The Future Of U.S European Command’s War On Terror: Countering Extremist Ideology In A Muslim Europe

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THE FUTURE OF U.S EUROPEAN COMMAND'S WAR ON TERROR: COUNTERING EXTREMIST IDEOLOGY IN A MUSLIM EUROPE

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Executive Summary

Title: The Future of U.S. European Command’s War on Terror: Countering Extremist Ideology in A Muslim Europe

Thesis: As the Muslim population of Europe grows and European identity evolves, U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) must adapt to these changing circumstances, particularly with respect to its strategy for combating terrorism.

The democratic governments of Europe are both shaping their populations and being shaped by them. Within this dilemma of openness to accept change and the resistance to lose the historically Western identity is the most adequate solution.

In terms of the multilateral approach to combat terrorism in 2025, USEUCOM and its European Allies are taking all of the right measures. Their military strategy for protecting U.S. and European interests in Europe properly links the political, economic, and social sectors of society. Still, the ultimate fate of Europe’s long term security will be determined in the political arena. If the European civilization is to pass on its legacy of democracy, it must prevent the merger of state and religious institutions at all levels and the subordination democratic principles to Sharia law must be prevented.

The privilege of citizenship is conditional on a respect for the laws of Western government and a respect for the rights of its citizens. The valid message and effective counter to the extremist social movement strategy will come from within the community first. This duty applies not only to European Muslims to revile subversive rhetoric and violent behavior; it applies to all citizens who accept the individual responsibility to protect their country. The comprehensive European/NATO stance against extremism is essential to Europe’s security in 2025.
DISCLAIMER
THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT. QUOTATION FROM, ABSTRACTION FROM, OR REPRODUCTION OF ALL OR ANY PART OF THIS DOCUMENT IS PERMITTED PROVIDED PROPER ACKNOWLEDGEMENT IS MADE.
Introduction

The Muslim population in Europe is increasing due to two main factors: (1) a higher birth rate than non-Muslim Europeans and (2) a high immigration rate from predominantly Muslim countries (see Figure 1). The Muslim European birth rate is greatly outpacing non-Muslim Europeans at a rate of approximately three to one. Over the past thirty years, the Muslim population has tripled and the trends continue to suggest that nearly twenty percent of Europe will be Muslim by the year 2025. Although there are many security challenges associated with a Muslim population boom, Muslim Europeans will be critical to the long term viability of Europe. This long term viability depends on successful integration. Current trends suggest a difficult road ahead. In a 2006 poll, 81% of British Muslims identified themselves as Muslims first and British citizens second. Difficulties in combating terrorism in Europe will likely grow proportionally with its increasing Muslim population if current trends of non-integration continue. An overwhelming number of these problems will not and should not require a military solution, but if allowed to continue these problems are likely to limit the military options available to the United States European Command (USEUCOM). With a strategy of Active Security, EUCOM and its 86,000 Service Members are adapting to these challenges.

Islam is not the problem facing Europe today. Islam is, rather, the environment from which the problems and the solutions will be generated. Western-minded Muslim citizens are the most capable of deterring conflicts with radical Muslims and identifying the terror threats. European governments have a responsibility to their Muslim citizens’ freedoms regardless of their level of assimilation. Within this environment, European democracies are struggling to protect the rights of their citizens to obtain political equality while at the same time protecting their governments from political and social domination. The internal unrest within European
governments is shifting the balance of domestic and foreign security risks. EUCOM must also balance Europe’s domestic risks with its requirements for a strong alliance.

