Emerging global complex threats like terrorism, kidnapping, and lone perpetrators do not recognize national borders or responsibilities and confront governments with enormous challenges. The cooperation between Federal police and military SOF in Germany is very limited due to constitutional constraints. On July 3, 2012 a Supreme Court decision increased the military authority to project lethal force within Germany. This provides an opportunity to implement a German Joint Federal Special Operations Forces Headquarters (JFSOF HQ) to coordinate the cooperation of Federal police and military SOF within and outside the national territory to increase the effectiveness of German SOF. In the beginning of the paper, obstacles concerning Federal SOF cooperation as well as the hurdles to implement a JFSOF HQ are mentioned, followed by the advantages, tasks, and structure of a possible JFSOF HQ.
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FUTURE WAR PAPER

TITLE:
A German Joint Federal Special Operations Forces Headquarters – An Opportunity?

AUTHOR:
Thorsten G. Kunzmann, LtCol (GS), German Army

AY 2014-15

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Oral Defense Committee Member: Dr. Wray R. Johnson
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Executive summary

Title: A German Joint Federal Special Forces Headquarters – An Opportunity?

Author: Thorsten G. Kunzmann, LtCol (GS), German Army

Research Question: Emerging global complex threats like terrorism, kidnapping, and lone perpetrators do not recognize national borders or responsibilities and confront governments with enormous challenges. This research question focuses on a better coordinated and more effective collaboration between Federal police and military Special Operations Forces (SOF) in Germany through implementation of a Joint Headquarters.

What are the synergy effects and limitations of a German Joint Federal Special Operations Forces Headquarters?

Discussion: The methodology used in this study describes initially the availability of German Federal police and military SOF. Afterwards, it analyzes prerequisites, obstacles concerning a cooperation between Federal SOF, and hurdles to implement a German Joint Federal Special Operations Headquarters (JFSOF HQ) and recommends solutions to overcome these challenges. Finally, it concludes with a possible structure and tasks of a Joint Headquarters as well as a conceivable location in Germany.

Conclusion: This paper proposes that the implementation of a JFSOF HQ in the German capital would broaden the flexibility of national decision-makers to react and respond to emerging global complex threats. The recommended lean structure of the HQ staff and the adaptation of a military building would save resources concerning personnel and budget. The hesitation of the German Federal Ministry of the Interior and the Federal Ministry of Defense could be overcome due to the following key conclusions.

- more police and military SOF personnel available due to joint training
- reduced costs because of more effective usage of training facilities
- daily collaboration which enhances a better understanding of future SOF developments
- representation of the commander of GSG 9 and KSK on a permanent basis to increase trust of national decision-maker in SOF
- use of JFSOF HQ could be used as a think tank to recommend solutions to mitigate and respond to global threats

Despite the strict separation between internal and external security, the JFSOF HQ could be a first step to stay inside that constitutional framework and achieve more effective German Federal SOF capabilities and capacities.
Preface

I would like to thank, first and foremost, Professor Dr. Gordon Rudd, who supported me in an outstanding manner, but also all comrades and SOF operators, with a Bavarian phrase.

“Ein herzliches Vergelt's Gott”
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APPENDIX A: STRUCTURE JOINT FEDERAL HEADQUARTERS
1

The evolution of emerging global complex threats and the capacities of Federal police and military Special Operations Forces to protect Germany

The emergence of increased, global, complex threats like transnational terrorism, mass hostage-taking, and lone perpetrators confront governments with enormous challenges. Examples such as ISIL \(^1 \) in Syria and Iraq, the kidnapping of more than 250 girls in Nigeria, \(^2 \) and the killing of 69 people by Anders Breivik in Norway \(^3 \) highlighted the dramatic scale of complex threats. The use of dirty bombs, \(^4 \) cyber attacks, paramilitary tactics, and military equipment by terrorists or criminals are further aspects of these global security challenges. The containment of these threats requires very effective governmental authorities inside and outside the national territory. In Germany, the scope of police and military forces is strictly defined to ensure internal security (Innere Sicherheit) and external security (Äußere Sicherheit) due to historical abuses. However, the rapid evolution of global threats demands a closer cooperation of police and military and a refined approach to ensure national prosperity and economic growth. Special Operations Forces (SOF) conducted, because of their capabilities, these politically sensitive and oftentimes risky operations in the past to protect Germany and its people and will continue to execute them in the future. The global dimension and greater complexity of emerging threats requires a closer cooperation and coordination between governmental authorities.

