**Title:** Irregular Warfare Persistent Engagement Through Regional Affiliation Of U.S. Army Units

**Abstract:**
Regionally affiliating General Purpose Forces (GPF) supports expanding Irregular Warfare (IW) mission profiles and worldwide engagements while maintaining Conventional Warfare (CW) requirements. As forces draw down in Iraq and violent extremists look at other under-governed and ungoverned regions for bases of operations, U.S. Army forces must approach these threats with a different strategy. Regional engagement with states friendly to US interests and countering the effect of actors unfriendly to US interests will be critical. Conventional US Army units will provide the capacity and institutionalizing current IW capabilities will provide a regional approach toward meeting these threats.
FUTURE WAR PAPER

TITLE:

IRREGULAR WARFARE PERSISTENT ENGAGEMENT THROUGH REGIONAL AFFILIATION OF U.S. ARMY UNITS

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF OPERATIONAL STUDIES

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Executive Summary

Title: Irregular Warfare Persistent Engagement through Regional Affiliation of U.S. Army Units

Author: Major Shannon S. Hume, United States Army

Thesis: Regionally affiliating General Purpose Forces (GPF) supports expanding Irregular Warfare (IW) mission profiles and worldwide engagements while maintaining Conventional Warfare (CW) requirements.

Discussion: U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) reported last fiscal year (FY) that 86% of deployed Special Operation Forces (SOF) were deployed to the Central Command (CENTCOM) area of operations (AOR), leaving roughly 200 countries without persistent U.S. military engagement. As the drawdown in Iraq continues to approximately 50,000 troops, or pieces of eight Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs), the drain on SOF is not likely to change for several years, as reported by ADM Eric Olson, Commander, USSOCOM. This creates a capacity gap between the force of choice, SOF, and the capability of the forces available, GPF. The 2008 National Defense Strategy (NDS) identified four countries, Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, which are potential threats. The NDS identified IW and its associated subsets as the likely source of conflict for the next 10-15 years for Department of Defense (DOD) organizations. The Strategic problem for the U.S. becomes how to maintain persistent engagement when units, specially trained in language and culture, are not available. The answer to this problem is the regional affiliation of U.S. Army GPF. Each Corps would establish a training and operational relationship with the United States Special Forces (USSF) organization operating in that AOR to ensure both operations and effects are synchronized. Each Corps would be augmented with one or two National Guard divisions. These divisions would serve two purposes: first, these formations would provide regional engagement in the event of a large scale conflict necessitating the deployment of the active divisions to another theater; and second, these divisions would support “steady state” named operational support such as deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan, allowing the active divisions to continue regional engagement. The historical size of engagement is typically battalion and below. This may change in the future, but an assumption of engagements of BCT and smaller size organizations is not unjustified. This relatively small commitment will allow the rest of the Corps to continue its CW training and preparation.

Conclusion: As a result of globalism, regional engagement is critical to homeland security. As forces draw down in Iraq and violent extremists look at other under-governed and ungoverned regions for bases of operations, U.S. Army forces must approach these threats with a different strategy. Regional engagement with states friendly to US interests and countering the effect of actors unfriendly to US interests will be critical. The capacity of USSF will be insufficient to meet these threats. Conventional US Army units will provide the capacity and institutionalizing current IW capabilities will provide a regional approach toward meeting these threats.
DISCLAIMER

THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED WARFIGHTING OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT.

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Preface

I would like to thank Doctor Wray Johnson for his help, guidance, and ideas throughout this process. Without his assistance, this paper would still be unorganized and certainly poorly written. I would like to thank the Director of the School of Advanced Warfighting (SAW), Col. Tracy King, for his leadership and even handed approach to all things. I would also like to thank LTC Michael Lewis, USA, Marine Corps University, SOF chair. His knowledge is only surpassed by his leadership and friendship throughout.

Special acknowledgement is required for LTC (ret) Mike Walton, USA, and LtCol (ret) Gus Dearolph, USMC, from the J10, Irregular Warfare, United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). This idea is an extension of the brainstorming and mission analysis from the very broad guidance given to us in January of 2007. Special thanks are reserved for the officers and NCOs of the SOF Integration and Interoperability Branch, J7, USSOCOM. Their continued support and assistance has been crucial.

I would like to acknowledge my SAW classmates for their help, sound-boarding, and fellowship. Candor, humor, professionalism, and sage advice are just some of the qualities of these men. Daily, I am reminded how very lucky I am to be in their midst and how very lucky we are, as George Patton said, “that such men existed.”

Lastly, I would like to thank my family for all the support and understanding while I pursued my dreams. They have always been in my corner and I consider myself lucky for that very fact.
INTRODUCTION

Post 9/11 military operations reinforce the reality that the Department of Defense needs a significantly improved organic capability in emerging languages and dialects, a greater competence and regional area skills in those languages and dialects, and a surge capability to rapidly expand its language capabilities on short notice.

- Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Defense Language Transformation Roadmap, House Committee on Armed Services, Building Language Skills and Cultural Competencies

In 2006, Mario Mancuso, then a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (SOLIC), stated: “We must improve the capability of our General Purpose Forces to conduct counterinsurgency operations and to partner with and train foreign forces to defeat insurgencies and terrorist organizations on a global scale and for an indefinite period.”

In that regard, ensuring that the U.S. military is organized, trained, and equipped to respond to current and future threats represents only half of the problem referred to in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The more challenging half is the capacity for persistent worldwide engagement with mission partners at sustainable levels and with positive repetitive results.

Regionally affiliating General Purpose Forces (GPF) supports expanding Irregular Warfare (IW) mission profiles and worldwide engagement while maintaining Conventional Warfare (CW) requirements. The current overseas contingency capacity requirements for persistent engagement and the requisite capabilities of the force do not match. Therefore, U.S. Army units should be regionally affiliated with the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC). This will generate the capacity required to meet the current and likely future commitment of the force with regard to IW. Although tactical unit structure and regional specific requirements are an important topic for discussion, they are outside the scope of this paper.

With respect to regional affiliation of U.S. Army GPF units, there are three key advantages: 1) stable relationships established through persistent engagement with mission partners; 2) a clear relationship established between Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF)
and GPF; 3) and finally, improved agility across the force through greater regional understanding.

The challenge of persistent engagement and its attendant training requirement begins with understanding seven key terms: Irregular Warfare (IW); Conventional Warfare (CW); Persistent Engagement (PE); Foreign Internal Defense (FID); Security Force Assistance (SFA); Operational Preparation of the Environment (OPE); and Intelligence Preparation of the Environment (IPE).

For the purposes of this paper, Irregular Warfare is defined in the Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept (JOC), “as a violent struggle between state and non-state actors to gain legitimacy and influence over relevant populations. IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence and will (see Table 1).” Conventional Warfare is a form of warfare conducted by using regular military formations, weapons, and tactics between similarly organized belligerents where the battlefield is relatively well-defined and the focus of operations primarily targets the opposing army.

Persistent engagement is defined as engagement that is tailored and appropriate for a specific country or region while supporting an overall engagement strategy. The old paradigm was Operations Plans (OPLANS) and forces allocated against them; the new paradigm is the Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF) at the national policy and strategic levels and the Theater Campaign Plans (TCP) managed by the GCCs (see Figure 2).

One component of the TCP is the Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP). Broadly, the TSCP is informed by Security Force Assistance (SFA), which are activities, as defined by FM 3-07, “to generate, employ, and sustain local, host-nation or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority.” SFA improves the capability and capacity of host-nation or regional security forces. These forces are collectively referred to as foreign security forces. A
subset of SFA is Foreign Internal Defense (FID) and is defined by JP 1-02 “as the participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.” SFA and Building Partner Nation Capacity (BPC) are seen as the ways to achieve the end of preventing violent extremism (see Figure 3). Building Partner Nation Capacity is defined for this paper as the increased ability of a Host Nation Security apparatus to conduct operations unilaterally or in conjunction with an allied force, primarily through U.S. military assistance.

In addition to preventing violent extremism, the Department of Defense (DOD) has the task of preparing for conflict within a theater. This includes Intelligence Preparation of the Environment (IPE) and Operational Preparation of the Environment (OPE). IPE is defined in the IW JOC as “persistent, long-duration intelligence networks that focus on the populations, governments, traditional political authorities, and security forces at the national and sub-national levels in all priority countries.” OPE is defined as non-intelligence activities conducted by regional or country specialists, with language and cultural expertise, in likely future areas of operations focused on those aspects necessary for follow-on military operations.