Figure 1. Islam in Europe Today. Dark Brown= Muslim population over 50%. Light Brown= Muslim population of over 2%. Green= Muslim population of less than 2 %. Thin line=voluntary migration less than 750,000. Thick line=voluntary migration more than 750,000. Green dot=cities with significant Muslim population

Europe’s leaders are divided in their approaches to improve Muslim/non-Muslim relations and solve the problem of radical Islam. Their solutions range from mass deportation of all of those who will not comply with existing European norms to a complete integration of Islam and Sharia law into the political process. Larry Auster, a Member of Parliament representing the ultra-conservative British National Party, believes that Muslim integration is impossible and forced Muslim emigration is necessary. Although Auster’s approach is unrealistic and undemocratic, it serves as a strong indicator of increasing tension.
Without an apparent and lasting solution to this dilemma, many countries are choosing to avoid confrontation. The resulting neglect has led to a de facto implementation of Sharia laws and courts in areas with high concentrations of Muslims. As Bruce Bawer explains, several Muslim neighborhoods across Europe are attempting to prevent the entrance of non-Muslims.\footnote{7} The British National Statistician, Jil Matheson, described the Muslim population as young, tightly clustered, and often disadvantaged. This clustering is evident in London’s districts of Tower Hamlets and Newham where Muslims account for 36 per cent and 24 per cent of the total population respectively.\footnote{8} (See Appendix A) These trends are clear indications of a failure to integrate Muslims into mainstream British society and an environment increasingly capable of incubating a domestic terror threat.

The relationship between Europe and the United States draws its strength from a common history, ideology, economy, and defense. Over the next 25 years, those shared interests risk diverging as Europe addresses the growing grievances of its Muslim populations. The United States must work within the changing conditions to protect its historically and currently shared interests. Europe’s internal and external threats will necessitate a greater U.S. commitment to both NATO and the EU efforts to combat terrorism.

USEUCOM’s strategy for combating terrorism can best be explained through its supporting plan to US Special Operations Command’s (USSOCOM) War on Terror Strategy. This strategy also serves as a model to analyze the changes to Europe’s current and future security problems.
As indicated in Figure 2, isolating and defeating the terrorist threat requires simultaneous or complementary action along five lines of operation generated from the Global Combating Terrorism Network (GCTN). The GCTN is an interdependent coalition of International, National, Governmental, and non-governmental organizations unified in their opposition to terrorism. The top three lines represent an indirect approach to shape and stabilize the environment: (1) Enable Partners to Combat Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs); (2) Deter Tacit and Active Support for VEOs; and (3) Erode Support for Extremist Ideologies. Two lines require a direct approach to isolate and defeat terrorists and prevent future attacks: (1) Disrupt Violent Extremist Organizations and (2) Deny Access and Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) by VEOs.

Figure 2. GWOT Campaign Framework.\(^9\)
Enabling Partners to Combat VEOs.

Combating Violent Extremist Organizations in Europe requires a global and continental approach. Most often, the primary partners in this strategy are the United States’ Middle Eastern and Central Asian partners. EUCOM’s challenge, however, is to aid Europe in defeating its internal threats as well as its external threats. Partnership with the Middle East and Central Asia is still essential to EUCOM objectives in light of the historical and current immigration trends.

In broad terms, the United States’ strategy to combat terrorism remains acceptable to address future threats, but it will be important to clarify that the non-military effort will be equally as important as the military effort. From assistance to law enforcement to more responsive intelligence exchanges, EUCOM in partnership with NATO and the EU is transforming to better combat the threat.

NATO’s role in the Future of Europe will increase while EUCOM reduces its unilateral commitment. In 2005, General James Jones, as both the Supreme Allied Commander of NATO and Commander of EUCOM, announced a strategic change from collective defense to collective security.

As General Jones described, "In the 20th century, people understood what NATO was for: It was a linear defensive alliance designed to take the first hit that that never came." According to General Jones, the Al Qaeda attacks on September 11th, 2001, served as a “unifying anchor point for the transatlantic relationship.” In describing the future challenges that NATO faces, he stated that NATO must improve its efforts to convince their populations that NATO remains useful for the 21st century."
With the return of France as a NATO member and an unprecedented deployment of over 35,000 troops as part of the NATO-International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan, the resolve of NATO partners is clearly evident in spite of their growing domestic threat. It follows that NATO member commitment is still promising.

