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FUTURE WAR PAPER

TITLE: KALININGRAD 2025,

THE PAST, HISTORY AND A POSSIBLE NUCLEAR FUTURE

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF OPERATIONAL STUDIES

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AY 2009-10

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Approved: Dr. Bradley J. Meyer
Date: 23 May 2010
DISCLAIMER

THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED WARFIGHTING OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:

History in the future will likely record the year 1991 not only as the year the colossus fell, but also as the year America wrongfully diverted its attention from Russia and her intentions. To Soviet leaders the lesson was painfully clear, military power alone was not enough to maintain an empire. Systematically ignoring diplomatic, informational and economic concerns were the main catalysts of Soviet failure.

An objective history of the City of Kaliningrad and the Kaliningrad Oblast is lost from the present memory of Europe and the world. Several considerations have colored the understanding of Kaliningrad, but these considerations are not an objective representation of the past. Knowledge of the past informs our understanding of Kaliningrad’s present through its history. If understanding is drawn from the past and seen through the lens of present, possible futures with reasonable outcomes could emerge to be examined. Kaliningrad’s future fate will not escape its past. Decades after the demise of the communism system, why does Russia retain this small piece of territory in Eastern Europe? Kaliningrad still serves as the warm water port for the Russian Baltic Naval Fleet, but its real value is as a “strategic observation post” for future Russian possibilities.

Focusing attention specifically on present Russian intentions to compete economically in the Baltic along with the Soviet approach to nuclear power allows for the creation of a scenario similar to the April 1986 Chernobyl disaster. Examining the Soviet response to Chernobyl allows for the postulation of possible Russian responses to a similar problem in Kaliningrad. Based on current conditions, a scenario and the historical responses of Russia and NATO, it is possible to deduce that the state of affairs in the Kaliningrad Oblast will require NATO countries to carry out a large-scale disaster relief operation before 2025.
INTRODUCTION:

The end of the twentieth century saw the collapse of the Soviet empire and several significant changes in American foreign policy. History in the future will likely record the year 1991 not only as the year the colossus fell, but also as the year America wrongfully diverted its attention from Russia and her intentions. While the United States validated years of Cold War military thought in the deserts of Saudi Arabia and destroyed the Iraqi Army in Kuwait, the Soviet empire was dying. To Soviet leaders the lesson was painfully clear, military power alone was not enough to maintain an empire. Systematically ignoring diplomatic, informational and economic concerns were the main catalysts of Soviet failure. As the Soviet Union disappeared and the Iron Curtain fell around Eastern Europe, America’s military focus shifted to “Military Operations Other Than War” rapidly erasing Russian considerations from future contingency planning. Soviet friendly governments in Poland and the Baltic States folded quickly while their populations hurried to reestablish the independence they each lost in 1939 and 1940 respectively. While these events occurred, a broken but proudful and ultra nationalistic Russian people struggled to continue their lives in the shadow of past greatness. Soviet history would not allow Russian leaders to forget lands they saw as historically their obligation to control. Without Poland and the Baltic States, Kaliningrad was the new “front line” of the Russian nation. [See Map 1]

An objective history of the City of Kaliningrad and the Kaliningrad Oblast is lost from the present memory of Europe and the world. Several considerations have colored the understanding of Kaliningrad, but these considerations are not an objective representation of the past.¹ Historians struggle to identify the difference between the past, meaning events as they actually happened objectively without bias and history, a subjective interpretation of past events. Knowledge of the past informs our understanding of Kaliningrad’s present through its history. If
understanding is drawn from the past and seen through the lens of present, possible futures with reasonable outcomes could emerge to be examined. Kaliningrad’s future fate will not escape its past. While time continues to pass, the horrors of the Second World War and decades of communism continue to shape the memory of Kaliningrad. The residents of the Kaliningrad Oblast are themselves living relics of the Cold War, a time when nuclear annihilation was a grim possibility. In the warm water port of Kaliningrad rested the pride of their nuclear capable Red Banner Baltic Fleet, while in old farmer’s fields, garrisons of Soviet soldiers armed with nuclear weapons awaited orders to fulfill the nightmare of nuclear holocaust. The dark specter of nuclear power continues to haunt Kaliningrad’s present; no longer in the form of weapons, but rather as nuclear power plants. Decades after the demise of the communism system, why does Russia retain this small piece of territory in Eastern Europe? Kaliningrad still serves as the warm water port for the Russian Baltic Naval Fleet, but its real value is as a “strategic observation post” for future Russian possibilities.

