QPME: Warfighting: History of the MCDP, Roots of Maneuver Warfare, and the Doctrine in Action

 The quote above is a mandate for all Marines to be “creative, thinking leaders.” [ii]  If we, all Marines – officer and enlisted – are military professionals we must continuously assess our “philosophy for action that, in war, in crisis, and in peace, dictates our approach to duty.” [iii] Our assessment must include examples from history and the present.         

One of most difficult aspects of assessing any military doctrine – or “philosophy” as General Gray would call it in the video clip Warfighting as a Philosophy, is assessing the application and evaluation of doctrine while “preparing for war” [v] and “conducting war.” [vi]  “Maneuver Warfare,” with its strong emphasis on gaining a position of advantage in multiple dimensions – psychological, technological, temporal and spatial [vii] – poses some unique challenges in both application and evaluation. 

One challenge to assessing the Marine Corps’ doctrine of “Maneuver Warfare,” is that “…maneuver warfare does not exist in its theoretically pure form.” [viii]  According to MCDP 1, Warfighting, warfare exists on a spectrum; with “attrition warfare” at one end of the spectrum and “maneuver warfare” at the other end.  Attrition warfare seeks victory systematically by “…the cumulative destruction of every component in the enemy arsenal…” and maneuver warfare seeks victory by attacking the enemy ‘“system”—to incapacitate the enemy systemically.” [ix]

To help evaluate “attrition warfare” and “maneuver warfare,” Marine Corps doctrinal publications provide us with several historic examples:   
  

Attrition Warfare or Maneuver Warfare?

Due to the wealth of details associated with these historic examples it can seem easier to place these campaigns on the spectrum of attrition warfare and maneuver warfare.  Where more recent military campaigns belong on the spectrum can be less clear.  MCDP 1, Warfighting defines “maneuver warfare”:

Using the definition above – and Gen Gray’s mandate to “to refine, expand, and improve our profession” – assess the more “recent campaigns” and concepts listed below in order to ensure our Corps does not become “…outdated, stagnant, and defeated.” [xix]