opportunities to serve in other agencies coupled with a more comprehensive education and training program can lead to the development of an institutional capability. These efforts could produce a better experienced and trained staff at the MEF, MEB, and division headquarters. If these measures are undertaken by the Marine Corps it will be smartly postured to address this core competency while surviving and thriving during SSTR operations.
Notes


7. Ibid, 27.


16. Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration, Total Force Structure Division, II Marine Expeditionary Force Headquarters Table of Organization.

17. Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration, Total Force Structure Division, 2d Marine Division Force Headquarters Table of Organization.

18. Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3210.06, Irregular Warfare, June 10, 2010, Enclosure A-10.


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DEVELOPING INTERAGENCY EXPERTS IN THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

12 SLIDES
AGENDA

1) The Problem  
2) Current Directives/Concepts  
3) Civilian Response Corps  
4) Interim solutions  
5) Long-term solutions  
6) Conclusion

Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction-Department of Defense activities that support U.S. Government plans for stabilization, security, reconstruction and transition operations, which lead to sustainable peace while advancing U.S. interests. (DoDD 3000.05, November 28, 2005)
1. THE PROBLEM

• How can the Marine Corps best capitalize on the capabilities of both civilian government agencies and military might during Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) operations?

• The pursuit of a civilian capability is a noble cause; however, the capacity will not meet the demand signals of our future operating environment.

• Reality requires the Marine Corps to be prepared to address these civilian resource shortfalls by recruiting, organizing, training, and educating their own personnel to address the SSTR tasks routinely assigned to other United States agencies.
2. CURRENT DIRECTIVES AND CONCEPTS

- Nation's Leadership
  - 2005 National Security Presidential Directive-44 (NSPD-44) states the requirement for United States departments and agencies to increase coordination, planning, and implementation in reconstruction and stabilization efforts.
  - Current recruiting efforts remain behind schedule.

- Marine Corps Leadership
  - The Marine Corps' 2009-2015 Service Campaign Plan attempts to address the requirement SSTR with other agencies.
    - Tasks CD&I via the implementation guidance with identifying key interagency skills by capability and capacity
    - CD&I's *The Concept for Unified Action Through Civil-Military Integration* recognizes organizational culture, structure, and fiscal issues have made multi-agency cooperation difficult. The concept states that resources available to commanders are plentiful and commanders are required to plan, execute, and assess operations which can be supported by adding a liaison office from a Country Team to the military staff.
    - Manpower and Reserve Affairs tasked by the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3210.06 to develop a plan to identify and assign officers to these unique billet assignments. This instruction requires the Marine Corps to track personnel inventories of those Marines who have proficiency in interagency/irregular warfare relevant requirements.
3. CIVILIAN RESPONSE CORPS

- Comprised of Foreign Service Officers and Civil Service personnel from eight United States government agencies:
  - Chartered to fill 250 full-time positions for members of the Active component and 2,000 “standby” federal employees volunteers to undertake additional training and to be available to serve in stabilization missions in case of need. Standby component is to be prepared to deploy within 30 days for up to 180 days.
  - Reserve component consisting of 2,000 volunteers from the private sector and state and local governments could be called upon to augment the response corps in roles such as local police officers, city administrators, and port operators.
  - Personnel goals have been slow to materialize as the organization fell 750 employees short of their fiscal year 2010 recruiting requirements according to the 2010.
4. INTERIM SOLUTIONS

- The Marine Corps should develop a comprehensive phased approach to recruiting, educating, training, and organizing its forces to address the Marine Corps' ability to implement interagency activities.

- **Organize**
  - II MEF FWD HQs manning doc calls for (12) officers to be assigned to the G-9 section in support of SSTR planning, execution, and assessment. Of these identified billets, only two are filled organically by the MEF.
  - 2d MarDiv's HQ manning doc requires (10) officers in its section.
  - Arty Regiment normally fills (7) of these billets, requiring the remainder of these sections to be sourced from throughout MEF or via global sourcing.
  - Center for Irregular Warfare and M&RA identified Marines who hold degrees in specific interagency fields. Seven major identified SSTR capability categories: civil security operations, restoration of essential services, justice, governance, economic development, agriculture, and commerce. Only agriculture did not have sufficient Marine personnel.
  - Using the II MEF FWD headquarters and the 2d Marine Division HQs manning docs as a baseline, the Marine Corps would require (60) officers to augment deploying forces requirements.
  - M&RA could develop a draw-case code allowing consolidated administration centers and G-1 to determine who has particular educational backgrounds aligned with SSTR requirements.
4. INTERIM SOLUTIONS

• Train

- Pre-deployment training period Marines could attend classes provided by the Office of Stabilization and Reconstruction (OSR) IOT introduce these personnel to U.S. government agency composition, capability, and policy.

