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Indirect Expeditionary Warfare (IEW) is a future operational concept for the Australian Army that seeks to meet the emerging security challenges of the 21st Century. IEW seeks to leverage the skills resident within the Australian Army as formulated in the document Adaptive Campaigning- Army's Future Land Operating Concept (AC-AFLOC).

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AUTHOR:

MAJOR IAN D. LANGFORD, DSC
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Mentor: Lt Col David Casey, USMC
Approved: [Signature]
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# Glossary

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Disclaimer

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References to this study should include the foregoing statement.

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Executive Summary

Title

An Australian Army response to the emerging security environment: Indirect Expeditionary Warfare.

Introduction

Indirect Expeditionary Warfare (IEW) is a future operational concept for the Australian Army that aims to defeat the emerging security challenges of the 21st century. IEW seeks to leverage the skills resident within the Australian Army as formulated in the document “Adaptive Campaigning- Army's Future Land Operating Concept” (AC-AFLOC).

Thesis

The Australian Army requires an Indirect Expeditionary Warfare (IEW) operating concept in order to wage a protracted, direct and indirect military campaign against all threats and security challenges that exist within the future complex operating environment.

Discussion

The future operating environment, as described within the recently released Australian Government Defence White Paper, emphasizes that the Australian Army must be capable of responding to an ever-increasing range of challenges, varying in complexity and scale. As a result, there is a need to develop a new operating concept, collectively titled “Indirect Expeditionary Warfare (IEW).”

IEW capabilities include (but are not necessarily limited to): Strategic Communication operations, Security Partnership operations, Decisive Intelligence And Precision Action operations, Essential Services operations, and Low Visibility Enabling Operations.

Conclusion

The Australian Army must adapt to the emerging operating environment at a pace that guarantees its knowledge and capability edge over potential adversaries and that retains the ability to adapt to an ever changing complex operating environment. IEW seeks to expand upon those current roles and tasks resident within the Australian Army and as prescribed in the current AC-FLOC capability requirements.
Introduction

The Australian Army requires an Indirect Expeditionary Warfare (IEW) operating concept in order to wage a protracted, direct and indirect military campaign against the threats and security challenges that will exist within the future complex operating environment.

IEW is a future operational concept for the Australian Army that aims to pre-emptively defeat emerging security threats to Australia in the 21st century. IEW seeks to leverage off the developing set of skills currently being incorporated within the Australian Army as specified in its capstone document, Adaptive Campaigning- Army’s Future Land Operating Concept (AC-AFLOC). This foundational operating methodology provides the conceptual, doctrinal, and force modernization path for the Australian Army. The Army’s key tasks are:

“[to] safeguard Australian territory, population, infrastructure and resources; manoeuvre (sic) in the primary operating environment, including amphibious maneuver; [conduct] proactive combat operations against an adversary’s military bases and staging areas; and [provide] support to domestic security and emergency response tasks.”

AC-AFLOC also emphasizes the need for the Army to develop operational concepts that can act within a “Complex Warfare” (CW) environment. It specifically identifies that:

“[The] Army is to be designed for a diverse range of operations in complex environments. Army is to be able to operate as combined arms teams and undertake combat in littoral and land environments. AC-AFLOC describes these requirements as an integrated Land Force response, within a broader Joint and Whole of Government approach, to the demands of Complex War (emphasis added).”

IEW seeks to compliment and exploit the aforementioned AC-AFLOC operating concepts to ensure that the Australian Army remains postured to meet the demands of the future.

The Future Operating Environment

The dominant Australian military experience throughout the nation’s history has been the application of military power against a defined, state-sanctioned enemy force within a conventional setting. Since the end of the Second World War, Australia’s strategic environment
has been affected largely by the interplay amongst nation-states and their distribution of power and influence. The demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the "bipolar" world saw Australia’s strategic outlook become strongly shaped by the strategic primacy of the United States (US).\(^6\)

Globalization, demographic distribution, growth patterns, resource competition, urbanization, and the spread of technology can be described as “actors” within the international “system” of states, and represent some of the most significant influences that shape today’s strategic environment.\(^7\) Actors within this system are constantly adapting to their changing environment; this changes the nature of the international system, which is often demonstrated through policy, politics, treaties, alliances, etc. The international system continually “re-frames,” resulting in new systemic “emergence.” Emergence includes (but is not limited to), complex international actions such as trade blocs, international law, international policies, etc. The current international environment is such a system and can be characterized as a “complex adaptive system.”\(^8\)

Modern military planners, who observe this system for change and adaption, conduct detailed analysis to anticipate future trends that may affect the future operating environment. These trends help form a nation’s defense policy. For Australia, some of the key trends identified from the 2009 Defense White Paper policy document (summary attached as Appendix 1), are:\(^9\)

- Australia’s security outlook will be determined by the increasingly “multi-polar” distribution of global power (see Figure 1 below)

- Changing climate patterns, booming population growth, and scarcity of food and water will exacerbate existing security challenges,

- US strategic primacy will come under increased competition from rising states, such as China and India, in the decades beyond the year 2030.
The convergence of global demographic change, resource pressure, health risks, and the emergence of non-state actors, such as criminal syndicates and terrorist groups, will increase the likelihood of inter-state and intra-state conflict (see Figure 1 below).\(^{10}\)

**Figure 1. Global Forecasts.\(^{11}\)**

For the Australian Army, these trends assist operational and strategic planners to identify the specific features that are likely to be most relevant to planning within the international system. Recent Australian defense planning, (highlighted in AC-AFLOC), has deduced that in the future:

- Operational environments are likely to be littoral in nature,
- Population areas are likely to intensify in number, resulting in the further proliferation of “mega-cities” throughout the developing and developed world,
- Intra-state conflict will be an enduring feature of warfare, as non-state actors seek to exhaust their adversaries through attacks on non-military targets such as economic and social systems,
- State on State warfare is possible amongst state actors,
- Lethality systems (weapons) will continue to permeate from state actors to non-state actors (criminals, terrorists, radical ideologues, etc),
- The operating environment will become increasingly disaggregated; that is, both state and non-state actors will become more greatly dispersed as they attempt to operate below their adversaries detection threshold,
- That complex operating systems such as physical terrain, human terrain, and informational terrain will become more and more the dominant battle-space in both inter-state and intra-state conflicts, and
- These types of conflict will span all elements of national power, and therefore require a Whole-of-Government response in order for them to be successful.\textsuperscript{12}

On the basis of this analysis and the 2009 Defense White paper, the Australian Army has determined that the future operating environment is likely to continue rapidly adjust and shift, as well as increase in complexity. Success for any actor within the international system, both state and non-state, will ultimately depend on their ability to adapt at a faster rate than their enemy, so that they rapidly emerge to a position of superior strength relative to any other actor within the international system.