The Federal police Special Operations Forces in Germany consist of the Grenzschutzgruppe 9 \(^5 \) of the Bundespolizei (GSG 9 – comparable to Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Hostage Rescue Team) and the hostage negotiators (Verhandlungsgruppe) of the Bundeskriminalamt \(^6 \) (BKA – comparable to FBI). Both elements are part of the Federal Ministry of the Interior and responsible for internal security. The total strength of German Federal police Special Operations Forces will not be published but is approximately 450 police officers. \(^7 \) If the Federal police SOF lack personnel for an operation the federal state in which the operation occurred, for example Bavaria, will support with regional Special Operations Forces.
However, the active defense (Gefahrenabwehr) of complex threats requires in some cases antitank weapons or explosives to gain access to terrorists or criminals' locations. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany severely limits police forces from using these means. Moreover, a mass hostage-taking incident, for example a hijacked German cruiser in the Baltic Sea, would exceed the necessary special equipment of the German police SOF such as boats. Additionally, the required number of qualified Federal police Special Operations Forces, even if regional Spezialeinsatzkommandos (SEKs – comparable to Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Teams) support them, would be a challenging effort.

The military Special Operations Forces consist of the brigade sized Army Kommando Spezialkräfte (KSK – comparable to Combat Application Group/CAG) and the battalion sized Navy Kommando Spezialkräfte der Marine (KSM – comparable to Navy SEALs) within the Federal Ministry of Defense, which are responsible for external security. The deployment of military forces within Germany territory in peacetime is only possible when either core values of the federal constitution are under imminent threat or the government of a federal state requests via the federal government military expertise due to a lack of its own capacity or capability in order to grant security. An example could be a hijacked oil tanker by terrorists, located in the Hamburg harbor area. This tanker could be used as a gigantic bomb to threaten the local population and to destroy an important national economic installation. On July 3, 2012, a German Supreme Court decision (Plenarentscheidung) increased the authorities of military personnel to project lethal force within Germany. This new legal framework offers exploitable synergy effects for a more effective cooperation between German Federal Special Operations Forces. One opportunity for a closer collaboration could be an organizational change where police and military personnel work together in a joint institution.
Research question and defined scope of the Study

This study analyzes one option of a new structure of federal police and military SOF cooperation in Germany to identify advantages and disadvantages of that particular organizational change.

What are the synergy effects and limitations of a German Joint Federal Special Operations Forces Headquarters?

This question focuses on the influence of a Joint Federal Headquarters in regards to further possibilities of effective collaboration of Federal Special Operations Forces, more efficient usage of budget and personnel, and the increase of political confidence in SOF. In addition, the analysis tries to identify the obstacles of a close cooperation between police and military SOF. Further, it addresses the hurdles to implement a Joint Federal Headquarters in regards to individual interests of involved institutions and decision-makers. Due to the plentitude of German legislation only the most important aspects in regards to a joint cooperation of Federal SOF are highlighted. Moreover, it will be assumed that the political leadership in Germany supports an organizational change to contain the emerged, global, complex threats. Finally, all information used is unclassified to guarantee the access of interested readers.

Prerequisites to contain the emerged complex threats in Germany

The first and most important task is to define responsibilities and stick to these despite monetary, lobbying, and publicity aspects. Federal police Special Operations Forces ensure internal security (Innere Sicherheit) and military Special Operations Forces external security (Äußere Sicherheit). The precise definition of responsibilities is paramount, especially with transnational terrorist organizations to specialize on the different aspects of mitigating and countering these threats. Special operations in Germany normally take place in a permissive
environment and require therefore a different preparation and focus. For example, so far terrorists have not used Improvised Explosive Devises (IEDs) and do not have the support of armed fighters to resist the police SOF. Whereas, in a non-permissive environment military SOF have to deal with no governmental control, a different racial appearance, and time pressure because of rallying opponents. However, even in Germany special equipment could be required in a hostage release operation such as drones, because of the hostages’ remote location, which can be provided by the military. Furthermore, neither domestically nor abroad can police or military SOF attack cyber threats alone; this necessitates the involvement of other agencies. An effective threat mitigation and elimination requires a coordinated and comprehensive whole of government approach to identify feasible technical and legal solutions. Additionally, the increasing abilities of criminals to apply paramilitary tactics and military equipment demand new material and training for police SOF. These few aspects point out some opportunities of an effective and institutionalized joint approach of Federal Special Operations Forces, but there are also hampering elements.

