**Modern Melos: Why the U.S. Initiative to Develop the U.S.-Vietnam Relationship Into An Anti-China Partnership Will Fail**

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**Abstract**

The United States has made much of the rapid progress in its relationship with Vietnam since normalizing relations in 1995. Washington’s optimistic view of Hanoi is that of regional partner with converging diplomatic, economic, and security interests. However, the true impetus for the U.S.-Vietnam entente is Southeast Asia security, specifically U.S. efforts to sustain its post-WWII preeminence in the region and incorporate a rising China into the existing international framework. There are limits to the budding U.S.-Vietnam friendship. Those limits will work against Department of Defense efforts to strengthen military-to-military ties with Vietnam thereby hindering the U.S. strategic objective: aligning Vietnam against Chinese aggression in a U.S. led ‘constainment coalition’.

**Subject Terms**

Vietnam, Pacific Rebalance, South China Sea, Military-to-Military Relationships
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MODERN MELOS: WHY THE U.S. INITIATIVE TO DEVELOP THE U.S.-VIETNAM RELATIONSHIP INTO AN ANTI-CHINA PARTNERSHIP WILL FAIL

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Introduction

During a December 2013 visit to Ho Chi Minh City, Secretary of State John Kerry said no other two countries, “have worked harder, done more, and done better to try to bring themselves together and change history and change the future.” The United States has made much of the rapid progress in its relationship with Vietnam since normalizing relations in 1995. As recently as July 2013 U.S. President Obama and Vietnamese President Truong Tan Sang met at the White House and signed a Comprehensive Partnership. The purpose of the Comprehensive Partnership is to provide an overarching framework for the relationship. To that end it specifies nine cooperation sectors: political and diplomatic relations; trade and economic ties; science and technology; education and training; environment and health; war legacy issues; defense and security; protection and promotion of human rights; and culture, sports, and tourism.

According to a 2014 Congressional Research Service Study of 2014 Issues and Implications for U.S. Policy, “The United States reportedly resisted Vietnam’s push for declaring a “strategic partnership,” which according to one analysis generally includes a multi-year plan of action and a high-level joint mechanism to oversee implementation across all sectors of cooperation.” The implication of this analysis is Vietnam wanted to go even further than the United States in the 2013 Comprehensive Partnership. Washington’s optimistic view of Hanoi is that of regional partner with converging diplomatic, economic, and security interests. However, the true impetus for the U.S.-Vietnam entente is Southeast Asia security, specifically U.S. efforts to sustain its post-WWII preeminence in the region and incorporate a rising China into the existing international framework. Vietnamese national interests represent limits to the budding U.S.-Vietnam friendship. Those limits will inhibit U.S. Department of Defense efforts to
strengthen military-to-military ties with Vietnam thereby hindering the U.S. strategic objective of building a prosperous, independent Vietnam.

South China Sea and U.S. – Vietnam – PRC Relations

The major premise of this paper is the United States’ interest in strengthening its relationship with Vietnam is an outgrowth of China’s increasingly assertive behavior. The ongoing maritime dispute in the South China Sea is where one looks to ‘operationalize’ this assertion. Freedom of navigation along sea lines of communication (SLOC) is a U.S. strategic interest, and has been since Alfred Thayer Mahan wrote of their importance to British prosperity in his work, *The Influence of Seapower Upon History*. As recently as July of 2010, then-Secretary of State Clinton reaffirmed that freedom of navigation was a U.S. “national interest” during a gathering of Asia-Pacific foreign ministers at the annual ASEAN Regional Forum hosted in Hanoi.iii The ongoing maritime dispute within the South China Sea not only threatens commerce along an essential global SLOC, but also holds the potential to deny the U.S. Navy operating access in strategically important waters.

