In the future, United States military operations will focus more on “Phase Zero” operations than on high intensity conflict on the African continent. The military will be conducting operations such as theater security cooperation and capacity building in those countries, which require a “whole of government” approach using all the instruments of national power. United States African Command was established with the intent to provide such embedded capacity. The current command structure does not adequately address the complex nature of the African continent. Current AFRICOM command structure contains five engagement divisions to plan for the implementation of national strategy. This command structure is woefully inadequate given the size, scope, and strategic importance of the continent. AFRICOM should be structured to have five standing Regional Joint Task Forces (RJTF)’s, each commanded by a senior non-Department of Defense civilian, to properly plan, coordinate and implement national strategy.
FUTURE WAR PAPER

CIVILIAN LED REGIONAL JOINT TASK FORCE: THE WAY FORWARD FOR AFRI COM

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF OPERATIONAL STUDIES

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DISCLAIMER

THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT.
Introduction

In the future, United States military operations will focus more on “Phase Zero” operations than on high intensity conflict on the African continent. The military will be conducting operations such as theater security cooperation and capacity building in those countries. These operations require a “whole of government” approach using all the instruments of national power, Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic (DIME), which military officers are neither trained nor equipped to perform. United States African Command (USAFRICOM or AFRICOM) was established with the intent to provide such embedded capacity. AFRICOM was to provide a holistic approach to Africa through a larger permanent interagency presence within the command. This approach has failed in that the current command structure does not adequately address the complex nature of the African continent. Current AFRICOM command structured contains five engagement divisions to plan for the implementation of national strategy. (See APPENDIX A for the complete command structure) This command structure is woefully inadequate given the size, scope, and strategic importance of the continent. AFRICOM needs to be structured to have five standing Regional Joint Task Forces (RJTF) s, each commanded by a senior non-Department of Defense civilian, to properly plan, coordinate and implement national strategy.

Background on Africa

Africa is massive on almost every scale. The African continent contains more than fifteen countries in the arc of instability that stretches from the Andean region of Latin America across Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, the Caucasus, and through the northern parts of South Asia. It is the second largest continent in the world containing 22% of the earth’s land surface. Africa is approximately 7,000 kilometers from the Cape of Good Hope to Cairo, and
about the same distance from Dakar in the west to the tip of the Horn of Africa in the east. To put it in perspective the United States, China, India, Europe, New Zealand, and much of South America could fit within Africa’s coastline.³

Aside from vast size, Africa also has diverse ecological climates ranging from desert in the north to deciduous forest in the center and savanna in the south. The Nile is the world’s longest river stretching nearly 7,000 kilometers and empties into the Congo River Basin that in of itself is larger than all of India.⁴ With a land that is so vast and with geography that is often compartmentalizing, typical relationships form around tribal loyalties. These tribes observe no geo-political boundaries and as such have been a key cause for many of the atrocities that Africa has become infamous for.

**Future**

The future of Africa is expected to be one of continued unrest, as the economic situation gets better for some and worse for others.⁵ Countries in Africa are estimated to add nearly 300 million to their populations’ in the next 15 years. Approximately 27 countries in Africa will experience a “youth bulge” by 2025, mostly notably Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Democratic Republic of Congo (DROC) who are each expected to increase their populations between 40-50 million persons each.⁶ This combined with continual inequitable shared economic prosperity is expected to add to the social unrest. Certain countries in Africa have already become a key strategic location for markets of goods as well as for natural resources.

There have been new discoveries of vast petroleum deposits located on the continent as well as along the coast. The United States currently imports nearly as much oil from Africa as it does from the Middle East. Three of the top ten countries from which the United States imports oil from are in Africa: Nigeria ⁵th, Angola ⁶th, Algeria ⁷th.⁷ In addition to petroleum, Africa has
become a leading source for precious resources as aluminum, bauxite, chromite, coal, copper, nickel, silver, uranium, zinc, gold and diamonds.