The identified obstacles of a close cooperation of Federal police and military Special Operations Forces

Different laws and regulations apply for German Federal Special Operations Forces

The close cooperation of police and military Special Operations Forces is constrained by different laws and regulations in Germany. The military forces conduct combat missions (Kampfeinsätze) with the task of destroying an enemy (Vernichtung des Gegners). Of course, police SOF use the ‘final shot’ (deliberate killing of a person) to rescue a hostage and apply lethal force in an absolutely certain hostile intent, too. However, the police officer only returns fire if somebody shoots at him or he is facing a lethal threat because of the German legal jurisdiction, his training, and the permissive environment. The Rules of Engagement (ROE) of military SOF are not as constrained due to their combat mission and non-permissive
environment. The German Supreme Court decision of July 3, 2012 extended national domestic capabilities and now allows military forces, under the command of police, to apply lethal force in Germany. Nevertheless, the application is still very restricted, highlighted by the court’s decision: “Even if insurgents fight with military equipment in Germany, military forces are not automatically responsible due to constitutional limitations.” The determination of military SOF personnel to conduct rotating small unit exchanges could improve the common understanding concerning legal constraints in Germany. Based on these experiences military training could be adjusted for assigned units to minimize the harmonization time if tasked to support a police SOF operation.

Another regulation is the proportionality principle. The police, including SOF, have to escalate their available means to ensure the lowest possible force is applied to accomplish the mission. That said, if the military, including SOF, identified and confirmed a military target it is not necessarily required to escalate. Instead, all means at hand are legally acceptable. Of course, the prevention of civilian casualties is mandatory, and if not definitely possible an engagement is aborted. The implementation of GSG 9 teams within military SOF exercises could be a first step to overcome this fundamental difference and sensitize police SOF for operations in a non-permissive environment. Further, a legal framework could be developed for a supporting role of Federal police SOF in military special operations.

Finally, paragraph 8 of the German Federal Police Law (Bundespolizeigesetz) states that “German police SOF are authorized to conduct general rescue operations abroad (includes hostage release operations - HRO), which are not on national territory and in a permissive environment.” The implementation of this legislation in 1994 is related to the famous freeing of a hijacked German airplane in Somalia in 1977 by GSG 9 police officers and is still the foundation of GSG 9’s global reputation. However, a permissive environment, especially in
African and Asian Third World countries, could quickly change into a non-permissive environment caused by increased global complex threats, which requires different planning, tactics, and equipment. The hostage negotiators of the BKA are the first SOF element involved in a HRO in a foreign country. The close cooperation and personal knowledge about acting persons is the foundation of trust and success in these very risky and politically sensitive operations. The intensification of combined police and military exercises and daily collaboration could mitigate the risk for hostages in the preparation and execution of a HRO.

These laws and regulations for German Federal SOF indicate a different mindset of police and military SOF, which is deeply implemented due to daily training, police and military education, and conducted operations. However, global, complex threats such as the shoot down of the Malaysian airliner over the Ukraine in 2014 and the attack on the editors of the magazine Charlie Hebdo in 2015 with the national expectation to prosecute the assassins would demand military capabilities implemented into police operations as well as police capabilities into military SOF Task Forces. The meticulous selection to become a special operator and the capabilities of completely trained SOF personnel establish the foundation, which could overcome the different mental framework. The distinction between different ROEs and the application of lethal force by police and military SOF under stress could be incorporated through close cooperation and coordination as well as joint training and leadership.

