From 1990 to the present, the United States (U.S.) consciously developed a New American Way of War (NAWOW). Flawed visions of the nature of war and a delayed understanding of competitor security paradigm shifts have combined with fiscal realities to generate an incoherent national security architecture for fighting against peer or near-peer adversaries in 2025. This maturing way of war as expressed in a family of seven concepts misunderstands the complex relationship between strategic ends and military ways and means, leading to a flawed foundation for building the military strategies and capabilities necessary to succeed in 2025 and beyond. The concepts currently defining NAWOW, which provide the foundation for the ends, ways, and means of war for the U.S. Joint Force (JF) in 2025, are not capable of generating the necessary doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership & education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) to cope with the future world.
FUTURE WAR PAPER

Capoeira with a Hedgehog:
Joint Force Operational Penetration and Exploitation in 2025

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Introduction

From 1990 to the present, the United States (U.S.) consciously developed a New American Way of War (NAWOW).¹ Flawed visions of the nature of war and a delayed understanding of competitor security paradigm shifts have combined with fiscal realities to generate an incoherent national security architecture for fighting against peer or near-peer adversaries in 2025. This maturing way of war as expressed in a family of seven concepts misunderstands the complex relationship between strategic ends and military ways and means, leading to a flawed foundation for building the military strategies and capabilities necessary to succeed in 2025 and beyond. Thus, the U.S. is performing a martial dance with the hedgehog without figuring out how to kill it. The concepts currently defining NAWOW, which provide the foundation for the ends, ways, and means of war for the U.S. Joint Force (JF) in 2025, are not capable of generating the necessary doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership & education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) to cope with the future world.

History and Background

History of NAWOW – U.S. Thesis

The military success of the First Gulf War seemed to validate the tenets of what is now called network-centric warfare, a method characterized by high technology enabling enhanced battlefield awareness and massive firepower applied with relative precision.² The U.S. exited the First Gulf War having validated NAWOW, rejecting America’s rich small wars tradition, and embracing a general acceptance of the Weinberger Doctrine and Powell Corollary for the employment of military force.³ American strategic thinking subsequently evolved⁴ and post-Cold War military budgets declined precipitously to take advantage of the “Peace Dividend.”⁵ The industrial way of war described by historian Russell Weigley⁶ gave way to NAWOW. In a
time of military draw down and instability in a recently unipolar world, NAWOW sought to use the minimum amount of force and forces necessary to destroy the adversary’s will to fight through cognitive shock caused by divorcing his plan from reality. JFs operating in multiple domains, connected by a global network that allowed rich communications, massed in a secure area close to the theater of war (or within it) by dominating the air and sea. They attacked with speed and precision firepower, causing cognitive shock that destroyed the enemy’s ability to make decisions. In sum, NAWOW focused military power to collapse adversary command and control (C2) and morale while U.S. forces continued to rapidly observe, orient, decide, and act. 8

During the tenure of Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Donald Rumsfeld NAWOW grew into its late adolescence. Secretary Rumsfeld sought increased force readiness and limited support requirements by reducing the forces necessary to complete the mission. This shift relied on technology, especially low signature air forces, to allow small, nimble ground forces (often special operations forces (SOF)) to achieve effects and success beyond their organic means. Post 9/11, initial success in Afghanistan and Iraq, albeit against militarily inferior adversaries fighting in a generally regular manner, seemed to validate this way of war. As will subsequently be illustrated, despite the politico-military failures of the U.S. in these conflicts, belief in NAWOW increased, as did refinements in technology and tactics, techniques, and procedures.

Competitor Reaction - Antithesis

During the First Gulf War both allies and future adversaries observed and learned, but most were not in a position to act upon their conclusions. The Soviet Union was about to collapse before falling into a decade-long malaise. China was recovering from the massacres in Tiananmen Square and ensuring a smooth transition from the Old Maoist Guard while sustaining fragile economic improvements. The unipolar world, where the U.S. stood as the sole great
power, changed between 1990 and 2001, and competitors were in excellent positions to develop strategies and solutions as Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) unfolded. While the U.S. fought a “Global War on Terror,” competitors for regional hegemony analyzed two decades of U.S. military experience and implemented political and military solutions. NAWOW failed to adapt, stultified by American confirmation bias for a seemingly proven warfare methodology.

The most problematic aspect of NAWOW is the focus on destroying the adversary’s military power swiftly instead of using military action to achieve political ends. NAWOW’s political logic contains elements of the failed blitzkrieg concept and assumes that tactical excellence will result in the destruction of the enemy’s ability to resist, which then results in enemy acceptance of dictated political terms. U.S. strategic thinking posits that war comes after politics fails; politics resumes upon destruction of the enemy’s power to resist, and conditions for peace need to be set. During the period from 1990 to the present influential scholars broadcast this misunderstanding of the nature of war with a variety of works proclaiming a post-Clausewitzian era. This ignores significant historical evidence of the lack of finality of war outcomes and the challenges of building lasting peace. The troubling inability to achieve conflict termination is a thematic indicator of NAWOW’s theoretical weakness. The focus on disrupting the enemy’s cognitive coherence with the minimum force and forces possible leads to disruption without defeat. The conflict never ends; the enemy’s will to resist is temporarily disrupted and the capability to resist remains in at least a potential form.

It appears that U.S. competitors formulated political-military strategies to exploit this misunderstanding of the nature of war. Both China and Russia seem to have concluded that strategies to create de facto victory or present victory as a fait accompli are the best counters.
These strategies exploit the aforementioned artificial wall between politics and war by making the transition point ambiguous. American decision-making is paralyzed by ensuring that the question, “Has politics failed, and is war now necessary?,” is asked until military action is no longer relevant to achieving the political objective. Recent Chinese cyber warfare and actions in the South China Sea (SCS) illustrate this point. There is no need for China to seize terrain by military force because it builds new terrain in the SCS. Russia’s actions in the Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea show the presence of a concept of how to use military force in a manner that causes cognitive paralysis in the U.S. decision making process by creating either ambiguity or plausible (or even implausible) deniability of involvement. Thus, the American division between politics and war leads to an inability to cope with a Clausewitzian opponent.