The estimated population of Africa is around one billion with nearly one-third practicing some form of Islam; however, there is expected to be a significant increase in the number of practicing Christians, nearly doubling to 633 million in the next 15 years. The majority of Muslims live in the northern part of the continent roughly on a line drawn from Guinea to Somali. Research has shown that African Muslims tend to be more moderate than the form practiced in the Middle East and incorporate traditional African religions into their Muslim faith. This dispels the conventional wisdom that all of Africa is a potential breeding ground for Muslim extremists. Rather Africa is more vulnerable to economic disruption, population stresses, civil conflict, and political instability. With these factors, Africa can become a location for terrorists to hide. As stated in the 2002 National Security Strategy:

Regional conflicts can arise from a wide variety of causes, including poor governance, external aggression, competing claims, internal revolt, tribal rivalries, and ethnic or religious hatreds. If left unaddressed, however, these different causes lead to the same ends: failed states, humanitarian disasters, and ungoverned areas that can become safe havens for terrorists.

Background

The National Security Act (NSA) of 1947 established unified commands to “... provide for the effective strategic direction of the armed forces.” No part of the African continent was assigned to a Unified Command until 1952 when several northern African countries were added to United States European Command (EUCOM) and this was because of historic ties these countries had with Europe. It was not until 1960, with the growing threat from the Soviet Union and possible spread of communism, that Sub-Saharan Africa became the responsibility of Atlantic Command (LANTCOM), and then subsequently in 1962 it was re-assigned to Strike Command (STRICOM). STRICOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) encompassed the Middle
East, Sub-Saharan Africa, and South Asia. With a re-organization of commands in 1971, STRICOM became Readiness Command (REDCOM) and Sub-Saharan Africa was left unassigned until 1983. In 1983, the responsibility for the African continent was divided amongst three geographic commands; Central Command (CENTCOM) responsible for seven east African countries, Pacific Command (PACCOM) responsible for Madagascar, and EUCOM responsible for the remaining countries.12

It was not until the introduction of the National Security Strategy of 2002 that the United States Government (USG) formally recognized the strategic importance of Africa. As stated in the National Security Strategy of 2002 “In Africa, promise and opportunity sit side by side with disease, war, and desperate poverty. This threatens both a core value of the United States-preserving human dignity- and our strategic priority- combating global terror.”13 The strategic importance of Africa in relation to United States (US) security was further highlighted in the 2006 National Security Strategy where it was noted that there was a need to “recognize that our security depends upon partnering with Africans to strengthen fragile and dialing states and bring ungoverned areas under the control of effective democracies.”14

In February 2007, the Bush administration formally announced the creation of a new unified combatant command, US Africa Command (AFRICOM) with a mission to promote US national security objectives in Africa and its surrounding waters.15 With the creation of AFRICOM, the intent was for the USG to utilize an approach to Africa that centered more on “soft power”. The command was to have a larger civilian component from other civilian Federal Agencies than other CoCOMs, and to use that knowledge to concentrate more on “Phase Zero” operations. The purpose was to use a “whole of government” approach to addressing national security concerns and work towards developing a secure and stable environment in Africa. The belief was that “if US agencies, both military and civilian, are able to coordinate more efficiently
and effectively both among themselves as well as with their African partners and other
international actors, they might be more successful at averting more complex emergencies on the
continent."\textsuperscript{16}

The intent is for AFRICOM to take a three-pronged approach to addressing issues that are
having, or could have, an adverse affect on US national interests. AFRICOM takes the lead on
security issues; it plays a supporting role to Department of State (DOS) for diplomacy and a
supporting role to the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) for
development programs. This approach is in concert with the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review
Execution Roadmap that states, "DOD recognized the importance of a seamless integration of
US government capabilities by calling for strategies, plans, and operations to be coordinated with
civilian agencies."\textsuperscript{17} Two-thirds of all actions that AFRICOM is intended to execute fall within a
non-traditional military role.