Federal police and military Special Operations Forces have diverging tasks, TTPs, and SOPs assigned

The GSG 9 uses police SOF Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) and Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs) are used to arrest and gain evidence for a prosecution of a terrorist or criminal. In comparison, military SOF personnel are trained to collect material and gain personal data of suspects, but the usage as evidence for German jurisdiction is very limited. Therefore, the implementation of GSG 9 police officers in military SOF Task Forces could be
one solution to guarantee the uninterrupted expertise until a final prosecution in Germany. Furthermore, German police SOF could attend military training to adapt their TTPs and SOPs to counter the paramilitary tactics and military equipment of criminal organizations and other complex threats. The use of antitank weapons and explosives domestically is legally possible by GSG 9, but the deployment of specific weapons, free-fall canopies, and re-breather diving systems requires significant time and expensive training. These capabilities are core elements of military SOF and could be provided on very short notice if required. A closer coordinated collaboration between German police and military SOF with identified personnel to ensure permanent support would, on the one hand, increase the toolbox to contain global complex threats and, on the other hand, increase the effectiveness of German Federal SOF. Moreover, it is important to prevent a militarization of police SOF, which would diminish confidence of political decision-makers and confuse the German population. An example of police forces alienating the populace would be the ongoing discussion in the United States concerning the use of military equipment like night-vision devices and the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) by local police officers.22

In times of shrinking budgets, limited SOF personnel, and constrained resources, defined responsibilities and unity of effort become even more important. The coordinated mutual support between German SOF, the elimination of unnecessary redundancies in weapons and equipment, and the allocation of Federal capabilities could be ways to keep up with threats such as ISIL or the single perpetrator attack in Paris. A German Joint Federal Special Operations Forces Headquarters could be an option to achieve greater cohesion and effective use of personnel and available resources, but there are also hurdles concerning the implementation of a Joint Federal Headquarters.
Possible hurdles to implement a Joint Federal Special Operations Forces Headquarters

Varying institutional and individual interests as well as stereotypes prevent an effective cooperation.

The German Federal Ministry of the Interior as well as the Federal Ministry of Defense compete for political influence and monetary resources. SOF is a very attractive element for both ministries due to emerging global threats and the limited willingness to accept an organizational change. The political and public pressure has to be very high to overcome this hurdle, or a satisfactory compromise will not be achieved. An intermediate step could be a common installation such as a Joint Federal Headquarters to prevent organizational changes and push institutional interests aside. The idea of merging the police and military SOF units in Germany is very difficult due to the described constitutional limitations concerning the use of military forces for internal security. Furthermore, GSG 9’s leading role in the ATLAS organization, which consists of 27 European Union police SOF units, could result in a decreasing German influence in ATLAS’s future evolution due to the mixture of German police and military SOF into one organization. However, successful German hostage release operations such as in Afghanistan could convince political decision-makers that an organizational adaptation should be approved.

Global threats like the beheading of western world hostages and a possible greater flexibility of Germany to react with a police, military, or joint approach coordinated by a German Joint Federal Special Operations Forces Headquarters could convince national decision-makers to overcome their individual interests. The scenarios of the abduction of German citizens are usually different. For example, if the military is the ruling authority in a foreign country and hostage negotiations take place, it is often easier if the military is leading the German delegation with the police in a supporting role and vice versa. Reasons are the same profession, rank structure, and vocabulary. Nevertheless, the BKA hostage negotiators will always execute the
negotiations but implemented in a military Task Force. Furthermore, organizations such as Europol’s (European Union law enforcement agency)\textsuperscript{25} Joint Investigation Team (JIT),\textsuperscript{26} the U.S. Joint Interagency Task Forces (JIATF)\textsuperscript{27} to address threats abroad, and the U.S. Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF)\textsuperscript{28} for domestic missions lay out possible ideas for the next step of police and military SOF collaboration in Germany. However, to initiate these joint organizations and convince national decision-makers a Joint SOF Headquarters could be an essential tool.

The stereotypes of a peaceful, friendly police and a bloodthirsty military vanish more and more among political, police, and military stakeholders, which allow a further positive evolvement of German Federal SOF. The lack of knowledge and trust could be resolved and finally overcome through a Joint SOF Headquarters with equal police and military representation. Furthermore, the financially constrained budgets of the Ministries of Interior and Defense as well as the competition with major companies about qualified personal could be improved with a Federal SOF Headquarters but represent additional hurdles, too.

**Foreseeable budget constrains and a shortage of qualified personnel hamper an implementation of a Joint Federal Headquarters**

At best, the financial budget for the Ministries of Interior and Defense will not change; it is more probable to shrink. Therefore, the planning and execution of training, acquisition of new equipment, and the responsibility for national security should be well synchronized to prevent an unnecessary waste of monetary resources. The combat readiness of SOF formations require consistent training on TTPs and SOPs such as shooting, vehicle and rotary-wing exercises, and planning courses. Close cooperation and synchronization between German Federal police and military SOF would provide access to new training opportunities and a better understanding of requirements and limitations within police and military SOF in Germany. Moreover, the contracting of external expertise, using non-governmental training facilities, and practicing with special military weapons could be reduced. Further, useful and compatible equipment for joint
missions can be identified. The knowledge of available competence and confidence in these skills would contribute to the reduction of redundancies and improve mutual support.