\textit{The Australian Army’s Expeditionary Warfare Concept - Adaptive Campaigning}

A vital element of the Australian Army commitment to the defense of Australia against those all threats is the need to be proficient at Expeditionary Warfare (EW), defined as “a military operation conducted by an armed force to accomplish a specific objective in a foreign country.”\textsuperscript{13} The relevance of this to the modern operating environment is obvious: the littoral nature of the future operating environment, the emergence of “mega-cities” as a result of demographic change, and the increase in competition and access to resources (near coastal areas)
necessitate this capability as vital in order for the ADF to be able to thrive and survive in the current complex operating environment.

The essential tenets of EW are captured within AC-AFLOC. Manoeuvre Theory (and mission command), Complex Adaptive Theory, and Systems Theory, all make up what is described by the Australian Army as *Adaptive Campaigning*. This campaign is comprised of five Lines of Operation (LOO):

- Joint Land Combat,
- Population Protection,
- Information Actions,
- Population Support
- Indigenous Capacity Building (see Figure 2).

![Adaptive Campaigning diagram](image)

**Figure 2. Australian Army Adaptive Campaigning.**

Adaptive Campaigning is designed to capture core traditional military tasks for the Army as well as those additional frames and actors that will ultimately affect the operating environment. These additional frames, actors, and subsequent emergent behaviour will all affect the international system. Based on this analysis, the Australian Army will need additional skills
that will exceed the traditional war-fighting functions of a land Army. These additional, non-traditional skills could be characterized as "indirect" skills, in that they are currently beyond Army capability and do not exist within its current core tasks. There is therefore a need to develop a new "indirect" capability that harnesses these skills. Thus, "Indirect Expeditionary Warfare (IEW)" is a proposed future capability that meets this need.

**An Indirect Expeditionary Warfare Capability**

IEW seeks to identify potential emergent threats to Australia as part of the Australian Army’s response mechanism to any uncertain security situation. IEW comprises a range of conventional and irregular capabilities that will assist the Australian Army and its partners (e.g., the Inter-Agency [IA] and other foreign stakeholders) in avoiding and reducing the scale of a conflict and emerging crises through the conduct of preventative, indirect actions. IEW operations are typically time focused, urgent, and emphasize pro-active prevention rather than remedial diagnosis. IEW will occur in trying and uncertain circumstances. IEW is primed to operate across the spectrum of conflict, but is most influential and effective in a crisis in its developing stage. The insertion of a subsequent and additional Joint Task Force (JTF) (with its Army component) would be a "surged" branch or sequel plan of an IEW operation (see Figure 3). IEW actions prepare and re-frame the operating environment by reducing the risk threshold to an incoming JTF or instead control the emerging crisis to a level that can be managed by an alternative force such as an indigenous force of the Host Nation (HN). At its most successful, IEW would reduce or eliminate the need for the introduction of a JTF or major ground forces, thereby preserving Australian Army resources and capability for other future conflicts.
One of the key features of IEW is its emphasis on using indirect approaches as an alternative to the introduction of more traditional military forces. IEW would be focused on the following applications:

- an emphasis on the underlying economic, political, cultural, or security conditions that fuel the emergence of the threat,

- the use of irregular and non-conventional means and methods against any adversary/adversaries. These may include clandestine and covert actions, operations in combination with the HN regular force, or through the non-conventional use of conventional capabilities, or

- subverting the power and influence of the adversary over the target population groups through psychological operations, public diplomacy, public affairs, security operations, resource control, operational deception, and other means. 17

IEW intends to exploit the cognitive, moral, and psychological dimensions of conflict. The aim is to attack the adversary or solve the security problem from within and through others.
The indirect nature of these operations would generally involve fewer troops and resources and emphasize adaptive behaviour as one of its key tenets. An envisaged IEW operation is illustrated in the vignette attached as Appendix 2.

**Characteristics of Indirect Expeditionary Warfare**

Because of the potential wide scope for employment for an IEW force, there is no single situation or frame that describes how best to organize and arrange forces. Each operation would be individual in its nature, and an IEW force would be purpose designed. There are however, common characteristics that can help to define the nature of IEW and provide a basis for future IEW campaign designs. These characteristics are not strictly the domain of IEW, however they are currently not properly enabled or fused as a capability in the Australian Army.

**Dynamic Context and Mission Unity.** IEW are conducted in fluid and volatile emerging crisis. National strategic and possibly even theatre-level objectives would not be clearly defined due to the adapting nature of the problem. The mission for the IEW force will, and should be expected to vary due to the changing nature of the environment. It is in this context that IEW Force Elements (FE) must be able to constantly frame problems, detect emergence, and adapt to their environment. IEW FE should expect to immerse themselves into situations in order to properly determine the nature of the crisis, as well as render immediate assistance to the supported government, disparate non-government groups, and other state or non-state actors.

IEW FE also operates inside a complex command and control system that spans all elements of national power (diplomatic, information, military, economic). Decentralized decision-making is an important feature of IEW operations; this decision-making must also be nested with overall strategic and operational intent of the Australian Government and the HN.