**FUTURE WAR IS LIKELY TO BE IRREGULAR WAR**

*The inability of many states to police themselves effectively or to work with their neighbors to ensure regional security represents a challenge to the international system. Armed sub-national groups, including but not limited to those inspired by violent extremism, threaten the stability and legitimacy of key states.*

- National Defense Strategy, June 2008

Of the four countries specifically mentioned in the 2008 National Defense Strategy (NDS), only two were projected to have future “peer” or “near-peer” capabilities, an ascendant China and a resurgent Russia. Instead, the more likely threat identified in the NDS are known “prospective adversaries, particularly non-state actors and their state sponsors, [with a] strong motivation to adopt asymmetric methods to counter our advantages.” Of note: of the nearly 40
ongoing conflicts worldwide, 35 are of the IW nature (e.g., insurgency, civil unrest, etc.).
Thus, the threat today and in the foreseeable future is IW (see Figure 4).

The role of the indigenous population and the exploitation of local issues is what makes
IW different than the so called regular form of warfare. Insurgency and counterinsurgency
(COIN) are at the core of IW. According to the IW JOC, the purpose of insurgency is to
overthrow and replace an established government. Terrorism and counterterrorism are
activities conducted as part of IW and are frequently sub-activities of insurgency and COIN.
However, terrorism may also stand alone when its purpose is to coerce or intimidate
governments or societies without overthrowing them. Many of the IW activities are related to
armed groups seeking perceived legitimacy in the eyes of the population and a relative increase
in power and influence; the population is its “focus of operations” (See Figure 5).

In general, insurgencies can survive almost any setback except the loss of popular
support. The insurgent’s primary means of influence are attacks against the local population,
exploitation of weak security, economic plurality, and grievances such as poor infrastructure.
The most obvious form of insurgent action is violence visited on the population or the security
forces; however, this violence proves to be a critical vulnerability. The usual trap for the
counterinsurgent is what David Galula described as the “fallacy of a decapitation strategy to
defeat an insurgency,” which often leads to “kinetic kill or capture operations” aimed at the top
tier of insurgent leaders. Fighting insurgents is about countering the effects of their violence
and the perception of the indigenous population that the insurgent offers a better alternative to
the status quo.

Countering insurgency requires a comprehensive understanding of the complex character
of such conflicts, i.e., social, political, historical, cultural, and economic factors. In short, prior
to intervention, the U.S. must seek to understand the origins of the conflict and must work in
concert with the host nation (HN) to defeat the insurgency. According to Galula’s “First Law of
Counterinsurgency”, military action must be secondary to a political strategy on the part of the HN government to regain the support of the people, in essence executing a political insurgency by wresting the perception of settling grievances away from the insurgent.24 “IW is about people [and their wants], not platforms [and technology]. IW does not depend on military process alone. It also relies on the understanding of such social dynamics as tribal politics, social networks, religious influences, and cultural mores.”25

If IW is the most likely form of conflict and situational understanding is critical before, during, and after an intervention, then future force development must seek to man, train, and equip a culturally and linguistically sophisticated force for worldwide deployment – or smaller units capable of regional deployment. Typically, this type of force development has been the purview of SOF (see Figure 6).

Overseas contingency operations will shift from Iraq and Afghanistan to other areas of the globe. In this regard, future operations will consist of small unit actions focused on SFA or IPE/OPE activities in the southern tip of the Arabian Peninsula, East Africa, or Central or South America.26 Although SOF will remain the primary force of choice, they will likely be unavailable at the required levels to maintain a persistent presence. In 2008, nearly 86% of deployed SOF were concentrated in Iraq and Afghanistan. This is unlikely to change and, as a result, little additional capacity will be available to meet global requirements.27

Therefore, GPF will be called upon to conduct a wide range of IW missions in the future to meet these global requirements.28 Such missions will run the gamut from training and advising foreign forces to COIN.29 As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates noted, “The standing up and mentoring of indigenous army and police – once the province of Special Forces – is now a key mission for the military as a whole.”30 However, GPF are not currently optimized in terms of doctrine, organization, training, material, logistics, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) for worldwide IW missions.
The real challenges we have seen emerge since the end of the Cold War – from Somalia to the Balkans, Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere – make clear we in Defense need to change our priorities to be better able to deal with the prevalence of what is called asymmetric warfare....We can expect that asymmetric warfare will be the mainstay of the contemporary battlefield for some time. These conflicts will be fundamentally political in nature, and require the application of all elements of national power. Success will be less a matter of imposing one’s will and more a function of shaping behavior – of friends, adversaries, and most importantly, the people in between.\textsuperscript{31}

- Robert M. Gate, Secretary of Defense, Landon Lecture, Kansas State University, November 2007

In his paper, “Fighting on the Edges: The Nature of War in 2020,” MG Robert Scales said, “The American military does not protect an empire but it does protect vital interests whose geographical centers of gravity are nested at the extreme limits of military reach. As with the Romans long term tranquility in these regions can only be secured by a military equipped, trained and dedicated to protecting American interests over the long term.”\textsuperscript{32} The keys to protecting these interests are manning, training, and equipping the force. The approach is informed by two significant factors: U.S. history of military engagement as a means to promote American interests, and increased understanding of the linkage between regional understanding and security.

The U.S. Army has a long history of military engagement abroad, typically in the form of FID but referred to hereafter as SFA (see Figure 7). The Army has developed Advise and Assist Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) to enhance the security in Iraq once major combat formations have redeployed, but these units are provisional and will only be applicable in Iraq, unless institutionalized. In that regard, in spite of the growing need for such regionally specialized forces, the Army has opposed the creation forces purely designed for Stability, Support, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations.\textsuperscript{33}

In his paper, “Building Partner Capacity/ Security Force Assistance: A New Structural Paradigm,” Scott Wuestner asks the question: “[D]oes the Army have all the tools required to
execute Full-Spectrum Operations throughout the construct of FID and TSC operations from Phase 0 to Phase 5?" In short, no, and this answer is directly tied to capacity and capability gaps in the existing force structure. As the requirement for BCTs declines in Iraq and increases in Afghanistan we will likely see an increase in SFA requirements. However, Joint Force Commanders (JFC) outside of the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) may find the cupboard bare. In fact, the requests for forces have increased substantially as U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) becomes fully operational. Despite tinkering at the margins of extant force structure, the Army may run out of capacity long before requirements are met.

The Army attempted to adjust force structure in 1984 to meet the challenges of IW or as it was referred to at the time, Low Intensity Conflict (LIC). Chief of Staff of the Army, General John A. Wickham, Jr., published a “white paper” that described a force ideally suited to the changing strategic environment (see Figure 8). He called for the creation of five light infantry divisions (LID), rapidly able to globally deploy to trouble spots for LIC operations. The Army created the 6th, 7th, 9th, 10th, and 25th Infantry Divisions (Light) with the mantra was “Soldier power” (instead of firepower). In the end this experiment failed for three reasons: First, doctrinal solutions were not matched to the light force structure, an extension of the debate between policy and budget; second, the designers “provided little more than a set of characteristics, but certainly not a definition of purpose or utility;” and finally, in the words of Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell, “[We] have light divisions which are not light enough to get there and not heavy enough to win.”

The U.S. Marine Corps has experimented with several organizational solutions to meet current and future requirements. In addition to their maritime tradition, the Marines remain connected to two aspects of their history: small wars and their expeditionary mindset. As a result, the Marines are developing Security Cooperation Marine Air Ground Task Forces (SCMAGTF) and have implemented a significant language program. The SCMAGTF will be
based on a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) construct but will be task organized to meet the specific requirements of the security cooperation agreement with the HN. The Commandant of the Marine Corps, General James Conway, stated: “Among these changed practices is the implementation of a regional focus for units that source this new capability [SCMAGTF]. Through this initiative, changes to manpower policies will enable the development of linguistically adept, culturally aware units for training foreign military forces across the globe.”

However, despite the Marines’ apparent open-minded approach regarding organizational solutions to solving capacity and capability gaps, they have resisted supporting the Advise and Assist BCTs in Iraq or BCP, the most important regional security matter in the Middle East. Additionally, the Marine desire to deploy only in the MAGTF structure, and the requirement that the resources within the MAGTF can only be controlled by the MAGTF commander, not the JFC, remains a point of contention. In short, the Marines crafted an organizational solution that may or may not be in concert with GCC requirements.

The U.S. Navy has also experimented with regional solutions to IW, e.g., the Global Fleet Stationing (GFS). GFS is a Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) initiative which is an operational derivative of sea basing, to coordinate and execute missions within a regional area of interest, focused on Phase 0 (Prevent/Prepare) and SSTR operations, i.e. TSC, Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), Maritime Civil Affairs (MCA), and other overseas contingency operations. The GFS reflects the Navy’s commitment to a regional focus rather than a general approach to SSTR issues. The Navy also developed the Naval Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC). Based on the Naval Construction Division structure, the NECC serves as a clearing house for many of the Navy’s non-SOF IW organizations such as Maritime Civil Affairs and Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD).

The shortfalls of the Navy’s GFS and NECC are similar to the Army’s shortfalls in terms of sustainable capacity. However, the Navy, like the Air Force, is a platform-centric
organization. Without habitual relationships, NECC units struggle to become fully engaged. However, the GFS does offer increased agility for GCCs for maritime purposes.