The qualification of SOF operators is time and resource intensive and requires several years of training. The willingness of police or military leadership to send fully trained personnel to an assignment outside their respective organization is low, especially if the payoff is limited. Nevertheless, after an initial investment of personnel in a Joint Federal SOF Headquarters the mentioned benefits of reduced cost due to synchronized training and exercises, the increase of options because of the coordinated access to available special equipment, and the more effective countering of complex threats based on the institutionalized experience would be a vital advantage. For example, in the Netherlands a military SOF element is assigned to support the police in domestic operations. This ensures, through common training, that military personnel are fully aware of the permissive environment with its constraints, and it increases the number of available SOF operators for domestic operations. This would be also possible with an element of the GSG 9 and KSK as an assigned SOF capability in Germany. The exchange of individuals and small teams for a certain period of time on a rotational basis could be the initiation of a joint SOF Task Force to counter, if required, domestic and global threats. In addition, a common police and military Headquarters would provide a coordination element to increase the effectiveness of Federal SOF in Germany.

A Joint Federal Headquarters could provide advice to political decision-makers and act as a think tank to offer recommendations concerning German Federal Special Operations Forces

The first goal of a Joint Federal SOF Headquarters would be to gain acceptance and trustworthiness among German police and military personnel and more important with national political decision-makers even if both groups support the implementation of the joint institution. This could be achieved by sending former commanders and experienced SOF operators to
headquarters assignments. Their accomplishments, personal network, and situational awareness could establish a solid foundation to advise governmental leaders on questions of elements of national security and global threats such as kidnapping.

Further, the Joint Federal Headquarters staff could act as a think-tank to recommend solutions to very difficult SOF topics in Germany. One example would be intelligence sharing between police, military, and hopefully in the future the national intelligence service due to legal restrictions to protect the constitutional rights of German citizens. This Joint Federal SOF Headquarters cannot just advise; it could connect people because of their deep insights and background about the mindset of police and military necessities. This institution could be an initial step towards a German headquarters analogous to Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) within a national SOF directorate comparable to United States Special Operations Command (USSOCCOM) but on a smaller scale concerning the availability of resources like funding, personnel, and the U.S. SOF system in general. Further, almost all SOF operations have a component of external support like intra theatre and strategic airlift provided by conventional military forces and civilian contractors. It is crucial to adapt and implement these requirements to mitigate emerging complex threats. The German Joint Federal SOF Headquarters requires a certain structure to provide the mentioned features.

A Joint Federal Special Operations Forces Headquarters could have the following structure and organization

The command element would consist of two directors

The structure of the headquarters should be organized with a focus on internal and external security. However, police and military SOF would work together on a daily basis to increase their mutual understanding and coordination (see Appendix A). Moreover, the very difficult legal framework in Germany requires an equal hierarchy of both governmental authorities. Unity of effort could be established due to the domestic and foreign focus of the
institution with more and more overlapping elements caused by global, complex threats. The directors should be former commanders (above unit level) of one of the German Federal SOF elements to provide the necessary credibility and acceptance. The directors are the ‘face’ of the institution to provide advice to political decision-makers. Both are supported by a deputy, which would be permanently a former leader of the hostage negotiators (Verhandlungsgruppe) on the police side and an alternation of a former battalion commander of Army (KSK) and Navy (KSM) Kommando Spezialkräfte. The police director of the Federal SOF Headquarters would be subordinated to the commander GSG 9 and the military director subordinated to the commander KSK.

The Joint Federal Headquarters considers that the commanders of GSG 9 and KSK, in the rank of colonel and brigadier general, are the main persons within the German SOF and continue their representation and advice of SOF expertise. The accepted and experienced personnel of the permanent Joint SOF Headquarters in the capital would support these efforts to better inform national decision-makers. Further, the constant availability of the directors in the Berlin area enables a sensitization before a crisis or operation occurs. It is important to mention that if a SOF directorate would be newly established within the Ministry of Defense this directorate would command the military side of the Joint Federal SOF Headquarters.