Kaliningrad’s past and present both illuminate terrible waiting possibilities. When the possibilities are narrowed into focus, they reveal the potential possibility of a nuclear disaster along with decontamination and humanitarian relief operations the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Europe are only organizationally prepared to respond to. The stated purpose of this work is to examine a potential future for Kaliningrad based on its past and present. Through an objective understanding of the past and present conditions in Kaliningrad and through a well defined scenario, a possible disastrous future will be explored. A possible nuclear disaster provides an opportunity to evaluate potential Russian and NATO strategic decisions regarding the crisis with plausible responses based on current and projected future capabilities. Focusing attention specifically on present Russian intentions to compete
economically in the Baltic along with the Soviet approach to nuclear power allows for the creation of a scenario similar to the April 1986 Chernobyl disaster. Examining the Soviet response to Chernobyl allows for the postulation of possible Russian responses to a similar problem in Kaliningrad. Highlighting the differences of the location and time allows for an examination of NATO’s possible responses, based on humanitarian and disaster relief operations conducted in the organization’s recent past. Based on current conditions, a scenario and the historical responses of Russia and NATO, it is possible to deduce that the state of affairs in the Kaliningrad Oblast will require NATO countries to carry out a large-scale disaster relief operation before 2025.

**THE OBJECTIVE PAST AND THE SUBJECTIVE HISTORIES:**

Many believe the story of the city of Kaliningrad began with the death of Adolf Hitler and the fall of Nazi Germany in 1945. While this fact is undisputable, it only represents the origin of Kaliningrad in modern memory without reference to the entire past. For Kaliningrad to come into being, old Königsberg had to first die. [See Map 2] Records indicate Königsberg was founded in 1255 with the building of the Cathedral in 1333 by the Teutonic Order.³ The conquest of the Teutonic Order eventually ended allowing for settlement and the subsequent establishment of Königsberg as a member of the Hanseatic League.⁴ [See Map 3] Active rivalry along with continuous wars between Germanic and Russian peoples for control of the Baltic Sea and the region surrounding it characterized relations for the next 800 years.⁵ The Baltic region of what is now Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, along with Poland further to the south, were traditionally seen by both Germanic and Russian kings as extensions of their territories, and the people were their subjects.
From inception, Königsberg was the intellectual and cultural capital of Prussia. Geographically positioned in the east of the German Empire, Königsberg controlled the Baltic region, then known to the Germans as “Das Land Ober Ost.” [See Map 4] The First World War provided Germany an opportunity to consolidate their power base in the east. As the war in France continued as a stalemate through 1915 and 1916, the war in the east against Russia was given new purpose. Seeing the real possibility of defeating the Russians in late 1916 or early 1917, Ludendorff, against the will of the German Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg, began making preparations to defeat the Russians with the intention of securing more territory and permanent control of “Das Land Ober Ost.” Ludendorff operated under the auspices of securing the liberties of the Baltic Germans living in the region. Russia left the war in 1917 as a result of the Bolshevik Revolution and the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.

From the end of the First World War into the early years of the interwar period, Germany maintained troops from the “Frei Korps” in areas of “Das Land Ober Ost” to protect German national interests. The Baltic countries each began wars of independence, fighting both the Germans and Russians to secure their countries and freedom.