**Patience, Persistence, and Resolve.** The nature of IEW necessitates that these operations will often be conducted in a gradual, deliberate way that maximizes the ability to understand the
various actors within the targeted complex system, as well as gives the Australian Government
the most opportunity to attempt to control and influence the situation without inflaming tensions
from amongst any potential adversary. In IEW, the patient pursuit of objectives and their well-
defined metrics highlight progress. Unlike EW, where the decisive employment of military
combat power produces results in order to achieve an absolute effect, IEW stresses the need for
operations that are allowed to be conducted in many places over longer and more protracted
periods of time. Such examples could include defense cooperation to a partner-nation over many
years in order to achieve precise objectives, and the distribution of non-military aid to a partner
nation over a long period in line with planned, deliberate measures of effectiveness.

**Intelligence and Action.** IEW must also be able to collect, analyze, and distribute
intelligence to all consumers within the Australian Intelligence Community (AIC). Critically,
IEW must specialize in the collection of Human Intelligence (HUMINT). The use of Human
Terrain Teams (HTT) are a feature of IEW, and their emphasis on collecting HUMINT via
cultural intelligence will help to inform decision making at the earliest possible moment. The
cultural aspects of intelligence collection focus on language, traditions, local law and protocols,
tribal affiliations and networks, and social studies to give IEW an optic into intelligence sources
that will provide the Indicators and Warnings (I&W) needed to detect emergence of an
adversary.

IEW FE must also be equipped to act decisively if so required. These tasks include, but
are not limited to: lethal force, non-lethal force, anti-terror operations, counter-terror operations,
low signature precision strike, humanitarian aid distribution, Key Leader Engagement,
Unconventional Warfare (UW), Foreign Internal Defence (FID), counter-weapons proliferation,
local law enforcement, consequence management, psychological operations, public affairs
operations, civil affairs operations, intelligence collection, Information Operations (IO), strategic
communication operations, electronic warfare, and capability synchronization.
**Major Mission Elements of the Indirect Expeditionary Warfare Capability**

IEW comprises five key Major Mission Elements (MMEs). These MMEs can and should be conducted in an integrated and concurrent manner, tailored to the specific problem that the IEW FE is confronted with.

An IEW force consists of the following Force Elements:

![Figure 4. IEW Security Partnership Team](image)

**Note:**
- Up to six positions within the team can be made up of Inter-agency sponsored positions.
- 6 dedicated ARSOF positions form the hub of the kinetic capability within the team.
- Positions are fielded from both the military and non-military domains; particularly where the operating environment or threat is non-traditional and non-militarily structured.
- Inter-operability and inter-changeability of the positions allow the team to better anticipate change, as well as conform to an operational environment where detection from the threat is essential. Examples could include covert and clandestine infiltration where 12 stereotyped military personnel moving into an area present a much more visible indicator than 12 personnel of varying age, height, gender, body shape, and race moving into an area.
Strategic Communications Operations (SCO). SCO in IEW encompasses "those processes and efforts that understand and engage key audiences, to create, strengthen or preserve conditions favorable to advance national interests and objectives through the use of coordinated information, themes, plans, programs, and actions synchronized with other elements of national power."\(^{18}\) IEW SCO differ from broader JTF and ADF strategic communications in that the primary focus of the IEW message is to principally promote the legitimacy of a HN, partnership, or the Australian Government. Common themes that should feature in SCO are: legitimacy, trust, credibility, cultural sensitivity, and perceptions. Strategic Communications in IEW are seen as an offensive tool and should be employed as a shaping action.

IO operations in IEW support strategic communications and are also important in trying to understand and influence the complex environment. IO should anticipate adversarial propaganda and develop mechanisms for defeating it. Public Affairs, Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations and Intelligence collection perform enabling actions for Strategic Communication and importantly set the conditions for future IEW and EW, when and if they are required.

Security Partnership Operations (SPO). SPO require a joint IEW force that works to build up and expand the capabilities of a HN. Importantly, these operations must be seen as a preventative measure before a smaller crisis matures and evolves into a more serious and far reaching security challenge. The force composition will depend on the nature of the tasks, suffice to say that IEW deployment teams will involve elements of both the military and IA; the rapid expansion of HN security capabilities is the enduring priority of these operations and ultimately aim to protect the HN from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.\(^{19}\)

SPO as a part of IEW can also generate new capabilities for the HN that are cost-prohibitive or not yet introduced into their security forces. Examples include, the provision of tactical Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles (UAV), leaflet drops and transistor radio deliveries (to support the HN SCO), Electronic Attack (EA), Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD),
consequence management (in the event of a large scale natural disaster), intelligence collection and fusion for HN prosecution, combat search and rescue, joint targeting (either through trained targeting personnel or through the provision of specialist equipment), and policing technical skills such as forensics, criminal investigations, and evidence gathering.

**Decisive Intelligence and Precision Action Operations (DIPAO).** An IEW FE must have the ability to rapidly transition from indirect supporting operations to decisive military operations. An example would be the employment of a targeting and decisive action model known as ‘F3EA’, or the Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyse.20

F3EA uses IEW skills such as persistent intelligence collection that can allow the IEW team to adapt to the situation and the environment as required. This will generate tempo and decision speed that exceeds that of an adversary. This intelligence would in turn enable the adversary to be ‘found and fixed’ in his location, regardless of appearance, clothing, operating methods, or rate of effort. Any change to the enemy is observed and the IEW team therefore remains adaptive.

On an intelligence cue, the IEW team can then ‘finish’ the target, either surgically via precision effects (if in an area of high civilian population), or through mass effect (if located in a base area with other terrorists). The IEW team remains capable for multiple options of kinetic and non-kinetic targeting, making them able to scale their response in a way that is adaptive to the adversary and the environment.

The IEW team then ‘exploits and analyses’ the target to gain an insight into the adversary’s system, allowing for further weaknesses to be identified for possible future exploitation. This in turn cues the intelligence assets to begin operations against this discovered weakness and so the process begins again.
An IEW force that is F3EA capable is able to design, plan, adapt, and act whilst allowing for the development of future operations that are not contingent on a higher headquarters or external strategic intelligence lead.