A full discussion of the South China Sea dispute is not within the scope of this paper; however, it is important for the reader to recall that China, the Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam, Brunei, Indonesia, and Malaysia have overlapping claims. China is the most aggressive claimant, and issues maps with an ambiguous “nine dash line” covering most of the sea. The South China Sea is a rich fishery, and may also have significant oil, natural gas, and mineral deposits below the sea floor. Roughly two-thirds of South Korea, and 60% of Japan and Taiwan’s energy exports, as well as 80% of China’s pass through the South China Sea.iv Ostensibly the claimants’ interest is based on the potential economic windfall from natural resource development and territorial sovereignty, but China has a particular interest in excluding
the U.S. Navy from waters near its South Seas Fleet bases and sensitive military sites in its littoral region.

The U.S. takes no sides in the South China Sea dispute and successive U.S. Administrations have encouraged all parties to negotiate a multilateral code of conduct. However, China’s actions in the area continue to polarize its neighbors. In a May 2014 statement, the U.S. State Department described China’s recent deployment of an exploratory oil platform into Vietnam’s EEZ as a “provocative... unilateral action” that “appears to be part of a broader pattern of Chinese behavior to advance its claims over disputed territory in a manner that undermines peace and stability”. For its part, Vietnam actively solicits international support to pressure China into multilateral discussions. The United States is one of Vietnam’s potential great power advocates and Vietnamese officials, “...tend to say that while they do not expect the United States to take sides in the dispute, it would be helpful if the United States did more to emphasize, through language or actions, that all parties to the dispute – including China – should adhere to common principles...” From the preceding statement, it appears the unintended consequence of China’s action was to deepen US-Vietnam cooperation on maritime security issues. However, Vietnam’s leaders are well aware of their requirement to balance relationships and prudently decreased military-to-military cooperation with the United States to defuse tensions with China.
U.S. Interests

Although the military element of national power dominates the discussion of U.S. interests in Vietnam, it is actually a distant third to the economic and political elements. The U.S. is home to more than 1 million Americans of Vietnamese descent. Economic benefits are real and shared by both Vietnam and the United States. The U.S. is Vietnam’s largest export market and in 2013 the U.S. was Vietnam’s seventh largest foreign investor (although in some years it is Vietnam’s largest source of foreign direct investment). Bilateral trade continues to grow and reached $25 billion in 2013 (a more than 60% increase over 2010). Vietnam is also negotiating to be an inaugural member of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the region’s signature free trade agreement. Inauguration of the TPP is the Obama Administration’s paramount policy goal for the U.S. – Vietnam relationship.

Diplomatically, the U.S. and Vietnam have had some success resolving Vietnam War legacy issues to include accounting for the remains of missing U.S. service members, as well as unexploded ordnance removal, and Agent Orange cleanup. Since the late 2000’s, annual U.S. aid surpasses $100 million, much of which is earmarked for healthcare initiatives. However, human rights conditions within Vietnam remain a major obstacle.

Within the realm of defense cooperation, the United States and Vietnam hold two annual vice-ministerial dialogues, the Defense Policy Dialogue (DPD) aimed at boosting defense cooperation. In December 2011 representatives of the U.S. Department of Defense and Vietnam’s Ministry of Defense signed a Memorandum of Agreement on Advancing Bilateral Defense Cooperation specifying five areas for cooperation: (1) regular high-level dialogues; (2) maritime security; (3) search and rescue; (4) humanitarian assistance and disaster relief; and (5) peacekeeping. The DOD has also expressed interest in access to the deep-water port of Cam
Ranh Bay as a cornerstone of future defense cooperation. All of the above must be understood in the context of the central position of the South China Sea within U.S. security thinking. When asked during his June 2014 confirmation hearing how the U.S. could help foster a peaceful resolution to the South China Sea dispute, now-U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam, Ted Ossius said, “I think we should explore further expansion of Vietnam’s maritime domain awareness and how we can help Vietnam build its capacity to deal with the challenges in the South China Sea.” The Ambassador also advocated relaxing the U.S.’s long-term ban on exporting lethal weapons to Vietnam. The United States conditionally lifted the ban in October 2014 and no permits non-lethal weapons exports in support of Vietnamese maritime activities.