With a "whole of government" approach to national security, AFRICOM, unlike
CENTCOM, PACCOM, or EUCOM, is not intended to be a warfighting CoCOM. Despite this,
the announcement of the creation of a CoCOM to focus on Africa was met with significant
skepticism from other agencies within the US government, Non-Governmental Organizations
(NGO), and several African countries. Other agencies within the US government felt that the US
was militarizing its foreign policy. Some African countries felt it was an attempt by the US to
colonize Africa for its abundance of natural resources. This misconception was compounded
when it was erroneously announced that AFRICOM would be looking for a location on the
continent to establish its headquarters. While some nations presented offers to host AFRICOM
HQ, Liberia most publically, other strategic partners, such as South Africa and Algeria, expressed
reluctance to host the command. \textsuperscript{18}
In October of 2007, AFRICOM was initially established as a sub-unified command under EUCOM and on 1 October 2008, AFRICOM became a standalone command. Its current mission statement highlights the difference between AFRICOM and EUCOM, CENTCOM, and PACCOM, all commands who used to have responsibility for parts of Africa. AFRICOM’s mission statement is as follows:

United States Africa Command, in concert with other US government agencies and international partners, conducts sustained security engagement through military-to-military programs, military sponsored activities, and other military operations as directed to promote a stable and secure African environment in support of US foreign policy.¹⁹

A key component of AFRICOM’s mission statement is its supporting role to other US governmental agencies role on the continent.

The design for AFRICOM is to improve the integration of DOD and non-DOD personnel into the command and to allow for greater coordination between US Government organizations to achieve a “whole of government” approach. To do this AFRICOM has been authorized a staffing goal for 52, or 4% of its total staff, being interagency personnel.

**Existing Organization**

AFRICOM was declared Fully Operational Capable (FOC) on 1 Oct 2008. It has within its AOR 52 of the 53 countries on the continent (Egypt remaining in CENTCOM AOR) which represent almost 3,000 culturally distinct groups, over 2,000 different languages, and often commingled Christian, Muslim, and animist populations.²⁰

AFRICOM was originally authorized an end strength of 1,304, but as of January 2010 it had only 1,140 on staff at its headquarters.²¹ As of June 2010, AFRICOM reported that is has only 27 of its authorized end strength of 52, interagency partners into its headquarters staff (See
Appendix B). This represents about 2% of the total headquarters staff. These officials have been placed in several directorates throughout the command.²²

The basic organizational structure for AFRICOM is similar to other CoCOMs in that it has J-1 through J-9 sections, and a Chief of Staff (See Appendix A). Where the uniqueness of AFRICOM’s mission can begin to be seen is in its structure with its deputies. The commander has two deputies, one Deputy to the Commander for Military Operations (DCMO) and the other Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Activities (DCMA). The DCMO is a three star flag officer position who is responsible for the implementation and execution of the command’s programs and operations. The DCMA is a civilian, with the rank equivalent of a three star flag officer, who directs many of AFRICOM’s civil-military plans and programs, as well as its various security cooperation initiatives, and is responsible for ensuring that policy development and implementation are consistent with US policy. The DCMA is DoS foreign service officer and former Ambassador with more than 30 years of experience. This is the first non-DOD civilian to be integrated into the command structure of a unified command.²³

AFRICOM has sub-divided the continent for planning purposes into five engagement divisions; North (J5-NED), West (J5-WED, Central (J-5 CED), South (J5-SED), and East (J-5 EED). The purpose of these engagement divisions is to develop plans for US involvement within those areas. The purpose for the engagement divisions is for them to be the planning cells to ensure that AFRICOM is properly translating the National Security Strategy into actionable processes.

Problems

While the intent behind having a comparatively heavy interagency presence within AFRICOM is good, numerous issues arose even before AFRICOM became Full Operational Capable (FOC). With many of AFRICOM’s specified and implied tasks representing a shift
from traditional warfighting activities, AFRICOM’s efforts to plan and implement its activities have required increased collaboration with other federal partners such as the DOS and USAID. This has caused concern with federal civilian agencies who believe that increased collaboration between the civilian and military will give the appearance that AFRICOM is going to militarize US foreign policy in Africa. These federal agencies believed that missions such as providing medical supplies, humanitarian assistance, civ-mil ops (digging wells, building/repairing schools, hospitals, and roads) are missions better led by a civilian agency or non-governmental organization (NGO) than by the US military. NGOs share many of the same concerns as federal agencies, that AFRICOM will be seen as militarizing US foreign aid which will lead to greater US military involvement in humanitarian assistance, thus putting NGO personnel at undue risk.\(^{24}\)