Additionally, NATO has taken great strides to improve NATO force structure and deployment processes to handle the changing threat of terrorism. NATO members authorized the creation of a new force structure in 1999 in order to provide a more rapidly deployable, mobile, sustainable, and flexible multinational force. The NATO Response Force (NRF), as part of the larger Joint Forces Command- Brunssum, is an example of NATO’s adjustment to more effectively combat terrorism. With a force of 25,000 Soldiers, it can deploy anywhere deemed necessary by its members within five days under the direct control of the Supreme Allied Commander (SAC). The NRF’s primary missions are Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO), Support to Chemical, Biological, Radiation, Nuclear (CBRN) operations, Crisis Response Operations, Support to Counter Terrorism (CT) Operations, Embargo Operations, Initial Entry Force Operations to facilitate the arrival of follow-on forces, and Demonstrative Force Package Operations. Another example of the NATO increased flexibility is their commitment of civilians to serve as part of NATO PRTs. Although civilians are not part of the NATO treaty, member nations have shown a great determination by deploying civilians under individual country authority.

The 27 member nations of the European Union (EU) have demonstrated an extraordinary strength in the world’s financial and economic markets. Just as this solidarity has served as a means to protect and promote the European economy, it has also protected European security.
Relationships within the radical Muslim movements extend well beyond the borders of their host European Countries and serve as a means to exploit the gaps between two sovereign countries. Through an informal and decentralized network of family, friends, and fellow terrorists, the VEOs have avoided detection and capture. The EU security mission is well suited to address the numerous difficulties associated with the transnational advantages of the extremists.

The EU’s Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism is evidence of the EU’s progress. The decision uniformly criminalized terrorism and adopted a common terrorist watch list. The European Union adopted a common arrest warrant which has greatly reduced the lengthy extradition flights and processing requirements. EU members are now able to transfer suspects to districts within neighboring countries. The expanded authorities of the European Police Office (Europol) in the collection, analysis, and dissemination of criminal intelligence enable member nations’ national law enforcement agencies to anticipate the emergence of transnational threats.¹²

As part of The Hague Program, the EU has been able to strengthen European security in ways that the military could not (Figure 3).

1. Better methods in dealing with legal and illegal immigration
2. Developing integrated management of the European Union’s external borders
4. Maximizing the positive impact of immigration by improving integration policies.
5. Strengthening fundamental rights and citizenship
6. Anti-terrorism measures.
7. Improved Informational Exchange among member countries
8. Threat financing, risk analysis,
9. Protection of vulnerable infrastructure
10. Consequence Management
This line of effort depends on an adequate number of military-aged Europeans willing to serve in their country’s armed forces and in other organizations committed to the defeat of violent extremist organizations. As the trends imply, there will likely be a greater number of Muslims serving. Although no religious data may be collected on French military personnel, estimates suggest that 10-20% of the Soldiers serving in the French Armed Forces are Muslim. Although there are occasional concerns about wavering loyalty and radicalization, Muslim inclusion in French military has been largely positive. In contrast, Great Britain has only 248 Muslim Soldiers serving in a military of over 100,000. Facing the same dilemma of a declining non-Muslim population, Great Britain could face greater challenges in maintaining its current force size. Muslim integration will therefore be a critical step in generating the sufficient number of recruits who are loyal to their country’s laws, systems of government, and multicultural society. Without integration, EUCOM will contend with a weaker alliance in 2025.

Deter Active and Tacit Support for VEOs

NATO’s concept of deterrence using a large coalition still has merit against traditional threats, but that merit decreases as motivations for terrorism shift from group-driven causes to individually-driven ones. Furthermore, terrorism, as a phenomenon, cannot be explained without context. Europe’s economic, social, and political environments offer us the only hope of accurately predicting the future of terrorism in Europe and EUCOM’s actions in the future to contribute to its defeat.
The level of commitment to the extremist cause is diverse. Their support ranges from actively recruiting, training, and conducting operations against Westerners to actively opposing extremism in Europe. The lines between active and tacit support are blurred and are often changing. Again, the Muslims who believe in freedom of religion and secular government will have the greatest success in deterring Muslims from radicalization and violence.