Poland remained free until 1939 when it was invaded by both Germany and the Soviet Union. The Baltic countries were secretly sacrificed by the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement and were subsequently occupied by the Soviet Union in 1940. On June 22, 1941, Adolf Hitler went to war with the Soviet Union, quickly occupying Poland and the Baltic countries in his drive to the east. These areas remained under German control until the Soviets returned in 1944. Once again, the Soviets had secretly decided the fate of the Baltic countries and Poland, this time with their Anglo-American Allies.
From February 4-11, 1945, the leaders of the Allied Powers met at the second of three conferences at Yalta to decide the fate of the Axis powers and what role the victors would play in the post war world. Joseph Stalin came to the meeting insisting upon a Soviet sphere of control. This meant two things: 1) A buffer from the western powers by using Poland to the west; and 2) Reorganizing German occupied areas such as the Baltic nations under Soviet Communism.

Understanding the historic struggle with Germany over control and influence of the Baltic region, Stalin saw it as necessary to destroy the traditional hub of German cultural identity resident in Königsberg. The fight for the city of Königsberg saw some of the most horrific urban combat of the war, with much of the city being destroyed in the process. The Soviets, under the orders Stalin himself, left only the Cathedral and the final resting place of Immanuel Kant. Königsberg was plowed flat and made ready for the next phase of transformation. [See Picture 1]

[Picture 1]: Downtown “Kaliningrad,” 1946. The Cathedral and final resting place of Immanuel Kant are in the center of the picture, The Pregel River is behind the Cathedral. (Author’s collection)

Königsberg’s name was changed to Kaliningrad in 1946 following the death of Mikhael Kalinin. According to the Great Soviet Encyclopedia of 1950, “Michikal Kalin was a long time comrade of Lenin and Stalin and was serving as the President of the Supreme Soviet at the time of his death.” Remaining in the way of Soviet “progress” were the German residents of
Kaliningrad themselves.

The Soviets wasted no time dispatching the residents of East Prussia, sending them to Eastern Germany, Poland, Lithuania or in some cases, Siberia. Kaliningrad was to become a “model” Soviet city, meaning it was to be a perfect communist example, being rebuilt from the ground up. Kaliningrad and the surrounding area were repopulated with ethnic Russians as well as other Soviet citizens serving in the military. The port of Kaliningrad was rebuilt and given to the Soviet Navy as the new home warm water port of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet. Kaliningrad was now a closed city, a model of the Soviet empire.

During the Cold War the Soviets occupied the traditional farming communities and small towns with Soviet Army garrisons. Without the organic ability to feed itself, Kaliningrad became dependent on freight shipments by rail and sea for daily needs from the rest of the Soviet Union. This was life in Kaliningrad through the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 into the present day under the Russian Federation. Under the Russian Federation, the brutal justice citizens were accustomed to remained, but years of corruption invited the activities of the Russian Mafia. Throughout the mid-1990s into the new millennium, Kaliningrad became a prime breeding ground for vice controlled by the Russian Mafia. Drunkenness, drug addiction, gambling and prostitution created an environment conducive to a high unemployment rate, AIDS and serious crime.

The factors of the past and present collectively lead us to the question of possible futures for Kaliningrad. While it is not possible, nor necessary in the scope of this work to examine all of the possible futures for Kaliningrad and Central Europe, a realistic scenario encompassing a nuclear accident provides the back drop necessary to examine possible Russian and NATO responses. The scenario sets Kaliningrad in the year 2025, as the Russian Federation continues to
find ways to export cheap resources and electrical power to the west. States in Central Europe have responded to the Russian Federation by lowering the cost of electricity they export, while increasing their capacity to produce it. The Russian response was to increase the output through their aged facilities to remain competitive.