The police and military part of the headquarters would be divided into the staff sections of personnel or J1, intelligence or J2, operations or J3, logistics or J4, and communications or J6. All sections of the SOF Headquarters would be manned with one police and one military person, who could be either a GSG 9 / hostage negotiator police officer or a KSK / KSM military personnel. Only the operations or J3 section on the police and military side would include two persons to represent both forms of expertise. The reason for a limited number of personnel in each section is, on the one hand, the lack of SOF personnel in general and, on the other hand,
neither the police nor the military SOF would support a ‘big’ Joint Federal SOF Headquarters. However, both sides use different intelligence systems, logistical procedures, and communication technologies; therefore, trained personnel of both governmental authorities are necessary. The police and military representatives of each section have a shared office to provide the ideal cooperation.

The Federal Special Operations Forces provide funding and personnel

The total amount of personnel and annual budget is in all four Federal SOF units very different and will be reflected in the contribution to the Joint Federal SOF Headquarters. The maximum strength is 10 police officers and 10 military personnel. As the GSG 9 and the KSK have more personnel and a higher budget, these units should provide the main portion of the staff and resources. It is essential that the experienced and accepted persons assigned to such a new joint institution would face no disadvantages concerning their future career. This includes combat ready status, monthly bonus payments, and evaluation reports. These vital elements have to be established, in parallel to the implementation of the headquarters. Additionally, the new assignments and opportunities have to be transparently conveyed within police and military SOF to address qualified persons. Furthermore, the compatibility with the personnel rotation cycles within the German Federal SOF community is needed to ensure a return into the SOF units occurs without unnecessary friction. Another supporting element to gain qualified personnel could be the location of the Joint Federal Headquarters.

The Joint Federal Headquarters would be established in proximity to political decision-makers and available efficient infrastructure used

The German capital Berlin is the only location where a Joint Federal Headquarters should be established. Despite modern communication means, like Video Telephone Conference (VTC), many highly risky and sensible SOF operations depend on trust and relationships to be
approved by national decision-makers. This can only be established if the police and military representatives are in close proximity and personally known especially in hostage release operations.

Currently, all police and military SOF units are represented in Berlin, and their locations provide different advantages and disadvantages. However, the main focus of the implementation of a new Joint Federal SOF Headquarters would be the expenses. Despite the argument that all units are represented in the capital, more common meetings could not replace the benefits of a new Joint Headquarters. The Ministries of Interior and Defense do not have to spend money for a new building only to provide the means to adjust one building in the area. The police as well as the military have big complexes, which are conceivable solutions to integrate the Federal Joint Headquarters and could be supplemented with the missing equipment. In both cases the implementation of police or military information technology (IT) is the main cost increasing factor but offers for the first time a possible combination of German Federal SOF software and hardware to improve efficiency. Nevertheless, the likelihood of police and military SOF operations being supported by a conventional military contingent recommends the location of the Bundeswehr Joint Forces Operations Command in Potsdam. This command is responsible for deployment of German armed forces and coordinates necessary resources and means such as strategic airlift. Moreover, the recent modernization of buildings and command, control, communication, computer, and information (C4I) means setting a good foundation for a new Joint Federal SOF Headquarters.

Conclusion

In conclusion, emerging global threats are forcing the German government to take a more comprehensive and effective approach. A Joint Federal SOF Headquarters could provide an opportunity to achieve greater synergy, enabled by the German Supreme Court decision in
2012 to refine the whole government effort. The close cooperation of police and military SOF displays one decisive tool to eliminate threats and increase the options of national decision-makers. The concerted advice provided by the police and military directors of the Joint Federal Headquarters is more concise and incorporates all elements of both governmental authorities.

The strict separation of internal and external security does not allow a merge of police and military SOF. However, the plentitude of German law and the different circumstances of hostage-takings require an independent but mutually supporting joint Federal SOF. The focus of police and military SOF will be unchanged and not hamper any cooperation with regional police or conventional military forces. Nevertheless, global threats such as the airliner shoot down in Ukraine 2014 or the Charlie Hebdo attack will increase the national and international pressure to counter these terroristic acts and convict the responsible assassins. Therefore, experiences of conducted special operations have to be shared and jointly coordinated to adapt TTPs and SOPs in permissive and non-permissive environments. A Joint Federal SOF Headquarters could ensure an improvement in the capabilities of police and military SOF in Germany and contain the effects of global threats. Further, this accumulated expertise enables the Joint Federal Headquarters to recommend and assess future developments of SOF concerning Joint Task Forces, intelligence sharing, and interoperability.