NAWOW assumes air and maritime supremacy over a wide area allows concentration of land forces close to the theater of operations. This supremacy then enables nearly unimpeded projection by multiple means at the point and time of the U.S. military’s choosing into the battle space. Adversaries have conceptualized a counter involving a modern defense in depth that invalidates the key assumptions of NAWOW. This defense’s outer zone now encompasses the physical and informational global commons (the cyber domain and information operations). In practice, the threat rings emanating from adversary territory continue radiating outward and upward until they encompass the globe and the reaches of space that can be reached by ballistic missiles or affected by satellites. Adversary defenses encompass the U.S., but American forces on their veritable island must still transit the global commons to reach those same adversaries unless it is decided that an exchange of missiles will decide the issue.
The Present Situation – Synthesis

As conventional operations in OEF and OIF came to an end, the American public wearied of war, and the global financial crisis ushered in fiscal austerity. U.S. military budgets declined rapidly while the National Security Strategy (NSS) (2010 and 2015) and derivative strategies and concepts increased mission sets and operational tempo to cope with the changed world system.\(^{16}\) This led to the recognition that the United States could not afford the force required (the means) to meet stated strategic ends.\(^{17}\) Due to this mismatch in ends, ways, and means, NAWOW matured as a way for smaller forces to achieve the strategic ends within fiscal constraints. With adversaries eroding the intellectual, conceptual, and technological superiority of the U.S. military, the stage for a U.S. paradigm shift is set.\(^{18}\) The concept development process is a critical factor in how the U.S. military seeks to achieve strategic objectives.

NAWOW Concepts

The mature NAWOW is expressed in the 2015 National Military Strategy (NMS), the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance: Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership (DSG), the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: JF 2020 (CCJO), the Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC), the Air-Sea Battle Concept (ASB), the Joint Concept for Entry Operations (JCEO), the Joint Concept for Rapid Aggregation (JCRA), and Gaining and Maintaining Access (GAMA).

Authoritative documents, such as the NMS, inform the JF Development (JFD) system.\(^{19}\) Through JFD, the JF seeks to ensure that the DOD is postured to meet future challenges by improving joint warfighting capability through the development and implementation of validated joint concepts, produced within the Joint Concept Development (JCD) program.\(^{20}\) Joint Concepts are an essential element of the JFD system because they seek to address emerging operational challenges by defining the military problems, proposing conceptual solutions, and
identifying the future capabilities required. The concepts attempt to apply a logical approach to force development. They link the projected future environment with National Strategic Objectives (NSOs) to conceptualize probable military problems. The result is a series of documents that describe how the JF envisions it will fight. This vision generates and/or sustains joint warfighting capabilities through joint and service DOTMLPF.

Written in 2006 as a response to the 2004 military strategy, Major Combat Operations (MCO) is critical to NAWOW as it sets the framework for how the JF envisions future warfare against a “peer/near-peer adversary”. The MCO posits that the JF will leverage all resources to: shatter the enemy’s plans and dispositions; preclude the enemy from adapting, recovering, and reconstituting; and, break the enemy’s will for organized resistance. With the MCO the JF, supported by other instruments of national power, sought to develop a force that conducts synergistic, high-tempo actions in multiple domains to shatter the adversary’s plans and dispositions and renders him unable or unwilling to militarily oppose NSO achievement.

However, in light of budget constraints, the President challenged the military to “develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives, relying on exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities.” This direction was captured in the 2011 NMS, the first rewrite of national military strategy since 2004. The 2011 NMS acknowledged that high-end combat capabilities had atrophied due to a focus on counterinsurgency. As a result, the strategy charged the DOD with maintaining the capability to fight a conventional conflict by calling upon the services to “provide the full range of capabilities necessary to fulfill this strategy,” but it did not envision expanded capacity to meet the original MCO design. This direction appears to have manifested itself in the current preference for SOF over other forces.
Despite the updated NMS, the Joint Staff did not update the 2006 MCO and focused instead on defeating certain aspects of anti-access area denial (A2/AD) systems to maximize capabilities already under development. The 2011 NMS, combined with the threat assessment contained in the 2012 DSG, identified three trends in the operating environment that complicate the challenge of opposed access for the JF: 1) the improvement and proliferation of technologies capable of denying access to or freedom of action within an operational area; 2) the changing U.S. overseas defense posture; and 3) the emergence of space and cyberspace as increasingly important and contested domains. *These documents updated the military problem with new circumstances, but did not re-evaluate the application of military means beyond gaining access.* Because of these new circumstances, the Joint Staff expanded the MCO series to include the JOAC, the JCEO, and the JCRA, but poorly conceptualized post-access exploitation. This drove the development of ASB (soon to be replaced by the Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC)) and GAMA as supporting multi-service concepts.

The concept family focuses on the need to project power where access is challenged. Defeating A2/AD, therefore, became viewed as the essential challenge to allow the future JF to project military force in the face of armed opposition. The CCJO drove the Joint Staff to develop the idea of cross-domain synergy to establish local superiority across some combination of domains to provide the freedom of action required while addressing fiscal constraints. The JOAC uses cross-domain synergy to establish the appropriate conditions to conduct entry by integrating force capabilities across multiple domains, exploiting gaps in an adversary’s defenses at select entry points to achieve operational objectives. This appears to be an attempt to combine available resources from strategic distance against key objectives to achieve local
superiority, which then supports strategic or operational penetration to enable follow-on exploitation to bring about the defeat mechanisms expressed in the MCO.