**KALININGRAD 2025:**

Thirty-four years have passed since the fall of the Soviet Union. Kaliningrad has been under the control of the Russian Federation, with the Russian Mafia controlling much of the day to day life of the citizens. Over decades, the port of Kaliningrad continued to decay significantly, making economic trade in the Baltic region difficult. Recognizing the limitation created by the port for commerce trade, the Russian Federation decided to shift its economic efforts to the energy field. The Russian Federation announced on April 16, 2008 it would build two nuclear reactors in the Kaliningrad region, each capable of producing 2,300 megawatts of electricity. The intent of this project was to produce cheap electricity for export to the Baltic States and Central Europe, continuing to dominate the new “resource war” in the region. This project was completed in accordance with the deadline of 2015 and has been consistently operating for 10 years without fault. Since the 1986 Chernobyl accident, Russian authorities have guarded their nuclear programs closely from western eyes, allowing no visitation from western scientists or authorities to examine the state of their program or facilities. Like Chernobyl, proper safety precautions were not followed and one of the facilities main reactors melted down, causing a nuclear reaction with a radiological cloud. Several hundred people were killed instantly. The port of Kaliningrad is totally contaminated, not allowing vital aid into the Oblast. Much of the food and water supplies are contaminated in the city of Kaliningrad and the Oblast. Radiation sickness is becoming common. Citizens of Kaliningrad are moving in mass away from the Oblast toward
Poland and Lithuania. Looting and crime are widespread in areas that are unaffected. Is there any advantage to be gained in such a scenario for Russia? More importantly, what options and courses of action are available to the Russian Federation?

**THE DECISION TO RETAIN KALININGRAD:**

Keeping the Oblast of Kaliningrad in all probability is the most likely course of action for the Russian Federation. A major factor that instructs the Kaliningrad nuclear scenario is the Soviet treatment of the April 26, 1986 Chernobyl nuclear accident. Even with the nuclear meltdown of a reactor in the Soviet state of the Ukraine, a state which traditionally the Russian Soviets hated, the Ukraine was not abandoned. This was most likely due to the fact the Ukraine was the bread basket of the former Soviet Union. In the Russian mind, the ability to feed the Soviet state was the key requirement which outweighed the risks associated with radiation. History of the 20th century proves the Russians have always been willing to accept terrible casualties to ensure the survival of the “Motherland.”

Similarly, the Russians in a Kaliningrad scenario recognize they have a key piece of strategic terrain their nation could not be without. As long as the Russian Navy occupies the warm water port of Kaliningrad, they can continue to remind the regional powers of NATO of their ability to project power into the Baltic Sea and beyond. Russian leadership understands the necessity and value of maintaining Kaliningrad as a strategic observation post in relation to NATO and would be likely unwilling to abandon Kaliningrad. The past of this region is too closely linked to the possibilities for the future. While Russia is forced to recognize the independence of the Baltic States and Poland now, their desire for the “good old days” of the region under the domination of Russia is culturally indelible in the mind of Russian leadership. There is little doubt the Russians desire to keep what they see as theirs, and will continue to
rewrite the history of Kaliningrad as they see fit.\textsuperscript{30} Further explanation of why the Russians would retain Kaliningrad is found in the Soviet response to Chernobyl.

**UNDERSTANDING CHERNOBYL AND FUTURE RUSSIAN POSSIBILITIES:**

Looking to Chernobyl and the Soviet past, the danger of the Kaliningrad scenario emerges quickly. Shortly after the Chernobyl accident in the summer of 1986, the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group published a report examining Soviet mistakes leading to the accident. The report found the “root cause of the Chernobyl accident … was to be found in so-called human error.”\textsuperscript{31}

Lessons learned from the Chernobyl accident were broken into three categories:

1. Training, with special emphasis on the need to acquire a good understanding of the reactor and its operation, and with the use of simulators giving a realistic representation of severe accident sequence;
2. Auditing, both internal and external to the utility, in particular to prevent complacency arising from routine operations;
3. A permanent awareness by all personnel of the potential safety implications of any deviation from the procedures.\textsuperscript{32}

Perhaps a more significant finding of the independent commission was targeted toward the Soviet command and control architecture, it cited:

The vital conclusion drawn is the importance of placing complete authority and responsibility for the safety of the plant on a senior member of the operational staff of the plant. Formal procedures properly reviewed and approved must be supplemented by the creation and maintenance of a ‘nuclear safety culture.’ This is a reinforcement process which should be used in conjunction with the necessary disciplinary measures.\textsuperscript{33}