F3EA has proven itself operationally - an example demonstrating its effectiveness was the targeting and killing of the Al-Qaida terrorist leader al-Zarqawi in Iraq in 2006.21

**Low Visibility Enabling Operations (LVEO).** Defeating an adversary indirectly or averting a crisis totally usually requires the employment of a combination of conventional and nonconventional methods including clandestine or covert actions, operations in combination with irregular forces, or the non-conventional use of conventional capabilities.22 In order to achieve this an IEW team must be capable of operating below the detection abilities of the adversary or any other stakeholder that seeks to undermine the overall intent of the Australian Government’s intervention.

**Provision of Essential Services (PES).** The generation and enabling the provision of Essential Services (ES) is an important capability for IEW. Unlike major military-civil operations where the JTF will provide the infrastructure and personnel for the establishment of ES, in IEW, personnel who are specifically trained and skilled to advise and assist the HN form part of the IEW team. ES as a focal point at an early stage of a developing crisis has the immediate effect of achieving legitimacy for the IEW ES FE and with the HN, who in turn becomes more legitimate in the eyes of the civilian populace (through the provision of ES). The ability to assess and survey must also form part of the IEW capability in order to allow the priorities for the HN and the IEW team to shift in line with the emerging situation.

An IEW ES capability must also be able to complement and seamlessly operate alongside and in consideration of other stakeholders, such as Australian government departments, HN government, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO), as foreign partner governments and their
agencies. Importantly, an IEW ES FE needs a substantial "reach-back" capability in terms of authorities and financial delegation so that they can make commitments to the HN without excessive and unnecessary bureaucratic interference.

**IEW across the conflict spectrum**

Each indirect operation for an IEW team will vary in the mix and application of capabilities and characteristics. In certain circumstances, an indirect IEW operation could require an FE to provide specialist support to a faltering friendly government in danger of losing its legitimacy against a growing insurgency. This could occur in a climate of widespread lawlessness and sectarian violence. Other issues may include an ongoing humanitarian crisis as well as negative interference from another state actor.

In this case, the conduct of the DIPAO as well as SCO would form the bulwark of response from an IEW team. The subsequent introduction of an Australian conventional JTF follow-on force could also be supported through PES and SPO activities.

A less challenging mission set for the IEW team could involve the provision of assistance to a government grappling with a natural disaster, such as a tsunami or hurricane. In this instance, a breakdown of law and order as well as the loss of government services in the wake of the event may de-legitimize the friendly HN government. An IEW team would be expected to focus on SCO, PES, and SPO as part of their overall strategy to support the HN. It may be possible in this circumstance that the IEW team is effective at restoring HN governmental legitimacy, negating the need for the introduction of large-scale JTF conventional forces.

In either situation, the IEW team must be able to understand the emerging situation, anticipate the complexities of the operating environment, and be prepared to adapt in accordance with the need in order to generate solutions that are effective and enduring.
Conclusion

The Australian Army requires an IEW operating concept in order to wage an effective protracted, direct and indirect military campaign against all current and emerging threats to security over the coming century.

As stated, IEW seeks to leverage off those resident skills within the Australian Army as formulated in the document “Adaptive Campaigning- Army’s Future Land Operating Concept” (AC-AFLOC). This document provides the conceptual, doctrinal, and force modernization development path for the Australian Army. IEW operations are time urgent, focused on proactive and preventive action rather than reactive and remedial diagnosis and action; they will normally occur under extremely uncertain circumstances. IEW seeks to act as the leading edge to an Australian directed national “surge” into a HN designed to arrest that state’s further deterioration. At the very least, IEW seeks to bring capabilities and capacities that can reduce or eliminate the developing causes of the crisis, especially during the early stages of its development.

The Australian Government has many facets to its strategic shaping and influencing activities. The Australian Army has a significant role to play in this domain. These operations are never stand-alone efforts. Rather, they are invariably inter-linked with a range of other diplomatic initiatives.

IEW will enhance Australia’s expeditionary capability. It will give those whose interests are inimical to Australia reason to pause. For others, IEW is an opportunity to enhance collective security efforts. It also provides the Australian Government with a new range of options for shaping and influencing on a more consistent and significant scale.
Notes

1 Australian Army. *Adaptive Campaigning- Army's Future Land Operating Concept* (Canberra: Army Headquarters, September 2009). AC-AFLOC seeks to build upon the Australian Army's previous conceptual documents, *Complex Warfighting* and *Adaptive Campaigning*. These concepts are underpinned by the Army’s fundamental approach to warfare as articulated in *LWD 1: The Fundamentals of Land Warfare, 2008*. AC-FLOC is also reflective of the *Defence White Paper 2009*, the *Defence Capability Plan (DCP 09)* and other service initiatives. These documents establish the operating paradigms for the formulation of all Australian Army capability within the broader Australian Defence Force framework.

2 Ibid, Foreward.

3 Complex environments are: The environment shaped by physical, human and informational factors that interact in a mutually-reinforcing fashion. It is terrain that limits the utility of technological intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance and reduces opportunities for long-range engagement with a consequent increased emphasis on close combat.

4 Australian Army, Foreward.

5 By ‘conventional’, I mean conflicts that are fought *by convention* rather than with purely symmetric weapons and tactics. This is an important distinction, because the Australian Army has considerable experience in “Small Wars” and “Irregular War” as well as large-scale warfare. For more details, see, von der Heydte, Frederich Frhr. *Modern Irregular Warfare, In defense (sic) policy as a military phenomena*, trans. George Gregory. (New York: New Benjamin Franklin House, 1986).


7 Australian Army, p 27.


10 Ibid, pp 30-37.

11 Australian Army, p 25.

12 Australian Army, pp 13-19.
13 Expeditionary Warfare is defined as “a military operation conducted by an armed force to accomplish a specific objective in a foreign country.” (MCDP 3)

Australian Army, pp 20-40.

Ibid, p 22.

Ibid, p 23.


Ibid, p 41.