The service-level concepts of ASB and GAMA identify the capabilities required to project power directly into the crisis area. The JCEO, apparently a response to ASB and GAMA, addresses the gaps in the JOAC identified by the service concepts by introducing mission-tailored JFs with the organic capability to achieve operational penetration, exploitation, and sustainment. The JCRA addressed the projection from strategic distance by seeking “to improve the speed, effectiveness, and efficiency of Joint Force aggregation in support of globally integrated operations by informing force development and force management activities across the Department of Defense (DoD).” The JCRA attempts to explain how future smaller forces will “transition from a steady-state global defense posture to a crisis-specific operational stance at the outset of a short-notice or no-notice crisis.”

The concept family projects a future where the JF will succeed at MCO, despite fiscal constraints, by conducting synergistic, high-tempo actions in multiple domains. These concepts envision smaller forces supported by more sophisticated systems aggregating from strategic distance at the critical time and place to deliver decisive military power. Despite the need for a highly integrated JF, the concepts accept the requirement for service “uniqueness”. This purports to allow future small, networked JFs to gain access to the theater of operations from strategic depth, penetrate the outer layer of the adversary’s defenses, and then quickly aggregate by sea and air before using cross-domain combined arms at the lowest levels of command.

The 2015 NMS reset national priorities by developing new NMOs that placed an emphasis on preparing for conventional operations at the higher end of the range of military operations (ROMO): to deter, deny, and defeat state adversaries while simultaneously disrupting,
degrading, and defeating [violent extremist organizations] VEOs, and strengthening the U.S. global network of allies and partners.\textsuperscript{34} The NMS notes that "today, the probability of U.S. involvement in interstate war with a major power is assessed to be low but growing."\textsuperscript{35} The NMS reflects the new security situation where the U.S. is facing near-peer adversaries while challenging diffuse groups like the Islamic State.\textsuperscript{36} As a result, and in spite of the concept development process and the intellectual effort expended, there appears to be a disconnect between the type of conflict the U.S. sees in its future and the means now being generated.

\textbf{Testing the Concepts}\textsuperscript{37}

Given the 2025 capabilities that should result from the concept family, the U.S. will be able to rapidly place some level of air, land, or maritime combat power globally, in addition to applying cyber and space power. The concepts failed, however, to provide a coherent way to subsequently build the necessary combat power with sufficient rapidity to turn a single point of access into a strategic or operational exploitation leading to the strategic end.

\textbf{Scenario 1 Discussion (See Appendix A for Scenario)}

Forward-deployed forces immediately available to the Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC), supported by national or strategic-level assets employed or deployed from the Continental United States (CONUS), proved incapable of the rapid and deep operational-level exploitation necessary to defeat the adversary. The 2025 United States European Command (USEUCOM) was predicted to be well-structured to conduct reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSO&I) of forces projected from CONUS. There was also a predicted increase in forward-deployed land and air forces. However, the GCC did not contain sufficient combat power to exploit access in the RSO&I-less method described in the concept family and required by the method of warfare used by the adversary.
The JCRA conceptualizes follow-on forces capable of exploiting access in 30-45 days, but this was an insufficient response time. If the enemy attempts to present the political result of military action as a *fait accomplis*, then response times must be much faster, on the order of hours to a handful of days. If the adversary can consolidate gains and create a defense in depth in less than 30 days, these concepts cannot lead to victory even if the JF gains access, which according to the concept family will always be temporary or fleeting.

Based on Scenario 1, the authors opine that Russia would use the following way to build a winning European campaign. Note the asymmetry created between the way described below and the capabilities and capacities envisioned in the concepts described in the previous section.

1. Disrupt alliances by targeting diverging national interests to create decision-making paralysis and delay response times. In all of the methods within this overall way, it is not necessary to eliminate the military response, it is enough to make it small enough to lack the ability to operationally exploit access.
2. Set limited objectives probably not associated with U.S. vital national interests, therefore allowing success by fighting in rapid spurts of less than 30 days to create multiple politico-military *faits accomplis*. The campaign links these limited objectives, which will be made to appear as unrelated to each other as possible, to achieve the strategic ends.
3. Project the possibility of diplomatic resolution to create the appearance of a potential diplomatic resolution while securing the limited military objectives until ends are achieved to retard or obviate enemy military responses.
4. Bring the diplomatic offensive directly to the American people using industry, interest groups, media, and social media to apply political pressure that will slow the military response. The aim is to force the Executive branch to feel that it must justify its actions extensively to the people prior to committing military forces.
5. In conjunction with method number four, pit the U.S. Legislative branch against the Executive branch by appealing directly to the House of Representatives and/or the Senate to sow political discord. This can slow large troop mobilizations and can impact the political will of the Executive branch to call up reserves or federalize the National Guard.
6. Ensure that the limited objectives outlined in method number two will not trigger an emotional response among the American populace.
7. Use economic leverage as an integral part of the military plan (in Scenario 1, this involved attacking in winter and threatening to cut off natural gas supplies to Europe).

**Scenario 2 Discussion** *(See Appendix B for Scenario)*

This scenario also illustrated that the U.S. can gain access, sometimes with significant initial combat power (in this case naval). The ability to exploit, however, especially by fighting
directly from the move after projecting power from strategic distance, is very limited. The issue of mismatches between U.S. strategic/national ends and military ways and means and circumstances were particularly sharp in this scenario.