All four services have struggled with the question of a regional or worldwide focus when manning, training, and equipping their forces. In contrast, SOF has traditionally taken a regional approach and focused training and acquisitions based on that approach. However, operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have forced SOF to significantly reduce regional focus. But, serendipitously, GPF have developed useful skill sets in support of military engagement worldwide. The challenge for GPF will be transferring those skills into regions other than the CENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR). By providing focused education and training, the Army can create (or in some cases restore) its institutional prowess and capability in dealing with foreign security forces, local populations, and potential mission partners. In the current operating environment, the increasing reality is that small units commanded by company and field grade officers in remote locations, conducting full spectrum operations requiring regional understanding and language skills.

AN OPTION: REGIONAL AFFILIATION OF ARMY UNITS

In normal times, and in the very early stages of subversion, the intelligence organisation [sic] has got to be able to penetrate small...highly secure targets.
- Sir Frank Kittson, Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency And Peace-keeping, 1971

U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and its subordinate units are unequalled in terms of IW capability. With SOF, specifically Army SOF (ARSOF), the U.S. has a capability with decisive strategic significance and of crucial importance to worldwide engagement, but with numbers unable to meet current requirements. Admiral Eric Olson, Commander, USSOCOM, testified before Congress that, “increasing the IW capabilities of the
general purpose forces will serve to increase the availability of SOF to perform activities for which they are specially trained and equipped."\textsuperscript{49}

In this era of persistent conflict, the Army, and to a lesser extent the Marine Corps, remains the principal force in interventionary operations, critical to the future of American National security.\textsuperscript{50} The Army’s continued development as an expeditionary force is based on the ability to operate effectively with joint, interagency, and multinational partners across the full spectrum of conflict.\textsuperscript{51} Currently, the Army has 255,000 soldiers deployed in nearly 80 countries around the world, with more than 145,000 soldiers in active combat theaters (see Figure 8).\textsuperscript{52} In addition to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army has supported SFA with training teams in 11 countries in the USCENTCOM AOR; “22 teams to 12 countries in the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) AOR; 8 teams to 6 countries in U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) AOR; and 14 teams to 4 countries in the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) AOR.”\textsuperscript{53}

To meet joint force requirements for operations in the new security environment, the Army adapted and implemented the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process (see Figure 9),\textsuperscript{54} which matches capabilities and requirements from the individual to the unit level in order to prioritize and synchronize institutional functions (recruit, organize, man, equip, train, sustain, mobilize, and deploy).\textsuperscript{55} In this regard, the Army is developing an approach to cultural and foreign language education and training which is focused on training programs preparing individuals before deployment.\textsuperscript{56} The desired annual goal is the sustainment of 19-21 trained and ready Active component modular brigades with additional access to 50,000-70,000 Reserve Component (RC) soldiers.\textsuperscript{57}

In addition to ARFORGEN, the Army has reassessed its basing choices and is attempting to adjust these choices to support GCC priorities. In concert with the other services, the Army, according to the 2009 Army Posture Statement, “is transforming its overseas posture into one of three locations: 1) main operating bases, large sites with [permanently stationed personnel]; 2)
forward operating sites, smaller and expandable sites [capable of supporting] rotational forces and pre-positioned equipment; and 3) cooperative security locations, small, rapidly expandable sites with little or no permanent U.S. presence.”

Along with facilities and locations, the Army must adjust other aspects of its structure. According the 2009 Army Posture Statement, “The Army is out of balance. The current demand for our forces in Iraq and Afghanistan exceeds the sustainable supply and limits our ability to provide ready forces for other contingencies. Even as the demand for our forces in Iraq decreases, the mission in Afghanistan and other requirements will continue to place a high demand on our Army for years to come.” The Army must continue to transform training and development of agile and adaptive leaders able to overcome the challenges of full spectrum operations in complex and dynamic operating environments. However, to meet future requirements, training must be tailored to regional challenges where skill sets and area-specific knowledge can be developed in greater depth.

The Army views specific regional knowledge as “supporting fires” to the larger force. Although development of Foreign Area Officers (FAOs) is expected to be increased, this represents only a very small portion of the overall force structure. In addition to FAOs the Army has invested in Human Terrain Teams (HTT), comprising cultural and other experts to advise the commander. The Army has also developed a Reachback Research Center (RRC) of regionally-focused cells. The RRC provides research and analysis capabilities to the deployed HTTs and other customers. Although commendable, these programs will not be able to provide the sort of real-time support needed to inform the activities of tactical units interacting with mission partners or the HN population. These capabilities must be resident in those units.

The Army’s transformation process has focused on six distinct qualities necessary for land forces to be successful in the current and future operating environment: versatile, expeditionary, agile, lethal, sustainable, and interoperable. While each of these qualities are
necessary, they do not really contribute to the nuanced, sophisticated approach required of a regionally tailored force (see Figure 10).

AN APPROACH FOR REGIONAL AFFILIATION

Correspondingly, the overall posture and thinking of the United States armed forces has shifted—away from solely focusing on direct American military action, and towards new capabilities to shape the security environment in ways that obviate the need for [purely] military intervention in the future.\(^{65}\) - FM 3-07, Stability Operations, October 2008

A regional approach to the apportionment of Army units will undoubtedly be opposed in certain quarters. First, the argument will be made that focusing units in this manner will limit their ability to respond to any challenge. Second, budget limitations will constrain education and training to the point of making this concept untenable. Both arguments can be overcome.

In the late 19\(^{th}\) Century, British geographer Halford Mackinder referred to the “Rimlands, namely, the huge crescent that starts in the Middle East, passes through the horn of Africa, proceeds through South Asia, and ends in northeast Asia.”\(^{66}\) In his paper, “Modern Conventional Warfare: An Overview,” Martin van Creveld similarly noted that, geographically speaking, conventional wars “were not spread evenly over the globe. Instead, almost all of them took place in [the area] described by Mr. Mackinder.”\(^{67}\) If we accept this, we can allocate forces based on this fact. In short, the location of potential military engagement and likely type of intervention can be predicted with reasonable certainty. Thus, we can establish the priority of languages and potential mission partners as well as designate areas requiring persistent engagement.

Within the GEF, the policy and strategy at the national level is translated into requirements for each GCC specifically for Phase 0 operations (Prevent and Prepare for Conflict). When these requirements are viewed against the backdrop of likely areas requiring persistent engagement, capability and capacity gaps begin to become clearer. A reasonable approach to solving these gaps is the affiliation of U.S. Army corps and their attendant divisions
and BCTs to those regions, within the GCCs, that require persistent engagement. The Army has
4 standing Corps headquarters, 18 divisions (10 Active and 8 National Guard), and 73 BCTs (45
Active and 28 National Guard). These formations can be aligned with GCCs to achieve the type
of IW PE needed to ensure homeland security and regional commitments. In general, one corps
would be affiliated with one GCC with two exceptions: NORTHCOM and EUCOM.
NORTHCOM would not be affiliated with a Corps Headquarters. EUCOM and AFRICOM
would share a single Corps Headquarters, as those GCC headquarters are currently co-located.

Corps allocations are in accordance with habitual relationships, existing unit composition,
and based on the dominant terrain of the theater. V Corps would be affiliated with EUCOM and
AFRICOM and augmented with additional divisions and brigades to support both missions. I
Corps would be affiliated with PACOM; III Corps would be affiliated with CENTCOM; and
XVIII Corps (ABN) would affiliate with SOUTHCOM (see Figure 11). The 82nd Division
(ABN) would be a Strategic Response Force, unassigned to a Corps or affiliated with a GCC.

Each Corps would establish training and operational relationships with the USSF group
operating in that AOR, to ensure operations and effects are synchronized. Each Corps would be
augmented with one or two National Guard divisions. These divisions would serve two
purposes. First, these formations would provide regional engagement in the event of a large
scale conflict necessitating the deployment of the active divisions to another theater. Second,
these divisions would support “steady state” operational support requirements such as
deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan, allowing the active divisions to continue regional
engagement.

The typical unit size for engagement is the battalion and below. This may change in the
future, but one can assume that the BCT and smaller units will continue to be deployed. Such a
small commitment allows the remainder of the Corps to continue training and preparation for its
traditional conventional mission. Additionally, a focus on the BCT as the primary means of
engagement supports current Army initiatives in three ways: first, Army training centers are optimized for BCT and below level training; second, the Army has transitioned to the modular structure, with many of the enabling resources being resident in the BCT; and third, the modular BCT structure is “plug and play” and the division can be altered to achieve the right mix of units.

