14. ABSTRACT
The current Western defense drawdown, coupled with constant crises in Europe, Africa, and Asia, presents a problem which also carries within it a potential solution. The US and its allies are likely to find themselves in a dilemma as they attempt to address both their mutual security obligations and emergent crises with a shrinking pool of combat forces. The release from service of tens of thousands of well-trained troops by these same states at a time of heightened chaos abroad provides both a challenge and an opportunity. The oversupply of these military veterans could either threaten stability or provide the U.S. the needed flexibility to both respond to emerging crises and meet multilateral security commitments. In short, The United States can employ properly managed private military forces as operational maneuver elements in a range of scenarios, up to and including conventional warfare.

15. SUBJECT TERMS
Private Military Company (PSC), Private Security Company (PSC), Mercenary, combined arms
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Harnessing the Dogs of War: Using Private Military Companies at the Operational Level of War

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The current Western defense drawdown, coupled with constant crises in Europe, Africa, and Asia, presents a problem which also carries within it a potential solution. The US and its allies are likely to find themselves in a dilemma as they attempt to address both their mutual security obligations and emergent crises with a shrinking pool of combat forces. The release from service of tens of thousands of well-trained troops by these same states at a time of heightened chaos abroad provides both a challenge and an opportunity. The oversupply of these military veterans could either threaten stability or provide the U.S. the needed flexibility to both respond to emerging crises and meet multilateral security commitments. In short, The United States can employ properly managed private military forces as operational maneuver elements in a range of scenarios, up to and including conventional warfare.

The challenge that the U.S. faces with regard to force structure is its ability to meet its security obligations to its allies with conventional maneuver forces as well as preserve the flexibility to intervene in emergent crises with sufficient force to rapidly secure American interests. Currently, the U.S. seeks to retain the military capability to defeat large-scale aggression in one region while retaining the capability to deny or delay an aggressor in another region. But, the shrinking pool of forces available to the U.S. military exacerbates the tension between apportioned forces and crisis response. Every U.S. battalion committed to an emerging contingency is one less available to support U.S. security commitments in the event of a major theater war. The 2012 Strategic Guidance seeks to redress this lack of forces by insisting that U.S. forces “plan to operate whenever possible with allied and coalition forces.”

Coalitions, however, have certain inherent weaknesses. Building a coalition can take a great deal of time, as the United States negotiates command and support arrangements, reflecting contributors’ varying political goals and military capabilities. These negotiations, necessary to
the foundation of any coalition, can have negative impacts on the ability of the coalition commander to create unity of effort, particularly if there are significant national caveats to how some contributors' forces are employed. Even if the U.S. is able to form a coalition, the quality and quantity of troop contributions may render the exercise little more than a Potemkin gathering of flags around the headquarters.

The availability of modern coalition units is also likely to decrease in the future. Modern units, for the sake of this paper, are those that trained to conduct what Stephen Biddle describes as “modern-system tactics”, and are seldom found outside of developed countries for a variety of reasons. As established earlier, most NATO countries, including the United Kingdom, the United States most reliable security partner since the Cold War, are reducing the size of their militaries. Future U.S.-led coalitions will likely contain fewer units capable of operating at or near the same level of proficiency as American forces. The resulting gap in capability between modern units and those of other states may result in the former “sidelining” the latter. This can negatively affect the political commitment of the contributing power and requires either the allocation of more scarce modern units to make up the capability shortfall, or an alternative source of modern units.

The Western defense drawdown that is creating this gap between available and required modern forces is also flooding the market with a surplus supply of military manpower trained to a modern standard. In the unstable portions of the world, specifically Africa and Asia, the demand for modern military skills remains high amongst states and other organizations vying with each other for power. Some element of the surplus supply will move towards the demand signal, as the glut of military skills on the domestic job market makes moving abroad the only way to apply their skills for reasonable compensation. The current global conditions favor the
migration of skilled military manpower to the least stable portions of the world. The potential danger is that this infusion of military skill will result in a recurrence of the *les Affreux* and “Wild Geese” phenomena of the Cold War.