The formal and informal U.S. alliances in the Pacific created issues. U.S. forces in South Korea and regional ally naval forces were of little assistance due to a North Korean threat. A simultaneous threat to South Korea and Taiwan caused slow decision-making and forced the resourcing of multiple operations plans. The sudden need for large numbers of combat forces proved overwhelming. This resulted in a lack of flexibility to the point where the logical choice was to adopt a defensive posture while conceding ownership of the global commons to China until at least one threat subsided. The opportunities for economy of force measures to solve this problem were limited, militarily very risky, and forced the near abandonment of at least one ally. Projection of CONUS-based forces that could move directly into the attack without RSO&I, as envisioned in the concepts, was problematic. The U.S. ability to project power from the sea was limited by the A2/AD threat, and this led to maintaining a naval and maritime character to the conflict, making the envisioned cross-domain strategy difficult to enact. 38

The U.S. required the resources and will to pursue unlimited aims while China only required the resources and will to achieve a highly limited objective. This created a strategic and operational asymmetry. In the test, the U.S. faced having attack mainland China to achieve the strategic objectives resulting from the contestation of islands in the SCS of dubious sovereignty. In a competition for access to the global commons, in this case sea lines of communication, the adversary needed only to accomplish the limited military objective of showing that the U.S. could not GUARANTEE access to achieve the strategic end of contesting regional hegemony. The mere ability to affect access caused a fundamental shift in commercial and economic
patterns. This resolved the regional hegemony issue in favor of the adversary even when they were disrupted militarily. Guaranteeing permanent access as envisioned in the NSS involved an invasion, or at least the striking of targets on the Chinese mainland and maintaining the capability to continually strike the mainland to keep it clear of threats. This strategic objective resulted in a permanent state of war while strategic ends were not achieved.

Escalation took place so quickly that the U.S. faced a choice between major war or using diplomatic/economic pressure with little or no time for deliberation or mobilization. Denial of the global commons occurred as a fait accomplis with poor U.S. military options for limited objectives. Maintenance of a naval and air blockade in the area, one of the alternatives to direct strikes, required more capability and capacity than the authors projected for the 2025 U.S. force.

Pitting the authors’ predicted 2025 DOTMLPF results of the concept family against the scenarios showed that in 2025 the U.S. could gain access to any domain, and sometimes multiple domains, in any area of the world, for a limited period of time. Additionally, the tests showed that the United States military will have a significant non-nuclear deterrence capability, especially in the air domain, and will be able to quickly penalize an adversary in a limited, but painful way. After deterrence and penalization there is a dearth of plausible options. Therefore, these concepts fail in three interrelated areas: 1) exploiting fleeting and localized penetration, 2) providing appropriate command and control structures for forces projected from strategic depth, and 3) providing rapidly deployable, flexible, and cohesive JFs to achieve and exploit penetration. The current U.S. military force structure paradigm is both insufficient and potentially antithetical to challenges the CCJO seeks to meet.
Conclusions and Recommendations

The family of concepts currently defining the American way of war is not capable of generating the DOTMLPF to cope with future armed conflict with peer or near peer adversaries at the higher end of the ROMO. This is a symptom of the lack of JFD agility as illustrated by the lack of MCO re-assessment. The JF has instead chosen to apply small corrective measures embodied in minor updates to existing concepts in conjunction with building subordinate concepts to cope with narrow military problems as they emerge.

The failure of the concepts is partially due to a problem in the national security infrastructure resulting from the Goldwater–Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Under the authors’ predicted 2025 DOTMLPF the concept of globally managed and synchronized forces is not compatible with the current GCC-centric construct. This construct leads to intense inter-GCC competition for forces through the Global Force Management (GFM) process, which erodes service and functional component capability and capacity to provide the rapidly deployable forces required, but not truly captured in the concepts below the CCJO level.

One of the core propositions of the CCJO is that the current GCC and OPLAN-centric paradigm may not meet the future need. Subordinate concepts ignore this proposition in favor of “service uniqueness.” This leads to a conceptual inconsistency that cannot be overcome by technology or the application of other physical means. The root of the problem is the desire to divorce politics from the cost of war. This desire leads to a political bias for SOF and task-organized special purpose units, such as Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Forces (SPMAGTF), to lead the “building security globally” strategy. Furthermore, the focus on these low-density/high demand forces for Phase 0 and crisis response operations compounds the problem by rejecting the employment, and investment in the training of, general purpose forces.
(GPF). Thus, SOF and specialized task forces are increasingly used for operations that could be executed by properly trained GPF, leading to increased stress on low-density units, atrophy of key skills amongst GPF, and a lack of investment in GPF capability that could provide critical flexibility in force generation.

Just as U.S. forces will seek to be decisive in one theater while raising the cost of an adversary conducting operations in another theater\textsuperscript{43}, the adversary(ies) will do the same, potentially leading to U.S. under-resourcing a theater of war. Because the enemy decides the primary theater of war, the fluidity of forces between GCCs, a foundational national security concept and a core assumption in the CCJO\textsuperscript{44}, may be invalid. If the location and scale of the crisis is unpredictable or uncontrollable, then the available force and its projection must be predictable. Both of these cannot be unknown variables without acceptance of unacceptable risk to response capability, capacity, and timeliness. Therefore, it is apparent that maintaining a force that can deploy and win a conflict within the appropriate timeframe is essential.

The strategy of maintaining relationships everywhere is meant to enable operational access and allow for military buildup and partnering to establish a coalition platform to hedge political, financial, and military risk. However, partner forces are often marginal and in locations that can be dominated by adversaries, obviating the access-centric 30-45 day response time outlined in the concept family. Therefore, this strategy can only be effective if cross-domain synergy maintains access or the enemy does not pursue the strategy best suited to the situation. Neither scenario is plausible given the authors’ tests.

Given the 2025 capabilities that will result from the current concept family, the U.S. military will not be capable of simultaneously maintaining dedicated OPLAN forces, providing the rapidly deployable JTFs envisioned in the concept family, deploying forces to execute Phase
0 global and theater campaigns, and sustaining the necessary equipment and mobility platforms. If the location and scale of the crisis is by nature unpredictable, then force availability and projection must be guaranteed. If service-retained and functional forces are not fenced off, trained, and ready for immediate deployment as cohesive units, then they will not be available for a crisis at the higher end of the ROMO or to exploit a fleeting penetration.