There are two significant problems remaining to be dealt with: language and cultural training. Such training could be managed by the Corps and assigned to the divisions and BCTs for implementation. Current language programs do not have the slack necessary to expand to handle the hundreds, perhaps thousands of additional students. Also, foreign language skills still reside primarily in specific elements of the force, such as ARSOF and FAOs. One solution might be to combine two programs: the civilian logistics deployment representative at the BCT level and the language laboratory at the Special Forces Group level. In short, each BCT would be allocated two language specialists in accordance with its focus region. Each corps and division would build language and cultural staffs to manage the programs of subordinate units, provide command support, and advise the commander on topics related to language and culture. These language and culture specialists would represent an overall increase of less than 500 Department of the Army (DA) civilians. If every specialist was hired as a GS-14 or 15, the overall cost would be about $50 million, roughly the cost of only one M1A2 SEP Tank Company.

The initial target population for language training would be non-commissioned officers (NCO) and officers, and would expand as the program matures. Language proficiency tests would be given at initial entry training for all grades. In terms of personnel management, soldiers on a specific language track could be assigned to any unit within the Corps, to Military Transition Teams within a GCC AOR, or to other units requiring that language specialty, such as a joint headquarters or FAO duty. Although not linguistic experts, these soldiers would certainly
know basic customs and greetings and the vocabulary would undoubtedly expand over time as the programs become institutionalized.

CLEAR ADVANTAGES AND MITIGATED DISADVANTAGES

_IW specialists can only come to be “if the Military Services change the way they identify, access, educate, train, develop, utilize, and retain Irregular Warfare specialists.”^70_

- House Armed Services Subcommittee On Terrorism Unconventional Threats And Capabilities, September 2006

The choice of languages is an important decision and the inability to include languages pertinent to every current or potential threat is a clear disadvantage. With literally thousands of choices, the selection should be based on likely areas of military engagement and the dominant language spoken. This selection should be based on the long-term U.S. foreign engagement strategy and must transcend presidential administrations. The ability to hold a long horizon view is crucial, concomitant with the ability to chart likely future conditions.

Not unlike Mr. Mackinder, John Nagl has identified an “‘Arc of Instability’ that encompasses much of the greater Middle East and parts of Africa and Central and South Asia.”^71_ This perspective is supported in the Marine Corps publication, Flashpoints 2009, which states, “Our latest analysis indicates that 35 out of the 50 [emphasis in the original] of the world’s most at risk nations are from this one region. Other regions having multiple nations within the top 50 most at risk countries include the Middle East & North Africa region with 6, the East Asia & Pacific region with 4, and the South & Southeast Asia region with 3” (see Figure 12).^72_

The focus languages for each GCC are: Indonesian and Tagalog for PACOM; Arabic and Pashtu for CENTCOM; French and Arabic for AFRICOM; Slavic languages for EUCOM; and Spanish and Portuguese for SOUTHCOM. Languages associated with current mission partners such and Germany and South Korea, as well as such current threats, China and North Korea, are not included. In that regard, a significant linguistic capability exists inside of the U.S. Government and a dedicated language program can be built to meet current and future requirements.
Language and cultural awareness alone do not provide the regional expertise necessary for the future operations called for in this paper. However, language and cultural awareness permit access to the population and over time the relationships developed will generate information that leads to regional success. For example, many SOF units are geographically oriented, have developed and maintained regional expertise over time, and that has yielded crucial advantages such as in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in the Philippines.\textsuperscript{73}

As noted earlier, a perceived disadvantage of this concept would be that regionally oriented corps would be unable to reorient quickly and deploy worldwide to fight and win our Nation’s wars. This disadvantage is mitigated in three ways: First, most interventions are small, requiring only a portion of the corps; second, conventional conflicts have also grown increasingly smaller, and the intervention force for a major combat operation will also likely be smaller in future\textsuperscript{74}; and finally, as SOF has demonstrated in Iraq and Afghanistan, GPF units can support operations outside its area of focus until the crisis is passed, without a significant loss of its regional expertise or combat skills.

One aspect of regional expertise which enhances GPF capabilities is their ability to support IPE and OPE activities within a theater and in concert with other agencies. The relationships established with HNSF and HN governments will support U.S. foreign policy and, as well, will aid future military action as necessary. Likewise, the development of military infrastructure will enable GPF to prosecute operations in an expeditious manner as required.\textsuperscript{75} And it goes without saying that the assistance of indigenous population permits operations to be orchestrated by, with, and through the mission partner.\textsuperscript{76}

CONCLUSION

Current military operations demand different skills than those that were mastered to win the Cold War. Today’s operations increasingly require our forces to operate with coalition and alliance partners and interact with foreign populations, in a variety of regions, with diverse languages and cultures.\textsuperscript{77}

- Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness,
Since 1775, “regular” warfare for the United States has often been IW. American interventions in the Philippines, Cuba, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Vietnam, Colombia, and, most recently, Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM have all been marked by a decision for intervention, military action, and, ultimately, withdrawal. In every case, language, cultural awareness, and local expertise was bought and paid for with national treasure and blood.

Although largely ignored in the past, today the Army continues to integrate IW into individual and collective training. This is not surprising given that SFA will continue to shape future force and capability decisions. SFA missions will remain important in the future and represents a significant departure from the “pre-9/11” mindset. That said, more work is needed.

In the last eight years, vast numbers of GPF officers, NCOs, and soldiers have worked with irregular forces, and advised HN Security Forces and militias in the campaign against terror around the world. This is unlikely to change. USSOCOM has deployed troops to more than 150 countries, and this is likely to increase. With this in mind, SOF units have received extensive foreign area training and operated in assigned countries to gain expertise. This mission and training focus must be expanded to include GPF units, specifically U.S. Army units, in order to achieve the desired capability for IW.

The first and third priorities for the current National Security and National Military Strategies are directly related to a future military engagement and the strategic implications of irregular, traditional, and hybrid challenges. The relationship between U.S. regional objectives, BPC programs, and the ability of a partner to contribute to U.S. strategic goals is interwoven. Thus, as in the past, U.S. foreign policy will be carried in the rucksack of a forward deployed soldier. The future difference is that the soldier will likely not be conducting “pure” combat operations and his mission success will be tied to the mission success of the HN
element with whom he is interacting. How successfully he is able to interact and his knowledge and understanding are conditions that can be shaped today.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


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2 House Armed Services Subcommittee On Terrorism, Unconventional Threats And Capabilities, September 27, 2006, Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee Hearing Focuses on Irregular Warfare Roadmap, http://armedservices.house.gov/comdocs/pressreleases/9-27-06hearingsummary.pdf (25 December 2009), 1-2. Specifically, according to Mancuso, “We must improve the capability of our General Purpose Forces to conduct counterinsurgency operations and to partner with and train foreign forces to defeat insurgencies and terrorist organization on a global scale and for an indefinite period. Our Special Operations Forces must also rebalance to devote a greater degree of effort to counter terrorism operations, defeating terrorist networks, and combating the threat of WMD proliferation.”


4 Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept, 11 September 2007, http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/concepts/iw_joc1_0.pdf , (25 December 2009), 2. “A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will.”


6 Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Jefferson P. Marquis, Cathryn Quantic Thurston, Gregory F. Treverton, A Framework to Assess Programs for Building Partnerships, RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2009, http://rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG863.pdf , (26 December 2009), 3. “The United States seeks to conduct security cooperation in a deliberate and carefully orchestrated manner that takes into account relatively enduring U.S. national security interests arrayed against an ever-changing international security environment. Thus, security cooperation priorities change over time, and a national-level assessment mechanism is necessary to underpin decisions concerning resource and program increases, decreases, and reallocations. We recommend an initial step in that direction by suggesting an integrating role for the OUSD/P. However, that function falls somewhat short of the comprehensive national-level integrated security cooperation assessment that ultimately will be required. Of course, such an assessment should comport with the security cooperation priorities delineated in the Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF).”

7 FM 3-07, Stability Operations, OCTOBER 2008, http://usace.army.mil/cac2/repository/FM307/FM3-07.pdf , (26 December 2009), 6-14. “Security force assistance is the unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, host-nation, or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority. It is integral to successful stability operations and extends to all security forces: military, police, and border forces, and other paramilitary organizations. This applies to all levels of government within the host nation as well as other local and regional forces. Forces are developed to operate across the spectrum of conflict—combating internal threats such as insurgency, subversion, and lawlessness; defending against external threats; or serving as coalition partners in other areas.”

8 JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 17 October 2008, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf , (26 December 2009), 216. “Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to both protect and provide its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Also called FID. (JP 3-05).”


10 Ibid, 22. “Persistent, global IPE will play a decisive part of any IW campaign. It will enable the joint force to understand the imperatives of the operational environment and the vulnerabilities of adversaries. To achieve this understanding, the Intelligence Community will establish persistent, long-duration intelligence networks that focus on the populations, governments, traditional political authorities, and security forces at the national and sub-national levels in all priority countries. The joint force will leverage these networks by linking them to operational support networks of anthropologists and other social scientists with relevant expertise in the cultures and societies of the various clans, tribes, and countries involved. Where civilian expertise in the social sciences is not available, the Department of Defense will provide its own experts. Reach back to academia is useful, but not a failsafe in extended IW operational environments.”