The mercenaries of the Cold War were notorious for spreading instability in their wake. They were typically individual “soldiers” organized loosely into *ad hoc* organizations who had no long-term obligation to each other or their unit, and who were recruited and deployed by “oblique and circuitous ways.” The “Wild Geese” succeeded in suppressing the Simba revolt, but subsequently became entangled in the coup that brought Mobutu to power in the Congo. Bob Denard, *Les Affreux*’s most infamous commander, earned notoriety for organizing coups throughout the developing world over the next three decades. The mercenaries who attempted to prop up the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA) in 1976 failed to stop the National Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) onslaught, but committed murder as a “daily process.” Despite being of some military use, these *ad hoc* gangs of mercenaries failed to provide regional stability and simply vanished at the termination of their contracts.

Private Military Companies (PMCs) appeared during the last significant Western military drawdown. Executive Outcomes and Sandline, the most prominent PMCs of the late 1990s and early 2000s, coalesced in South Africa and Great Britain respectively. They formed as the end of the Cold War caused the Western powers to seek a peace dividend by reducing the size of their militaries, and the collapse of communism removed one of the last props of the South African *apartheid* regimes’ legitimacy. In both cases, a large number of military personnel, trained to a Western standard, were suddenly without employment, while conflicts engendered by the Cold War continued in the developing world. The continued fighting in Angola provided Executive Outcomes a stage on which to demonstrate how a PMC could have an operational impact.
Heritage Oil originally hired Executive Outcomes in March 1993 to recover drilling equipment in the town of Soyo, Angola, which had recently been overrun by *Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola*¹² (UNITA) forces in the course of their civil war against the *Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola*¹³ (MPLA) government of Angola. The small Executive Outcomes force partnered with the Angolan military to recover Soyo and the machinery.¹⁴ Despite their small numbers, Executive Outcome’s modern training provided the Angolans with the necessary planning and combat skills to overcome UNITA over the course of a weeks-long battle, recaptured Soyo and secured the drilling equipment. The Angolan government, impressed by Executive Outcomes’ performance, reasoned that a small modern force employed with their army could have a broader impact on the continued struggle with UNITA beyond the tactical level.

In late 1993, the Angolan government hired Executive Outcomes to train its forces to a modern standard so that they could defeat UNITA, ending the multigenerational civil war and extending the government’s authority over the whole country.¹⁵ This was a difficult challenge, as South Africa had supported UNITA with arms and training for several years and rumors persisted that South Africa was still doing so despite international agreements to the contrary.¹⁶ Executive Outcomes realized that that merely training the Angolan military was insufficient and received permission to expand its role by providing the nucleus for a mechanized force as well as experienced staff planners and key combined arms and support enablers. The combined Executive Outcomes / Angolan force successfully seized Cafunfu after a three month mechanized movement punctuated by numerous engagements with UNITA forces, culminating in a sharp battle to retake the town. This was followed by weeks of repelling determined counterattacks. Executive Outcome’s operational success forced UNITA to the negotiating table,
achieving the Angolan government’s strategic objectives. This success provided an example of how countries with intractable insurgencies might better pursue military remedies.

In 1995, the government of Sierra Leone, desperate to survive against the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) onslaught and impressed by Executive Outcome’s success in Angola, hired the company to defeat the RUF. Executive Outcomes again had a mandate to both train the host nation’s forces to better fight the insurgency as well as to directly engage the enemy and secure operational and strategic objectives. Sierra Leone directed Executive Outcomes to recapture the Kono diamond district, which was the government’s sole source of revenue, and without which it was in peril of imminent financial collapse. In a lightning campaign, Executive Outcomes not only secured Kono through mechanized and air assault operations but also instituted a classic counterinsurgency campaign to deny the RUF sanctuary. This intervention forced the RUF from its safe haven to the negotiating table, again generating operational and strategic results with a small, modern military force. This established a pattern of developing nations hiring similar forces to resolve festering security problems through both training and direct combat operations.