- Classes could provide a networking opportunity and help to offset the lack of civilian response corps support within the MEF and Div. Additionally can provide a reach back mechanism for Marines who are planning, executing, and assessing SSTR operations void of civilians on these staffs.

- Classes could allow these newly formed staffs to focus on the fundamentals of planning, execution, and assessments during their time with MSTP rather than working through many of the basic periods of instruction during this stage in the pre-deployment training cycle.

- During the MRX command post exercise where MSTP has attempted to harness interagency; however, MSTP continues to contract for interagency role players via IDS International Government Services using Joint National Training Capability funds.

- This increased partnership between the Marine Corps and other governmental agencies leading up to this culminating event could provide the growth in interagency participation lending to a more realistic training and a better prepared staff.

- Cumulatively these efforts would decrease the discovery learning during the first weeks in theatre and allow these units to rapidly support and influence SSTR operations.
5. LONG-TERM SOLUTIONS

• Recruitment
  - Officer recruiters identify candidates that have degrees in specific programs such as city planning, city management, justice, economics, agriculture, and commerce. The Marine Corps could exploit these backgrounds allowing the institution to build a foundation of officers with a background in applicable SSTR missions.
  - Identification of officers with degrees in specific backgrounds is not intended to create a new MOS but serve as a means to develop a secondary MOS career track that will enable interagency activities.

• Manpower Management
  - Matching one’s educational background with specific billet needs for these deploying headquarters and individual augmentation assignments that would begin to develop skills that can be further refined through a formal education process as they progress in rank.
  - Following assignment to a B-billet an officer’s career track sees them return to the Fleet Marine Force in their primary MOS.
  - Following this step in one’s career progression an officer, having completed the professional military education requirements will have struck an effective balance between specific MOS credibility and a basic educational and operational background in SSTR that makes them ideally suited for further education.
5. LONG-TERM SOLUTIONS

- **Training and Education**

  - Marine Corps Order 152.28B (The Commandant of the Marine Corps Fellows Program) was originally designed to expose select field grade officers to assignments myriad of assignments outside of the military. In 2006 it was suspended due to operational commitments leaving a void in educational opportunities outside the military establishment.

  - Marine Corps could take these (10) officer education structure spaces not currently assigned and modify the program to have selected officers with SSTR educational backgrounds work for one year at the Departments of State, Agriculture, Commerce, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, Justice, Treasury, and USAID.

  - Would require selected officers to spend a portion of the year at the headquarters in Washington, D.C. as well as forward deployed in order to gain on-the-job training experiences that would educate them on the culture, policy, and user level aspects of these agencies operating in support of SSTR operations.

  - This program would provide officers a secondary occupational specialty in interagency operations with specific sub-specialties would then be required to serve a two year pay back tour on either a MEF or division staff in such a role meeting (CJCS Instruction 3210.06)
5. LONG-TERM SOLUTIONS

- **Organize**
  - As this program matures, and the understanding of this new capability is realized in the operating forces, the annual allocation of ten seats could grow by redistributing five seats each from the Marine Corps Command and Staff and Marine Corps War College. This small reallocation of seats would ensure an adequate number of interagency trained officers are available to either the G-3 or G-9 sections throughout all three MEF and division headquarters.
  
  - The next logical step is to find structure in the operating forces to exploit this new capability. TFSD could identify free billets that M&RA could then fill through the established manning process. When reviewing the Fiscal Year 11 Tables of Organization for the MEF and division headquarters there are numerous 8006 and 8007 (any officer/ any ground officer) billets that could serve as the compensated structure spaces necessary to ensure a staffing goal is allocated.
6. CONCLUSION

• A comprehensive phased approach to recruiting, educating, training, and organizing its forces see this capability fully fielded in the future.

• These efforts could produce a better experienced and trained staff at the MEF, MEB, and division headquarters which will posture the Marine corps to operate more effectively during SSTR operations.
QUESTIONS?