While the possibilities of how the Russians would deal with a nuclear accident in Kaliningrad rely heavily on the examination of the Soviet response to Chernobyl, the mentality which framed the problem of a nuclear meltdown would likely inform future decision making of any Russian government.\textsuperscript{34} In difference to Chernobyl, where the Soviets were forced to respond
to the disaster quickly because of the Ukrainian food supply, the Russian Federation would be in no such hurry, largely because it physically lacks the ability and infrastructure to mobilize and dispatch forces rapidly. Another key factor is the lack of immediate threat to the Russian mainland. Based on history since the fall of the Soviet Union, it is highly unlikely Russia would invite NATO forces into the Oblast to reestablish security or to help clean up the fallout; it is not outside the realm of possibility for Russia to request monetary support or resources without troops to clean up from the international community. It is also not outside possibility that like post-accident Chernobyl, the Russians would come to the west for scientific help, only providing the questions and possible answers to questions they needed to contain the accident in the scenario, not to prevent a recurrence.

Looking back to the Chernobyl accident also informs the west on the methods the Soviets used to clean up the fallout. While Russian Soviets organized and led the clean up, the people who actually did the work were largely from the satellite Soviet states and presumably political prisoners. Tiit Tarlap was a young Estonian man sent to Chernobyl to participate in the cleanup efforts. He states, “We twelve hundred (about seven hundred Estonians, five hundred Lithuanians, a small Latvian fire brigade company, with some Russians from their respective republics mixed in everywhere) were standing on our tired feet.”35 The implication is the Soviets had every intention of working these men until they died, and many did. The presumption these men were political prisoners is founded by Tarlap’s ability to remember Estonian men gathered around a campfire during the cleanup effort singing the anthem of the “Narwa Battalion” amongst other outlawed Baltic patriotic songs.36 While the Russians no longer have “satellite states” to draw from for a cleanup effort, it is safe to assume political enemies assembled in Russian prisons would be drawn out and sent in the first wave to clean up Kaliningrad.
Russian leaders analyzed the Soviet state failure to compete economically with the west and they are determined to not repeat the same mistakes. Although Russia today is struggling economically to survive, by 2025 Russia may have made significant economic gains through the use of their continental natural resource pipelines, but advantages could be quickly lost by paying for a nuclear clean up of this magnitude.\(^3^7\) Simply put, other Russian possibilities could center on the desire to clean up and rebuild the port and the city of Kaliningrad or leave the city and Oblast of Kaliningrad, allowing NATO, specifically neighbors such as Poland and Lithuania to clean up and decide what should happen next. However, Russia is not likely to leave Kaliningrad because of the geographic position and “window” it provides into the west. A cleanup effort could also be used to bring in big corporations as “investment partners” from around the European Union, hence working to the Russian Federation’s long term economic advantage.

Efforts were made in the recent past to bring money in from the “outside” of Kaliningrad with the vision of making Kaliningrad the “Baltic Hong Kong” of Europe.\(^3^8\) Several European investors, to include BMW, made significant monetary investments; only to be confronted with the harsh reality that business in the Oblast is controlled by the Russian Mafia.\(^3^9\)

What must be examined in any scenario involving a nuclear accident in Kaliningrad is how could Russian forces move quickly to attend to the needs of the Kaliningrad Oblast? Movement by rail through Lithuania has traditionally been difficult between the two nations, leaving only the Baltic Sea as the main avenue of approach to the disaster area. Current Russian military plans call for current force structures to be “transformed” from the traditional Soviet/Russian paradigm of a heavy military force comprised of tanks and artillery to a force of 85 “operational brigades” comprised mainly of light infantry forces.\(^4^0\) This proposed transformation
is to be completed by 2012. This suggests that Russian military forces were already in a state of drawdown, allowing them to meet such an aggressive time line. Like the Soviet Army, the Russian Army is currently organized by military districts. In the fall of 2009, the Russian Army operating from the Moscow Military District (less than 15,000 soldiers) were ordered to move to Belarus to conduct a joint military training operation. In terms of the time and space required to move the 800 kilometers, Russian forces took about five days moving on multiple axes to their assembly areas to begin the exercise. This equates to 160 Kilometers a day, not nearly fast enough to cap a nuclear reactor in the Kaliningrad Oblast. With these considerations in mind, what would the Russians lose by giving up on Kaliningrad?