Sierra Leone and Angola sought out Executive Outcome’s services, as both nations were in desperate straits, and had neither allies nor patrons to turn to in their respective crises. While the employment of Executive Outcomes may have hurt both nations’ international prestige, it enabled both to survive existential threats to their governments’ existence. Moreover, Executive Outcomes did this work relatively cheaply, charging Sierra Leone merely $35 million: a small price to pay for securing the regimes survival and a measure of stability. Executive Outcomes and other contemporary PMCs brought small, modern, and professional forces to bear, in
contrast to both the Wild Geese and *Les Affreux* before them and the Private Security Companies that operated in Iraq after them. 22

Executive Outcomes and Sandline were able to provide such professional forces by largely recruiting from a small pool of trusted and trained military professionals. Executive Outcomes recruited its employees from only a few units within the South African defense forces, often through direct personal contact. 23 Sandline similarly recruited from both the British and American special operations communities by similar means. Despite being engaged in intensive combat operations, neither company precipitated incidents similar to Nissour Square. 24 In fact, Executive Outcomes relations with the local population in Sierra Leone were not only positive, but surpassed that of national and regional military forces. 25 EO’s record, conducting both conventional combat operations and retaining the trust and goodwill of the local populace, demonstrates that PMCs can operate both effectively and responsibly on the modern battlefield.

The US government needs to address three aspects of PMCs in order to take advantage of them. The first aspect of PMCs that the US needs to address is their manning, which ensures that the unit is of the appropriate quality and can rapidly deploy. The US also needs to develop ways to overcome or at least mitigate the “principal-agent” problem with respect to PMCs in order to ensure that they serve the interests of the US and not their own. The other critical aspect the US needs to address is the need to integrate PMCs with conventional forces so that they can complement and support each other. Before these aspects can be addressed, however, the US needs to engender an environment that supports the right kind of PMCs.

Few PMCs remain extant, and PSCs have partially filled their market niche. 27 PSCs have been extensively employed to conduct operations short of direct combat in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other places where the US has engaged in overseas contingency operations. 28 PSCs,
however, have lent themselves to neither effective command and control nor accountability by either the United States or the host nation government. Thus, simply converting the contracts for PSCs to include direct combat would be insufficient to convert them into effective and accountable PMCs. The United States first needs to create an environment that would encourage the formation of PMCs that provide not only readily available modern forces, but also forces that are accountable to the United States or a host nation government.

The first step to engendering PMCs is to send a demand signal. Currently, US law prohibits the government from hiring contractors to perform “inherently governmental functions,” and current interpretation considers direct combat to be such a function. However, the definition of “inherently governmental functions” itself is vague. By offering contracts to conduct combat operations under the supervision of and in conjunction with US forces, the US would send a demand signal. Beyond merely incentivizing the existence of PMCs, however, the government needs to design the contracts to get the maximum benefit from the PMCs, to ensure that they can supply the professional and modern force needed.

To guarantee that the PMC provides the proper personnel for a mission, the manning criteria in the contract must be strictly defined. To ensure the rapid deployment of a trained, modern force, the contracting authority would have to stipulate personnel with service not only within a modern military but within certain specialties. Once engaged in combat operations, the PMCs, would need the flexibility to adapt to a changing environment by recruiting new personnel with the needed skills as the situation changes. Of course, the contracting authority could include additional stipulations, such as requiring full criminal background checks and an honorable discharge from the aforementioned modern military force to weed out the desperate and the ne’er do wells.
The PSC recruiting model provides a starting point for how PMCs would create and man a force for a contract. Most PSCs are essentially databases of potential employees who are not paid until they are signed onto a contract.\textsuperscript{32} PMC’s would likely use the same method, but the aforementioned contract stipulations would more narrowly define who could be added to the databases and subsequently employed. Further, contracts could stipulate that personnel dismissed by one PMC would not be eligible to work for another, as a means of preventing the contract jumping that was widespread among PSCs in Iraq. These personnel practices would support the goal of rapidly assembling and deploying a vetted, combat-ready force.

In order to avoid the challenges of having to prepare bids for contracts in response to a contingency, and the loss of time that this entails, the United States could best use PMCs by keeping them on “retainer”. The retainer would specify the size and composition of a force the PMC would be required to assemble in the event of a contingency, as well as the time it would have to deploy it. Since the force the PMC would raise would be equipped in theater, the deployment time would mostly consist of the time to transport the personnel to the area of operations, either by commercial or military means. Once present, they would be equipped either by the host nation or by their own means, spend a short period familiarizing themselves with their locally procured equipment, and proceed to conduct operations under US government auspices.