The Joint Federal Headquarters should consist of a maximum of 10 police and 10 military personnel. This does not allow the staff to analyze every topic, but the insights and acceptance of assigned persons facilitate a management of information and a reach back to experts within the police or military SOF community if required. Connecting SOF and governmental authorities including political decision-makers establish better understanding, trust, and confidence necessary to counter global complex threats. Another important element is to dismantle stereotypes between Joint Federal SOF such as the peaceful, friendly police and the
bloodthirsty military to create a solid basis for future operations. Further, the knowledge of the Joint SOF Headquarters about training facilities for federal police and military SOF units enables them to synchronize exercises more effectively and use their annual budgets more efficiently.

The location of the Joint Federal SOF Headquarters should be in the capital of Germany due to the proximity of national decision-makers. The Bundeswehr Joint Forces Operations Command in Potsdam, responsible for deployments of German armed forces, offers not only a close coordination with conventional military forces to provide supporting capabilities like strategic airlift but has also equipped buildings to accommodate a Joint Federal Headquarters.

The identified synergy effects in that research highlight the effectiveness and necessity of a Joint Federal SOF Headquarters to improve the cooperation of German Federal SOF. The new institution is not just ‘another’ headquarters within the police or military organization. The joint approach to contain and eliminate emerging global complex threats is a feasible and affordable solution within the German governmental toolbox to increase elements of national security.

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4. The use of nuclear, biological, or chemical material for explosive devices.
11. “Kommando Spezialkräfte (KSK)”, accessed October 17, 2014, https://treff.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/treff/?ut/p/c4/DcFBDYAgDAXQWYyA3r25hXr7SGsaoBAETZxe806PdvoZbj3RtRgSrbOdvzH9cYilrA_8MQi-FiyRkWvIX5vTYwNKZalvmD7e4e98!/. 
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**Abbreviations and Acronyms**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BKA</td>
<td>Bundeskriminalamt</td>
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<tr>
<td>BPoi</td>
<td>Bundespolizei</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAG</td>
<td>Combat Application Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>COM</td>
<td>Commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>C4I</td>
<td>Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence</td>
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<td>Dep</td>
<td>Deputy</td>
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<td>Dir</td>
<td>Director</td>
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<td>FBI</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation</td>
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<td>GSG 9</td>
<td>Grenzschutzgruppe 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMMWV</td>
<td>High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle</td>
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<td>HRO</td>
<td>Hostage Release Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>Improvised Explosive Devise</td>
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<td>ISIL</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant</td>
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<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>Information Technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>JIATF</td>
<td>Joint Interagency Task Forces</td>
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<td>JIT</td>
<td>Joint Investigation Team</td>
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<td>JSOC</td>
<td>Joint Special Operations Command</td>
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<td>JTTF</td>
<td>Joint Terrorism Task Forces</td>
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<td>J1</td>
<td>Joint staff section 1 (personnel)</td>
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<td>J2</td>
<td>Joint staff section 2 (intelligence)</td>
</tr>
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<td>KSK</td>
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<td>Kommando Spezialkräfte der Marine</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoI</td>
<td>Ministry of the Interior</td>
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<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
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<td>OPCOM</td>
<td>Operational Command</td>
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<td>pers</td>
<td>Personnel</td>
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<td>ROE</td>
<td>Rules of Engagement</td>
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<td>SEK</td>
<td>Spezialeinsatzkommando</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOF</td>
<td>Special Operations Forces</td>
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<td>SOP</td>
<td>Standing Operating Procedure</td>
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<td>SWAT</td>
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<td>TTP</td>
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<tr>
<td>USOCCOM</td>
<td>United States Special Operations Command USOCCOM</td>
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<tr>
<td>VTC</td>
<td>Video Telephone Conference</td>
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Appendix A:

MoI (BPol / BKA) \quad \text{OPCOM} \quad \text{COM hostage negotiators} \quad \text{COM GSG 9} \quad \text{COM KSK} \quad \text{COM KSM} \quad \text{MoD (SOF Directorate)}

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<th>Internal security</th>
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<th>Hostage negotiators</th>
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