The DoD’s privileging of security and defense concerns may be undermining the U.S. strategic objective of stability in the region by over emphasizing the military-to-military relationship. During an August 2014 visit General Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, went to great lengths to stress this when he said, “The shadow of China hangs over the region,” he said. “Everyone thinks our interest here is just about China. It’s not.” To support the national goals, the DoD must adapt to a slow and steady approach.

**Vietnamese Interests**

Vietnam shares U.S. interests in improved diplomatic, economic, and security ties. Whereas security issues dominate the U.S.’s side of the relationship, it is of secondary importance to the Vietnamese. Mindful of the need for economic development to enhance the quality of life for its population of 90 million and the benefits of continued access to the U.S. market, Vietnam’s ruling communist party is keen to raise GDP growth rates above 2013’s 5.4% (2004 to 2013 average is 6.3%) and reach industrialized state status by 2020. Trade between the U.S. and Vietnam has expanded greatly since the two signed a 2002 bilateral trade
agreement. The U.S. is now Vietnam’s largest export market and in 2013, Vietnam had a $12 billion trade surplus with the U.S.

This is not say that Vietnam does not share U.S. interest in enhanced security ties. Moreover, Vietnam’s security interests clearly reflect apprehension of China. Improved security ties with the United States enable Vietnam to maintain an independent foreign policy by mitigating the potential dominance of China, leverage U.S. naval capabilities to maintain stability in the South China Sea, modernize its military, and triangulate China and the U.S. for improved ties with both. The importance of an independent foreign policy and positive relations with hegemonic powers to Vietnam cannot be overstated. The “three-no’s” policy is a clear communication of Vietnam’s position and includes: (1) no military alliances; (2) no foreign bases on Vietnamese territory; and (3) no use of relations with one country to oppose another.xii Still, Vietnam is keen to improve its relationship with the United States. Vietnamese policymakers are keen to encourage a sustained U.S. presence in the region to counter Chinese ambitions in Southeast Asia and preserve their territorial interest in the South China Sea.

U.S. defense officials frequently express frustration with the slow evolution in US-Vietnam defense cooperation. Vietnam remains reluctant to participate in regional multilateral training exercises (such as Cobra Gold in Thailand or Balikatan in the Philippines), and is unwilling to expand the annual U.S.-Vietnam Naval Engagement Activity beyond permitting U.S. Navy warships to dock in Danang.xiii These examples underscore Vietnam’s unwillingness to commit to a bilateral security relationship.

There are limits to the US-Vietnam relationship. The Sino-Vietnamese relationship remains Vietnam’s most important relationship, and Vietnam is wary of upsetting its great power neighbor to the north. Although the United States is Vietnam’s largest export market, China is
Vietnam’s largest trading partner. The two countries share a land border, governance, and strong cultural ties. Relevant security agreements include the 2011 Agreement on Basic Principles Guiding the Settlement of Maritime Issues and 2013 bilateral agreement creating working groups to discuss joint development of South China Sea natural resources and a hotline for fishery incidents. With respect to its bilateral relationships with the U.S. and China, Vietnam’s clear policy priority is balancing between the two. This is contrary to the United States’ goal of cultivating Vietnam as a regional ally to thwart future Chinese.

**Military to Military Ties**

The upgrade in US-Vietnam military ties is a direct consequence of Vietnam’s increased concerns about China. The post-Vietnam War relationship is founded on nearly two decades of small, trust building programs. The example par excellence is the cooperative relationship to locate the remains of missing U.S. servicemen under the U.S.’s Joint Task Force Full Accounting. In 2005 the two sides signed the International Military Education and Training agreement establishing protocols for officer exchanges. By 2009, the United States and Vietnam had adopted the U.S.-Vietnam Political, Security, and Defense Dialogue (PSDD), a framework for annual meetings ranging from ministerial-level visits to working-level meetings. The 2010 Defense Policy Dialogue followed by the PSDD and the 2010 inaugural meeting was the first high-level channel for direct military-to-military discussions. The Defense Policy Dialogues led to the aforementioned December 2011 Memorandum of Understanding. Notable signs of actual cooperation include non-combatant joint naval exercises, repair of U.S. noncombatant vessels at Cam Ranh Bay, and search and rescue training, and Vietnamese officers attending U.S. staff colleges.
Military-to-Military ties are at the forefront of U.S. Department of Defense efforts to strengthen the bilateral US-Vietnam security relationship. These ties follow a continuum of contacts to training and then exercises. Foreign military sales are also a key component of U.S. military-to-military relationships. Of the $98.5 million in non-lethal defense articles and $3.7 million in defense services authorized in fiscal year 2009 (eligible through fiscal year 2015), "very little" has been spent.\textsuperscript{xiv} U.S. sales of lethal weapons to Vietnam have only been authorized since October 2014 and no sales of significance have been announced yet.