20 Flynn Michael, JueRgens Rich, Cantrell Thomas, Employing ISR- SOF Best Practice, *Joint Force Quarterly, issue 50, 3rd Quarter 2008* (Hulburt Field, Florida: NDU, 2008), 56. Whilst F3EA is not strictly limited to Special Operations, it is an example of where SF Teams, using this targeting process, display elements of CASO in their abilities to continuously adapt to the environment to ensure that they maintained positive control over the targeting and killing of a AQ leader.

Ibid.

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Appendix 1. The Australian Defence White Paper 2009- Executive Summary

Defence planning is, by its very nature, a complex and long-term business. Defence planning is one area of public policy where decisions taken in one decade have the potential to affect, for good or ill, Australia's sovereignty and freedom of action for decades to come. The Government must make careful judgements about Australia’s long-term defence needs. Such judgements are even more important in times of fiscal or strategic uncertainty.

This new Defence White Paper explains how the Government plans to strengthen the foundations of Australia’s defence. It sets out the Government’s plans for Defence for the next few years, and how it will achieve those plans. Most importantly, it provides an indication of the level of resources that the Government is planning to invest in Defence over coming years and what the Government, on behalf of the Australian people, expects in return from Defence.

Ultimately, armed forces exist to provide Governments with the option to use force. Maintaining a credible defence capability is a crucial contributor to our security, as it can serve to deter potential adversaries from using force against us or our allies, partners and neighbours. It is the Government’s policy that the main role of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) should continue to be an ability to engage in conventional combat against other armed forces.

The ADF must also be prepared to play its part in dealing with intra-state conflict, an enduring feature, and assessed to be the most common form of conflict in the period to 2030. Australia’s armed forces must also be able to contend with non-state global actors. Defence’s vital role in supporting domestic security and emergency response efforts will continue, and Defence will support these areas of Commonwealth responsibility.

From the outset, we need to have a clear view of how much strategic risk Australia is prepared to bear, and hence how much military power we should seek to develop. The more Australia aspires to have greater strategic influence beyond our immediate neighbourhood - that is to say the ability to exert policy influence that is underpinned by military power - the greater the level of spending on defence we need to be prepared to undertake. If we want to back up strategic influence with military power, we have to be prepared to invest the resources required, and to be confident that the security benefits outweigh those costs.

As in other areas of public policy, the more balanced our portfolio of capabilities, the more we will be able to hedge and re-balance as required. The key issue is to have a solid foundation upon which to build, adapt and take advantage of opportunities. We need to
review periodically and rigorously whether the mix and scale of our capabilities are appropriate to the emerging challenges in our strategic outlook. The Government intends to prepare a new Defence White Paper at intervals no greater than five years. This quinquennial White Paper development process will be the centrepiece of the Government's new strategic risk-based approach to defence planning.

Defence policy must be based on clear objectives. Not all strategic risks necessarily require our full attention, while those that are the most remote might require our fullest attention because of their potential consequences. We have to be very clear about what matters most, so that we can provision against the right risks and do not waste resources. Australia's most basic strategic interest remains the defence of Australia against direct armed attack. This includes armed attacks by other states and by non-state actors with the capacity to employ strategic capabilities, including weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This most basic strategic interest abides irrespective of the perceived intentions of others, and is a function of our geography and levels of current and future capability in the region around us. Before we attend to anything else, we must secure this strategic interest.

Our next most important strategic interest is the security, stability and cohesion of our immediate neighbourhood, which we share with Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, East Timor, New Zealand and the South Pacific island states. While we have a wide range of diplomatic, economic, cultural and other links with those countries, from a strategic point of view, what matters most is that they are not a source of threat to Australia, and that no major military power, that could challenge our control of the air and sea approaches to Australia, has access to bases in our neighbourhood from which to project force against us.

Beyond our immediate neighbourhood, Australia has an enduring strategic interest in the stability of the wider Asia-Pacific region, which stretches from North Asia to the Eastern Indian Ocean. In particular, we have a deep stake in the security of Southeast Asia. Strategically, our neighbours in Southeast Asia sit astride our northern approaches, through which hostile forces would have to operate in order to sustainably project force against Australia. A stable and cohesive Southeast Asia will mitigate any such threat and is in our strategic interests. More broadly, we have a deep stake in the maintenance of an Asia-Pacific regional security environment that is conducive to the peaceful resolution of problems between regional countries and can absorb the rise in strategic and military power of emerging major players.

Beyond our region, Australia cannot be secure in an insecure world. We have a strategic interest in preserving an international order that restrains aggression by states against each other, and can effectively manage other risks and threats, such as the proliferation of
WMD, terrorism, state fragility and failure, intra-state conflict, and the security impacts of climate change and resource scarcity.

The Government has decided that Australia's defence policy should continue to be founded on the principle of self-reliance in the direct defence of Australia and in relation to our unique strategic interests, but with a capacity to do more when required, consistent with those strategic interests that we might share with others, and within the limits of our resources. This posture entails the maintenance of alliances and international defence relationships that enhance our own security and allows us to work with others when we need to pool our resources. In terms of military power, this defence policy means that we must have the capacity to:

- act independently where we have unique strategic interests at stake, and in relation to which we would not wish to be reliant on the combat forces of any foreign power;
- lead military coalitions where we have shared strategic interests at stake with others, and in relation to which we would be willing to accept a leadership role, in part to compensate for the limited capacity or engagement of others; and
- make tailored contributions to military coalitions where we share wider strategic interests with others and are willing to accept a share of the burden in securing those interests.

The principal task for the ADF is to deter and defeat armed attacks on Australia by conducting independent military operations without relying on the combat or combat support forces of other countries. This means that the ADF has to be able to control our air and sea approaches against credible adversaries in the defence of Australia, to the extent required to safeguard our territory, critical sea lanes, population and infrastructure.

After ensuring the defence of Australia from direct attack, the second priority task for the ADF is to contribute to stability and security in the South Pacific and East Timor. This involves conducting military operations, in coalition with others as required, including in relation to protecting our nationals, providing disaster relief and humanitarian assistance and, on occasion, by way of stabilisation interventions.