Muslim community leaders are the most critical requirement when implementing a counter to extremist ideology. Muslims like Dr. Ghaayassudin Siddiqui, the leader and co-founder of the Muslim Parliament in Great Britain, have made great strides in calming popular British Muslim passions. As 100,000 angry Muslims marched on the Israeli Embassy in London in response to Britain’s failure to condemn Israel’s attack on Palestinians in the Gaza strip, he was aggressive in reducing the overall tension by preaching that restraint is necessary in a pluralist society and that a peaceful demonstration was the only acceptable course.\(^\text{16}\)

Although the Muslim Parliament and other advocacy groups are not a recognized political parties in Great Britain, they still have a great influence over the Muslim population. Political Islam relates to radical organizations and the non-Muslim leaders and could serve as a means to deter further radicalization. Muhammad Ayoob explains that “the local context has largely determined the development and transformation of Islamist movements within particular national milieus.”\(^\text{17}\)

EUCOM and its European partners face a critical challenge as they determine how terrorism is being employed. Obtaining consensus to accept an event as a terrorist act is not guaranteed, but this becomes all the more complicated when a coalition must agree on its causes. From the determination of its causes, EUCOM will be able to distinguish whether or not the act
was political violence stemming from a jihadist agenda or merely just a criminal act. The act will impact the local, national, and international audiences in different ways. The organization claiming the act will have a much more localized effect from the propaganda of the deed. The positive or negative effects of deterring future attacks will largely depend on the amount of Muslim approval and the government response to bring about justice. The more Muslim and non-Muslim concepts of crime and punishment are in line, the less success the event is likely to have.

Crime and radicalization are related in varying degrees across Europe. With Muslims comprising 70% of the French prison population, prisons have become a powerful venue for radicalization. A strong link between law enforcement intelligence and military intelligence would facilitate early identification of radicals who pose a threat to National Security.

Erode Support for Extremist Ideology

The purpose of this line of effort is to remove the moral energy from violent extremist movements and eliminate the causes for unrest. Yet, this is more easily said than done. Richard Holbrooke once asked, “How can a man in a cave out-communicate the world’s leading communications society?” Nine years after that statement, the United States and its technologically superior European allies have not resolved the problems plaguing our efforts to erode support for extremist ideology. In order to improve USEUCOM’s chances for success in eroding support for extremist ideologies, we must examine the reasons why the radical message resonates within the European Muslim population.
A successful counter to the radical message implies a complete understanding of the message. Donald Hanle describes Sun Tzu’s imperative to understand the enemy by answering the fundamental question, “Why are they fighting?”

There is no single cause for fighting, but as Rodney Stark explains, shared grievances, hope for success, a precipitating event, and a social network are all necessary conditions for a social movement to occur. Shared grievances such as European Muslim isolation, unemployment, resentment of secular society, and European cooperation with Israel are commonly present. The hopes for success often rest with their unwavering belief in the superiority of Islam as compared to the decadence of the West and that their purposes are divinely sanctioned. Their hopes for a successful movement may also come from a confidence that Europeans will continue to tolerate their violent actions or that Europeans lack the will to act against them. The precipitating events are perhaps the most troublesome. The events that drive European Muslims to action are often not within European control. For instance, Israel’s attack on Gaza, and the lack of an immediate British condemnation of the event, triggered the riot of 100,000 Muslims in London. The social networks established through common ethnicity, nationality, language, and religion are important factors determining the likelihood of an occurrence of a social movement.
Disrupt VEOs and Deny Access and Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction

The direct approach to combating terrorism and in disrupting VEOs and denying access to WMD, as recent history has shown, has both positive and negative outcomes. Allied resolve in Afghanistan was overwhelmingly positive among the developed nations of the world, yet within the larger sectors of the undeveloped and developing world, the results were mixed. USEUCOM’s ability to operate anywhere in the world is essential to our national security, but there will be increasing costs as the sympathetic Muslim population grows.