The conceptual solution is for the U.S. to abandon the attempt to determine the character of future war and accept the Clausewitzian conception of the immutable nature and changing character of war. The political solution is to reevaluate Goldwater-Nichols. The military solution is the restructuring of the JF around fully resourced, equipped, and projectable corps-sized JTFs that organically possess the ability to penetrate, exploit, and sustain themselves. History shows that corps are capable of managing multiple maneuver units as well as combat support and logistics functions while wielding the necessary combat power to fight at the high end of the ROMO at both the tactical and operational levels of war. GCCs would act as theater support commands or as field army headquarters capable of fighting multiple corps-sized JTFs. This type of JTF would be postured to deploy within 24 hours to conduct operations without an embarkation or mobilization period at the home base and without conducting theater RSO&I. Maintaining such a force would require a shift in how the services and functional components conceptualize and provide forces. The bold line between SOF and Conventional Forces (CF) would be replaced by more integrated SOF and GPF. JTFs would be manned by flexible GPF capable of operating across the ROMO, with SOF gaining time for GPF deployment. GCCs would retain their responsibility for generating OPLANS for possible conflicts. Standing JTFs with guaranteed capability along the entire ROMO, capacity, and response time, would replace assigned or apportioned units of questionable readiness provided by GFM.
The authors of this paper are not the first to use the term “new american way of war,” but came to this term independently after analysis of the concepts addressed in this paper. After using this term the authors found several uses that closely resemble the formulation in this paper in Antulio J. Echevarria II, "Toward an American Way of War" (Occasional Paper, 2004); Max Boot, "The New American Way of War", Foreign Affairs, 2003 <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2003-07-01/new-american-way-war> [accessed 12 October 2015].; Rose Lopez Keravuori, "Lost in Translation: The American Way of War", Small Wars Journal, 2011.


Either the United States’ or its close allies’ vital national interests had to be at risk; The war had to be fought "wholeheartedly, with the clear intention of winning"; We should employ decisive force in the pursuit of clearly defined political and military objectives; We must constantly reassess whether the use of force is necessary and appropriate; There must be a "reasonable assurance" of Congressional and public support; Force should be used only as a last resort. See Jim Mokhiber and Rick Young, "The Uses of Military Force" <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/military/force/> [accessed 27 October 2015]

Specifically, acceptance of Weinberger Doctrine and the Powell Corollary strictures significantly eroded as the Administration conceptualized military force as a way, in the opinion of the authors of this paper, to spread American ideals, and thus promote the national security of the United States through exporting ideals supported by focused military action and constabulary missions.

“In recent years, discussions about when to use force have turned on a set of vital questions, such as whether our forces match our objectives; whether we can fight and win in a time that is acceptable; whether we have a reasonable exit if we do not; whether there is public and congressional support. But we have overlooked a prior, strategic question -- the question of "where" -- which sets the context for such military judgments.

I see four components to a strategy of enlargement.

First, we should strengthen the community of major market democracies - including our own - - which constitutes the core from which enlargement is proceeding.
Second, we should help foster and consolidate new democracies and market economies, where possible, especially in states of special significance and opportunity.
Third, we must counter the aggression - - and support the liberalization - - of states hostile to democracy and markets.
Fourth, we need to pursue our humanitarian agenda not only by providing aid, but also by working to help democracy and market economics take root in regions of greatest humanitarian concern.” Anthony Lake, "From Containment to Enlargement", in Johns Hopkins University: School of Advanced International Studies <https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/lakedoc.html> [accessed 28 October 2015].


7 These were the air, land, maritime, and space domains. Cyber was not a domain at this time.


This critique of “blitzkrieg” is not unique to Naveh, but he expressed the idea in the most developed manner and earlier than other modern scholars of the operational art. The authors of this paper accept Naveh’s critique of “blitzkrieg,” but reserve judgement on his critique of Clausewitz as a theorist that presents the achievement of strategic ends as a process of achieving strategic destruction through achieving an “accumulation of tactical destructions.” This is important since our conclusion follows Clausewitzian lines and assumes that, as stated by Echevarria, that “Americans—not unlike many of their European counterparts—considered war an alternative to bargaining, rather than part of an ongoing bargaining process, as in the Clausewitzian view.” We believe that it is possible to accept Naveh’s critiques of blitzkrieg without accepting his idea that the problems stem from following Clausewitz’s theory. See Shimon Naveh, In pursuit of military excellence: The evolution of operational theory (Abingdon: Frank Cass, 1997), 235.; Antulio J. Echevarria II, "Toward an American Way of War" (Occasional Paper, 2004), 1.

In the opinion of the authors, the obsolescence of state on state war and the gradual decrease in the intensity of war (the end of total war) is overstated in these works. The post-Clausewitzian war assessment rests on the assumption that states are in decline and that state power will no longer be the dominant power in the world. As Colin Gray states, there is also a difference between claiming that there is a decline in the probability of wars between major states and a decline in major interstate war. The post-Clausewitzian assessments are highly influenced by Creveld’s Transformation of War and William Lind’s fourth generation war (4GW) ideas. These ideas are based on the state losing its monopoly on war, with Huntington’s “Clash of Cultures” serving as the dominant source of conflict instead of state interest. There is some current evidence to support such a claim, such as the rise of the Islamic State (IS), but at the same time, an organization such as IS is (arguably) a state. It has borders, it taxes people, it has a body of laws, it has the organs of government, it has an army. There are a plethora of state-on-state “hot” wars going on right now, which would seem to contradict the aforementioned theories. These theories propose that ethnic and religious identity will be more of a motive for war than state interest. The authors concur with Mr. Gray that states go to war when they think it makes sense for them to do so. In addition the authors propose that nationalism is in itself a religion or has religious-type characteristics, further invalidating the post-Clausewitzian war theories. In Another Bloody Century, Colin Gray makes the point that states are still the principal security providers for most people, and thus they have a strong claim to the loyalty of their people. Because many states have dominant ethnic groups that differ from the ethnic groups of nearby states, the concept of ethnic and inter-state conflict is still bound together into one. Why would someone give that up to establish a cross-state consciousness via the internet? Could a diaspora without a state function in this manner? Yes, but this is not the dominant mode of conflict. Although technology continues to proliferate, states have access to means of warfare, including national and industrial mobilization, that dwarf those of non-state actors. Although this could change in the next 10 years, and states do collapse, history shows that people associate themselves strongly with their nation-state and will fight and die for it if its existence or core interests are threatened. Even powerful non-state actors, such as Hizballah, are reliant on states for their military power. See William S. Lind, "Understanding Fourth Generation War", Military Review, 2004: 12-6.; Martin Van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: The Free Press, 1991).; Foreign Affairs, "The Clash at 20: What did Samuel P. Huntington's "The Clash