The next most important priority task for the ADF is to contribute to military contingencies in the Asia-Pacific region, including in relation to assisting our Southeast Asian partners to meet external challenges, and to meeting our alliance obligations to the United States as determined by the Australian Government at the time. The strategic transformation of the region will mean that Australia should be prepared to make contributions - including potentially substantial ones - to such military contingencies in support of our strategic interests.

Finally, the ADF has to be prepared to contribute to military contingencies in the rest of the world, in support of efforts by the international community to uphold global security
and a rules-based international order, where our interests align and where we have the capacity to do so.

As a result of these priorities, the ADF of 2030 will need to be a more potent force in certain areas, particularly undersea warfare and anti-submarine warfare (ASW), surface maritime warfare (including air defence at sea), air superiority, strategic strike, special forces, Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), and cyber warfare. It is the Government's judgement that these are the crucial areas which require particular attention to secure our unique strategic interests.

The major new direction that has emerged through consideration of current and future requirements is a significant focus on enhancing our maritime capabilities. By the mid-2030s, we will have a more potent and heavier maritime force. The Government intends to replace and expand the current fleet of six Collins class with a more capable class of submarine, replace the current Anzac class frigate with a more capable Future Frigate optimised for ASW; and enhance our capability for offshore maritime warfare, border protection and mine countermeasures.

While focusing on building our maritime capabilities, the Government has also been able to make provision for the enhancement of other key elements of the ADF, including our air combat capability (by proceeding with the acquisition of fifth-generation multirole combat fighters); strike capability (through the acquisition of long-range, land-attack strike missiles); the Army's fleet of heavy protected vehicles and other land force capabilities; the capabilities of our special forces; and in the emerging area of cyber warfare.

In addition, the Government has made provision for remediation of the current and projected force, by addressing crucial deficiencies and gaps that might limit the size and duration of deployments, or create unacceptable risks in some more demanding scenarios in which the weight, reach and relative combat power of major capabilities would make a crucial difference.

Finally, the Government has also made provision for remediating Defence's critical 'backbone', such as facilities and infrastructure, information and communications technology (ICT) systems, and warehousing and distribution system. To give effect to this remediation and reform, the Government has endorsed a Strategic Reform Program comprising a comprehensive set of reforms that will fundamentally overhaul the entire Defence enterprise, producing efficiencies and creating savings of about $20 billion. The Strategic Reform Program will deliver Australia a genuinely strategic national advantage: savings will be reinvested in capability and Defence's call on national resources will be constrained.
The Strategic Reform Program will drive efficiencies without compromising effectiveness. It draws on detailed analysis of almost every aspect of the Defence enterprise. Through the Strategic Reform Program, the Government will improve the development, procurement, maintenance and management of: military capability; ICT; the Defence estate; science and technology support; and general goods and services. Enterprise support services will be centralised, standardised and simplified. And through the introduction of an integrated workforce management system, Defence will make better use of the taxpayers' dollar by better matching the skills and competencies of its people to the jobs that need to be done.
Appendix 2. Future War Environment Scenario - Nigeria*

Overview.

This vignette describes a notional, large-scale IEW scenario modeled on Nigeria. The scenario posits a future (circa 2017) challenged by an array of problems, some domestic in origin and others fomented by external actors. It offers a particularly rich experimental case, incorporating many planning factors and issues that might be relevant in other large irregular warfare/COIN contingencies – oil (Saudi Arabia), a large population (Pakistan, Indonesia), Islamic radicalization (much of the Middle East and several countries in Southeast Asia), a large Shia minority (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait), ethnic/tribal divisions, lawlessness/gangs, etc. In this scenario, the Australian Government intervention must deal with a growing domestic insurgency, rampant corruption throughout the government and national police force, an antiquated civil infrastructure groaning under the weight of a large population, and operational exploitation by Al Qaeda and associated Islamist movements (referred to as AQAM). While it possesses vast oil wealth (both current and potential), the proceeds from years of oil exploration have largely been wasted by a small, corrupt, elite segment of the population, while the people have been ignored and are now largely estranged from their central government. The government recognizes its own inability to unilaterally handle these challenges and calls upon the ADF for assistance.
Regional Situation.

With an estimated population of 140 million, Nigeria has enormous human resources; it is the ninth most populous country in the world and the most populous in Africa (approximately one out of five Africans is a citizen). It remains the continent’s largest oil producer (eighth largest exporter in the world), providing the government with a steady stream of hard cash. Not surprisingly, it is the economic powerhouse of West Africa. It is a leading player in the African Union and Commonwealth of Nations; the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD); and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Nigeria is also a regional military power, contributing to numerous African peacekeeping operations.

The country is also faced with enormous internal problems. The country has over 250 ethnic groups with numerous languages and tribes, which makes governance challenging even under the best of circumstances.

Although $500 billion in oil had been extracted since 1970, the microeconomic policies of the government have never truly benefitted the population; the ruling party’s policy implementation has been rife with corruption and mismanagement and payments have been used by powerful state governors to strengthen their hold on power, while an estimated 90 percent of the population lives on less than $2 a day. All of this has driven the country’s numerous ethnic and tribal groups to express their frustrations more freely, with increasing violence. In the oil rich south, an umbrella separatist organization called the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) has waged a “resource war” against the government. In the predominantly Muslim north, dissatisfaction with the national government has prompted the 12 states located north of the Niger and Benue Rivers to adopt Sharia laws, creating tension between the Muslim and Christian communities. Sectarian fault lines between Muslims (50 percent of the population) and Christians (40 percent) have been increasingly marked by violence and an estimated 10,000 Muslims and Christians have died as a result.