**LOSING KALININGRAD:**

This option would likely be the least appealing to the Russian leadership, but it would not be without benefit for Russia. If the Russians were to abandon the Kaliningrad Oblast without taking responsibility for the accident, they would force NATO to act. The Russians know NATO will have to come to a decision quickly in this emergency and decisions could not be made in haste. The main short term gains Russia could achieve by giving up Kaliningrad are twofold. The first advantage Russia would achieve is forcing members of NATO to react quickly with the Polish and Lithuanians being the most interested in responding because of common borders with Kaliningrad. Russia could also achieve further division among NATO members and possibly break the alliance which would be already stretched to its limits by years of war in Afghanistan. If the Russians wanted to ignite a different sort of fire within NATO, they could give Kaliningrad back to Germany. Germany would not likely want the area of Kaliningrad back based on problems experienced with reintegrating eastern Germany back into the western Germany. This would also likely reignite past hatred and further exasperate differences within
the already fragile alliance. Russia could do nothing but prosper from these actions, but how would NATO possibly respond?

**POSSIBLE NATO RESPONSES:**

By looking at NATO through the same lens as we have Russia, we are able to appreciate the recent operational experiences NATO has in the area of disaster and humanitarian relief operations, while using these experiences to speculate on how NATO would deal with nuclear decontamination on a massive scale.\(^4^4\) In order for any subsequent actions to occur in the wake of a nuclear accident where fall out was a part of the scenario, the source of the radiation would have to be first contained. This would require a massive construction and decontamination effort just to get to the site, followed by another extensive effort to close and clean up the site. More than the massive construction and cleanup effort, this scenario would first require a massive rapid planning and coordination event. All facets of international law and NATO Article Five for the mobilization and employment of troops to conduct the operation would have to be discussed in short order.\(^4^5\) From a recently published draft of the “Allied Command Operations Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (short title: COPD),” dated February 25, 2010, the task organization for a response element would likely be drawn from two different organizations. The International Staff Division of Political Affairs and Security Policy or PASP and the Civil Emergency Planning Directive or CEDP would both be coordinated by the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre or EADRCC. It is the duty of the PASP to work with contacts in Russia concerning security matters, while the CEDP would coordinate needed expertise for the sort of accident described in the scenario. The EADRCC is “mandated to respond to civil emergencies” and would act as the overall coordinating element within a functional higher headquarters.\(^4^6\)
The political considerations of this operation could not exclude the Russians from the discussion or planning. Planning for this operation would naturally resemble the planning of any other military evolution with the exception of facing a hostile force. Once the operation had begun, NATO would have to monitor the relationship with Russia closely to avoid the appearance of taking over territory or interfering in Russian domestic affairs.

Establishing security and safety for decontamination workers would have to quickly be addressed. Decontamination and medical treatment facilities would be the next order of business. As the population moves toward the border of Kaliningrad, decontamination centers and refugee camps would have to be established in the vicinity of the Polish and Lithuanian borders. The U.S. would likely take the lead in areas related to disaster and humanitarian relief based on continued operational experience in Haiti and other areas over the decades. Depending on the size of the fallout area, this may necessitate refugee camps being placed inside Polish or Lithuanian territory. As Kaliningrad is no longer able to feed itself, food would have to be flown in until the port was decontaminated and prepared to accept shipments. Contaminated corpses would have to be carefully entombed in the same fashion as the reactor to avoid further contamination of the living and decontaminated areas.