One of the most glaring issues is the lack of cultural understanding between DOD and other governmental agencies. Interagency personnel assigned to AFRICOM experience an overwhelming adjustment to military culture, processes, and authorities. As a result, there has been significant resistance from federal agencies in their willingness to send personnel to work on the AFRICOM staff. State Department officials express concern that AFRICOM will become the lead for all US government activities in Africa, even though the US embassy is the lead for all US government non-combat activities conducted a the country. Planning is another issue for interagency personnel. The planning process used within the DOD is significantly different from that used at DOS or USAID. Interagency personnel often feel left out of the process and have to inject themselves into the planning process to affect decision-making. Most USAID planning efforts occur at US embassies in country and AFRICOM has not fully integrated its staff into the planning process at the country level.

AFRICOM is criticized for failing to involve other federal agencies first; rather it tends to begin the planning process then engages other agencies. By doing so AFRICOM has not been
able to leverage the individual expertise of the interagency personnel on its staff. Since AFRICOM's mission is weighted heavily on "Phase Zero" operations this necessitates a larger coordination with embassies throughout the continent. The increased need for coordination has caused a rift between AFRICOM planners and embassy personnel as US embassies, particularly in Africa, are short-staffed, and AFRICOM's request for information and assistance has placed a large burden on already under-staffed and over worked embassy personnel. There have been numerous occasions where DOD led exercises were planned with little to no coordination with other US federal agencies working in the host nation. An example of such a case was in Ghana where the USS Nashville had planned to conduct training with the Ghanaian Navy. No advance coordination was conducted between NAVAF and the US embassy in Ghana. When the embassy was finally notified, the embassy noted that the training the US Navy wanted to conduct was not the training that the Ghanaian Navy actually needed. Last minute adjustments had to be made to ensure that the training delivered was the training needed.

Interagency personnel have noted that the planning that occurs at the AFRICOM service components is often not nested into the planning that occurs at the AFRICOM Headquarters. Interagency personnel have stated that there are issues with coordinating planning when it is conducted at the service components rather than at the AFRICOM headquarters, as there are few interagency personnel assigned to the service components. Component officials said that they currently lack visibility and coordination with the other components for the full range of activities, and as a result, they are unaware of some activities being planned or conducted by other AFRICOM components.

These issues have resulted in a lack of interagency support for AFRICOM in both coordination and assignment of personnel. As mentioned earlier barely half, 27 of 52, of the authorized non-DOD civilian personnel have been assigned to the AFRICOM headquarters.
There has been improvement since AFRICOM became Fully Operation Capable (FOC) in October of 2008 when it had only 13 non-DOD personnel. There is not going to be a full force endorsement by federal government agencies until AFRICOM makes both cultural and structural changes to its organization.

**Proposed Changes**

President Obama stated, “When there is genocide in Darfur or terrorists in Somalia, these are not simply African problems, they are global security challenges, and they demand a global response.” He goes on to say, “Africa Command is focused not on establishing a foothold on the continent, but on confronting these common challenges to advance the security of America, Africa, and the world.” To do this effectively there must be a more focused and coordinated effort between the National Security Strategy, the DOD and other federal agencies. As has been highlighted one of the largest obstacles in preventing a “whole of government”, approach in dealing with Africa has come from the inherent differences between the multiple agencies that have a stake in Africa. To break through these obstacles there has to be a change to the current paradigm through which US national interests are addressed concerning Africa.

AFRICOM as currently structured has five engagement divisions to coordinate the planning of exercises and operations on the continent. As mentioned earlier Africa is diverse in culture, economics and geography and is expected to become more critical to the US in regards to strategic concerns. What action the US military takes in Africa will be more “Phase Zero” or shaping operations and less kinetic operations. Having what amounts to five planning cells is an inadequate approach for AFRICOM to take. As has been outlined above, this structure has resulted three significant issues regarding United States National Security Strategy being properly implemented in Africa. The issues are lack of trust and understanding between the
military and civilian participants, lack of cohesion between regional plans and overall strategic plan for Africa, and a lack of nesting of service components plans and AFRICOM plans.