While the aforementioned milestones are suggestive of progress, the US-Vietnam military to military relationship has evolved incrementally, and far slower than preferred by U.S. military planners. Vietnamese military officials have been reluctant to accelerate the relationship, most likely due to their enduring concern of alarming China. Is the reality of the military-to-military relationship consistent with the emphasis placed upon it by the U.S.? Given, the stated goal of building a relationship of sufficient strength to pull Vietnam off the fence with regards to China, the answer is no: the military-to-military relationship has fallen short of expectations. It is important to understand the U.S. is not Vietnam’s only potential security partner. Both India and Russia have been aggressively courting Vietnam. Equipped for decades with Soviet-bloc equipment, Vietnam has a decades old relationship with Russia. In 2009 Vietnam signed a contract for six Russian Kilo-Class submarines. As part of its ‘Look East” policy initiative India also works closely with Vietnam, and New Delhi hosted Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung in October 2014. During the visit India and Vietnam announced the sale of four offshore patrol ships and enhanced training programs for the Vietnamese military.\textsuperscript{XV}

Notwithstanding the U.S. goal of constraining China through a robust partnership with key Southeast Asian countries, Vietnam has little choice but to carefully balance between the
United States and China. While China is a clear concern, and potential threat, Vietnam’s leaders are not certain of the U.S.’s long term intentions or commitment.

**USMC Actions & Objectives**

The DOD is at the forefront of the Obama Administration’s Pacific Rebalancing initiative, and military to military relationships are the preferred means by which the DOD executes its policy. Marine Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC), working within the guidance of U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM’s) theater security cooperation plan, is the USMC’s agent for military to military contacts with Vietnam. Although MARFORPAC’s surfeit of enthusiasm is consistent with PACOM and DOD, the reality of interaction is much more limited. Official USMC support for PACOM’s Theater Security Cooperation plan includes encouraging engagement, increasing trust, conducting humanitarian mine actions, and supporting Vietnam’s pursuit of humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) and peacekeeping operation capabilities (PKO).xvi These engagement areas are essentially a restatement of the cooperation areas detailed in the 2011 DoD-MoD MOU. The USMC is particularly keen to further develop cooperation within the HA/DR and PKO areas as these are Marine Corps competencies and the USMC has had recent relief effort successes with tsunamis, earthquakes, and typhoons. The USMC also encourages Vietnamese officer attendance at service schools, and junior officer participation in Marine training and education.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sept 2014</td>
<td>Non-Lethal Weapons Executive Seminar (NOLES)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nov 2014</td>
<td>Commanding General, 3d MarDiv visited Hanoi</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nov 2013</td>
<td>MARFORPAC Deputy Commander visited Hanoi</td>
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Given the lack of depth and assigned metrics to the aforementioned equities, it is no surprise that USMC interaction with Vietnam’s armed forces has been limited to senior leader contacts and conference attendance. The importance of USMC-Vietnamese MoD interactions through the present is definitely in their form. Given that Vietnam has opened to the United States in a deliberate manner and only since 2011, it is an accomplishment to have service level interaction with components of the Vietnamese People’s Army’s Navy. Regarding like service interaction, it is relevant to note the Vietnamese naval infantry force is small and is permitted limited interaction with the US by the Vietnamese government. The broader DOD establishment may consider USMC engagement at this level a mission and size mismatch. The USMC would like to see greater cooperation with Vietnam generally and specifically with its comparatively small amphibious forces, coast guard, and border guards.