**CONCLUSION:**

There is little doubt the face of traditional problems in the Kaliningrad region are a direct result of the unchanged nature of the past while projecting an uncomfortable future for Europe and the world. In dealing with Kaliningrad or any problem including the Russians, we are charged to call to mind what makes something Russian? Is it the nation state, a language, or simply an idea of the mind? In some cases, Russian can be all three, but the idea of what Russian is stems largely from a convoluted and distorted picture of the past provided by centuries of
repression without an enlightenment like in the west. The immediate past of the Cold War and the reality of a nuclear accident are still very real possibilities which western leaders are selectively neglecting. If the purpose of studying history is to develop judgment, NATO should examine its performance in recent operations, while taking a sobering and realistic approach to potential future problems based on the traditional understandings of what Russia does in crisis. Failure to understand what is Russian, and specifically the Russian mind throughout the course of history has always led to the destruction of regimes and unimaginable losses of life for western societies. Through the use of history, logic and science we can establish a baseline for what reaction Russia and NATO alike would have in the event of a nuclear accident in Kaliningrad. Politics and ways of leveraging nations and organizations will always be a part of any conceivable future, just as they have been a part of every past. If the leaders of NATO and Russia choose to ignore the warnings of the past along with the gravity of seriousness assigned to nuclear conditions within Europe, a dark form of the future is not likely, but imminent. History has proven the world is ill advised to ignore the ramifications of Russia and the problems associated with nuclear facilities. The survival of NATO and Europe depends on understanding Russian intentions and their use of nuclear power.
Endnotes:

5 Ibid, 41-43.
15 Большая советская энциклопедия(The Great Soviet Encyclopedia) 2nd ed., s.v. “Калининград.”
16 Ibid.
18 Большая советская энциклопедия(The Great Soviet Encyclopedia) 2nd ed., s.v. “Калининград.”
20 Ibid, 16.
21 Большая советская энциклопедия(The Great Soviet Encyclopedia) 2nd ed., s.v. “Калининград.”
25 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Oksana Procyk, *Famine in the Soviet Ukraine, 1932-1933* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986). It is roundly estimated that just under seven million Ukrainians died in the famine of 1932-33. Conclusive evidence exists to support claims that Joseph Stalin sold the food of the Ukraine to the west in order to starve the population of the Ukraine into submission and retain control. Looking further into the Soviet ability to take high causalities during the Second World War, in *Soviet Military Thinking*, ed. Derek Leebaert (Winchester, MA: Allen & Unwin Inc.1981), 36., Robert Bathurst wrote in his chapter *Two Languages of War*, “That Americans who have lost in all their wars since the American Revolution fewer than the Soviets lost during the siege of Leningrad alone have difficulty in understanding the implications for the present of that vast historical disaster[speaking of nuclear war], is not surprising”
29 Walter C. Clemens, *The Baltic Transformed, Complexity Theory and European Security* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001), 182. In a well developed argument the author continues by saying “Even before the breakup of the USSR, some Russians lamented the fate of “children of Russia” - kinspeople living in non-Russian republics. A conservative literary critic published a book in 1990 entitled *We Are All Children of Russia*. In 1991 a literary periodical introduced a series on “the children of Russia” by affirming: “We are all your children,
Russia, both those of us living on the land of our ancestors, and those living beyond her borders. We have the same roots. We have had the same fate.”


31 The International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group, *Summary Report on the Post-Accident Review Meeting on the Chernobyl Accident* (Vienna, Austria: International Atomic Energy Agency, 1986), 76. This information was no shock to the Soviet Union. In a secret KGB document dated February 21, 1979, titled “Construction Flaws at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant [AES]” The KGB of the Ukraine informed the Central Committee of the CPSU of “design deviations and violations of construction and assembly technology are occurring at various places in the construction of the second generating unit of the Chernobyl AES, and these could lead to mishaps and accidents”. The document also indicated “The leadership of the Directorate is not devoting proper attention to the foundation, on which the quality of the construction largely depends. The cement plant operates erratically, and its output is of poor quality. Interruptions were permitted during the pouring of especially heavy concrete causing gaps and layering in the foundation. Access roads to the Chernobyl AES are in urgent need of repair.” This document is part of the permanent collection of the U.S. Library of Congress. It is available at: http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/archives/n2constr.html