Nigeria also finds itself on the front line of an expanding radicalized Islamist penetration into West Africa. “AQ Central” has reached out to militant Islamists in the Middle East, Africa, and Central and Southeast Asia with the hopes of creating franchises charged with carrying out attacks on Western targets. AQAM leaders accept that they have little chance of overthrowing established “apostate regimes” with good security services; instead, they have opted for a global campaign of “vexation and frustration” that focuses on taking advantage of, and operating from, ungoverned areas in weak, failed, or failing states. Their objective is to create “zones of barbarism” in which “savage chaos” reigns, as in pre-Taliban Afghanistan. Tactics include attacks on tourist sites, oil facilities, and other relatively soft, high value facilities to compel states to pull their security forces out of remote areas and outlying sites, thereby creating exploitable security vacuums. To further their strategic aims, AQAM encourages the development of autonomous, home-
grown cells inspired by al Qaeda’s violent jihadist ideology. Al Qaeda has moved to exploit the growing religious, sectarian, and tribal frictions in hope of creating an operational sanctuary for itself, in which to recruit and train operatives and from which to launch attacks against the West.

On the upside, and in spite of rampant government corruption, the middle class has grown due to strong GDP growth (6 percent annually), creating an increasingly vocal and influential bloc of voters less and less dependent on the largess of the state. Leaders from the middle class have formed a new political party that espouses good governance, the rule of law, improved human rights, and improved anti-corruption legislation – an approach that has led to the election of a President not beholden to the corrupt policies of the past and who is bent on implementing good governance practices and reasserting the appropriate control of the central government on the mechanisms of security and responsible wealth distribution.

While the President and his senior cabinet officials are intent on making improvements in responsible governance, their efforts in the oil-rich Delta region have been hampered by the ineffectiveness of the National Police Force (ANPF), which is corrupt and distrusted by the local communities. MEND has been able to arm itself, through funds obtained from oil piracy and black-market sales, with increasingly sophisticated equipment and weapons of all types. Infrastructure projects in the Delta, and even in the northern part of the country, have stalled due to graft and corruption. Life is especially hard for the growing urban population due to the breakdown of city infrastructure and the rise of criminal gangs who control much of the urban terrain.

Though the young APP government is determined to meet the population’s high expectations for change, the array of problems a decade-and-a-half in the making – degrading national infrastructure; a collapse of social services in the cities; a persistent insurgency in the Delta; a brewing Muslim insurgency in the north; and sectarian violence between Christians and Muslims – make any progress extremely difficult. Attacks by Al Qaeda on Saudi oil infrastructure, together with an increase in MEND attacks on production has caused a major spike in crude oil prices and a corresponding precipitous decline in global stock markets, with world losses exceeding a trillion dollars. These attacks on global energy production have made stability of the market all the more important to the global economy.

Nigerian military units in the south have their hands full keeping a lid on violence in the major cities, where citizens are protesting a lack of food and services, and key port facilities, and where oil is loaded in waiting tankers. The central government is rapidly becoming overwhelmed as the crisis spins out of control.

**Australian Government National Objectives:**

- To prevent the collapse of Nigeria and assist in restoring it to a stable footing.
To maintain the viability of the APS energy sector.

- To prevent the creation of an AQAM operational sanctuary.

- To improve the ability of the APS government to address its domestic security challenges.

IEW Operational Concept

IEW JTF Mission.

Conduct operations in Nigeria and the surrounding region to support and foster effective governance, security, and economic development, to include the restoration of civil order, expansion of governmental capacities, protection of critical infrastructure, and suppression of terrorist and criminal organizations/elements, in order to promote Nigerian and regional stability.

Commander’s Intent/Planning Guidance.

Conduct an “indirect campaign,” meaning that we will operate by, with, and through Nigerian forces to help them address their security challenges. I need to understand Nigerian requirements and their desired framework for operations, and we will build our plans to support these requirements. We will perform direct tasks as Nigeria currently lack some capabilities that only the Australia in its partnership with Nigeria can bring to bear; but we will always act in support of the Nigerian Government. Therefore, I want to quantify requirements and identify enablers for their success. I want to create an operational architecture that accounts for Nigerian concerns and ensures all Australian actions are complementary internally and externally. We are dealing with a complex, irregular warfare contingency composed of a combination of IW tasks (COIN, CT, FID, etc) that will support long-term security, stability, and reconstruction operations. Our operations will be divided among three general tasks: nation-wide stabilization and security operations in support of the Nigerian government, with a heavy emphasis on the Lagos sector; COIN operations in the SE/Delta sector; and counter-sanctuary operations in Abuja (North) sector. All forces assigned, apportioned, or deployed to this IEW JTF to support this effort, will be subject to my focus on supporting accomplishment of Australian Government National objectives. All civilian agencies, personnel, or organizations – likely to be deployed as part of an Interagency Task Force (IATF) – will be under the operational control of the IEW JTF. Supported and supporting relationships will be determined by me on a case-by-case basis, as appropriate to the mission.

Purpose.

In conjunction with the full range of national resources, and anticipated contributions from the international community, the Australian Government will ensure the stability of the Nigerian government, the long-term viability of the Nigerian energy sector, and the
Method.

We will conduct an Indirect Expeditionary Warfare campaign aimed at supporting the operational needs of the Nigerian government and its military and security forces, to address three key challenges: weak, corrupt institutions and failing civil infrastructure; an insurgency that threatens the country’s energy sector and its primary source of revenue; and nascent efforts by AQAM to establish an operational sanctuary within APS. This campaign will include the following focus areas:

- Combat, combat support, and civil security operations throughout the country, to help the Nigerian government restore its “monopoly on violence.”

- Expansion and improvement of Nigerian military and security forces.

- Development and improvement of essential civil service infrastructure (with specific focus on major urban population centers).

- Comprehensive information operations designed to support the enhancement of Nigerian central government legitimacy, place Australian actions in the proper context of supporting the Nigerian government and serving the security interests of Nigeria as a whole, invalidating the competing information campaign waged by the insurgents.

- Expansion of “good governance” initiatives through improvements to the security environment.

- Improvement of the economy through increased stability, brought about by an improved security environment.