Conclusion

The democratic governments of Europe are both shaping their populations and being shaped by them. Within this dilemma of openness to accept change and the resistance to lose the historically Western identity is the most adequate solution.

In terms of the multilateral approach to combat terrorism in 2025, USEUCOM and its European Allies are taking all of the right measures. Their military strategy for protecting U.S. and European interests in Europe properly links the political, economic, and social sectors of society. Still, the ultimate fate of Europe’s long term security will be determined in the political arena.

If the European civilization is to pass on its legacy of democracy, it must prevent the merger of state and religious institutions at all levels and the subordination democratic principles to Sharia law must be prevented. The privilege of citizenship is conditional on a respect for the laws of Western government and a respect for the rights of its citizens. The valid message and effective counter to the extremist social movement strategy will come from within the community first. This duty applies not only to European Muslims to revile subversive rhetoric
and violent behavior; it applies to all citizens who accept the individual responsibility to protect their country. The comprehensive European/NATO stance against extremism is essential to Europe’s security in 2025.
Definitions

- **Combating Terrorism**—Combating Terrorism is the collective application of four related activities: (1) antiterrorism (AT) (defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability to terrorist acts); (2) counter terrorism (CT) (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism); (3) consequence management (CM) (preparation for and response to consequences of a terrorist incident); and (4) intelligence support (collection or dissemination of terrorism-related information). Article 29 of the Treaty on European Union specifically refers to terrorism as one of the serious forms of crime to be prevented and combated by developing common action in three different ways: closer cooperation between police forces, customs authorities and other competent authorities, including Europol; closer cooperation between judicial and other competent authorities of the Member States; and approximation, where necessary, of rules on criminal matters.

- **Non-State Actor**—A group or organization that is not within the formal structure of any state, not limited by any state boundary, and operates beyond the control of any state and without loyalty to any state.

- **Terrorism**—The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate government or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. Martha Crenshaw in her book *Terrorism in Context*, defines terrorism as follows, “Terrorism is a conspiratorial style of violence calculated to alter the attitudes and behavior of multiple audiences. It targets the few in a way that claims the attention of the many. Thus a lack of proportion between resources deployed and effects created, between the material power of actors and the fear their actions generate, is typical. Among systematic and organized modes of civil or international violence, terrorism is distinguished by its high symbolic and expressive value. The discrepancy between the secrecy of planning and the visibility of results gives it even more shock value.”23
Appendix A- Muslim Population in Britain
Appendix B- The Actors

Categorizing the Actors
The categories may help us to maintain a consistent indicator to determine the results of our strategic effort. But just as the lines between environmental factors are blurred, so are the lines that separate the enemy from friendly actors. The individuals and organizations contained within the categories listed below are likely to fluctuate between the extreme fringes of support and opposition as the environment changes. The categories, although not comprehensive, will help to assess the degree of change and the subsequent success or failure.

The populations from which support and opposition to European and U.S. interests occur represent a diverse audience with varying levels of susceptibility to USEUCOM generated themes and messages designed to counter extremist ideology. The message must be capable of extending beyond the geopolitical boundaries of Europe. The categories below may help to inform that capability.

Level 1-Active Supporter of Terrorist. Radical Muslims are Muslims who actively seek to destroy or support the destruction of the West through Jihad and to establish a Caliphate. They may be European or Non European. However, this distinction is blurred when considering the relaxed immigration policies toward former colonies. Many groups, such as Global Organization for Salafist Preaching (GSPC), Al Qaeda (AQ), the Taliban, Hamas, and Hezbollah serve as examples of this group.