11 Ibid, 22. “OPE will require permanent posting of joint force personnel overseas. JFC’s will position small forward-based joint teams in or adjacent to all priority countries. The teams will be composed of career-trained regional specialists who have or are developing expertise in the languages, customs, attitudes, and cultures of their region. These teams will prepare for future joint force operations by gaining understanding of the relevant populations, cultures, political authorities, personalities, security forces, and terrain within potential operational areas. The teams will assist in the training and preparation of friendly security and irregular forces to wage IW. The teams will use their cultural understanding of the population to influence the indigenous people in terms meaningful to them and through their own key communicators. The teams will contribute to joint force operational reach by enabling the rapid employment of forces during crises and contingency operations.”

12 2008 National Defense Strategy, June 2008, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/20080620National%20Defense%20Strategy.pdf , (25 December 2009).2. “The inability of many states to police themselves effectively or to work with their neighbors to ensure regional security represents a challenge to the international system. Armed sub-national groups, including but not limited to those inspired by violent extremism, threaten the stability and legitimacy of key states. If left unchecked, such instability can spread and threaten regions of interest to the United States, our allies, and friends. Insurgent groups and other non-state actors frequently exploit local geographical, political, or social conditions to establish safe havens from which they can operate with impunity. Ungoverned, under-governed, misgoverned, and contested areas offer fertile ground
for such groups to exploit the gaps in governance capacity of local regimes to undermine local stability and regional security. Addressing this problem will require local partnerships and creative approaches to deny extremists the opportunity to gain footholds.”

13 Ibid, 3-4. “China is one ascendant state with the potential for competing with the United States. For the foreseeable future, we will need to hedge against China’s growing military modernization and the impact of its strategic choices upon international security. It is likely that China will continue to expand its conventional military capabilities, emphasizing anti-access and area denial assets including developing a full range of long-range strike, space, and information warfare capabilities. Russia’s retreat from openness and democracy could have significant security implications for the United States, our European allies, and our partners in other regions. Russia has leveraged the revenue from, and access to, its energy sources; asserted claims in the Arctic; and has continued to bully its neighbors, all of which are causes for concern. Russia also has begun to take a more active military stance, such as the renewal of long-range bomber flights, and has withdrawn from arms control and force reduction treaties, and even threatened to target countries hosting potential U.S. anti-missile bases. Furthermore, Moscow has signaled an increasing reliance on nuclear weapons as a foundation of its security. All of these actions suggest a Russia exploring renewed influence, and seeking a greater international role.”

14 Ibid, 4-5. “U.S. dominance in conventional warfare has given prospective adversaries, particularly non-state actors and their state sponsors, strong motivation to adopt asymmetric methods to counter our advantages. For this reason, we must display a mastery of irregular warfare comparable to that which we possess in conventional combat. Our adversaries also seek to develop or acquire catastrophic capabilities that could involve biological, chemical, and especially nuclear weapons. In addition, they may develop disruptive technologies in an attempt to offset U.S. advantages. For example, the development and proliferation of anti-access technology and weapon systems is worrisome as it can restrict our freedom of action. These challenges could come not in the obvious forms we see today but also in less traditional forms of influence such as manipulating global opinion using mass communications venues and exploiting international commitments and legal avenues. Meeting these challenges will require better and more diverse capabilities in both hard and soft power, and greater flexibility and skill in employing them.”


17 Ibid, 9.

18 Ibid, 9.

19 Ibid, 9.

20 FM 3-24, Counter-Insurgency, 15 December 2006, 1-1 – 1-5.


22 David Galula, Pacification in Algeria, 1956–1958, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG478-1.pdf. (29 December 2009), vi. The fallacy of a decapitation strategy to defeat an insurgency: “Then, five top leaders of the rebellion, including Ben Bella, had been neatly caught during a flight from Rabat to Tunis. Their capture, I admit, had little effect on the direction of the rebellion, because the movement was too loosely organized to crumble under such a blow.”


24 David Galula, Pacification in Algeria, 1956–1958, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG478-1.pdf. (29 December 2009), 246. “The first law. The objective is the population. The population is at the same time the real terrain of the war. ( Destruction of the rebel forces and occupation of the geographic terrain led us nowhere as long as we did not control and get the support of the population.) This is where the real fighting takes place, where the insurgent challenges the counterinsurgent, who cannot but accept the challenge.”


27 Ibid.

28 Ibid.

29 Ibid.


31 Robert M. Gates, Secretary of Defense, “Landon Lecture,” Manhattan: Kansas State University, November 26, 2007, http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1199. (27 December 2009). “The real challenges have since emerged since the end of the Cold War—from Somalia to the Balkans, Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere—make clear in our defense need to change our priorities to be better able to deal with the prevalence of what is called “asymmetric warfare.” As I told an Army gathering last month, it is hard to conceive of any country challenging the United States directly in conventional military terms—indeed, for some years to come. Indeed, history shows us that smaller, irregular forces—insurgents, guerrillas, terrorists—have for centuries known ways to harass and frustrate larger, regular armies and sow chaos. We can expect that asymmetric warfare will be the mainstay of the contemporary battlefield for some time. These conflicts will be fundamentally political in nature, and require the application of all elements of national power. Success will be less of a matter of imposing one’s will and more a function of shaping behavior—of friends, adversaries, and most importantly, the people in between. Arguably the most important military component in the War on Terror is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we enable and empower our partners to defend and govern themselves. The standing up and mentoring of indigenous army and police—one the province of Special Forces—is now a key mission for the military as a whole. But these new threats also require our government to operate as a whole different entity, to act with unity, agility, and creativity. And they will require considerably more resources devoted to America’s non-military instruments of power.”

32 Scales, Robert, Major General, USA (ret.), Fighting on the Edges: The Nature of War in 2020, 25 May 2004, Changing Nature of Warfare, http://www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_2020_202004_05_25_intro.html. (27 December 2009), 9-10. “The American military does not protect an empire but it does protect vital interests whose geographic centers of gravity are nested at the extreme limits of military reach. As with the Romans long term tranquility in these regions can only be secured by a military equipped, trained and dedicated to protecting American interests over the long term. Success will come only when the world realizes that the American military and ground forces in particular are capable of winning decisively and staying the longer course of war until its strategic ends are met and sustained. America’s new borders are a great distance from her shores. A military force engaged there can only be effective in the long term if it becomes an institution with staying power, and if it seeks to win through moral intimidation and patient engagement rather than continuous combat.”

33 Scott G. Wuestner, Building Partner Capacity/ Security Force Assistance: A New Structural Paradigm, February 2009, (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2009), 14-15. “In spite of these growing specialized requirements, the Army has argued against “specialized forces” to conduct Stability Operations. In accordance with the Army Position Paper: Force Structure for Stability Operations, “operational experience supports the Army’s view that a combined-arms modular force, fully trained to conduct full-spectrum operations, is more effective in the current environment and more flexible to meet the range of joint force requirements under realistic, fiscal and end-
strength restrictions.” The Army conducted modeling over a 7-year period that compared two different force structure configurations to attempt to validate its position. One was a BCT-based modular force, and the second was a force that contained a mix of approximately 60 percent SO specialized forces and 40 percent BCT modular forces. “The pure BCT modular structure was capable of executing 93 percent of its total mission load (including SO) and 100 percent of its Major Combat Operations (MCO) requirement. The BCT specialized mix was capable of executing 68 percent of its total mission load (including SO) and only 20 percent of its MCO requirement.”40 Critics argue this mix is unrealistic and that the all or nothing approach is fundamentally flawed.”

4Ibid, 29-30. “So does the Army have all the tools required to execute Full-Spectrum Operations throughout the construct of FID and TSC operations from Phase 0 to Phase 5? The answer is simply no. The U.S. Army lacks the minimum force structure to meet current or future requirements for stabilization, training, and advising. Capability and Capacity Gaps. As outlined above, the U.S. Government’s ability to execute Partner Capacity Building, Security Force Assistance, Theater Security Operations, Foreign Internal Defense, Irregular Warfare, and SSTR is critical as we face a time of persistent conflict. There are capability gaps beyond the military requirement such as police and military training, regional and local governance, and civil works type operations.”

5Ibid, 29-30. “Additionally, these requirements will likely increase over time as the United States builds the Africa Command (AFRICOM) and the associated challenges of that AOR. So capacity is an issue as our nation faces a continued terrorist threat.”