**15-20 Year Horizon**

Ultimately, Vietnam will resist U.S. efforts to overtly oppose China because of both the existential threat posed by China, and also a lack of meaningful resource commitments to enhance Vietnam’s economic growth and security deterrence. This paper contends the long-term American objective for the US-Vietnam relationship is for Vietnam to rebalance its trilateral US-Vietnam-PRC relationship towards a pro-US partnership. Specifically, the U.S. is seeking Vietnam’s participation and support in bilateral, regional, and international forums to help it
deter China from upending the US dominated post-WWII global order and constrain Chinese aggressiveness. The challenge for the United States is its desire to construct a new power structure in Southeast Asia does not reflect the reality of its resource commitments or geography. As a result of the 2008 Financial Crisis, decade long wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and unsustainable long-term growth in entitlement spending the United States has become increasingly limited in its discretionary spending. The most recent military assistance offered to Vietnam by the United States was $18 million for five fast patrol boats in December 2013. Although the Obama Administration’s Pacific Rebalancing strategy continues to evolve, it is clear that the United States does not have the resources necessary to seriously woo Vietnam.

Vietnam’s senior leadership is aware that not only does Vietnam share cultural and historical ties with China, but it also shares a land border with its significantly more populous northern neighbor as well as disputed maritime claims in the South China Sea. Moreover, China is Vietnam’s largest trade partner and is its third largest source of foreign direct investment. Vietnamese prosperity, and by association Vietnam’s security, will continue to demand that its bilateral relationship with China remain it’s most important. Therefore, absent direct Chinese military action against Vietnam or a massive increase in US security and financial commitments, the United States will not succeed in shifting Vietnam out of neutral/leans towards China policy.

The most likely outcome for the US-Vietnam relationship is that Vietnam evolves into a Thailand-like partner, less the US-Thailand mutual defense treaty. The World Bank ranked Thailand 21st in its 2013 GDP by Purchasing Power Parity with a GDP of $972B. Vietnam ranked 34th with a GDP of $475B. More importantly to the U.S. is Thailand’s playing host to the annual multilateral Cobra Gold exercises. Thailand’s economic prosperity and relative domestic stability enable a bilateral relationship best understood as ‘measured interaction.’ The Thais
work with America, but in their own terms. If by 2030 Vietnam were to achieve economic prosperity and development akin to Thailand, and not only participate in but host U.S. sponsored training exercises, the U.S. could reasonably claim success in its efforts to improve the US-Vietnam relationship.

**Conclusion**

The future of the U.S.-Vietnam relationship is uncertain. The paramount U.S. objective is active Vietnamese participation in constraining Chinese aggression. Vietnam, mindful of its northern neighbor, is more inclined to have its *relationship* with the Unites States be a deterrent to China, not the United States *as* the deterrent. Through the present Vietnam has consistently put off U.S. requests for more meaningful security ties, and conveyed concern that U.S. initiatives will upset China and stoke Chinese fears of U.S. containment. Notwithstanding Chinese bellicosity in the South China Sea, Vietnam remains mindful of its northern neighbor and like ancient Melos, does not want the U.S. to force it to choose between the U.S. and China. The U.S. would succeed in strengthening its relationship with Vietnam by two potential catalysts. The first would be for China to increase its assertiveness in the South China Sea, thereby driving Vietnam into the U.S.’s arms. The second is for the U.S. to make a significant and sustained commitment to President Obama’s ‘rebalancing’ and thereby convince Vietnam (and other regional states) of its long-term staying power. A circular logic links these catalysts, and as of the present neither the U.S. nor China has demonstrated sufficient behavior to shift Vietnam from its successful balancing policy. As of the present Vietnam does not have to choose between the United States and China; therefore, Vietnam will not choose between the United States and China.


Manyin, pg. 4.


Hiebert, et all.

The United Stated maximum position is access to Cam Ranh Bay anchorage and repair facilities for warships.

Manyin. Page 22.