PSC’s have garnered a reputation, fairly or not, for acting as laws unto themselves and often acting in ways that fulfill the letter of their contracts but do significant damage to the United States larger objectives.\textsuperscript{33} This is one of the primary dangers of using contracted forces, as the PMCs interests do not always align with US strategic interests. Some PSCs, most notably Academi,\textsuperscript{34} have developed a reputation for acting with impunity, accountable to neither the host
nation nor the US. While contracting officers are supposed to exercise oversight over all contracted organizations, their performance in Afghanistan shows that contracting officers are often overwhelmed with the sheer number of contracts in a conflict zone, resulting in poor oversight.\textsuperscript{35} The command using the PMC (either the COCOM, JTF, or a lower tactical entity) should employ a directed telescope\textsuperscript{36} to both monitor and advise the PMCs to ensure they carry out their task in a manner that supports America’s interests.

Instead of assigning a PMC solely to an overburdened contracting officer, a commander’s representative from the concerned military command would be assigned to the headquarters of each PMC as well as any significant maneuver components. The officer would be able to veto courses of action, and would serve as a conduit of information between the concerned US military command and the PMC, ensuring that the intent of the local US commander is executed.\textsuperscript{37} The representative would not be in command of the PMC but would serve as the direct link between the PMC and the commander. Furthermore, he would also be the point of contact for US military units looking to coordinate their activities with the PMC. He would be responsible for ensuring the accountability of the PMC to both the US government as well as host nation and international laws, acting as a check on possibly divergent PMC interests. To prepare officers for this delicate task, the US would have to integrate the use of PMCs into routine training.

The US should employ retained PMCs by using them to support and complement training exercises with conventional units. This would have the benefit of testing the PMC’s ability to rapidly stand up and deploy a unit. Further this would also provide the government with an opportunity to spot check the PMC’s records, to make sure that it is properly screening the forces that it claims to be able to provide. By participating in regular training exercises alongside
national military units, regular officers would gain familiarity with PMCs that would facilitate later operations with them. PMCs would gain an opportunity to cooperate with a regular military unit, and refresh their tactical skills. Further, this would enable them to identify shortcomings in critical skills that they would need to address through recruiting to better fulfill the requirements of their retainer. Attaching enablers during training, such as JTACs and engineers, would prepare both prepare the enablers and the PMC for future operations where the former would likely be

The US needs to look at PMCs not merely as troops available for temporary hire but as customizable combat units, much like a MAGTF, that can be quickly assembled and dispatched to a crisis. By engendering a market for PMCs, the US government could shape its nature, and develop confidence that PMCs could provide the types of forces that the US needs at a moment’s notice. By keeping PMCs on retainer, they could be kept available and continually monitored by the government. Further, employing them for training would enhance both their readiness and the military’s ability to operate with them. PMCs would thus reduce the tension between allocating resources to security obligations and crises response. Additionally, their employment would have further effects beyond their mere use a solution to the shortage of uniformed manpower.

A PMC able to provide both training and a modern combat force provides much the same service for an unstable developing nation as a payday lender does for the working poor. Instead of providing an emergency infusion of cash for the short-term at a high interest rate\textsuperscript{38}, a PMC can provide a developing nation with a window of stability and security to enable it to get back on its feet. A world with effective PMCs, providing quality personnel at a market price would soon become a world where even fewer demands are made upon American military manpower, as developing nations are able to rent security in a crisis. This would achieve one of the ultimate
goals of American foreign policy, namely building partner capacity to the point where
developing nations move from being security consumers to providing their own, or even regional
security.