16 Retired Marine General James Mattis puts this well: “In light of worldwide challenges to the international order we are nonetheless shrinking our military. Are we adjusting our strategy and taking into account a reduced role for that shrunken military? Strategy connects ends, ways and means. With less military available, we must reduce our appetite for using it. Absent growing our military, there must come a time when moral outrage, serious humanitarian plight, or lesser threats cannot be militarily addressed. Prioritization is needed if we are to remain capable of the most critical mission for which we have a military: to fight on short notice and defend the country. In this regard we must recognize we should not and need not carry this military burden solely on our own.” See James Mattis, "A New American Grand Strategy" <http://www.hoover.org/research/new-american-grand-strategy> [accessed 23 November 2015]

17 Secretary of Defense, "Quadrennial Defense Review 2014" (QDR 2014, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense, 2014), IV.

18 It may seem overly bold to some readers to state that U.S. military superiority in these areas is either eroding or eroded. It is clear to the authors that competitors for regional or global hegemony have been embarked on a deliberate strategy for negating the ability of the U.S. military to guarantee or enforce U.S. diplomatic and economic hegemony in contested areas.
From an intellectual and conceptual standpoint, China and Russia in particular have successfully enacted these strategies and show clear ends, ways, means constructs. Interestingly, both countries seem to have concluded that strategies that create de facto victory or present victory as a fait accompli are best suited to countering U.S. military power. Recent Chinese actions in the South China Sea where they are using reclamation techniques to build islands that can support military missions on previously uninhabitable, and highly contested reefs, as well as development and deployment of A2/AD systems, shows this country has chosen this method and is currently enacting it. There is no need for China to seize terrain by military force, it simply builds new terrain under its control and places offensive and defensive capabilities on that terrain. Russia’s actions in the Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea show the presence of a concept of how to use military force in a manner that causes cognitive paralysis in the U.S. decision making process by creating either ambiguity or plausible (or even implausible) deniability of involvement. Technologically, it is abundantly clear that U.S. investments in large power projection platforms such as capital ships (carriers especially), stealth bombers, etc. has been countered by rapidly proliferating technologies. The authors drew upon many sources to form this opinion. See Steven Lee Meyers, *The New Tsar: The Rise and Reign of Vladimir Putin* (New York: Knopf, 2015). For a biography of current Russian President Vladimir Putin and some of the intellectual, cultural, and political underpinnings of Russia’s strategy; See Shawn Brimley, "Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee: Arresting the Erosion of America’s Military Edge" (SASC Testimony, Center for a New American Security, 2015). For a cogent and clear description of the state of U.S. military technological superiority; See Colin S. Gray, *Another Bloody Century* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2011). For a detailed discussion of trends in war and warfare; See Janis Berzins, "Russia’s new generation warfare in Ukraine: implications for Latvian defense policy" (Policy Paper, National Defence Academy of Latvia, Center for Security and Strategic Research, 2014). for an outstanding discussion of Russia’s political and military doctrine in action.


Joint Concept Development (JCD) is intended to improve the future Joint Force within the context of strategic guidance and the anticipated future security environment. Joint concepts examine military problems by describing how the Joint Force, using military art and science, may conduct joint operations, functions, and activities in response to a range of future challenges. Joint concepts are written using a “problem-solution” method. The identification and refinement of a joint military problem, a proposed operational solution, and the capabilities required to implement the proposed solution are essential components for guiding and evaluating the concept as it progresses toward validation and approval. Authoritative documents such as the National Security Strategy (NSS), Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, the National Military Strategy (NMS), and joint doctrine inform joint concepts. Additionally, the Joint Operating Environment (JOE) provides insights into the dominant trends affecting the security environment and their implications for future military operations. JCD is a component of the overall Joint Force Development (JFD) system. See Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "CJCSI 3010.02D: GUIDANCE FOR
DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF JOINT CONCEPTS" (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction, 2013), A-1.


22 Although this term was not introduced until 2014, the envisioned adversaries are the same.


26 The future Joint Force must be able to enter onto foreign territory and immediately employ capabilities to accomplish assigned missions in the presence of armed opposition, including advanced area denial systems, while overcoming geographic challenges and degraded or austere infrastructure. Overcoming this challenge requires capabilities from across the entire Joint Force to conduct, support, and exploit entry operations.

27 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Operational Access Concept" (Joint Concept, 2012), ii.

28 This is the complementary vice merely additive employment of capabilities in different domains such that each enhances the effectiveness and compensates for the vulnerabilities of the others.

29 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Concept for Entry Operations" (Joint Concept, 2014), vi.