6Accelerate Army Growth, 2009 Army Posture Statement, http://www.army.mil/aps/09/information_papers/accelerate_army_growth.html, (25 December 2009). “The President approved and Congress authorized this plan in January 2007. The increases include: Active Component (AC) to 74,200, a growth of 65,000, 8,200 in the Army National Guard (ARNG), and 1,000 in the United States Army Reserve (USAR). The plan, as amended by the FY10 Budget proposals, builds toward a total of 73 Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) and approximately 227 support brigades with enabling combat support and combat service support structure to improve the balance of forces across all three components and better meet the global force demand in an era of persistent conflict. This decision to expand the size of the Army was driven by the President, the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), and the Congress of the importance of Joint ground forces to meet strategic requirements and the need to reduce stress on Soldiers and Families related to the increasing and enduring operational demands. Kevin D. Stringer, The Light Infantry Division: Cold War Chimera, VMI Archives, Adams Center, 2009,” http://www.vmi.edu/uploadedFiles/Archives/Adams_Center_AwardContests/20082009/AdamsCenterEssay_SpringerKD.pdf, (25 February 2010), 7. “After Wickham’s October 1983 approval, the Army publicly announced the creation of the light infantry division in the Army’s Fiscal Year 1985 budget. In January 1984, the Department of Defense concurred, and in February 1984, President Ronald Reagan placed his stamp of approval on it. By March 1984, the basing discussions were underway. The Army planned to convert two heavy divisions, the 7th and 25th Infantry Divisions, into light units in 1985, and the 6th and 10th Infantry Divisions (Light) were to be newly created. The 7th Infantry Division was the pilot formation and its transition began in October 1985. Ultimately, by the end of the Cold War in 1991, the National Command Authority had at its disposal five light infantry divisions in the Army force structure.”

7Ibid, 7. “The force designers had essentially defined the light infantry division as a 10,000 man infantry force capable of being transported in 500 C141 aircraft sorties. This provided little more than a set of characteristics, but certainly not a definition of purpose or utility. It also did not shed much light on the roles and missions of the light infantry force.”

8Ibid, 1. “General William Caldwell, “If we wanted a force that was rapidly deployable and designed for low intensity conflict then the light division should have been made ‘lighter’. But if we wanted a force that had utility in the mid-high intensity spectrum, which could function as regular infantry, then the light division should have been made heavier. Unfortunately, due to political and budgetary constraints we are in a position not to do either and instead have light divisions which are not light enough to get there and not heavy enough to win.”

9The Strategy Page, 8 February 2008, Corps To Get Back To Its Expeditionary Roots, http://www.strategypage.com/militaryforums/516-5664.aspx, (27 December 2009). “It will be made up of ground, logistics and aviation combat elements, and standing SC MAGTFs will support Africa, Southwest Asia and South America. The SC MAGTFs would be staffed with officers and noncommissioned officers educated in specific micro-regions and Marines who are native speakers of the languages in the region. “Among these changed practices is the implementation of a regional focus for units that source this new capability [SC MAGTF],” according to an introduction signed by Conway. “Through this initiative, changes to manpower policies will enable the development of linguistically adept, culturally aware units for training foreign military forces across the globe.”


11Ibid, xiii. “The problem statement also reflects our desire to attain quality, detailed information about these needs with a scoped, regional focus, rather than with a broad “brush-stroke” synopsis of stability issues worldwide. The Gulf of Guinea region, representing 13 countries from Liberia in the Northwest to Angola in the South, presents a host of challenges to stability, and is the perfect venue in which to test and evaluate the GFS concept on a regional scale.”

12Ibid, xxi.

13James D. Campbell, “Making Riflemen From Mud”: Restoring The Army’s Culture Of Irregular Warfare, October 2007, (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2007), 21. “By providing such education and training, the Army can go a long way toward making its forces more proficient at engaging foreign militaries and allied armed groups. In the current operating environment, there is an increasing probability that young company and field grade officers will find themselves in remote locations conducting combat or stability operations with little close supervision and no counterparts from civilian government agencies. Given this consensus: field officers prefer lots of low grade information to a small amount of higher quality.”

14Sir Frank Kittson , Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, and Peace-keeping, Harrisburg PA: Stackpole Books, 1971, p 72. “PHASE I. Preparing to protest,...the enemy [a section of the country's people] is likely to be occupied in spreading his cause... (p 71). Set agents to work now! In normal times, and in the very early stages of subversion, the intelligence organisation has got to be able to penetrate small...highly secure targets (p 72). It may have to invent new ways to do it. (At a Rand Corporation symposium in 1962 the author found a consensus: field officers prefer lots of low grade information to a small amount of higher quality.)”


Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.


54 Addendum E (Army Force Generation), 2009 Army Posture Statement, http://www.army.mil/aps/09/addenda/addenda_e.html, (25 December 2009). “ARFORGEN ensures that every deploying unit is the best led, trained, and equipped force possible prior to mission execution. It is a structured process generating Active Component (AC) and Reserve Components (RC) forces that progressively increases unit readiness over time. Operational requirements focus the ARFORGEN process to prioritize and synchonize institutional functions (recruit, organize, man, equip, train, sustain, mobilize, and deploy). ARFORGEN is a dynamic, cyclic process where the coordination of schedules, resources, and readiness assessments are critical to producing capabilities to meet Joint mission requirements.”

55 Ibid. “ARFORGEN is not just about preparing units for worldwide deployments. It affects both the Operating Force and the Generating Force. It focuses on the right mix of resource, equip, source, mobilize, deploy and sustain, agile, cohesive units on a recurring basis. The goal is to generate combat power on a sustained cyclic basis more effectively and efficiently.”

56 Cultural and Foreign Language Capabilities, 2009 Army Posture Statement, http://www.army.mil/aps/09/information_papers/cultural_foreign_language_capabilities.html, (25 December 2009). “Foremost, all leaders and Soldiers must gain an appreciation of other cultures and languages and be able to apply cultural and foreign language knowledge to operational planning and execution. The Army is developing an organized and integrated approach to culture and foreign language education and training. This approach will prescribe career development education and training programs that prepare individuals during pre-deployment, leveraging the vast experience gained from current operational tours and other life-long learning. Finally, the Army will focus pre-deployment MTTs to empower units with the culture and foreign language capability necessary to complete their assigned missions. To accomplish these goals, TRADOC is in the process of developing and staffing language and cultural education and training opportunities targeted at the culture generalist and nonprofessional linguist.”

57 Addendum E (Army Force Generation), 2009 Army Posture Statement, http://www.army.mil/aps/09/addenda/addenda_e.html, (25 December 2009). “The ARFORGEN model relies on continuous access to our RC forces at a level of 50,000 to 70,000 Soldiers mobilized per year. As demand decreases, mobilization of RC forces could be reduced, but not eliminated.”

58 Global Force Posture, 2009 Army Posture Statement, http://www.army.mil/aps/09/information_papers/global_force_posture.html, (29 December 2009). “Global posture actions are continuously adjusted against requirements to support combatant commanders. In conjunction with the other services, the Army is in the process of transforming its posture abroad into a network of three types of locations: 1) main operating bases, which will be enduring, large sites with permanently stationed service members and their Families; 2) forward operating sites, which will be smaller, but expandable sites that can support rotational forces and pre-positioned equipment; and 3) cooperative security locations, which will be small, rapidly expandable sites with little or no permanent U.S. presence.”

59 Two Critical Challenges, 2009 Army Posture Statement, http://www.army.mil/aps/09/two_critical.html, (25 December 2009). “The Army is out of balance. The current demand for our forces in Iraq and Afghanistan exceeds the sustainable supply and limits our ability to provide ready forces for other contingencies. Even as the demand for our forces in Iraq decreases, the mission in Afghanistan and other requirements will continue to place a high demand on our Army for years to come. Current operational requirements for forces and insufficient time between deployments require a focus on counterinsurgency training and equipping to the detriment of preparedness for the full range of military missions. Soldiers, Families, support systems, and equipment are stressed due to lengthy and repeated deployments. Overall, we are consuming readiness as fast as we can build it. These conditions must change. Institutional and operational risks are accumulating over time and must be reduced in the coming year.”

60 Ibid. “Modernization efforts are essential to ensure technological superiority over a diverse array of potential adversaries. Our Army must adapt its institutions to more effectively and efficiently provide trained and ready forces for combatant commanders. We will continue to transform how we train Soldiers and how we develop agile and adaptive leaders who can overcome the challenges of full spectrum operations in complex and dynamic operating environments. We also must continue the transformation of our Reserve Components to an operational force to achieve the strategic depth necessary to successfully sustain operations in an era of persistent conflict.”

61 Cultural and Foreign Language Capabilities, 2009 Army Posture Statement, http://www.army.mil/aps/09/information_papers/cultural_foreign_language_capabilities.html, (25 December 2009). “The Foreign Area Officer (FAO) program has made force structure changes to accommodate the global demand for linguistic and regional expertise, including expansions into interagency, Joint Staff, and Army Service Component Commands (ASCCs). Combat Training Centers have completely transformed, using native-speaking role-players to replicate the culture of civilians on the battlefield and enemies in their midst. The Language Enabled Soldier Program at Fort Lewis, Washington trains one soldier from each platoon of a deploying Brigade Combat Team for 10 months in a critical language to support mission essential tasks. The 09L (Interpreter/Translator) Program has been converted from a pilot program to a full Military Occupational Specialty. This program actively recruits native speakers of Arabic, Kurdish, Pashto, Persian-Dari, and Persian-Farsi from heritage communities. More than 700 have been trained and mobilized since FY06.”