In nearly all cases, our operations will be in support of multiple agencies. At all times, our actions will be coordinated with our IA partners to ensure unity of effort. Australian military forces will act in conjunction with guidance from the IEW JTF. Bear in mind that we will put an “Nigerian face” on all efforts; that our efforts will ultimately be part of a broader international effort to stabilize the region (from a security and economic perspective) and global energy markets; and that we need to help Nigeria dominate the “strategic narrative” so that the citizens can fully understand what is at stake and that their government is making every effort to provide them a better way of life. To that end: While the Australian military will surge capabilities to address the most immediate security challenges threatening the continued viability of the state, every effort should be made to reduce the Australian level of effort and physical presence as quickly as possible, without compromising the long-term success of Nigeria.
The focus of support will be on expansion and improvement of Nigerian capabilities, but our forces need to be prepared to conduct some military tasks unilaterally, given their shortfalls in some capability areas.

End State.

A functioning, stable Nigerian state capable of handling all internal security concerns.

Supporting Concepts.

The Nigerian operating environment is quite complex and is impacted by the objectives and interests of a variety of groups, as listed below.

**Insurgent Elements.** (AQAM, indigenous groups hostile to central government, MEND)

Objective. To obtain and sustain autonomous control of areas of interest in order to support recruiting, training, and employment of forces against the West (AQAM), expand areas of control and influence (AQAM, MEND, and indigenous religious/ethnic sects), and to exploit the lucrative energy reserves of Nigeria (MEND, local criminal elements, corrupt governmental officials).

Concept. Disrupt and prevent government forces from obtaining control of the security environment. Actions will include small unit/guerrilla actions, terrorism and intimidation of local population, sabotage and attacks on critical infrastructure, bribery of local officials and tribal/ethnic leaders, and establishment of alliances along common areas of interest/benefit.

**Non-Belligerent Stakeholder Elements.** (tribal/ethnic/religious groups)

Objective. Improve economic status, power, and influence of the group relative to competing groups; improve “security” of the group relative to potentially disruptive or hostile influences; and improve the status of the group relative to its interactions with the central government.

Concept. Align with other, more powerful entities that can assist in the relative positioning of the group with respect to the long-term interests of that group. If the central government can ensure the protection and advancement of the group, the Brown element will make accommodations to cede some measure of authority to the government. But in cases where the government cannot protect the groups’ interests, the Brown element will align with and support stronger factions, be it AQAM, other indigenous tribal/ethnic entities, or local political power-brokers. Cooperation or resistance to Australian intervention is purely a function of the extent to which Australian actions further the interests of the group.
Green Elements. (Nigerian government entities)

Objective. Re-establish control of the internal security environment, regain control of borders, exercise formal management of the national economy (through stabilization and regulation of energy (oil) extraction and sale), and establish “good governance” practices (reduction/elimination of corruption, elimination of private militias and entrenched criminal elements) necessary to ensure the survival of as well as create a stable economic and political framework for its citizens.

Concept. The APS government, with the assistance of US military forces, US civilian inter-agency elements, and contributions from the international community, will:

- Improve the professionalization and discipline of APS military forces and national police,
- Develop capabilities in deficient areas, and expand capacity in capability areas with critical shortfalls, and
- Regain control of the domestic security situation,

... in order to create conditions necessary to implement economic and “good governance” initiatives. Australian support to Nigerian central government initiatives will enable the government to deny operational space to Red Elements, increase the availability of funding (from the energy sector) critical to addressing decaying urban/civil infrastructure, and meet the needs of the APS citizenry. As capabilities improve, the presence of Australian forces and their level of involvement will correspondingly decline.

Blue Elements. (Australia)

Mission. Combined forces conduct operations in Nigeria and the surrounding region to support and foster effective governance, security, and economic development in Nigeria, to include the restoration of civil order; expansion of governmental capacities; protection of critical infrastructure; and suppression of terrorist and criminal organizations/elements in order to promote the government and regional stability.

Objectives.
- To prevent the collapse of Nigeria and assist in restoring it to a stable footing.
- To maintain the viability of the energy sector.
- To prevent the creation of an AQAM operational sanctuary.
To improve the ability of the government to its domestic security challenges.

CONOPS.
- Phase 1. Immediate deployment of senior advisory and trainer personnel to rapidly augment and expand the existing Australian military advisory and training teams resident in country. Initial efforts will focus on assessment and understanding of requirements to expand and improve both the capability and the capacity of Nigerian military forces and national police to handle the security challenges confronting the country.

- Phase 2. Based on the security assessment, execute a rapid deployment of the IEW joint combat and combat support elements,

- Phase 3. Conduct military operations in support of Nigerian and Australian government objectives, focused on creating the improved security environment that will deny an operational sanctuary to terrorist organizations, resolve the grievances of the domestic insurgency, improve the ability of law enforcement forces to provide proper security for citizens, and quell the sectarian violence between religious, ethnic, and tribal entities.

- Phase 4. Drawdown of Australian military forces to pre-crisis levels, in conjunction with the successful introduction of international and Australian agencies entities better suited to the long-term security and stability operations necessary to attain and sustain viability as an anchor state for the continent and contributor to the global energy market.

* This scenario has been adapted to the ADF from the planning scenario used in U.S. Government. *Military Support to Indirect Security and Stability Surge Operations (MISSS)- A Study* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense), 2007.
Appendix 2. IEW Functional Capability Requirements.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SCO</td>
<td>Ability to engage key local and foreign audiences in order to maintain a HN national legitimacy, thereby setting the conditions for the attainment of the Australian Government’s strategic objectives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPO</td>
<td>The ability to defeat or suppress all internal and external security threats and restore the host nation government’s monopoly on violence. These activities emphasize indirect approaches, and rely on combat arms and special operations advisors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PES</td>
<td>The ability to build up host nation governance capabilities and capacities in order to provide for the immediate provision of basic necessities (e.g., water, food, sanitation, public health, medical care) to the host nation population and to enhance the government’s credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of the population.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIPAO</td>
<td>The ability to conduct F3EA targeting operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LVEO</td>
<td>The ability to rapidly build up a minimal footprint for the conduct of operations and support infrastructure without compromising the nature of the IEW activity being undertaken.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Additional