30 A mission-tailored joint force capable of entry operations is comprised of integrated joint forces, and most likely multinational forces, made up of four types: Support Forces, Initial Entry Forces, Reinforcing Entry Forces, and Follow-on Forces. To be globally agile, forces capable of entry must be properly postured in order to permit rapid forming of a mission-tailored force sufficiently responsive to emerging crises. It is important to note that not all entry operations require all types of forces.
The central idea within the JCEO is the employment of “opportunistic, unpredictable maneuver, in and across multiple domains, in conjunction with the ability to attain local superiority at multiple entry points to gain entry and achieve desired objectives.” This local domain superiority may not be permanent; more often it will be temporary. After landing, the entry forces themselves may be able to achieve the operational objectives and then extract, thus not requiring the introduction of follow-on forces. In other operations entry forces may need to transition the effort to follow-on joint or coalition forces, or in some cases, non-military partners.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Concept for Rapid Aggregation" (Joint Concept, 2015), iv.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Concept for Rapid Aggregation" (Joint Concept, 2015), iv.


The authors tested the concepts and their predicted 2025 DOTMLPF outputs against competitors in two scenarios, appended in Annexes A and B. This was not a formal turn-based war game, and served as a thought experiment vice the pitting of exact forces against each other. The tests were not meant to develop conclusions regarding exact forces, and were instead executed to test concepts against each other. The authors did not attempt to determine the efficacy of the M1AX versus the T-90 or T-10 Armata, for example, but there was significant thought and research on the ends, ways, and means & circumstances construct to develop reasonable and conceptually coherent actions on all sides. One scenario required a predominantly naval response in the Pacific and the other required a predominantly land force response in Europe.

It was possible to bring other domains to bear, however, the required support was either prohibitive or could not be placed within the theater of operations due to adversary threats. Naval forces, specifically surface combatants and their support architecture, sub-surface combatants (attack, ballistic missile, and guided missile submarines), and naval aviation proved to be the most viable in terms of their ability to remain within the theater and secure their own access with organic assets. Channeling the multiplicity of capabilities resident within each domain through naval forces afloat proved challenging and ultimately did not allow cross-domain fires as conceptualized.
This period of time could vary from hours to days, and perhaps weeks, but fell short of the time or capability required to exploit physical access or penetration on a sustained basis. The concepts all recognize that access is temporary, but the linkage between the temporary access envisioned by the JOAC and JCEO and the aggregation of an exploitation force in the JCRA are not internally coherent as described in the main text. Access methods tested ranged across the domains from submarines, airborne forces, special operations forces, cyber penetration and network exploitation, space system surveillance, maritime and air unmanned surveillance.


By “corps-sized” the authors envision an organization with at least two division-sized maneuver units (infantry and/or armor) in addition to combined arms capabilities from throughout the joint force. The United States Marine Corps (USMC) could posture itself to be the first of the aforementioned JTFs by restructuring the force. Because of the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) model, the USMC is uniquely positioned to provide the vast majority of the JF in the suggested model. To parrot *Jerry McGuire*, the Marine Corps needs less MEFs. A single MEF, organized as a corps-sized JTF with three Divisions, a large and highly capable Logistics Element, a fully ready aircraft Wing, with associated JFs such as ships, could be highly effective in the proposed role. The USMC also fits the concept of GPF admirably, occupying the doctrinal and intellectual space between dedicated SOF and dedicated GPF.


In the authors’ opinion the CCJO requires forces to be capable of fighting without conducting RSO&I to be valid.

This is essentially the definition of the “hollow force” syndrome that occurs when decreases in defense spending are matched with increases in capabilities demand. This incentivizes military
services and components to maintain capability structures and organizations that are inadequately staffed or manned to actually create the capacity to achieve the stated mission. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 5-0: Joint Operation Planning* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2011), xiii, IV-6, IV-10, IV-47.
APPENDIX A – Scenario 1

Russia perceives a threat to its only ice-free Baltic port in Kaliningrad due to NATO overtures to Finland and the collapse of the friendly Lukashenko dynasty in Belarus. There is a Belarusian national debate regarding whether to maintain Russia as the primary security and economic guarantor. Russia claims that the minority ethnically Russian population (approximately 8.5%) of Belarus are under imminent threat. Strategically, this instability provides the opportunity to permanently split the “NATO belt” in Russia’s “near abroad” formed by Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania by maintaining instability in Ukraine, isolating it from the north, and virtually annexing Belarus to prevent containment. Russia also demands that theater ballistic missile defenses being considered for placement in NATO Baltic states (especially Denmark) be disallowed over fears that placement of these assets are meant to deny the Russian Fleet entrance to the Baltic and Kaliningrad.

In the months preceding the invasion of Belarus, Russia builds up significant combat power in Kaliningrad, essentially turning it into a well-garrisoned fort prepared for extended military operations. A Russian armored corps, an aircraft wing, a coastal defense brigade, and several highly mobile RT-2PM2 Topol-M nuclear-armed missiles are transported to Kaliningrad and placed in a high state of readiness. Russian nuclear-capable ballistic and cruise missile submarines deploy, and the U.S. loses track of at least four of them. The Baltic narrows are mined. One week prior to the invasion of Belarus, Russia activates a heretofore unknown ship and land-based anti-GPS net that effectively blocks GPS signals over large portions of Eastern Europe and strategic points in Russia. It is estimated that each node in the net provides signal jamming over an area of nearly 500 NM. Russian troops invade Belarus with the invitation of deposed President Kolya Lukashenko, who was “legitimately” elected, while simultaneously
launching a diplomatic offensive aimed specifically at Poland and Lithuania, but more broadly at European core NATO members. This diplomatic offensive leads to European NATO member decision-making paralysis as the legality of the invasion is debated after Lukashenko publicly states that he desires Russia intervention to prevent the collapse of the state. Russia promises that it will not take further military action if European NATO members reject U.S. calls for military preparations. Russia offers to place a large portion of its foreign currency reserves in Polish and German banks (primarily) as a show of good faith. This will, according to Russia, provide a permanent disincentive for Russia to go to war with its NATO neighbors. The alternative is presented as all-out war, to include the potential use of nuclear weapons, on the European continent.