As J. Peter Pham, Senior Fellow and Director of the Africa Project at the National Committee on American Foreign Policy and currently Vice President of the Association for the Study of the Middle East and Africa (ASMEA), stated in his article in *World Defense Review*

"The mission of AFRICOM will necessarily require a major break with conventional doctrinal mentalities both within the armed services themselves and between government agencies." 29

AFRICOM has not divorced itself from the traditional military paradigm of viewing other federal agencies with skepticism as to their capability or capacity to significantly affect operations. This mindset combined with a lack of a cohesive, nested campaign plan for Africa, has significantly reduced the effectiveness of AFRICOM.

In order to address these issues and ensure proper implementation of the National Security Strategy, AFRICOM needs to be re-structured from having five engagement divisions to having five standing Regional Joint Task Forces (RJTFs) with a non-DOD civilian in command. This new structure would address each of the three significant issues listed above. Having a non-DOD civilian in charge of military forces is historically met with significant institutional resistance. In the proposed change, the RJTF commander will be an experienced interagency civilian who retains the civilian rank equivalent to that of an O-7. This person would be sourced from any Federal agency (most likely from DOS) that is represented on the AFRICOM staff. His deputy commander would be a military officer of the rank of O-6. The RJTF commander would report to the Combatant Commander (CoCDR), but fall under the Director for Operations and Logistics (J-3/4) for tasking. In addition, his staff would be set up along the traditional J-staff functional areas ex. J-1, J-2, J-3 etc. These sections would be manned with personnel from each of the service components and interagency personnel on a permanent basis.
To ensure that the interagency personnel who report to the RJTFs are properly prepared for working with the military each would be required to attend a preparatory course. This course would consist of, at a minimum, instruction on the Joint Planning Process and military culture. A lack of understanding of the military planning process and culture has been a leading friction point for those interagency personnel who report to AFRICOM. As noted in the Government Accountability Office’s July 2010 report “Embedded interagency personnel need to understand the function, operation, and role of a military command and how it differs from other federal government agencies.”

The long-term solution for this knowledge and cultural gap is twofold. First, each of the services needs to increase the number of interagency personnel who attend the service resident Professional Military Education (PME) schools. Second, those who do attend must then be assigned a follow-on tour at AFRICOM. Those attending Career and Intermediate Level Education (CLE, ILE) would have a follow-on tour on a RJTF. Those attending Top Level School (TLS) would then become a member of the AFRICOM Headquarters staff. To prepare those who will command the RJTFs they would be required to attend CAPSTONE with other General and Flag officers.

With a civilian in the lead, there would be a significant paradigm shift in the instinctual reaction to how each RJTF would achieve US National Security Strategy objectives. A review of the theater campaign plan gives specific guidance as to what each regional engagement plan will include. Each plan is required to include each of the following three items:

(1) Region planning guidance, which highlights key objectives for each region, must nest within the theater security objectives outlined in the theater campaign plans.

(2) Two-year calendar that depicts planned security cooperation engagement activities, month by month, and country by country, for the region.
(3) Country work plans, which should be developed for each critical partner identified in the theater campaign plan. \(^{31}\)

Currently much of the planning is done in a vacuum at the CoCOM level with little coordination with other agencies that are already operating on the continent, most notably USAID and the chief of mission, the Ambassador, or the staff at the embassy. This stovepipe planning has resulted in significant friction between AFRICOM and the other agencies that are executing the other instruments of national power. This is mostly done out of ignorance on behalf of the military personnel. "AFRICOM could better align its activities with US foreign policy goals and reduce the potential to burden US embassy staff in carrying out activities if AFRICOM would involve interagency partners earlier in the planning process." \(^{32}\) This would ensure that there is a cohesive and collaborative plan across all instruments of national power in accomplishing the National Security Strategy in Africa. With the commander of the RJTF having significant experience with either chief of mission or other high-level coordination type experience in areas other than military operations, coupled with resident interagency personnel on staff, AFRICOM will truly bring a holistic approach to Africa.

Another problem that would be solved by having RJTFs would be the continued problem of understanding funding sources. There are numerous instances where a lack of knowledge on behalf of military personnel about funding and budgetary restrictions originating from non-DOD funding sources has significantly hindered exercises and operations. Specifically AFRICOM had to un-invite nearly two-thirds of intended participating African countries for a particular conference because of a last minute discovery that certain funding sources could not be used. \(^{33}\) With permanent interagency personnel assigned to the RJTFs, theses personnel would bring with them the required knowledge of the complexities of funding. See Appendix C for an example of the complexity of funding in conducting one African Partnership mission.