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5 "... a wide range of political, cultural, and organizational factors pull states away from modern-system doctrines, and the relative strength of these factors varies widely across states. Politically unstable autocracies face different doctrinal incentives from those faced by stable democracies; domestic political pressure vary in strength and nature from state to state; ethnically fractious states confront different tradeoffs from those confronted by homogenous or harmonious ones. If doctrine were determined entirely by military considerations, then these varying nonmilitary pressures would be irrelevant and all states would be driven to adopt similar force employment along modern-system lines. But since real doctrines are the product of complex interactions between military and nonmilitary influences, real doctrines thus vary widely from both state to state and within states over time as the relative balance of political, organizational, and military pressures changes. The net result is a wide variance in force employment across the international system as a whole." Stephen Biddle, *Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 51.
Angola and Executive Outcomes: Against All Milita1J1 Jndust1J1

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the withdrawal of Executive Outcomes from the country. The international community disapproved of the finn, and there in 15 minutes.' And they were.

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hostilities through the revenue from [local] diamond mining. Roelfvan Heerden, Commanding Executive Outcomes in Angola and

headquarters element for a total of 54 personnel in country. Roelf van Heerden,

16 Eeben Barlow, "Shrinking Europe Military Spending Stirs Concerns," NYT.com, April 22, 2013,

Peter Singer posits four conditions can dramatically enhance the prevalence of private military forces in warfare. They are: (1) quality is perceived as more important the quantity; (2) military demobilization in one region, but continued conflict in others; (3) weak governance in a region which allows private military forces to thrive; and (4) linkages between private military ventures and other businesses. Peter W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 38. The current modern-system of tactics, and its inaccessibility to many countries, satisfies the first requirement as described in note 5. The ongoing shrinking of western militaries described in this paper satisfies the second requirement. Weak or nonexistent governance through large portions of the world, especially sub-Saharan Africa and Central and West Asia. Innumerable companies doing business in unstable regions typically employ private security, either their own or hired on a contract basis to protect their investments, satisfying the fourth condition.

Les Affreux or “The Terrible Ones” were a collection of predominantly European mercenaries hired by Moise Tshombe in support of the Katanga secession. The term “Wild Geese” traditionally refers to Irish soldiers who served foreign, Catholic monarchies during the period when the Protestant United Kingdom ruled Ireland. The later Wild Geese were a mercenary force raised by Moise Tshombe, intermittent Prime Minister of the Congo, to solidify his position and defeat the Simba revolt. The unit earned its moniker from reporters due to the Anglo-Saxon culture of its leadership. Tony Geraghty, Soldiers of Fortune: A History of the Mercenary in Private Warfare (New York: Pegasus Books, 2009), 37, 47.


National Union for the Total Independence of Angola

Popular Movement for the Total Independence of Angola

The initial EO contingent that participated in the Soyo operation consisted of three 15-man platoons and a

headquarters element for a total of 54 personnel in country. Roelf van Heerden, Four Ball One Tracer: Commanding Executive Outcomes in Angola and Sierra Leone (Solihull: Helion & Company Ltd, 2012), 31.

The Angolan generals perceived this as their last opportunity to defeat UNITA. Eeben Barlow, Executive Outcomes: Against All Odds (Alberton: Galago Books, 2007), 116.


“The intent of the Cafunfu offensive was to deny UNITA access to the Cafunfu area and their ability to sustain hostilities through the revenue from [local] diamond mining. Roelf van Heerden, Four Ball One Tracer: Commanding Executive Outcomes in Angola and Sierra Leone (Solihull: Helion & Company Ltd, 2012), 75. Executive Outcome’s success at Cafunfu and subsequent defeats of UNITA at the hands of both Executive Outcomes and a retrained Angolan Army drove UNITA to the negotiating table. However, one of the conditions for the Lusaka Protocols was the removal of Executive Outcomes, which UNITA perceived as a source of strength for the Angolan government. The war restarted shortly after Executive Outcomes left the country. Eeben Barlow, Executive Outcomes: Against All Odds (Alberton: Galago Books, 2007), 297-8.

Among the many counterinsurgency tactics that Executive Outcomes employed, it provided radios to each of the paramount chiefs. According to an observer of the war, “They [Executive Outcomes] said: ‘If you call us we will be there in 15 minutes.' And they were.” Simon Akim, “The Vagabond King”, The New Statesman, February 2012, http://www.newstatesman.com/africa/2012/01/sierra-leone-strasser-war.