Level 2-Non-Westernized Muslims. There are Muslims who oppose existing Western institutions and culture. They also believe Sharia law should replace Western secular legal systems. They identify themselves as Muslims first, not Europeans. They voluntarily remain isolated from Western culture. In addition, they regard Jihad against the West as righteous in most instances.

Level 3-Non-Westernized Non Muslims. These are individuals who oppose democratic rule. This group would most likely not be affected by Radical Islamic messages or Western requests for assistance. It is arguable that this group may represent the most neutral and the most static. They may exploit weaknesses in Western governments created from the conflict. Kim Jong Il is an example of this category.

Level 4-Westernized Muslims. These individuals believe in freedom of religion. They believe in secular government. They are loyal to national leaders over the Islamic Ummah or, at a minimum, can separate state from religious roles in their lives. They are integrated into Western culture and they actively and openly support operations against Islamic extremists. But this group remains susceptible to becoming more radical as many of their family members are radicalized against their permission or without prompting. Examples of this group include Aliya Hirsi Ali, and King Abdullah of Jordan.

Level 5-Westernized Non-Muslims. It is important to note that this group has the same values as Westernized Muslims. On many occasions, they will be less susceptible to Muslim propaganda and will actively support counter terror operations.
Bibliography


Endnotes

3 Pew Global Attitudes Project. "Muslims in Europe: Economic Worries Top Concerns About Religious and Cultural Identity." Pew Global Attitudes Project. July 6, 2006. http://pewglobal.org/2006/07/06/muslims-in-europe-economic-worries-top-concerns-about-religious-and-cultural-identity/ (accessed February 11, 2010). There is conflicting data on this subject. A recent Gallup poll indicated that 77% of British Muslims identify more with the United Kingdom than with their ethnicity or religion compared with 50% of the general public. In France and Germany, the numbers were similar.
6 Auster, Lawrence. "British Police Expect Bombay-Style Raid In London In Near Future." VIEW FROM THE RIGHT: The passing scene and what it’s about viewed from the traditionalist politically incorrect Right. December 20, 2009. http://www.amnation.com/vfr/archives/015076.html (accessed December 21, 2009). Auster states, "And they can't do anything to prevent it. Nor, in their own estimation, can they do anything to defeat it once it starts. The enemy is within. The enemy has been allowed within, because discrimination against him is prohibited. And the enemy must be allowed to remain within, because discrimination against him is prohibited. So all that's left to do is to wait for the enemy to strike." Auster explains that the liberal principle of non-discrimination has removed its identity and deprived it of the principle of life, which is also the principle of self-preservation. All that's left is for the vultures and maggots to consume the rotting remains. No one in today's Britain, with the exception of the BNP, has ever said that Muslims do not belong in Britain, that they should not have been permitted to enter Britain, and they should be made to leave Britain. Meaning that with the exception of a handful of "extremists," every British person is at least passively complicit in this act of national suicide." Aside from the political unacceptability of the article's recommendation to ban entrance of all Muslims, it does draw into question the real and growing domestic tension between Westerners and Muslims. This will allow analysis of domestic tensions as they relate to failed attempts to counter extremist ideology.
This data is inferred from the number of French troops immigrating from North African countries such as Algeria and Morocco with Muslim populations of greater than 95%.


17 Ayoob, Muhammed. The Many Faces of Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Muslim World. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2007. Ayoob describes the dangers of merging Political Islam. "The interaction between religion and politics in Islam must not be oversimplified. Analysts and "specialists" from across the American political spectrum describe Islamic fundamentalism as one of the greatest threats to modern, Western-style democracy, but do not provide an accurate definition of political Islam."

18 Bawer, Bruce. While Europe Slept: How Radical Islam is Destroying the West. New York: Doubleday, 2006. p. 84


21 Stark, Rodney.

22 (Tarbush 2009)