With RJTFs, there will no longer be a requirement for each service component to develop its own plan for the African continent. The RJTF commander with his staff would develop the
operational goals for its specific region to ensure that they are nested into the campaign goals of the CoCOM. This would eliminate the potential for conflict between each of the services when it comes to engagement in African countries. Upon the development of the operational goals at each RJTF, the service component representative on staff would then look to their respective Force Commands for sourcing required personnel and/or equipment for specific exercises and operations.

Service components have acknowledged that they lack “the understanding of the size, diversity and unique problems confronting the different regions of Africa.”34 RJTFs would eliminate the requirement on the service components to have extensive knowledge of all of Africa. An example is African Partnership Station. This is an initiative, with the Navy in the lead, which is designed to improve maritime safety and security of African ports and waterways through the training and development of African maritime forces. Africa has 32 countries that border one of the four main bodies of water with a combined coastline of more than 18,000 miles. As a point of reference, the United States has an estimated 12,000 miles of coastline.35 The development of a maritime capability and capacity strategy for all of Africa is an immense task for Naval Forces Africa (NAVFORAF). In addition, NAVFORAF is also the lead agency for coordination, development and execution of training. With a standing RJTF this would no longer be a requirement for NAVFORAF. RJTF Staffs would have in-depth knowledge of the countries within their AO and would be better suited to develop the proper goals to be accomplished. A RJTF would be better positioned to conduct long-term assessments on the effectiveness of its “Phase Zero” operations. Currently AFRICOM is woefully lacking in its ability to conduct assessments on its ongoing missions and as a result, it is unaware as to the success, failure, or unintended long-term consequences of particular operations or exercise.
With standing RJTFs AFRICOM would be better postured to respond to crises in Africa. The RJTFs would eliminate the need to quickly staff and bring up-to-speed a JTF to respond. The RJTFs would provide that capability; they would not only provide faster response time for the United States, but also the RJTF commander and staff would have developed those key relationships with the locals. This will reduce the chances of unintended consequences that often plague good intentions. The RJTFs will have been better postured to anticipate the problem for they would have been focusing on that area. It would be better able to draw on the resources of neighboring countries and provide a whole-of-government approach to the problem.

**Conclusion**

While many US embassies and federal partners now believe that AFRICOM has the potential to make positive contributions in Africa, until the command more fully incorporates interagency partners into its activity planning process, AFRICOM continues to risk the perception—or worse, the possibility—of conducting activities that may run counter to US National Security Strategy or lead to unintended consequences. AFRICOM needs to be structured to have five standing Regional Joint Task Forces (RJTF)s, each commanded by a senior non-Department of Defense civilian to properly plan, coordinate and implement national strategy.

The implementation of this proposal will not come easy for either the DOD or other Federal agencies. There is institutional resistance from all participants when it comes to what may appear to be mission creep. Currently there is no incentive for interagency personnel to request positions within AFRICOM as it is seen as detrimental to ones career. This coupled with an inherent distrust and misunderstanding of the military by non-DOD civilian federal agencies has hindered maximizing all instruments of national strategy. There must be cultural changes within both DOD and other federal agencies in order for AFRICOM to effectively and efficiently
execute the National Security Strategy. With the proposed changes, AFRICOM will demonstrate to other federal agencies the appreciation for the value that they can bring to the African problem.