62 Human Terrain Systems (HTS), 2009 Army Posture Statement, http://www.army.mil/aps/09/information_papers/human_terrain_systems.html, (29 December 2009). “Human Terrain Teams, The HTT’s are located at the brigade/regimental-level and human terrain & analysis teams (HTAT) are found at division, corps, and combined/joint task force-level. Fully integrated into unit staffs, HTTs conduct field research among the local population and represent the “human terrain” in planning, preparation, execution and assessment of operations. There are currently 27 teams deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan. Reachback Research Center (RRC). The RRC provides direct support (tactical overwatch) research and analysis capabilities to the deployed teams. The RRC consists of social scientists, as well as uniformed and civilian analysts, organized in regionally-focused cells. The Afghanistan cell is at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; the Iraq cell is at Newport News, Virginia and is co-located with the HTS Project office. Subjects Matter Expert-Networks. Consists of on-call, micro-regional focused academic and other civilian sector experts providing specific RRC support.”

qualities that land forces must possess to succeed in the evolving security environment. In order to face the security challenges ahead, the Army will continue to transform into a land force that is versatile, expeditionary, agile, lethal, sustainable, and interoperable.”

64 Ibid.

65 FM 3-07, Stability Operations, October 2008, http://usace.army.mil/cas2/repository/FM307/FM-3-07.pdf, (26 December 2009), 2-1. Robert M. Gates, Secretary of Defense, “Repeating an Afghanistan or an Iraq—forced regime change followed by nation-building under fire—probably is unlikely in the foreseeable future. What is likely though, even a certainty, is the need to work with and through local governments to avoid the next insurgency, to rescue the next failing state, or to head off the next humanitarian disaster. Correspondingly, the overall posture and thinking of the United States armed forces has shifted—away from solely focusing on direct American military action, and towards new capabilities to shape the security environment in ways that obviate the need for military intervention in the future.”


67 van Creveld, Martin, Modern Conventional Warfare: An Overview, 25 May 2004, Changing Nature of Warfare, http://www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_2020_2004_05_25_intro.html, (27 December 2009), 2-3. “Geographically speaking, what conventional wars did take place during the period in question were not spread evenly over the globe. Instead, almost all of them took place in what the British Geographer, Halford Mackinder, a hundred years ago used to call “the rimlands”; namely, the huge crescent that starts in the Middle East, passes through the horn of Africa, proceeds through South Asia, and ends in northeast Asia (Korea). To this rule there were only two exceptions, i.e. the Falklands War on the one hand and the NATO Campaign against Bosnia on the other. Of these two, the former was waged in such a remote region, and over such an unimportant issue, as to make many people wonder why it had to be conducted at all—unless it was done in the name of that highly potent factor, “honor.” The latter was “fought” with the aid of a forty to one advantage (counting combat aircraft only) against an enemy so small, and so utterly incapable of hitting back, that the Coalition did not suffer even a single casualty.”


69 House Armed Services Subcommittee On Terrorism, Unconventional Threats And Capabilities, Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee Hearing on Irregular Warfare Roadmap, 27 September 2006, http://armedservices.house.gov/comdocs/pressreleases/9-27-06hearingsummary.pdf, (25 December 2009), 2. “In his testimony, Air Force Brigadier General O.G. Mannon, Deputy Director of the Joint Staff for Special Operations, went on to explain that IW specialists can only come to be “if the Military Services change the way they identify, access, educate, train, develop, utilize, and retain Irregular Warfare specialists.” He noted further that “until recently, DoD educational and training institutions have not placed a priority on the importance of preparing DoD personnel to operate, thrive and succeed in Irregular Warfare environments.”

70 Nagl, John, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), Preface. “The army is adapting to the demands of counterinsurgency in Iraq at many levels, from the tactical and operational through the training base in the United States. However, Iraq is but one front in a broader war against Salafist extremists dedicated to eliminating Western influence from the Islamic world; winning the struggle may take decades. There is a growing realization that the most likely conflicts of the next fifty years will be irregular warfare in an “Arc of Instability” that encompasses much of the greater Middle East and parts of Africa and Central and South Asia. To cope more effectively with the messy reality that in the twenty-first century many of our enemies will be insurgents, America’s armed forces must continue to change.”

71 Flashpoints 2009, (Washington DC: Headquarters United States Marine Corps, 2009), 8. “Our latest analysis indicates that 35 out of the 50 (or 70 percent) of the world’s most at risk nations are from this one region. Other regions having multiple nations within the top 50 most at risk countries include the Middle East & North Africa region with 6, the East Asia & Pacific region with 4, and the South & Southeast Asia region with 3. A review of the latest ranking of countries reveals that in general the nations found to be at high risk in our earlier reports still appear near the top of the current list. The updated data resulted in the Chad, Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, and Zimbabwe ranking 1 through 5 respectively, and are clearly considered to be at the greatest risk for conflict.”


74 FM 3-07, Stability Operations, October 2008, http://usace.army.mil/cas2/repository/FM307/FM-3-07.pdf, (26 December 2009), 2-1. Robert M. Gates, Secretary of Defense, “Repeating an Afghanistan or an Iraq—forced regime change followed by nation-building under fire—probably is unlikely in the foreseeable future. What is likely though, even a certainty, is the need to work with and through local governments to avoid the next insurgency, to rescue the next failing state, or to head off the next humanitarian disaster. Correspondingly, the overall posture and thinking of the United States armed forces has shifted—away from solely focusing on direct American military action, and towards new capabilities to shape the security environment in ways that obviate the need for military intervention in the future.”


76 US. House Of Representatives Committee On Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations, (25 December 2009), 14. “Disregarding the numerous technicalities that have changed it and will continue to do so in the future, probably the best way of looking at conventional war is to realize that the fact is that it is declining and draw the necessary consequences from this fact. Fail to do this, and the only certain winner will be the national debt.”

77 U.S. House Of Representatives Committee On Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations, (25 December 2009), 14. “Disregarding the numerous technicalities that have changed it and will continue to do so in the future, probably the best way of looking at conventional war is to realize that the fact is that it is declining and draw the necessary consequences from this fact. Fail to do this, and the only certain winner will be the national debt.”


82 Flashpoints 2009, (Washington DC: Headquarters United States Marine Corps, 2009), 8. “Our latest analysis indicates that 35 out of the 50 (or 70 percent) of the world’s most at risk nations are from this one region. Other regions having multiple nations within the top 50 most at risk countries include the Middle East & North Africa region with 6, the East Asia & Pacific region with 4, and the South & Southeast Asia region with 3. A review of the latest ranking of countries reveals that in general the nations found to be at high risk in our earlier reports still appear near the top of the current list. The updated data resulted in the Chad, Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, and Zimbabwe ranking 1 through 5 respectively, and are clearly considered to be at the greatest risk for conflict.”

83 U.S. House Of Representatives Committee On Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations, November 2008, Building Language Skills and Cultural Competencies in the Military: DOD’s Challenge in Today’s Educational Environment, http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/Reports/LanguageCultureReportNov08.pdf, (25 DEC 2009), 24. “Special operations forces (SOF) are another element of the force that traditionally possess regional expertise capabilities. Because most SOF units have been geographically oriented, these officers and non-commissioned officers also develop and maintain regional expertise over the course of their careers. SOF units take advantage of the experience that the regional orientation provides and routinely assign senior non-commissioned officers as mentors to newer members to facilitate rapid learning and sustainment. While not considered language professionals, SOF personnel must attain at least some level of foreign language proficiency. Special operations forces, whose members do not include junior enlisted personnel, focus their language training on attaining at least rudimentary conversational speaking skills to enable them to interact with local populations as necessary in order to execute special operations tasks.”

84 van Creveld, Martin, Modern Conventional Warfare: An Overview, 25 May 2004, Changing Nature of Warfare, http://armedservices.house.gov/comdocs/pressreleases/9-27-06hearingsummary.pdf, (25 December 2009), 14. “Disregarding the numerous technicalities that have changed it and will continue to do so in the future, probably the best way of looking at conventional war is to realize that the fact is that it is declining and draw the necessary consequences from this fact. Fail to do this, and the only certain winner will be the national debt.”