32 Ibid.

33 Ibid, 76-7.

34 Ibid, 77. It is important to note that Soviet thinking is not Russian thinking, but the thoughts of current and future Russian leaders are and will be informed by the Soviet thought process and history. In *Soviet Military Thinking*, ed. Derek Leebaert (Winchester, MA: Allen & Unwin Inc.1981), 41., Robert Bathurst wrote in his chapter Two Languages of War, “Unlike the dialectic, so useful in Soviet thought, American military analysis relies heavily on paired opposites: either/or, aggressive/defensive, strategy/tactics, nuclear/conventional and so on.” The “dialectic” of Soviet thought is comprised of the thesis and the antithesis to create a new synthesis which “matches the violence of Soviet politics.” 45.


36 Ibid, 23. The “Narwa Battalion” was the beginning of the 20th Waffen SS Volunteer Estonian Division of the Second World War. The 20th Waffen SS Volunteer Estonian Division was considered a criminal organization by the Soviet Union. Today, the 20th Waffen SS Volunteer Estonian Division is widely referred to as the “Estonian Legion,” and is thought of as a group of Estonian patriots. For more information on this organization see Mart Laar, *Eesti Leegion, Sõnas Ja Pildis* (Tallinn, Estonia: Grenader Publishing, 2008).


40 General Joachim Spiering, German Army, a.D., interview with author at the Baltic Defence College, December 8, 2009. It is interesting to note the Russians are not only talking about altering the fabric of their military organizational structure, but they also realize the need to alter the fabric of their society and military culture. The Russians see the need for an “enlightment” to produce leaders and soldiers capable of operating in a decentralized fashion.

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid.

43 Walter C. Clemens, *The Baltic Transformed, Complexity Theory and European Security* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001), 187. It was thought by some residents of Kaliningrad with the fall of the Soviet Union, Germany would reclaim the territory it lost.

44 NATO Staff, *NATO’s Role in Disaster Assistance* (Brussels, Belgium: NATO Civil Emergency Planning, 2001).

45 NATO Staff, *Allied Command Operations Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive* (Brussels, Belgium: NATO, 2010), Introduction-2. Further amplification is provided as follows: “NATO’s Crisis Management Process ensures the Alliance is prepared to perform the whole range of its Article 5 and Non-Article 5 missions in circumstances that will be difficult to predict. While every crisis is unique, the process by which the Alliance will
address and, subject to decisions by the North Atlantic Council (NAC)/Defence Planning Committee (DPC), aim to manage and resolve a crisis follows a predetermined path. Such a phased consultation and decision making process should speed understanding of, and reaction to, an emerging crisis and aid decision makers and staff. Clearly each circumstance will dictate the exact steps, but the process provides a default template from which informed decisions are made to deviate.”

46 Ibid, 3-7/8. This extensive document on NATO planning explains the composition of the PASP and the CEPD. Per the document the purpose of the PASP is as follows: “PASP provides a source of information and contacts related to regional, economic and security affairs, relations with other international organisations and Partner countries including: (a) Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and Enlargement Policy. (b) Multilateral Policy, especially with the European Union. (c) Russia and Ukraine Relations. (d) Partnership for Peace. (e) Regional Affairs and the Mediterranean Dialogue. (f) Conventional Arms Control Policy. (g) Defence and Security Economics. (h) Political aspects of non-proliferation and arms control.” The purpose of the CEPD is to “maintains a Civil Capabilities Expertise (CEC) of expertise available in a wide range of civil/commercial/technical areas, including: (a) Movement and Transport (air/land/sea). (b) Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN), Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). (c) Medical. (d) Critical Infrastructure. (e) Civil Communications. (f) Food and Agriculture. (g) Civil Disaster Response. (h) Industrial Preparedness.”
Bibliography:


Большая советская энциклопедия(The Great Soviet Encyclopedia) 2nd ed. 1950.


Map 1:

Circled area is the Kaliningrad Oblast. (Author’s collection)
Map 2:

Map of old Königsberg from about 1890. (Author’s collection)
Map 3:

Map of the Hanseatic League. (Author’s collection)
Map 4:

German Map from the First World War Period detailing “Das Land Ober Ost”