The main internal obstacles facing AFRICOM are the lack of trust and understanding between the military and civilian participants, a lack of cohesion between regional plans and overall strategic plan for Africa, and a lack of nesting of service components plans and AFRICOM plans. These RJTFs would allow AFRICOM to have standing staffs that would ensure the proper focus is given to specific regional areas. With five standing RJTFs, each commanded by a senior non-DOD civilian, AFRICOM will be able to address three of the obstacles it is currently facing when attempting to execute National Security Strategy in Africa.
## APPENDIX B

Table 2: Reported Interagency Personnel at Africa Command Headquarters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>October 2008</th>
<th>June 2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Department of State</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Agency for International Development</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Homeland Security</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office of the Director of National Intelligence</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of the Treasury</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Commerce</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Energy</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Justice</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Security Agency</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>13</strong></td>
<td><strong>27</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percent of AFRICOM headquarters staff 1 2

Source: GAO presentation of AFRICOM data
## APPENDIX C

Table 1: Africa Partnership Station *USS Nashville* Theater Security Cooperation Activities, 2009 Reported Funding Sources, and Amounts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity amount</th>
<th>Funding source</th>
<th>Required</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Partner Ship Rider Program</td>
<td>Traditional Combatant Commander Activities</td>
<td>$300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Training</td>
<td>Humanitarian and Civic Assistance</td>
<td>$500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Relations</td>
<td>Counter Narcoterrorism</td>
<td>$100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key Leader Engagement/ Outreach</td>
<td>Community Relations</td>
<td>$30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partner Operational Travel/Fuel/Parts Developing Country Combined Exercise Program</td>
<td>Official Representation Funds</td>
<td>$60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Staff Engagement and Travel</td>
<td>Global War on Terrorism</td>
<td>$336</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: US Naval Forces Africa.* Dollars in thousands

Total $5,726
According to “The Long War: Send in the Marines” January 2008 p.8, Phase Zero operations are defined as the following: Shape the Environment. This phase involves those joint, interagency and multinational activities conducted on an ongoing, routine basis to assure or solidify friendly relationships and alliances and/or deter potential adversaries.

At the time of this paper, AFRICOM had five engagement divisions by structure, but due to personnel shortages, it was actually structured with three. Its actual manned structure is Northern (NED), West/Central (WCED), and South/East (SEED).


US Dept of Energy Stats July 07


see endnote 64 of (Robert G. Bershinski: AFRICOM’S Dilemma p.59


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CIVILIAN LED REGIONAL JOINT TASK FORCE: THE WAY FORWARD FOR AFRICOM

AGENDA

• Background on Africa
• Background on AFRICOM
• Future of Africa
• Problems
• Proposed Solutions
Background on Africa

- Geography
  - 22% of Earth’s land mass
  - 7,000 K from north to south and east to west
  - Can fit U.S., China, India, Europe, and much of South America
- Political
  - More than 50 countries
- Culture
  - 2,000 different languages
  - 3,000 culturally distinct groups

Future of Africa

- Population
  - Increase by 300 million by 2025
    - “Youth Bulge” in 27 countries
- Natural Resources
  - 3 of top 10 oil exporters to U.S.
  - Precious metals and minerals
- China?
Background on AFRICOM

- Focus on Africa has varied since NSA 1947
- National Security Strategy of 2002
  - A Combatant Command with a “Whole of Government” approach to addressing security concerns.
  - “Phase Zero”
- Not intended to be a warfighting command
- Intent 4% of staff to be interagency
- FOC 1 October 2008

AFRICOM Mission

United States Africa Command, in concert with other US government agencies and international partners, conducts sustained security engagement through military-to-military programs, military sponsored activities, and other military operations as directed to promote a stable and secure African environment in support of US foreign policy.
Problems

- Scope/diversity of problems facing Africa
  - Ability of Service components to properly support
- Interagency-military relationship
  - Culture
  - Planning
- Military’s ignorance of capabilities/limitations of other instruments of National Power
Proposed Solution

• 5 Standing Regional Joint Tasks Forces (RJTF)
  – Each headed by a senior non-DOD civilian (O-7)
  – Deputy military (O-6)
  – Set-up along standard staff functions
  – Permanent interagency personnel assigned
  – Regions assigned along same boundaries as Africa Union
  – RJTF commander works for CCdr
    • Under J-3 for coordination

Positives

• Allows for focused engagement
  – Better cohesion between regional plans and National Security Strategy objectives
• Better leverage all instruments of National Power
• Develop better command climate between interagency and military
• Existing HQ for contingency operations
Negatives

- Civilian understanding of military culture and planning
- Fiscal
  - Staffing, equipment, facilities, etc
- Possible relegation of service components
- Civilian in charge of warfighters in contact

Questions?