85 Kenny, Michael T., MAJ, “Leveraging Operational Preparation of the Environment in the GWOT” , SEPT 2005-MAR 2006, School of Advanced Military Studies, http://www.fas.org/man/eprint/kenny.pdf, (29 December 2009), 3. “[OPE operations] include activities that enhance or enable intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IBP) such as the conduct of area assessments and area familiarization, leveraging human intelligence (HUMINT) networks, and emplacing collection assets. Additionally, the development of operational infrastructure provides a pre-established architecture from which to prosecute operations in an expeditious and unobtrusive manner if needed. USSOCOM’s conduct of operational preparation of the environment (OPE) in potential terrorist support areas is one of the most effective preemptive measures DOD has at its disposal to set the conditions for the detection, disruption, and destruction of terrorist cells and activities. OPE enables SOF to contend with the unconventional nature of the enemy threat. Both the advantages afforded by indigenous local area knowledge as well as sovereign considerations mandates that OPE is orchestrated through, by, and with host nation forces where applicable.”
November 2008, Building Language Skills and Cultural Competencies in the Military: DOD’s Challenge in Today’s Educational Environment, http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/Reports/LanguageCultureReportNov08.pdf, (25 DEC 2009), 25. “Current military operations demand different skills than those that were mastered to win the Cold War. Today’s operations increasingly require our forces to operate with coalition and alliance partners and interact with foreign populations, in a variety of regions, with diverse languages and cultures. Our enemies blend in with the local population, making identification and achieving victory more difficult. To be effective in stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations, as well as other counterinsurgency measures and to prevail in the long war, we must be able to understand different cultures and communicate effectively in order to gain the support of the local people.” Mrs. Gail H. McGinn, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Plans, 25 April 2007.”

78FM 3-24, Counter-Insurgency, 15 December 2006, 1-4 – 1-5.

79Alexander, John B., The Evolution of Conflict Through 2020: Demands on Personnel, Machines, and Missions, Modern Conventional Warfare: An Overview, 25 May 2004, Changing Nature of Warfare, http://www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_2020_2004_05_25_intro.html, (27 December 2009), 7. “International relations have been a hallmark of USSOCOM activities as they annually deployed troops to more than 150 countries. For many years Special Forces soldiers have received extensive foreign area training and operated in their assigned countries. One of their missions that will take on new importance will be foreign internal defense (FID). Previous FID operations focused on training of indigenous soldiers with the intent of fostering regional stability. The SF personnel were also noted for providing medical assistance in remote areas not routinely serviced by doctors. As a result of the close interaction with the local population, over time personal relationships are built between the Special Forces troops and the people they serve. Future FID missions will build on the established base. To accomplish that, intense attention should be paid to personnel assignments to insure the same soldiers interact with the same indigenous people on a repetitive basis. Rather than spending months with foreign personnel, these interpersonal interactions should continue over several decades. These long-term personal relationships would provide quality intelligence that is not available via any other means. It may be feasible to identify potential coups, increasing societal and inter-group tensions, attempts of terrorist organizations to subvert the population, and pressure from criminal/drug cartels. These missions would provide a basis for policy makers to determine appropriate courses of action and the ability for early intervention while incipient problems are more manageable. Repeatedly we have injected operatives into difficult, often hostile situations in which they had to improvise and spend valuable time building trust before they could be effective. In the past some of these hastily formed alliances yielded unintended consequences. As an example, in Afghanistan warlords sometimes attempted to use American firepower to settle old scores by stating that the opposition was supporting the Taliban. The bottom line is that people trust people they know, and know well. It takes a long time to gain a meaningful understanding of these complex situations. Despite best efforts, some intertribal situations are beyond Western comprehension.”


81Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Jefferson P. Marquis, Cathryn Quantic Thurston, Gregory F. Treverton, A Framework to Assess Programs for Building Partnerships, 2009, RAND, http://rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG863.pdf, (29 December 2009), 5. “U.S. regional objectives and the capacity being built or expanded. Programs described as BPC ideally seek to embrace the partner’s ability to contribute to U.S. strategic goals. While this monograph focuses on BPC-related programs with a regional ally or partner, we believe that the assessment approach promulgated in the chapters that follow is also applicable to the broader set of security cooperation programs that are also focused on building bilateral or multilateral defense relationships.”
FIGURE 1. Phases of Joint Operation Planning

TABLE 1. IW Activities. The IW roadmap identified the following 10 activities (aspects) as an illustrative list. These 10 activities (aspects) were reviewed for doctrinal implications:

a. Insurgency and counterinsurgency (COIN).

b. Terrorism and counterterrorism (CT).

c. Unconventional warfare (UW).

d. Foreign internal defense (FID), now largely described as Security Force Assistance (SFA).

e. Stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operations.

f. Transnational criminal activities that support or sustain IW and the law enforcement activities to counter them.
g. Civil-military operations (CMO).
h. Psychological operations (PSYOP).
i. Information operations (IO).

j. Intelligence and counterintelligence operations.


FIGURE 2. The Transition from OPLANS to the GEF and Regional Contingencies


FIGURE 3. Concept for Building Partnership Capacity
FIGURE 4. Today’s Capability Portfolio Shifting to Meet Tomorrow’s Threat

[Diagram showing the transition from Irregular Challenges to Traditional Challenges and from Catastrophic Challenges to Disruptive Challenges]


FIGURE 5. Contrasting Conventional & Irregular Warfare


FIGURE 6. SOF Core Tasks

FIGURE 7. Historical U.S. Security Force Assistance

FIGURE 8. REALISTIC CONFLICT MODEL (Army 1984)

FIGURE 9. Army Global Commitments.

**FIGURE 10.** ARFORGEN Process by Force Pool.


**FIGURE 11.** FID Paradigm across Full Spectrum Insurgencies.

FIGURE 12. GCC and State Regional Bureau Map.

FIGURE 13. Countries Most at Risk for Conflict
GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

USAFRICOM  US Africa Command
AO        Area of Operations
AOR       Area of Responsibility
BCT       Brigade Combat Team
BPC       Building Partner Capacity
CA        Civil Affairs
USCENTCOM US Central Command
CI        Counterintelligence
CIFA      Counterintelligence Field Activity
CIMIC     Civil Military Cooperation
CIST      Counter Ideological Support for Terrorism
CJCS      Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSI     Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction
CM        Consequence Management
CNO       Chief of Naval Operations
COA       Course of Action
COIN      Counterinsurgency
COMSEC    Communications Security
CRO       Crisis Response Operations
CT        Counterterrorism
CW        Conventional Warfare
DOD       Department Of Defense
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EUCOM</td>
<td>European Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>EW</td>
<td>Electronic Warfare</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Foreign Area Officers</td>
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<tr>
<td>FID</td>
<td>Foreign Internal Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>GEF</td>
<td>Guidance for Employment of the Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>GPF</td>
<td>General Purpose Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>GW</td>
<td>Guerrilla Warfare</td>
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<tr>
<td>GWOT</td>
<td>Global War on Terror</td>
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<tr>
<td>HN</td>
<td>Host Nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HNSF</td>
<td>Host Nation Security Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HTS</td>
<td>Human Terrain System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HTT</td>
<td>Human Terrain Teams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUMINT</td>
<td>Human Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDAD</td>
<td>Internal Defense and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>Information Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPE</td>
<td>Intelligence Preparation of the Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IW</td>
<td>Irregular Warfare</td>
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<tr>
<td>JCA</td>
<td>Joint Capability Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>JEL</td>
<td>Joint Electronic Library</td>
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<td>JFC</td>
<td>Joint Force Commander</td>
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<td>JOC</td>
<td>Joint Operating Concept</td>
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<tr>
<td>JP</td>
<td>Joint Publications</td>
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<tr>
<td>JPME</td>
<td>Joint Professional Military Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>LIC</td>
<td>Low Intensity Conflict</td>
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<tr>
<td>LID</td>
<td>Light Infantry Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>MCA</td>
<td>Maritime Civil Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>MILDEC</td>
<td>Military Deception</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOOTW</td>
<td>Military Operations Other Than War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NECC</td>
<td>Naval Expeditionary Combat Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDS</td>
<td>National Defense Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSS</td>
<td>National Security Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPE</td>
<td>Operational Preparation of the Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ops</td>
<td>Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPSEC</td>
<td>Operations Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSD</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary Of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>Public Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>USPACOM</td>
<td>US Pacific Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>PD</td>
<td>Program Directive</td>
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<tr>
<td>PE</td>
<td>Persistent Engagement</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSYOP</td>
<td>Psychological Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>QDR</td>
<td>Quadrennial Defense Review</td>
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<tr>
<td>SFA</td>
<td>Security Force Assistance</td>
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<td>SO</td>
<td>Special Operations</td>
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<td>SOF</td>
<td>Special Operations Forces</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSTR</td>
<td>Stability, Security, Transition, And Reconstruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSOUTHCOM</td>
<td>US Southern Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>TCP</td>
<td>Theater Campaign Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>TSCP</td>
<td>Theater Security Cooperation Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>USCENTCOM</td>
<td>US Central Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>USG</td>
<td>US Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>USJFCOM</td>
<td>US Joint Forces Command</td>
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<td>USSF</td>
<td>US Special Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSOCOM</td>
<td>US Special Operations Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>UW</td>
<td>Unconventional Warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
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