One of the conditions of the peace brokered by the UN between the government of Sierra Leone and the RUF was the withdrawal of Executive Outcomes from the country. The international community disapproved of the firm, and the RUF, for obvious military reasons, wished to see them depart as well. Soon after Executive Outcomes departed, the country reverted into civil war and chaos. Peter W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 114. The Executive Outcomes forces in Sierra Leone numbered approximately 200. Roelf van Heerden, Four Ball One Tracer: Commanding Executive Outcomes in Angola and Sierra Leone (Solihull: Helion & Company Ltd, 2012), 144.

company modeled on Executive Outcomes, to provide training and limited combat forces to combat the Bougainville insurgency in 1997. The contract collapsed before Sandline engaged in combat due to significant pushback from the Papua New Guinean Armed force later that year. Tim Spicer, An Unorthodox Soldier (Edinburgh, Mainstream Publishing Company (Edinburgh) Ltd, 1999), 160-1. Similarly, after the peace between the RUF and the Sierra Leone government broke down, Sierra Leone hired Sandline to bring the regime back to power and assist the Nigerian-led intervention force in recapturing key locales. Peter W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 115.

21 Sierra Leone paid Executive Outcomes roughly one third of the state’s entire defense budget. In return Executive Outcomes stopped the fighting and enabled over one million displaced persons to return home. Peter W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 114.

22 “Due to a spate of high-profile incidents involving contractors allegedly shooting civilians, using excessive force, committing other crimes, or otherwise behaving in a manner that may be offensive to the local population, there is concern that the reliance on contractors may be undermining U.S. counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.” Jennifer K. Elsea, Private Security Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Legal Issues (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2010), 1.

23 The force that Eeben Barlow, founder of Executive Outcomes, initially recruited for the Soyo operation consisted largely of “his colleagues and friends”. Roelf van Heerden, Four Ball One Tracer: Commanding Executive Outcomes in Angola and Sierra Leone (Solihull: Helion & Company Ltd, 2012), 31.

24 In the Nisour square incident, a Blackwater Worldwide (a PSC) protective detail opened fire in a crowded Baghdad traffic circle when they believed insurgents were attacking them. Seventeen Iraqi civilians were killed as a result of the PSC’s actions, and the resulting controversies regarding their legal immunity to Iraqi prosecution seriously strained relations between the United States and Iraq. Jennifer K. Elsea, Private Security Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Legal Issues (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2010), 1-2.

25 “Locals took to calling them [Sierra Leone troops] ‘sobels’ (a combination of “soldier” and “rebel”) as the two pillaging sides were almost indistinguishable. Peter W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 3. A contemporary citizen of Sierra Leone stated that he was more impressed with Executive Outcomes, which was “in the bush, fighting the RUF” compared to the government troops who did not. David E. Manley, interview by John D. Jordan, November 17, 2014.

26 In terms of PMC contracting, the principal-agent problem occurs when the interests of the principal (the hiring party) differ from the agent (the PMC). The hiring parties dependence on the agent results in the agent’s ability to pursue its interests, to the detriment of the principal. Peter W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 160-1.


28 For the purposes of this paper, Private Security Companies conduct operations short of direct offensive operations. PSCs typically provide personal security details for important individuals, site security, and security for logistics convoys.


31 Military units typically have to conduct operations across the entire spectrum of combat operations, and the lag time to receive significant manpower can be significant as requests are screened at numerous levels.


34 Academi was formerly known as Xe Services, and before that as Blackwater USA.

A directed telescope is a dedicated information collector who observes specific events and reports directly back to the commander. In this manifestation, he would be a trusted subordinate who clearly understands the commanders intent, and can thus serve as a conduit to the PMC headquarters as well. Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps. *Command and Control*. MCDP 6. Washington, DC: Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, October 4, 1996), 76.

37 The Angolan government typically paired an Angolan commander with an Executive Outcomes commander at the tactical level. At higher levels, senior Angolan officers interacted directly with Executive Outcomes, and provided coordination between their subordinates and the PMC. Sierra Leone followed a similar policy at the higher levels, but generally left Executive Outcomes forces to themselves in the interior. Roelf van Heerden, *Four Ball One Tracer: Commanding Executive Outcomes in Angola and Sierra Leone* (Solihull: Helion & Company Ltd, 2012), 76-7, 155.