Russia reinforces the borders of Belarus and appears to be massing troops in both eastern Kaliningrad and western Belarus to create a land bridge to Russia, probably through Lithuania. Russia offers Lithuania a huge indemnity in the form of oil and gas and nearly duty-free trade with Russia to allow a permanent “right of free passage” for Russian military and commercial traffic over southern Lithuanian roads to Kaliningrad. With the prospect of a major theater war to be fought on its territory, Lithuania accepts the offer. From a European perspective, the crisis has reached its apex and is now de-escalating, with European nations preparing to accept a new normality of post-NATO security situation. Finland requests a bilateral security agreement with the U.S., which is quickly signed. The U.S. sends a destroyer and a Littoral Combat Ship to Finland in advance of a larger naval deployment, which results in a tense standoff with a Russian destroyer as the LCS sails past Kaliningrad. The Russian destroyer locks its weapons on the LCS, and the U.S. destroyer fires a single warning round. Coastal defense batteries in Kaliningrad react immediately by firing an anti-ship missile that sinks the destroyer. The LCS is
allowed to rescue the crew of the destroyer and then withdraws. Russia launches ASAT missiles and destroys a sufficient number of U.S. satellites to significantly degrade U.S. network communications capabilities and GPS signals. Soon thereafter, North Korea mobilizes the majority of its military power and deploys approximately two army corps directly behind the DMZ on “exercises.” The U.S. issues an ultimatum to Russia requiring a withdrawal of forces from Belarus and the removal of nuclear weapons from Kaliningrad. The ultimatum is ignored and Russia suggests a UN-sponsored peace conference with the United States and the remainder of the Security Council in attendance.

After intense diplomatic negotiations, Croatia and Slovenia will support the U.S. with port facilities and right of passage over their territory, less any nuclear weapons or ships, in return for large, no interest foreign aid packages. Hungary will allow right of passage to U.S. military forces, less any nuclear weapons, in return for similar guarantees. Ukraine, still smarting over 10 years of Russian creeping territorial gains and the loss of Crimea, will offer right of passage and logistical support in exchange for a significant military hardware and training package. Ukraine intends to use this package to launch an offensive to push back Russia-backed “rebels” in eastern Ukraine.
APPENDIX B – Scenario 2

In 2025 the Japanese military is well into its rearmament and reorientation as a power projection force after the 2015 modification of the pacifist constitution. Advances in oil drilling technology make extraction of the oil reserves in the vicinity of the Senkaku Islands possible, and Japan begins to move resources to begin exploration and extraction of these reserves, escorted by military resources to ensure non-interference in this contentious area. Taiwan launches vigorous protests while China, distracted by serious economic issues, encourages Taiwan’s protests as a proxy for its own interests. Both Japan and Taiwan appeal to the U.S. for support, but the U.S. is unwilling to become decisively diplomatically involved in a dispute between close allies if the global commons are not threatened.

Tensions mount as the Taiwanese and Japanese navies face off, but the proximity of Taiwan allows it to conduct more aggressive and persistent air patrols of the area. Japan begins to construct an airfield from reclaimed materials, a development that promises to fundamentally alter the strategic situation. Tensions escalate as Taiwan, after receiving no assistance from the U.S., requests Chinese assistance as the Japanese runway reaches completion. Taiwan does not want to initiate a war, and believes that by bringing the threat of Chinese military power to bear on the situation, the Japanese government will be forced to either withdraw or compromise. The U.S. is diplomatically paralyzed and confused by this conflict between allies with the addition of China on the side of Taiwan.

The U.S. sends a carrier battle group to the area as a “stabilization and monitoring force” in the hopes that this presence will de-escalate the situation or prevent further escalation. Aggressive actions by both sides of the conflict are conducted close to the carrier battle group as both sides attempt to draw the U.S. into the conflict on their side. Confusion mounts as air
forces from four nations fly patrols in a small area and a U.S. aircraft makes physical contact with a Chinese aircraft. The U.S. aircraft crashes into the ocean and the Chinese aircraft attempts to make an emergency landing on the Senkaku airstrip. Japanese air defense gunners engage and destroy the aircraft. China responds immediately by bombing the Japanese airfield, leading to an extended engagement where Chinese and Taiwanese aircraft and ships fight Japanese forces. The carrier battle group seeks clarification on its status and is ordered to withdraw, but before it can effect this, the group is forced to use anti-missile defensive measures due to the proximity of the group to the fighting. Chinese vessels believe that they are being targeted by the U.S. ships and return fire, leading to a general engagement. The group’s air capability is able to deploy in defense of the group, but is badly attrited due to the ability of the Chinese to mass aircraft and launch SAMs from the mainland. American submarines sink a Chinese guided missile destroyer. The group employs its Aegis capability effectively to withdraw, but several ships are badly damaged.

China reinforces its claim to the East and South China Seas as part of its EEZ and asserts the right to deny any ship transit of the EEZ, but states that any vessel complying with the new regime will be allowed free transit. No U.S., Japanese, or South Korean flagged vessels or vessels with masters from these countries will be allowed transit. China declares an air exclusion zone covering the same area. Narrow “sea lanes of control” are created by the use of large sea mine fields. Taiwan protests and is threatened with immediate invasion by China. Japanese forces withdraw from the Senkaku Islands, but deploy a large naval task force. North Korea puts its forces on high alert and naval clashes take place between China and Vietnam and China and the Philippines, leading to the sinking of several Philippine vessels. China begins to move reinforcements to its militarized island landing strips via air. A massive cyber attack
against U.S. critical infrastructure occurs, leading to a virtual shutdown of the electrical grid on both coasts, the disruption of sewer services in the midwest, and U.S. military networks are degraded.
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